Hong Kong\u27s Endgame and the Rule of Law (II): The Battle of  the People  and the Business Community in the Transition to Chinese Rule by deLisle, Jacques & Lane, Kevin P.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1997 
Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (II): The Battle of "the 
People" and the Business Community in the Transition to Chinese 
Rule 
Jacques deLisle 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Kevin P. Lane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Chinese Studies Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law 
Commons, Comparative Politics Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, International Law 
Commons, International Relations Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law 
and Society Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, Public Law and 
Legal Theory Commons, and the Social Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
deLisle, Jacques and Lane, Kevin P., "Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (II): The Battle of "the 
People" and the Business Community in the Transition to Chinese Rule" (1997). Faculty Scholarship at 
Penn Law. 985. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/985 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME AND THE RULE OF
LAW (II): THE BATTLE OVER "THE PEOPLE" AND
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN THE TRANSITION
TO CHINESE RULE
JACQUES DELISLE* & KEVIN P. LANE**
1. INTRODUCTION
Transitional Hong Kong's endgame formally came to a close
with the territory's reversion to Chinese rule on July 1, 1997.
However, a legal and institutional order and a "rule of law" for
Chinese-ruled Hong Kong remain works in progress. They will
surely bear the mark of the conflicts that dominated the final
years preceding Hong Kong's legal transition from British colony
to Chinese Special Administrative Region ("S.A.R."). Those
endgame conflicts reflected a struggle among adherents to rival
conceptions of a rule of law and a set of laws and institutions that
would be adequate and acceptable for Hong Kong. They unfolded
in large part through battles over the attitudes and allegiance of
"the Hong Kong people" and Hong Kong's business community.
Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (): The Struggle
over Institutions and Values in the Transition to Chinese Rule
("Endgame 1') focused on the first aspect of this story. It
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examined the political struggle among members of two coherent,
but not monolithic, camps, each bound together by a distinct
vision of law and sovereignty in the domestic realm. The People's
Republic of China ("P.R.C." or "China") and its allies and
surrogates in Hong Kong approached issues of the rule of law and
legal institutions from a primarily positivist perspective, invoking
procedural standards of legitimacy and insisting upon substantive
sovereign discretion. A looser alliance of Hong Kong's "liberal"
or "pro-democracy" politicians and the colonial and British
governments proceeded from a perspective grounded in more
"natural law"-like principles. They asserted that legitimate legal
rules and institutions had to meet substantive standards of what
justice demands of a good sovereign.
Endgame Iexamined how the political clash between these two
camps was highly polarized and how the camps were, to varying
degrees, unstable and fragmented internally during the 1990s.
These seemingly paradoxical traits, Endgame I argued, stemmed
from the endgame's inevitable focus on quite specific aspects of a
legal and institutional order for the S.A.R. On one hand, the
endgame's focus on these final and highly concrete issues of Hong
Kong's transition made it impossible for the participants to avoid
addressing fundamental conflicts between their perspectives by
postponing hard questions until later rounds of bargaining and
conflict. This focus on matters of legal and institutional detail
also made it harder for the participants to shroud the fault lines
between their visions in the ambiguities of the broad "framework"
laws and agreements on Hong Kong's future order that had been
the main concern of earlier phases of negotiations. On the other
hand, the endgame's emphasis on specific legal and institutional
arrangements exposed how each broad vision of law was sufficient-
ly indeterminate to permit its adherents to adopt disparate and
shifting positions on the specific controversies of the era while
credibly claiming to be faithful to the vision's core principles.
Two contingent political events that marked the beginning of
the endgame, the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989 ("Tianan-
men Incident") and the installation of Christopher Patten as Hong
Kong's last colonial governor in 1992, also contributed to the
pattern of sharply clashing yet substantially indeterminate visions.
On one hand, these developments deepened the political rift
between Hong Kong liberals, democrats, and colonial officials on
one side and the P.R.C. and its allies on the other. The crack-
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down on the Beijing protests and Hong Kong's reaction to it
seemed to lay bare fundamental gaps between the perspectives on
law and governance dominant in the P.R.C. and in the territory.
Patten's agenda of legal and institutional reform, his methods for
pursuing it, and China's reaction to Patten's goals and means all
seemed to point to a widening of the gaps that the Tiananmen
Incident had exposed. On the other hand, the pair of political
developments that signaled the endgame's beginning also heralded
the emergence of a complex and volatile political environment in
Hong Kong. This environment was conducive to divergent and
changing assessments within each camp about what strategies were
politically possible or prudent in the quest to settle the legal and
institutional questions of transitional Hong Kong's endgame on
favorable or acceptable terms.
This Article takes up the second aspect of the story of Hong
Kong's endgame. It focuses on the battles that the key political
participants, who comprised the two blocks identified in Endgame
I, fought over "the people" of Hong Kong and Hong Kong's
business community. In Hong Kong in the 1990s, these two
social constituencies appeared to be potentially vital allies or
formidable opponents for the principal political actors who were
striving to establish their preferred legal or institutional arrange-
ments in the final run-up to reversion, in what Endgame I called
a "colloquial" endgame scenario. These constituencies also seemed
to be promising sources of effective post-reversion pressure on the
S.A.R. regime to implement, go beyond, or retreat from the legal
and institutional arrangements formally, but perhaps meaning-
lessly, adopted during the last years of colonial rule, in what
Endgame I identified as a "technical" endgame scenario.
As Endgame I also indicated, the factors that fostered polariza-
tion and intramural schisms and shifts among the principal
participants in the political conflicts of Hong Kong's endgame also
reinforced the key political actors' determination to obtain
support, or at least acquiescence, from the people of Hong Kong
and the business community. The focus on concrete legal and
institutional questions to which fundamental visions of law
mandated no single answer allowed adherents to a particular
vision to consider how various arrangements that were arguably
acceptable in principle might be received in practice in Hong
Kong. They could do so without betraying core principles of the
vision of law and sovereignty that they embraced, or sacrificing
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the benefits that they thought would accompany a legal and
institutional order compatible with those principles. In addition,
the vastly more powerful popular politics and the increased
politicization of the powerful business community in 1990s Hong
Kong made either group's views on legal and institutional issues
obviously and immediately relevant to the political struggles of
the day. Because the main participants in the political conflict
over Hong Kong's future legal and institutional order sought a
rule of law that was viable in practice as well as acceptable in
principle, they could ill-afford to ignore the attitudes and values
of the people or the business community.
Section 2 of this Article discusses the struggle over "the Hong
Kong people." Section 2 begins by examining the long-standing
impediments to the emergence of an influential popular constitu-
ency in Hong Kong politics, the gradual and accelerating pressures
for its development and accommodation since the 1960s, and the
indications of a growing recognition of "the people" as an
important target for prediction and persuasion in the endgame
struggle to shape S.A.R. laws and institutions. The discussion also
notes the potentially salient fault lines running through the
people, whom the key political participants in the struggles of the
endgame nonetheless addressed as a near-monolith.
The principal subsections of Section 2 assess, in turn, the
"British and Hong Kong liberal-democratic" and "China and 'pro-
China' Hong Kong" approaches to the struggle over the people.
These subsections examine how members of each of the some-
times internally divided groups sought to claim or cultivate
popular backing or acceptance in clashes over general questions of
"rule-of-law" values and four key legal-institutional issues of the
endgame: the Bill of Rights, including broadly related amend-
ments to laws restricting civil and political liberties; the Legisla-
ture, including both the democracy-expanding electoral reform
laws introduced by Governor Patten to govern the last colonial
elections and the P.R.C.'s decision to install a post-reversion
"Provisional Legislature" named by a P.R.C.-selected committee;
the Court of Final Appeal ("C.F.A." or "Court"), including issues
of its membership, jurisdiction, and establishment date under Sino-
British accords reached in 1991 and 1995; and the Chief Executive
selection process, including issues raised by the initial occupant
Tung Chee-hwa's pre-reversion use of his position as Chief
Executive-designate.
[Vol. 18:3
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Section 2's analysis reveals several common features in the
arguments that the key political players addressed to the people.
On one dimension, the arguments ranged from claims about the
people's existing beliefs, to attempts to persuade, frighten, or
coerce the people to adopt preferences that they concededly did
not initially hold, to arguments that blended claims that a
proposed arrangement was or could be popular with reminders of
the political players' ultimate, popularity-indifferent insistence that
a legal and institutional solution must satisfy the minimal demands
of a favored vision of law, whether Chinese-style positivist or
liberal-democratic and broadly naturalist. Along another dimen-
sion, arguments ranged from ones that invoked a wide variety of
rule-of-law and related normative and political principles, at times
claimed to be subjectively important to the people of Hong Kong,
to other arguments that focused immediately on ordinary Hong
Kongers' pragmatic concerns with stability, prosperity, and
predictability. In practice, the result was a rich tapestry of
arguments that blurred the lines among analytically distinct claims
about actual and potential popular beliefs, popular preferences and
interests, and the relative importance of consensus and principle.
Section 3 discusses the battle over Hong Kong's business
community and has the same structure as Section 2. Section 3
begins with an account of the business community's long-
established political importance in Hong Kong, the extensive
measures taken by colonial and P.R.C. authorities to accommo-
date the business community's interests and preferences in the
decades preceding the endgame, and the emergence of the business
community as an important object of conflict, and a fairly
reluctant participant, in the contentious and highly public political
struggles of the endgame. The opening subsection also notes the
business community's considerable diversity of political views and
politically relevant economic interests - a diversity that the key
political participants all but ignored their skirmishes for the
allegiance and acquiescence of the elite business sector during the
1990s.
Section 3's main subsections, similar to Section 2's, address,
respectively, the British and Hong Kong liberal-democratic block's
and the China and pro-China Hong Kong block's approaches to
the political battle over the territory's business community during
transitional Hong Kong's endgame. As in Section 2, the analysis
within each of the two subsections focuses on how members of
19971
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each of these sometimes fissiparous camps tried to assert or to
develop approval or acquiescence from the business community
for preferred positions on broad rule-of-law questions and the four
specific legal and institutional controversies of the period. Key
political participants made arguments to and about business elites
that were similar to their arguments concerning the people. Here
too, arguments rooted in rule-of-law and related principles mixed
with appeals and threats to more material interests. More than
the arguments addressed to the people, they placed special
emphasis on arguments that had discernible connections to
economic concerns that presumably were at the core of business
elites' interests and preferences. Claims about "business'" pre-
existing preferences mingled extensively with attempts to con-
vince, or to warn, business elites about what they should or must
demand or accept. There was, however, seemingly less of an
effort to create genuine changes in this target group's apparently
less pliable preferences than was the case with arguments addressed
to the people.
Finally, a concluding section considers what the battles over
the people and the business community in the run-up to Hong
Kong's reversion and legal and political developments during the
S.A.R.'s first months add to the analysis offered in Endgame L
Section 4 first briefly summarizes the pre-reversion patterns
analyzed in Endgame I and in the principal sections of this Article,
and concludes that the evidence remains consistent with a
conclusion that key political participants perceived that they were
involved in any of the three types of endgames identified in
Endgame L Section 4 then notes the continuity in the identities
of Hong Kong's main political participants and the changes in
their roles since reversion, and sketches key post-reversion events
that have continued the story of the major endgame controversies.
These events include: early steps to enact new civil liberties-
related legislation; litigation concerning the Provisional
Legislature's constitutionality, debates about the propriety of the
interim body's early post-reversion actions, and the crafting of
electoral laws to govern the selection of the first full-fledged
S.A.R. legislature; the installation of members of the C.F.A. and
a lower court's decision in a case challenging the Provisional
Legislature; and Tung Chee-hwa's on-going shaping of the Office
of Chief Executive and the S.A.R. administration. Section 4
concludes that Hong Kong seems to have been facing an endgame
[Vol. 18:3
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that most closely approximates Endgame Ts "end of the game /
on-going games" scenario, although it remains possible that the
more starkly discontinuous "technical" endgame or the more
smoothly continuous "colloquial" endgame may ultimately
provide a more persuasive account of the struggles to shape a legal
and institutional order in transitional Hong Kong.
2. RULE-OF-LAw VALUEs (I) - THE STRUGGLE OVER THE
"HONG KONG PEOPLE"
2.1. The Hong Kong People and Stability
During the final decade of colonial rule, the participants in the
political battle to define the laws and institutions of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region struggled to claim the
allegiance of an ill-defined but assumedly vital group: the Hong
Kong people. The territory's citizens became the object of sharp
conflict and prodigious efforts to pressure, persuade, and predict.
Their views on the rule of law and the specific controversies of
the era became a critical element in the territory's prospects for
stability - the first half of the universally embraced "stability and
prosperity" formula for Hong Kong's future and a prerequisite to
achieving the second half.
2.1.1. The Hong Kong People and the Politics and
Government of a Borrowed Place
It is no small irony that the Hong Kong people became a
focus of such an intense struggle on the eve of the final implemen-
tation of a deal struck between the territory's past and future
rulers. The conventional wisdom long had been that the
territory's inhabitants were more concerned with commerce than
politics. They were thought to be disinclined or ill-equipped to
create pressures for holding the territory's government account-
able to its people or for allowing popular participation in the
territory's governance.' Social and demographic factors encour-
aged a generally apolitical orientation. For most of Hong Kong's
existence, most of the territory's residents have been recent
I See generally LAU SmU-Km & KUAN HsIN-cIu, THE ETHOS OF THE
HONG KONG CHINESE 69-117 (1988).
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arrivals.2 Primarily through immigration from neighboring parts
of China, the colony's population grew from a few thousand
inhabitants of Hong Kong Island in 1842 to 1.6 million in the
expanded colony less than a century later, to more than six
million by 1995.3
During the 1980s, when China and Britain were negotiating
Hong Kong's return and the issues of the endgame began to loom
on the political horizon, nearly half of the territory's population
had been born elsewhere. Generally, these recent immigrants
regarded themselves as sojourners or transients, and many planned
to return home eventually (if only to be buried) or to use Hong
Kong as a platform for moving overseas. Moreover, members of
Hong Kong's predominantly Chinese population retained strong
cultural and personal ties to their former homes despite the fact
that many fled political and economic hardship in the mainland.4
This peculiar mixture of rootlessness in the territory and
rootedness elsewhere inhibited the development of a strong local
Hong Kong identity among the bulk of the population.
Geography and politics had a similar impact. On the one
hand, a physically and culturally remote imperial power ruled
colonial Hong Kong. Such literal and metaphorical distance
prevented the vast majority of the territory's residents from
regarding themselves as British subjects. The United Kingdom's
("U.K.") nationality legislation, including amendments to the
Nationality Act passed partly in response to fears of an influx
from Hong Kong, made clear that the U.K. would not accept
many Hong Kong residents as full British citizens.5 More
subjects than citizens at home as well, Hong Kong inhabitants had
very few opportunities under British colonial rule to participate
in the territory's governance. The colonial government excluded
Hong Kongers from joining the senior ranks of the civil service,
2 See, e.g., Hugh D.R. Baker, Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong
Man, 95 CHINA Q. 469, 470 (1983) (stating that immigrants vastly outnumber
native Hong Kongers).
3 See HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, HONG KONG 1997, at 396,
407-09 (1997).
4 See LAu SIu-KAI, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN HONG KONG 157-76 (1984);
Ronald Skelton, Hong Kong in an International Migration System, in RELUC-
TANT EXILES? 21-51 (Ronald Skelton ed., 1994).
s See generally Hugh D.R. Baker, Branches All Over. The Hong Kong Chinese
in the United Kingdom, in RELUCTANT ExILES?, supra note 4, at 291, 298-305;
Skelton, supra note 4.
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until the adoption of "localisation" policies during the waning
years of colonial rule, and from voting for representatives in the
colony's weak legislature, until the implementation of electoral
and constitutional reforms in the final decade of British control.
Under British rule, Chinese Hong Kongers also held relatively few
posts in the upper echelons of a judiciary that conducted its affairs
in English and that was subject to reversal by the Privy Council
in London. While similar restrictions might have triggered a
powerful anti-colonialist or revolutionary nationalist reaction, in
Hong Kong this legal and political order went relatively unchal-
lenged and proved inimical to the emergence of a politically relev-
ant identity among Hong Kong citizens.6
On the other hand, the political implications of the strong ties
between Hong Kong residents and the Chinese mainland also
weakened prospects for a distinct Hong Kong identity. More than
just cultural, those links included Hong Kong's economic
dependence on the mainland, the P.R.C.'s military ability to
retake the territory by force, and China's long-standing ideological
and legal insistence that Hong Kong always has been a part of
China's sovereign territory.7  Together, these circumstances
precluded any realistic possibility of independence or self-determi-
nation for Hong Kong residents.
Despite these ties, the administrative separation of Hong Kong
from the rest of China during the colonial period assured that
Hong Kong residents were not fully Chinese, especially in the
political dimensions of their lives. Frequently frosty Anglo-
Chinese relations and the colonial authorities' determination to
6 See LO SHuI-HING, THE PoLiTcs OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG
KONG 33-60 (1997); NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
HONG KONG 53-181 (5th ed. 1991) (describing the evolution of Hong Kong's
governmental institutions under colonial nile); STEVE YUI-SANG TSANG,
DEMOCRACY SHELVED: GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA AND ATTEMPTS AT
CONSITUTIONAL REFORM IN HONG KONG, 1945-1952 (1988); Albert H.Y.
Chen, Law in a Foreign Language: The Case of Hong Kong, in HONG KONG:
THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION 212-38 (Kathleen Cheek-Milby &
Miron Mushkat eds., 1989); Jane C.Y. Lee, The Civil Service, in FROM COLONY
TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 39-50 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng &
Sonny S.H. Lo eds., 1995).
7 See generally James T.H. Tang, Hong Kong in Transition: Globalization
Versus Nationalization, in THE CHALLENGES OF HONG KONG'S REINTEGRA-
TION WrrH CHINA 177, 189-94 (MNing K. Chan ed., 1997); see also Anthony
Dicks, Treaty, Suffrage, Grant or Usage? Some Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong
Kong, 95 CHiNA Q. 427-55 (1983).
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keep the mainland's unruly politics out of Hong Kong further
limited the development of mainland Chinese influences in Hong
Kong. As a result, colonial Hong Kong residents remained
strikingly insulated from developments that shaped political
identities across the border.' In sum, while Hong Kong provided
its residents an attractive wealth of opportunities under more than
a century of colonial rule, it did not transform them into "Hong
Kongers." After more than a century of colonial rule, they were
neither British nor fully Chinese. Yet, they also had not become
members of a distinct group of Hong Kong people with an
identity that could firmly ground popular participation, or a sense
of entitlement to participate, in the public life of the territory.9
' See generally LAU, supra note 4, at 1-13; James T.H. Tang, World War to
Cold War: Hong Kong's Future and Anglo-Chinese interactions, 1941-55, in PRE-
CARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992,
at 107-30 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994) (describing Anglo-Chinese interactions in
Hong Kong from 1941 to 1955). In the last half-century, the unrest in Hong
Kong during the most radical phase of China's Cultural Revolution is a striking
exception, one that largely proves the rule. By mainland standards, however,
the riots in Hong Kong were fairly minor affairs. The British authorities
reacted swiftly to quell them and then undertook political reforms to address
local Hong Kong concerns that appeared to create the social discontent that
fueled the unrest. See, e.g., JOHN F. COPPER, COLONY IN CONFLICT: THE
HONG KONG DISTURBANCES, MAY 1967-JANUARY 1968 (1970); KEVIN P.
LANE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATUS Quo: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF
CHINA'S HONG KONG POLICY 75-78 (1990); MINERS, supra note 6, at 32-34;
John D. Young, China's Role in Two Hong Kong Disturbances: A Scenario for
the Future?, 19 J. ORIENTAL ST. 158 (1981). Colonial Hong Kong's isolation
from broader Chinese politics together with geographic proximity made Hong
Kong the principal destination for those who fled political upheavals and
repression in the mainland.
' The perpetual awkwardness in finding a term to refer to the people who
live in Hong Kong reflects this situation. "Hong Kong residents" is often the
preferred English term, but it connotes habitation rather than a distinct identity
and membership in a political community. "S.A.R. resident" is a hopelessly
one-dimensional and dryly administrative label. The locution "Hong Kong
Chinese is inadequate as well, because it is used primarily to distinguish the
territory's ethnically Chinese inhabitants from South Asians and Westerners
who live in Hong Kong.
A commonly used P.R.C. term, gangren, is perhaps a better label, but it
too is ambiguous. In some contexts, it is the equivalent of the English "Hong
Kong residents." In much official usage, it is definitively subordinate to Hong
Kongers' post-reversion status as Chinese citizens. That is, the core P.R.C.
policy of gangrenzhigan, Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong, is a matter of
delegating some subsidiary aspects of China's sovereign authority over the
territory to inhabitants of Hong Kong who have, in China's view, always been
Chinese nationals despite their residence in an area controlled by a colonial
power. To complicate matters further, the constitutional and statutory arrange-
[Vol. 18:3
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Beginning in the 1960s and accelerating in the 1980s and early
1990s, long-developing demographic and economic forces and
precipitous political shocks began to change this pattern. The
proportion of Hong Kong residents born and raised in the
territory rose considerably during the final decades of colonial
rule. This created a critical mass of people, including a majority
of the territory's residents and an even larger share of the younger
generation, who viewed themselves as Hong Kong "belongers,"
rooted in Hong Kong and sharing a uniquely Hong Kong culture
and experience." A 1988 survey captured this shift, finding that
almost two-thirds of Hong Kong residents considered themselves
"Hongkongese" rather than "Chinese." More than four-fifths
claimed to feel "a lot" or "quite a lot" that they belonged to Hong
Kong, with striking consistency across socioeconomic groups.11
Over roughly the same period, Hong Kong underwent a
sweeping economic transformation. Hong Kong's gross domestic
product grew at an average annual rate of seven percent between
1975 and 1995.12 By 1994, Hong Kong's per capita gross domes-
tic product was approximately eighty-four percent of that of the
United States.13 Particularly in the 1970s and after, Hong Kong
came to occupy an important place in the global and regional
economy, becoming a major trading and financial center, one of
ments implementing the gangrenzbigang policy contemplate that a significant
minority of the seats in the legislature, judiciary, and the senior ranks of the
executive branch are to be occupied by people who hold foreign passports.
The terms that best suggest a distinct Hong Kong identity, tellingly,
became fairly common usages only recently. They too may prove unsatisfacto-
ry. The English term, "Hong Konger," has the dysphonic clunk of a neolo-
gism. The Chinese xianggangren coexists uneasily with the more politically
charged and much more prevalent gangren, and has the shortcoming of
sounding in its Cantonese pronunciation very much like the English "Hong
Kongian."
10 See LAU & KUAN, supra note 1, at 178-87 (analyzing "Hong Kong" vs.
"Chinese" identities in Hong Kong); see also Tu Wei-ming, Cultura China: The
Periphery as Center, in THE LIVING TREE: THE CHANGING MEANING OF
BEING CHINESE TODAY 1, 10-11, 15 (Tu Wei-ming ed., 1994) (describing the
emergence of a Hong Kong Chinese cultural and political identity distinct from
a mainland Chinese identity).
" See Lau Siu-kai, Democratization and Decline of Trust in Public Institutions
in Hong Kong, 3 DEMOCRATIZATION 158, 166 (1996); Kuan Hsin-chi & Lau
Siu-kai, Mass Media and Politics in Hong Kong 8-9 (Sept. 1988) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
12 See HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 48.
13 See 2 EuROPA WORLD Y.B. 1996, at 3365, 3399 (1996).
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the world's busiest ports, the gateway to China, and a shining
example of the East Asian economic miracle. A growing sense of
proprietary pride among the territory's residents in the consider-
able accomplishments of Hong Kong accompanied this rise to
wealth and prominence. For many of its people, Hong Kong had
begun to look and feel like a unique and attractive place with a
distinctive and successful community.
The soaring levels of affluence and education that accompanied
economic growth correlated with increased pressure for a
democratic and accountable government. Facing such pressure
and fearing that the riots that shook the territory in the 1960s
indicated that the government was dangerously out of touch with
popular concerns, the colonial authorities responded. They began
to provide mechanisms for "consultation" with their subjects and
for a modicum of democratization. The establishment of a new
Urban Council, District Boards, and Regional Council between
1973 and 1986 put in place partially elected statutory consultative
bodies.14 A series of government Green Papers and White Papers
during the 1980s pledged gradual progress toward democratic
reforms in the process for selecting members of the Legislative
Council ("Legco")."5
During the final decade of colonial rule in Hong Kong,
dramatic events accelerated the development of "mass" politics and
pressures for public participation in government. The huge public
demonstrations in Hong Kong in 1989, held in support of the
student-led democracy movement in Beijing, and in outrage at its
brutal suppression, showed clearly that "ordinary" Hong Kong
14 See supra note 6; MINERS, supra note 6, at 155-57, 169-74.
15 See GOVERNMENT OF H.K., WHITE PAPER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT - THE WAY FORWARD (Feb. 1988)
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER (Feb. 1988)]; GOVERNMENT OF H.K., GREEN
PAPER: THE 1987 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT (May 1987) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER (May 1987)]; GOVERNMENT OF
H.K., WHITE PAPER: THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER (Nov.
1984)]; GOVERNMENT OF H.K., GREEN PAPER: THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG ([uly 1984) [hereinafter
GREEN PAPER (uly 1984)]; Lo SHI-HING, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZA-
TION IN HONG KONG 67-100 (1997); Norman J. Miners, Moves Toward
Representative Government 1984-1988, in HONG KONG: THE CHALLENGE OF
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 19-35; Lo Shui-hing, Decolonization and
Political Development in Hong Kong, 18 ASIAN SURV. 18 (1988).
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citizens could mobilize in support of political objectives.16
Subsequent demonstrations, including the annual memorial
gatherings on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident and
rallies to protest P.R.C. and colonial government actions and
policies, confirmed that the potential for politically motivated and
politically potent action by Hong Kong citizens had to be taken
seriously. To a considerable degree, Governor Patten's electoral
reforms reflected a recognition of the potential power of popular
political attitudes and mass political behavior during the waning
days of colonial rule.
In addition to loosely structured popular activism and partly
in response to the colonial government's constitutional reforms,
Hong Kong, in the 1990s' produced a number of true electoral
politicians who competed for newly elective positions in Legco
and local government bodies. These politicians also comprised the
leadership of newly established political parties." While still a
far cry from the big city pols that Governor Chris Patten encoun-
tered as a young man working on a campaign in the United
States, or the colleagues he worked with as a Member of Parlia-
ment and as a Conservative Party leader in Britain,18 these
16 Senior Executive Councillor Lydia Dunn commented in the wake of the
post-Tiananmen demonstrations that "Hongkong [sic] people have been so
enthusiastic to speak up in a responsible way that we can no onger say people
here are not interested in politics or are politically immature." Emily Lau,
Voice of the People, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 8, 1989, at 18. The head of the
Chinese delegation to the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, Ke Zaishuo,
conceded that the Tiananmen Incident shook popular confidence in Hong
Kong, but he argued that this reaction occurred only because the people in
Hong Kong were ignorant of what had really happened in Beijing. See Hong
Kong: Ironing Out the Wrinkles in the Face of 1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 1, 1989.
17 See, e.g., Jane C.Y. Lee, The 1997 Transition and Hong Kong's Evolving
Political Leadership, in ONE COUNTRY, MANY SYSTEMS 63-94 (Donald H.
McMillen & Michael E. DeGloyer eds., 1993); Alvin S.Y. So, The Tiananmen
Incident, Patten's Electoral Reforms, and the Roots of Contested Democracy, in
THE CHALLENGES OF HONG KONG'S REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA, supra
note 7, at 49-84; cf LAU SIU-KAi, DECOLONIZATION WITHOUT INDEPENDENCE
AND THE POVERTY OF POLITICAL LEADERS IN HONG KONG (1990)
(describing pre-1990 absence of effective political leaders and strong mass party
organizations).
" On Patten's earlier career and its implications for his approach to the
governorship of Hong Kong, see, for example, JONATHAN DIMBLEBY, THE
LAST GOVERNOR: CHRIS PATTEN AND THE HANDOVER OF HONG KONG 4-
15 (1997); James Bartholomew and Stacy Mosher, Last Viceroy, FAR E. ECON.
REV., May 7, 1992, at 15; Denis MacShane, Governing Principles, FAR E. ECON.
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budding Hong Kong politicians nevertheless reflected and
encouraged the territory's emergent popular politics. In a fashion
familiar in democratic polities, these politicians articulated and
pressed the colonial authorities to act on their constituents'
preferences, and sometimes sought to shape those preferences.
They used election campaigns, party organizations, floor debates
in Legco, other operations of government, and the mass media to
keep up a constant drumbeat of public discourse on issues of
politics and policy.
The territory's "liberals" and "democrats" and Hong Kong's
colonial government, itself a target of liberal and democratic
criticism, did not monopolize Hong Kong's new popular politics.
During the final decade of British rule, pro-China parties were
established in the territory to battle pro-democracy and business-
conservative parties in the elections mandated by late colonial
reforms.19 Politicians and officials of every ideological stripe
claimed to speak for the people of Hong Kong and sought to win
their support. In doing so, they drew on, and encouraged, a
boom in public opinion research by Hong Kong media and
academic institutions during the 1980s and 1990s, most of which
focused on popular attitudes toward aspects of the 1997 ques-
tion.20
In the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing appointed, directly or indirect-
ly, dozens of Hong Kongers to represent the interests and
preferences of Hong Kong in a succession of bodies charged with
shaping the S.A.R.'s laws and institutions. These bodies included
the Basic Law Drafting Committee, the Basic Law Consultative
Committee, the Preliminary Working Committee ("P.W.C."), the
Preparatory Committee ("P.C."), the Selection Committee for the
Chief Executive (which also voted on the Provisional Legislature's
membership), and the Provisional Legislature itself.21 While the
REV., May 7, 1992, at 31.
19 See supra note 14-15 and accompanying text (describing late colonial
reforms in Hong Kong).
20 See, e.g., KUAN HsN-CHI & LAU SIU-KAI, POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN A
CHANGING CONTEXT: THE CASE OF HONG KONG (1997); LAU & KUAN,
supra note 1; Robert T.Y. Chung, Public Opinion in the Late Transition Period,
in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note
6, at 491-526.
21 See, e.g., Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Cooking the Rice Without
Cooking the Goose: The Rule of Law, the Battle over Business and the Quest for
Prosperity in Hong Kong after 1997, in HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE:
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Hong Kong members of these bodies were mostly business elites
and reliably "pro-China" types, the appointments were not limited
to these circles and, in theory, represented all of the people of
Hong Kong.
In addition to such new features on the territory's political
landscape, established institutions also played a role in Hong
Kong's newly dynamic and contnetious public life. Officials of
the colonial government continued to hold forth as interpreters of
the people's wishes and guardians of their interests. A pro-China,
left-wing press, dedicated to conveying the P.R.C.'s views to the
masses, and a pro-China trade union had long been fixtures on the
THE EcoNoMIc AND POLTcAL IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSION 31, 39-40
(Warren I. Cohen & Li Zhao eds., 1997) (describing heavy representation of
business among Beijing's informal advisers and on formal transition-related
bodies); China Names HK Transition Committee, U.P.I., Dec. 28, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing the membership of the
Preparatory Committee ("P.C.") as dominated by pro-China people and
business leaders); Louise do Rosario, Follow the Leader, FAR E. ECON. REv.,
Feb. 23, 1995, at 18 (noting that the 37 Hong Kong members of the Prelimi-
nary Working Committee included business magnate Li Ka-shing, the head of
the territory's largest pro-China labor union, a long-serving, and knighted,
member of the territory's Executive Council, and some prominent solicitors);
Bruce Gilley, Down to Brass Tacks, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 25, 1996, at 14-15
tnoting that nearly half of the 94 Hong Kong seats on the 150-member
Preparatory Committee went to business people); Incumbents and Legco Losers
Win Selection Fight, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1 (describing
the party affiliation and leanings of Provisional Legislature members); John
Ridding, China's HK Move Criticized by Patten, US, FIN. TIMES(London), Dec.
23, 1996, at 4; Stephen Vines, The Movers and Shakers, ASIA TIMES, June 27,
1997, at 13 (describing the backgrounds of members of China's informal groups
of Hong Kong advisers and of key formal transitional bodies); see also The Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China, Apr. 4, 1990 (P.R.C.), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520 [hereinafter Basic
Law] annex I (mandating that members of the committee electing future Chief
Executives be drawn in equal shares from (1) the industrial, commercial, and
financial sectors, (2) the professions, (3) labor, social services, religious, and
other sectors, and (4) political representatives from Hong Kong); Decision of the
National People's Congress on the Methodfor the Formation of the First Govern-
ment and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region S 3 (1990), reprinted in id. [hereinafter N.P.C. Decision] (containing a
similar provision concerning the composition of the selection committee that
nominated the first Chief Executive and elected in the Provisional Legislature);
Ming K. Chan, Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong
Basic Law, in THE HONG KONG BASIc LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 7-8, 22-24 (Ming K. Chan &
David J. Clark eds., 1990) (describing the mixed but heavily pro-business com-
position of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and, to a lesser degree, the Basic
Law Consultative Committee).
1997]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Hong Kong political scene, and continued to be significant
political forces during the run-up to reversion. Hong Kong's
deputies to the National People's Congress ("N.P.C."), China's
national legislature, and the Chinese People's Political Consulta-
tive Conference, China's principal United Front organ, provided
at least a formal opportunity for popular representation of Hong
Kongers alongside their compatriots and future fellow Chinese
citizens in key P.R.C. bodies.22
The rise of more extensive political and institutional mecha-
nisms for hearing, amplifying, and directing the voice of the Hong
Kong people reflected a perception across the spectrum of political
elites that the territory's ordinary citizens were no longer reliably
apolitical. They had opinions about politics, which in transitional
Hong Kong were primarily opinions about prospective laws and
institutions for the S.A.R. Political elites recognized that these
opinions, if not addressed and accommodated, might drive Hong
Kong people to act in ways that could prove disastrous for Hong
Kong's stability and, therefore, its prosperity.
All sides in the political debates over Hong Kong's future
appeared to understand that disloyalty and exit were viable
options available to much of the populace. Leading participants
in the politics of the transition apprehended that popular
discontent with an unpalatable S.A.R. order could lead to a
sapping of Hong Kong's economic dynamism, eruptions of
disorder, and, in turn, repressive crackdowns. While the broad
masses had this disloyalty option, a more elite stratum of Hong
Kongers had a genuine exit option because they held or could
" See, e.g., XIAINFA [Constitution] arts. 57-78 (P.R.C.) (defining the
composition and powers of the National People's Congress; id. pmbl. (referring
to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference ("C.P.P.C.C.")); Basic
Law, supra note 21, art. 159 (conferring on Hong Kong N.P.C. representatives
the power, with the concurrence of the S.A.R. legislature and Chief Executive,
of proposing amendments to the Basic Law); id. annex I (declaring Hong Kong
N.P.C. and C.P.P.C.C. members to be among the small pool from which one-
fourth of the members of the election committee for future Chief Executives
are to be selected); N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21, S 3 (containing a similar
provision concerning the eligibility for membership in the selection committee
that nominated the first Chief Executive and named the Provisional Legisla-
ture); see also Karin Chai, The Politicization of Unions in Hong Kong, in ONE
COUNTRY MANY SYSTEMS supra note 17, at 121 (discussing the role of pro-
China unions); Emily Lau, The Press Gang, FARE. ECON. REV., Sept. 27, 1990,
at 26 (describing the considerable circulation of strongly pro-China and left-
wing newspapers in Hong Kong).
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONG'S END GAME (11)
acquire foreign citizenship or residence rights." Key political
players appreciated that legal and institutional arrangements
unsatisfactory to this vital group might trigger an exodus that
would devastate the territory's human capital, social stability, and
allure for international business. 4 On the other hand, the
principal participants in the political conflicts of the endgame also
seemed to discern the increased benefits of mobilizing popular
opinion in transitional Hong Kong. Properly channeled or
carefully cultivated public opinion and pressure appeared to offer
a formidable weapon in the endgame battles to shape laws and
institutions for the S.A.R.
Recognizing the dangers and opportunities presented by a
populace that identified with Hong Kong and that cared about
and could affect the territory's legal and political future, Hong
Kong's colonial rulers, the P.R.C., and the territory's "pro-
democracy" and "pro-China" political leadership undertook
considerable efforts to assert and to cultivate popular backing for
their preferred packages of laws and institutions for the S.A.R. In
the final years before reversion, the British and Hong Kong liberal
side argued that the people of Hong Kong did, should, or must
endorse a set of rule-of-law values and specific legal and institu-
tional arrangements that satisfied at least the minimum require-
ments for a just order, defined in broadly liberal-democratic terms.
China and its Hong Kong allies responded in kind. They asserted
that the Hong Kong people did, should, or must embrace a set of
rule-of-law values and concrete resolutions of the controversies of
the endgame that were compatible with China's positivist
conception of an acceptable legal and institutional order for the
1 See Emily Lau, Elites Take All, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Apr. 19, 1990, at 18-
19.
14 By most estimates, at least several hundred thousand, probably in excess
of 10%, of Hong Kong's population of six million hold foreign passports. See
Bruce Gilley, Red Flag over Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 7, 1995, at
72, 76 (stating that 12% of Hong Kong residents possess foreign passports).
This figure, however, surely understates the exit option. Tens of thousands
more have emigrated and not returned. In addition, many still in the territory
without foreign passports have the right of abode elsewhere or could acquire
it. See Louise do Rosario, Passport Politics, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Sept. 29, 1994,
at 18, 20 (reporting that while 400,000 Hong Kong residents hold foreign
passports, many others have emigration rights). Twenty-two percent of
respondents to a July 1995 poll indicated that they planned to leave Hong
Kong. See Stephen Vines, Sticky Chinese Fingers Close to the Honey Pot,
INDEPENDENT (London), July 1, 1995, Comment, at 17.
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2.1.2. Contradictions Among the Hong Kong People
The "Hong Kong people" were not nearly as monolithic as the
label and the rhetoric tended to suggest. In the political lexicon
of contemporary Hong Kong, the term has tended to exclude
expatriate Westerners and those ethnic Chinese who ranked
among the top elite of the territory's business community. Even
so narrowed, however, the group was hardly homogenous.
Although overwhelmingly ethnically Chinese and Cantonese-
speaking, the Hong Kong people also included thousands of South
Asians and a well-educated segment of the Chinese population
comfortable in English. The Hong Kong people encompassed
both recent migrants who had spent most of their lives in China,
and local residents who were born in Hong Kong, some of them
members of families that had been in the territory for genera-
tions. 25
At one extreme, the Hong Kong people included illiterate
peasants from the Guangdong countryside and the farmers of the
New Territories' remaining tradition-steeped villages.26 At the
other extreme, the label applied to cosmopolitan professionals
whose education included degrees from Western or Western-style
universities and whose work, or quests for foreign passports, had
taken them abroad for substantial periods. In between, there were
2 See HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 157-58, 467
(providing statistics on English language tertiary education in Hong Kong and
students going abroad to study); id. at 339-43 (describing the ethnic and cultural
composition of the Hong Kong population); LAU, supra note 4, at 175-76
(contrasting recent immigrants andold "Hong Kong families"); Skelton, supra
note 4 (anaryzing the origins, destinations, and socioeconomic characteristics of
Hong Kong emigrants and immigrants).
26 According to one mainstream academic estimate, roughly 10% of Hong
Kong's potential electorate was illiterate at the time of the final colonial era
elections. See Hong Kong: Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 23, 1995, at 29 (quoting Michael deGloyer of Hong Kong Baptist
University). The colonial government's long-standing accommodation of
traditional inheritance and family laws reflected the "tradition-steeped" quality
of the rural New Territories. See Louise do Rosario, Gender Wars, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Apr. 7, 1994, at 21 (describing Legco member Christine Loh's
efforts to secure repeal of an inheritance law that entrenched a traditional rural
area prohibition on women inheriting land); see also PETER WELEY-SMrrH,
THE SOURCES OF HONG KONG LAW 205-24 (1994) (describing Chinese law
and Chinese custom as a source of Hong Kong law, particularly in the New
Territories).
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hundreds of thousands of factory workers whose jobs were
increasingly threatened by the manufacturing industry's migration
to the mainland, and office workers whose livelihoods depended
on servicing the local, mainland, or global economies.Y
With such social and economic diversity came considerable
disparities in wealth. Hong Kong's developed-world level of per
capita income was less evenly distributed than in most industrial-
ized countries.2 Thus, the Hong Kong people included vast
middle and working classes, a group of desperately poor who lived
on the streets or, quite literally, in cages, and elite professionals
who paid rents that could shock Manhattanites. Socioeconomic
class distinctions also coincided with one of the most politically
salient fault lines dividing the Hong Kong people during the
endgame: successful businesspeople, professionals, and relatively
senior civil servants constituted the vast majority of the estimated
ten to twelve percent of Hong Kongers who held foreign
passports or rights of abode.29
As Hong Kong entered the final years of its protracted
transition to Chinese rule, the discernible political leanings of the
people of Hong Kong ranged widely. Official P.R.C., broader
pro-China, colonial government, and Hong Kong liberal views all
seemed certain to resonate in some quarters in Hong Kong. Many
Hong Kongers who had fled political repression or chaos on the
mainland held strongly anti-communist views and deeply distrust-
27 See supra note 25; see also HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, su pra
note 3, at 49-62, 79-81, 93-97, 116-17 (describing the sectoral composition of the
economy, employment, and foreign trade and investment); Leonard K. Cheng,
Trade and Industry: 1997 and Beyond, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG
KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 175-96 (describing trends in the
sectoral composition of the economy and trade); Jacques deLisle, Political
Alchemy, the Long Transition and Law's Promised Empire: How July 1, 1997,
Matters - and Doesn't Matter - in Hong Kong's Return to Chinese Rule, 18 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 91-96 (1997) (assessing the implications of pre-
reversion economic integration of Hong Kong with China).
" See, eg., Tang Shu-hung, The Economy, in FROM COLONY TO SAR:
HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 117, 13842 (finding the
inequality of income distribution in Hong Kong to have risen in the 1970s and
early 1980s, reaching a Gini Coefficient of.48 in 1991, indicating the least equal
income distribution among the newly industrialized economies of East Asia);
LAU, supra note 4, at 176-180 (describing income inequality and its social and
political consequences).
29 See, eg., Lau, supra note 23, at 18-19 (describing the British plan for
offering citizenship to some of Hong Kong's elite); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text (discussing the "exit" option).
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ed the regime that ruled across the soon-to-disappear border.
Other residents, especially, but not exclusively, those who formed
the territory's "pro-China" left, held political views that were
strongly nationalist and reunificationist. Other versions of
nationalism with substantial appeal were more anti-colonialist than
pro-P.R.C., and some were openly supportive of the Guomindang,
the ruling party in Taiwan that the Chinese Communist Party
had driven from the mainland in 1949.30 In addition, notions
that Hong Kongers did or should have rights to some form of self-
determination, and even a degree of nostalgia for fading colonial
rule, found some adherents among the Hong Kong people on the
eve of reversion.
Political issues and orientations less intimately linked to
questions of national identity also varied considerably in Hong
Kong at the twilight of colonial rule. In addition to orthodox
Chinese communist doctrines, conventional liberalism, social
welfarism, conservative corporatism, "Asian values"-tinged
developmentalism, and laissez-faire libertarianism attracted
followers in some segments of Hong Kong society. The diversity
in the political perspectives, social and economic status, ethnic and
cultural backgrounds, life experiences, and even citizenship among
the Hong Kong people portended conflicting views on the rule-of-
law questions facing pre-reversion Hong Kong, and differing
degrees of vulnerability to persuasion or pressure to accept any
particular answers to those questions. All sides in the political
conflicts over those issues thus seemed potentially able to find
natural and reliable supporters in some segment of the Hong
Kong public.
On the other hand, the historically weak sense of a Hong
Kong identity, Hong Kongers' limited experience with participa-
" See generally, KUAN & LAU, supra note 20 (finding variety and change
in attitudes toward politics, government, and the "existing system"); MNls,
sup-ia note 6, at 196-2 02 (describing political parties' and leaders' platforms and
the constituencies that support themn); Ghai, supra note 22, at 121 (discussing
political orientations of Fong Kong workers); So, supra note 17, at 49, 58-61,
68-72 (describing the formation of grass-roots support for diverse political
parties and agendas); Louise do Rosario, Grassroots Movement, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Aug. 18, 1994, at 20 (describing "United Ants," a small group pressing for
uncompromisingly liberal reforms, including selection of all Legco members by
universal suffrage direct elections); Emily Lau, The Press Gang, FAR E. EOON.
REV., Sept. 27, 1990, at 26 (describing considerable circulation of strongly pro-
China and left-wing newspapers in Hong Kong).
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tion in the territory's politics and governance, and the apparent
variety and fragmentation of residents' attitudes toward govern-
ment institutions and laws that were themselves in a state of flux,
suggested that the Hong Kong people's views on current issues
remained murky, volatile, and malleable. Attempts to predict,
mold, or merely plumb the depths of popular opinion thus
appeared likely to be worthwhile for key political participants in
the final battles over the rule of law and legal and institutional
arrangements for the S.A.R. Not surprisingly in these circum-
stances, members of both sides in the political struggle over
popular rule-of-law values and specific laws and institutions
worked diligently to claim popular backing and were able to do
so with some credibility.
Still, these battles almost never explicitly recognized the
numerous fault lines that seemingly diveded the people whose
allegiance or acquiescence the political players sought. The
arguments and assertions on both sides of the basic political divide
remained cast in terms of a single mandate from a monolithic
Hong Kong people. This striking, albeit implicit, rejection of
conventional coalition-building politics underscores that the
fundamental clash of visions of the rule of law and the nature of
the sovereign's domestic authority overshadowed and shaped the
ordinary politics of pursuing public support.
2.2. The Hong Kong People and the British and Hong Kong
Liberal-Democratic Vision of the Rule of Law
Throughout much of the final decade preceding Hong Kong's
reversion, officials of the Hong Kong and British governments,
and leaders of Hong Kong's "pro-democracy" parties and a
broader "liberal" political movement argued that the territory's
residents required that the rule of law be preserved. They asserted
that the continuation of Hong Kong's rule of law was an issue "of
greatest concern to Hong Kong people."3 Indeed, the Hong
Kong people regarded the rule of law as one of the truly definitive
traits of Hong Kong that "distinguished Hong Kong from all
other Asian societies."32 In his final annual policy address,
"' Fung Wai-kong & Louis Won, Patten Blasts Beijing Plan on Legislature,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1996, at 1 (quoting Martin Lee).
32 Martin Lee, Need for "Rule of Law," S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1,
1993, at 11.
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Governor Patten asserted that the "peace and safety guaranteed by
the rule of law" had prompted much of Hong Kong's population
to flee to the territory from China.33  Democratic Party leader
and Legislative Councillor Martin Lee claimed that numerous
reforms that had enhanced the rule of law in the 1990s reflected
the demands of the people of Hong Kong and their elected
representatives in the legislature.T m
Adherents to this perspective on Hong Kong's rule of law
argued that even if some or most of the people did not yet
appreciate it, their interests depended on the rule of law.
Governor Patten urged people to "stand up for the defence of
their rights" lest they be trampled upon.35 Similarly, Martin Lee
warned, "It is important that all Hong Kong people stand up to
make sure our rule of law is maintained," or else China's
prosecution and jailing of dissidents, such as Wei Jingsheng, will
be the "kind of thing that will happen in Hong Kong" after
36reversion.
Proponents of this line of argument added that failure to
assure that Hong Kong's rule of law survived the transition would
lead to serious instability. They found support for this view in
the fact that hundreds of thousands of the territory's people had
turned out for street demonstrations after the Tiananmen
Incident, in part because Hong Kongers feared that the suppres-
sion of the democracy movement in China portended a breach of
China's promises to preserve Hong Kong's rule of law and key
laws and institutions after reversion.3 ' They found additional
evidence for this characterization of the people's values in polls
"Peter Humphrey, Patten Swansong Defends HK Democracy, Rights,
Reuters, Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
' See A-G Rejects Attack on Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
13, 1995, at 5.
15 Jonathan Mirsky, Finms "Must Give Something Back" to Hong Kong,
TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 1996, at 11.
36 Peter Lim, Hong Kong Faces New Uncertainty After Wei's Sentencing,
Agence France Presse, Dec. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File.
17 On the impact of the Tiananmen Incident on Hong Kong politics and
attitudes toward a future under Chinese rule, see, for example, STEVE TSANG,
HONG KONG: AN APPOINTMENT WITH CHINA 156-80 (1997); Frank Ching,
Toward Colonial Sunset. The Wilson Regime, 1987-92, in PRECARIouS BALANCE:
HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992, supra note 8, at 178-
82; So, supra note 17, at 49.
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that showed flagging popular confidence in the territory's future,
and spikes in the rate of emigration and requests for right of
abode that accompanied a number of later shocks that seemed
threatening to a generally liberal rule of law for a P.R.C.-ruled
Hong Kong.3"
Although they disagreed about some of the specifics of a rule-
of-law regime that would meet the needs of the people, the
members of the loosely knit camp of Hong Kong politicians and
British and colonial officials all envisioned a distinctly liberal and
democratic version of the rule of law. They agreed that the
people required preservation of the common law system, as the
Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong 9 ("Joint
Declaration") and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China ("Basic
Law") recognized.' They also agreed that a rule of law adequate
and acceptable for the people of Hong Kong entailed an indepen-
dent judiciary and a non-corrupt and legally accountable executive
to administer the laws. Governor Patten articulated this perspec-
tive, arguing that a "clean, accountable government under the rule
of law" was among the virtues of Hong Kong that its people
could be expected to defend.41 Martin Lee offered another
formulation of the same basic idea: "In Hong Kong, when we
think about the rule of law, key principles come to mind: clear
rules that citizens can follow; a judiciary free from political
influence; the right to sue the Government; ... and a court
system that will allow justice to be done . . 42 The Hong
" See Bruce Gilley, Darkness Dawns, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 11, 1996,
at 14; Vines, supra note 24.
3 The Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984,
U.K.-P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
' See infra Sections 2.2, 2.3; Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art. 3(3),
annex I, II; Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 84, 160.
41 Fung Wai-kon&, Patten Pushes Open Selection, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 29, 1996, at 4 (citing Governor Patten's belief that a clean, accountable
government under the rule of law and institutions that checked corruption
were keys to Hong Kong's success, and were virtues the Hong Kong people
should support); see also Bruce Einhorn, The fitters Just Got Worse, BUS. WK.,
Feb. 3, 1997, at 26 (noting the importance of an honest civil service and
political freedoms to Hong Kong).
42 Lee, supra note 32, at 11; see also Margaret Ng, Lead Us to Transparency,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at 17 (noting the importance of clear
and stable laws and guarantees of judicial independence).
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Kong Bar Association made a similar point in a letter to the Chief
Executive-designate:
The rule of law does not merely mean that there is a body
of law by which the people will be ruled.... The rule of
law also means the process of making and repealing law is
open, reasoned and in accordance with the law. If not,...
it will become rule by the people in power.43
The British colonial authorities at times suggested that the rule
of law also required that the laws reflect the will of the people, as
expressed through institutions politically accountable to the
people. Governor Patten, for example, argued early in his tenure
that Hong Kong needed "a government which was accountable to
a broadly based legislature," and needed a legislature with
sufficient democratic legitimacy to be able to "hold the executive
to account in a responsible and effective way" and to "help secure
Hong Kong's way of life," including its rule of law.44
Some democratic politicians in Hong Kong asserted an even
tighter and clearer link between the rule of law that the people of
Hong Kong wanted and needed and the development of democrat-
ic institutions. As Martin Lee saw it, "Hong Kong has managed
to uphold the rule of law. . . solely because ... a democratically
elected British parliament has guaranteed our rule of law." The
rule of law's continuation beyond 1997 required "the introduction
and institutionalisation of democratic and accountable govern-
ment" that would be elected by and "answerable to the people of
Hong Kong."45
In mid-1996, a new political grouping of prominent pro-
democracy legislators and activists took the argument a step
futher. One of its leaders suggested that a rule of law adequate for
the people of Hong Kong additionally required that the people of
Hong Kong be allowed to draft their own constitution to replace
the faulty and P.R.C.-imposed Basic Law.' As many of these
43 Philip Stephens, One System Fits All, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 1997,
at 14.
44 A Different Style, FAR E. EcON. REv., Oct. 22, 1992, at 22.
4' Lee, supra note 32, at 11.
46 See Lawmakers Create Pro-Democracy Group, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug.
27, 1996, at 7.
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comments linking the provision of an adequate rule of law to
electoral democracy or a strong judiciary or continuity in specific
laws suggest, liberal-democratic attempts to describe or to shape
the rule-of-law values held by the Hong Kong people were closely
entangled with the specific legal and institutional questions that
dominated Hong Kong politics in the 1990s.
2.2.1. The Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Rights of the
Hong Kong People
Popular support for the Bill of Rights Ordinance ("Ordinance"
or "Bill of Rights") was taken virtually for granted when the
colonial government moved to adopt the Ordinance at the turn
of the decade. 4 After all, the events at Tiananmen in 1989 had
deeply shaken Hong Kongers' confidence that their accustomed
liberties would survive the transition to Chinese rule.48 A large
portion of the territory's population had taken to the streets to
say as much in the wake of the crackdown on China's democracy
movement. With the people's preferences thus presumed and
demonstrated, proponents of the Ordinance appeared to need to
do little in asserting or cultivating popular support.
The colonial authorities' and Hong Kong politicians' efforts to
claim and to cultivate popular support for the Ordinance, and for
the protection of civil and political liberties more generally,
became more elaborate in the middle of the 1990s. As Hong
Kong politics became more democratic and more volatile and the
P.R.C.'s threats to excise portions of the Ordinance and related
reforms grew more strident, British colonial officials and Hong
Kong's democratic politicians responded with stronger and more
complex arguments that the people of Hong Kong did, would, or
should demand the preservation of the Bill of Rights and other
liberty-protecting laws.
The British colonial and Hong Kong liberal side's principal
argument was, simply, that the people of Hong Kong strongly
supported the threatened laws, and that a roll-back therefore
would undermine Hong Kongers' confidence, alienate them from
47Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (1991). For discussions of the context
of the Ordinance's preparation and adoption, see, e.g., MINERS, supra note 6,
at 27-28; Emily Lau, Better Late than Never, FAR E. EcoN. Rv., July 12, 1990;
Emily Lau, Confidence Building, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 26, 1989, at 19.
41 See supra note 47; supra note 37.
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the new regime, and harm Hong Kong. Martin Lee asserted,
"Hong Kong's 6 million citizens cherish their civil liberties" and
"recognize that the difference in approach to human rights" in
Hong Kong and in China "will pose the greatest threat to Hong
Kong in the transition to Chinese sovereignty."49 When China's
hand-picked Preparatory Committee's legal subgroup announced
its final proposals to revise the Ordinance and to overturn liberal
amendments to laws restricting freedom of association and
assembly, Governor Patten denounced the recommendation as a
step that "deprives" the S.A.R. of "public confidence.""0 Patten
argued, "It is already crystal clear that what the community wants
to see is the preservation of Hong Kong's current civil liber-
ties.""l Independent, pro-democracy legislator Emily Lau made
a similar claim: "Hong Kong people want their lifestyle to remain
unchanged," and the threat to water down the Bill of Rights and
reverse rights-expanding amendments to colonial laws "shattered"
that "dream."52 "[T]he general consensus of the community is
that we want to see human rights protections entrenched in our
laws." 53 Lau's colleague Christine Loh added, "[P]eople here are
not following Beijing's line on the Bill of Rights."54 According
to a leader of the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic, Democratic
Movement in China, the "people of Hong Kong worry the
Chinese government will apply the concept of mainland laws
41 Martin Lee, Beijing's Tiananmen Mentality Augurs Most Ill for Hong Kong,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23, 1994.
50 Patten also described the recommendations as "ridiculous in legal
yrinciple." If the British Side Knew This Would Happen, It Should Not Have Done
t in te Beginning, WEN WEI Po, Jan. 22, 1997, at A2.
5s Peter Humphrey, China Presses on with Curbs on HK Freedoms, Reuters,
Feb. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. Characteristical-
ly, U.K. Foreign Secretary Rifkind took a more accommodating line with
China, hoping that his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen's consultations with
the people o Hong Kong would "reduce the damage caused by the repealing
of these ordinances." Greg Torode & Duncan Hughes, Qian Sticks to His Guns
in Final Meeting with R'fkind, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1.
" Alison Leung, China-Picked Committee on HK To Wind Up Tenure,
Reuters, Dec. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
53 Emily Lau, Letter to Hong Kong (Hong Kong radio broadcast, Feb. 2,
1997), transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 4, 1997, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
" Christine Loh, The Means To Clamp Down on Free Speech, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 20, 1995, at 22 (commenting on P.W.C. recommenda-
tions to roll back rights laws).
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regarding treason and subversion after 1997"55 - a concept that
was foreign to existing Hong Kong law.
Even a conservative Legco member who sided with China on
many issues commented that "the common people here have
accepted the Bill of Rights" and would see its repeal as a danger-
ous stripping-away of "protec[tion] from government abuses." 6
Presumably for similar reasons, a leader of the territory's leading
pro-China party reportedly urged China not to undercut the Bill
of Rights.17 The argument that the people were deeply commit-
ted to the Bill of Rights and related legal reforms drew additional
support from opinion polls that found civil liberties to be high on
the list of popular concerns on the eve of reversion.58 A 1996
survey, for example, reported that respondents rated preservation
of free speech and a free press as the most important tasks for the
head of the S.A.R. government. 9 Another survey showed Chief
Executive-designate Tung Chee-hwa's popularity dropping
precipitously in the wake of his announced support for the
Preparatory Committee's plan to reject parts of the Bill of Rights,
Public Order, and Societies Ordinances. 60 Moreover, liberal
commentary suggested that favorable poll numbers understated
popular support: a "silent majority" backed the Bill of Rights and
rights-protecting legislation, but was understandably reluctant to
express its views on politically sensitive issues of laws that China
had placed on the chopping block.61
Some critics of the planned retrenchments warned that the
true views of the Hong Kong people ultimately would surface,
" Chinese, British Officials in Verbal Sniping in New HK Dispute, Agence
France Presse, Nov. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(quoting Cheung Man-kwong).
56 Bruce Gilley, Hold Your Ground, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 16, 1995,
at 36 (quoting Liberal Party leader and Legco member Allen Lee).
V See Gilley, supra note 24, at 76 (quoting Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong (D.A.B.") leader Tsang Yok-sing).
" See Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-97 List; Survey Shows, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 5. The principal controversial laws, aside
from the Bill of Rights itself, were the Societies Ordinance, Cap. 151 (1992) and
the Public Order Ordinance, Cap. 245 (1995).
'9 See Bruce Gilley, Man on the Spot, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec, 19, 1996,
at 15.
o See Ng, supra note 42, at 17.
61 See Fanny Wong, A Flawed Argument for Legal Changes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 29, 1997, at 14.
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and that the Hong Kong people would surely make a decision to
alter the laws a costly one. Financial Secretary Donald Tsang
cautioned that China's and its allies' failure to "convince the
people of Hong Kong" that there were good reasons for diluting
rights-protecting laws would bring street protests, resignations
from the civil service, and increased emigration. 62 Pro-democra-
cy legislator Emily Lau and the liberal newspaper Sing Tao Daily,
respectively, predicted that moves to cut back on legal protections
for citizens' rights would "backfire and stir up resentment" 6 and
would "cause 'panic among Hong Kong people.'"64 In a some-
what less confrontational vein, Governor Patten warned that
attempts to "slap down on people's freedoms in the name of
greater stability" risked "produc[ing] exactly the political prob-
lems" of discontent and disorder that the moves to retrench
liberties ostensibly sought to avoid.65
Government officials' and liberal politicians' arguments that
the Hong Kong people supported the Bill of Rights and related
reforms and that they would react badly to their reversal were not
simply claims about the established preferences and values of the
territory's residents. The governor's and Legco members' soaring
rhetoric about Hong Kongers' love of rights and liberties sought
to persuade the people, as well as to describe them. The broadly
liberal camp's rather defensive invocation of the views of a "silent
majority" suggested a perception that such persuasion might be
necessary. The assertion that a roll-back of rights laws would
trigger social unrest also seemed to be something more than a
straightforward prediction or even a warning to China and its
allies. Although the argument was not as explicit as similar ones
made with respect to other issues of the endgame, the dire
62 See Chris Yeung, Tsang Warns on Law Changes, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at 1.
63 Peter Lir, China To Forge Ahead with Diluted Rights Laws for Hong
Kong, Agence France Presse, Feb. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File.
' China Hits Out at Patten Criticism over Human Rights Laws, Agence
France Presse, Jan. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see
also Michael Binyon, Hong Kong Leader Prepared To Head Street Protests, TiMES
(London), Feb. 22, 1997, at 16 (describing Hong Kong Democrats' pledge to
lead street protests in opposition to China's plans to alter the Bill of Rights and
reestablish restrictive colonial laws).
65 Jonathan Sprague, Future HK Government Blasted over Freedom Curbs,
Reuters, Apr. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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prognostications here too appeared designed to tap into the Hong
Kong people's presumed fear of instability and uncertainty as a
source of support for the liberal or pro-democracy position on
rights legislation. The calculation appears to have been that
residents who might be relatively unconcerned with liberal rights
might support laws protecting those rights if they were convinced
that gutting those laws would lead to social and economic
disruption.
Other arguments from colonial authorities and pro-democracy
politicians seemed to reflect a more affirmative dimension of a
strategy to cultivate popular support for rights laws by asserting
connections to other values thought to be important to the
people. Most notably, these arguments sought to link the issue of
the rights legislation's fate to questions of democracy and local
autonomy for Hong Kong. Liberal political leaders and the
governor argued that the roll-back that China and the S.A.R.
government-in-waiting were planning could not plausibly
represent the will of the Hong Kong people. According to this
line of argument, a Legco that included democratically elected
representatives of the people had passed the endangered laws.66
But unelected bodies that included non-Hong Kong residents, such
as the Preliminary Working Committee and the Preparatory
Committee, had called for the reversal of the laws. An unelected
"rubber-stamp" Provisional Legislature created by the P.R.C.-
controlled Preparatory Committee, and chosen by an equally
illegitimate and undemocratic Selection Committee, would
complete the process by enacting new, more restrictive laws.67
Moreover, the N.P.C. - a Beijing body with minimal member-
ship from Hong Kong - had cleared the ground for the the
Provisional Legislature's action when it approved the Preparatory
Committee's recommendations on striking key rights legislation.
The N.P.C., Governor Patten argued, "'appl[ied a] rubber stamp
behind closed doors'" and showed itself to be "'deaf to the almost
66 See infra Section 2.2.2. (discussing the democratic pedigree of the 1991-
elected legislature that passed the laws).
6' See, e.g., Martin Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in
America, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 1995 [hereinafter Lee, Selling an
Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America]; Martin Lee, Why the PWC Failed,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 10, 1995, at 10 [hereinafter Lee, Why the PWC
Failed]; Ng, supra note 42, at 17 (presenting comments of an independent Legco
member who frequently sides with Democrats).
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unanimous voice of the people of Hong Kong."1 8 In the same
spirit, a Democratic Party spokesperson commented that the series
of actions against the rights laws showed that China was "not
going to respect the will of [the] Hong Kong people."9 These
arguments strongly suggested that the people had reason to fear
rolling back of rights laws because such moves portended a
broader disregard of Hong Kongers' wishes and concerns.
Finally, in seeking to cultivate popular support for late
colonial rights laws, Hong Kong government officials and pro-
democracy politicians also made arguments that returned in part
to their shared notions of the substantive requirements of a just
and proper legal order. Thus, liberal and democratic voices
charged that, as both a normative and a descriptive matter,
revising the Bill of Rights and reinstating restrictions on civil and
political liberties would constitute, simply, an inexcusable betrayal
of the people of Hong Kong. Those Hong Kong pro-China or
conservative political leaders who were prepared to endorse or
facilitate the roll-backs would breach a "solemn responsibility" to
the people to protect their way of life and to maintain promised
and desired continuity of laws that committed the sovereign to
protecting key human rights.7" As a spokesperson for Governor
Patten articulated the point:
The community will have to decide whether Mr. Tung
[Chee-hwa, the future Chief Executive who would preside
over the enactment of new rights laws].., has answered
the central question: Are Hong Kong's freedoms and civil
liberties after June 30 going to be the same or not?... If
they aren't, the community is entitled to know how the
laws are going to be - and how they can conceivably be
- consistent with the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law,
and the two international covenants on human rights.7
When the N.P.C. acted to accept the Preparatory Committee's
68 Fung Wai-kong, Patten Fears for Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 25, 1997, at 4.
Humphrey, supra note 51.
70 See, e.g., Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10.
71 Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Tight Police Controls on Protests, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1.
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recommendations to reject portions of the Bill of Rights and other
laws, Governor Patten similarly derided the action as incompatible
with "the legitimate needs and expectations of a modern, open
society," the Hong Kong community's desires, and "the promises
made in the Joint Declaration and ... Basic Law." 2
Liberal and pro-democracy forces argued that, faced with such
threats to their liberties and disregard for their rightful expecta-
tions, the people of Hong Kong should act to prevent that
betrayal and to defend the besieged laws that protected their rights
and served their needs, despite their possible reluctance to do so.
Independent pro-democracy Legco member Christine Loh argued
that "Hong Kong people owe it to themselves" to take up the
challenge and "make it clear to Beijing that Hong Kong wants to
keep its Bill of Rights without it being watered down."" While
these arguments still made claims about popular attitudes, their
language of betrayal and moral obligation, and their hints of
concern that the people might not respond as hoped, marked
them as a blend of claims of appeals to principle and pragmatism
that is qualitatively different from simple assertions about Hong
Kongers' established views or predictions of Hong Kongers' likely
actions.
2.2.2. Democratic Reforms and the Will of the People
The conflicts over the Hong Kong government's moves in the
1990s to introduce democratic reforms, particularly in laws
governing elections for the Legislative Council, produced the most
intense and sustained of the battles over "the people" during the
endgame. This was to be expected. After all, the laws and
policies for which the people's support was asserted or sought
were ones that would structure the institutions charged with
representing the will and interests of the people.
Much of the foundation for laying claim to popular backing
for Governor Patten's admittedly modest democratic reforms for
Legco was in place before he presented the outlines of his package
in 1992.'4 The 1980s series of Green Papers and White Papers on
2 Fung, supra note 68, at 4.
Loh, supra note 54, at 22.
7 See Lo Chi-kin, From Through Train to Second Stove, in FROM COLONY
TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 25-30; Frank
Ching, Cleared for Action, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 20-22
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the development of representative government in Hong Kong s
had put the issue of democratization onto the agenda of Hong
Kong politics and into the minds of the territory's prospective
electorate. In the late 1980s, the widely publicized drafts and final
texts of the Basic Law included extensive provisions promising the
gradual implementation of democratic elections for all seats in the
S.A.R. legislature. 6 In addition, modest institutional reforms in
the 1970s and 1980s had given the people of Hong Kong a little
experience with electoral democracy through the introduction of
partially elected local consultative bodies and, as of 1985, indirect
elections for a small number of Legco seats.""
By the middle to late 1980s, there were strong indications of
support among the Hong Kong people for extending democracy.
Indeed, to defend the slow pace of change advocated in its reform
(describing the contents of the Patten reforms).
75 WHITE PAPER (Feb. 1988), supra note 15; GREEN PAPER (May 1987),
supra note 15; WHITE PAPER (Nov. 1984), supra note 15; GREEN PAPER ([uly
1984), supra note 15.
76 See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 68. "The Legislature of the Special
Administrative Region shall be constituted by election." Although the "method
for forming" the Legislature is to be "specified in the light of the actual
situation" in the S.A.R. and "in accordance with the principle of gradual and
orderly progress," the "ultimate aim is the election of all members of the
Legislative Council by universal suffrage." Id.; id. annex II (providing for the
ratio of members returned by directly elected - and presumably universal
suffrage-based - geographic constituencies, by more narrowly elected functional
constituencies, and by an election committee to be 24:30:6 in the second term
of the S.A.R. Legislature and 30:30:0 in the third term); N.P.C. Decision, supra
note 21, S 6 (prescribing a ratio of 20:30:10 for the first S.A.R. legislature);
Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the P.R.C.
(for Solicitation of Opinions) (April 1988), reprinted in THE HONG KONG
BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY UNDER CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY?, supra note 21; id. art. 67 (providing that the S.A.R. legislature
"shall be constituted by a combination of direct and indirect elections" as
prescribed in Annex II, with the procedures set forth in Annex II subject to
"modifi[cation] in light of the actual situation" in the S.A.R. and "in accordance
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress"); id. annex II (setting forth
four alternative mixes of directly and indirectly elected seats for the legislature);
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the P.R.C. (Feb.
1989) (draft) art. 67, reprinted in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT
FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY?, supra note
21 (containing substantively the same terms as Article 68 of the final Basic
Law); id. annex II (providing a ratio of geographic to functional constituencies
that rises to 40:40 in the third and fourth terms of the legislature); cf. Joint
Declaration, supra note 39, annex I, S I ("The legislature of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections.").
' See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONGS END GAME (II)
plans during the 1980s, the colonial government had invoked
seriously flawed or rigged public opinion surveys that severely
understated popular support for more rapid democratization. 8
At the advent of the endgame, there was clear popular backing for
a fairly robust form of democratic reform. The violent suppres-
sion of the 1989 student-led movement in Beijing and the per-
ceived implications for post-reversion Hong Kong galvanized
ordinary Hong Kongers to demand changes that would give them
a more direct and institutionalized voice in the territory's
governance. Reacting to the mass sentiments that had brought
one-sixth or more of the colony's population into the streets, even
the conservative members of the entirely-appointed, cabinet-like
Executive Council ("Exco") and the mostly-appointed Legco
backed a proposal to make half of the legislature popularly elected
in 1995.z ' Establishment figures, such as Exco Senior Executive
Councillor Dame Lydia Dunn, and Legco members closely tied to
business interests, remarked publicly that the Hong Kong people
were no longer "apolitical" and should be permitted to vote in
direct elections for the territory's main representative body.80
The results of the 1991 Legco elections, the first to include
directly elected seats based on universal suffrage, further supported
the conclusion that the Hong Kong people wanted democratiza-
tion. Candidates from the United Democrats of Hong Kong
("U.D.H.K.") and Meeting Point, the territory's two nascent pro-
democracy parties that later merged to form the Democratic
Party, and pro-democracy independents nearly swept the contests
's See, eg., Philip Bowring and Emily Lau, Without a Fight, FAR E. EcoN.
REV., Feb. 1, 1990, at 16; Frank Ching, The Betrayal of Hong Kong, FAR E.
ECON. REV., May 19, 1994, at 36 [hereinafter Ching, The Betrayal of Hong
Kong]; Frank Ching, Past Impefect, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 29, 1992, at 23
[hereinafter Ching, Past Impeifect] (describing a flawed 1984 survey understating
support for universal suffrage and a flawed 1987 survey used to justify the
delayed introduction of direct election for some Legco seats); Hong Kong:
Moer and Father Do Not Know Best, supra note 26, at 29 (describing the
delayed introduction of direct balloting for Legco and attributing the delay to
British authorities' succumbing to pressure from the P.R.C.).
" See Frank Ching, Something Britain Can Do, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar.
10, 1994, at 30.
" See, e.g., Lau, supra note 16, at 18 (presenting the comments of Lydia
Dunn and Legco "conservatives" with ties to the business community); Ching,
supra note 79, at 30 (describing the Exco and Legco electoral reform proposal
of 1989).
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for the new broadly and directly elected seats."
Against this background, the colonial government and Hong
Kong's emergent liberal and pro-democracy politicians advanced
their arguments concerning public attitudes toward legal reforms
to expand democracy in the territory. Their principal argument
in the initial conflicts over Governor Patten's program to expand
the electorate for Legco was, simply, that the Hong Kong people
did in fact want democratic reforms. The camp divided over
whether the people wanted only the Patten reforms or required
more extensive changes. Claiming a popular mandate for the
proposals he had just outlined and defending them against calls for
more sweeping moves, Patten explained that his "gut instinct" was
that the Hong Kong people wanted greater democracy but that
they wanted it "secured in a way which has a good chance of
lasting" beyond July 1, 1997.2 Governor Patten argued that, to
ensure their survival, any reforms to electoral laws had to be
compatible with the Basic Law. He asserted that his plan met that
criterion while the proposals of the more radical democrats, who
sought to have half or more of the seats in Legco directly elected
in 1995, did not. 3 Patten added that his plan also would accu-
rately reflect the democratic preferences of the territory's people.
"We shouldn't be prepared to go further than the people of Hong
1 See Stacy Mosher, Liberal Landslide, FARE. ECON. REV., Sept. 26, 1991,
at 19 (describing the outcome of the 1991 Legco elections); see also MINERS,
supra note 6, at 116-17 (describing the evolution of electoral rules for Legco).
82 A Different Style, supra note 44, at 22.
83 See id. The NP.C. Decision provided that "[i]f the composition of the
last Hong Kong Legislative Council before the establishment of the Hong Kon
Special Administrative Region is in conformity with the relevant provisions o1
this Decision and the Basic Law," its members could "become members of the
first Legislative Council of the Region." N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21, 5 6.
The N.P.C. Decision further provided that a pre-reversion legislature (and thus
a 1995-selected Legco) that hoped to "ride the through train" to become the
first the S.A.R. legislature had to be composed of twenty members chosen by
direct election from geographic constituencies, ten members chosen by an
election committee, and thirty members selected by "functional constituencies."
Id. Under Governor Patten's plan, later passed b Legco, the Legco elected in
1995 would include twenty directly elected seats based on universal suffrage in
geographic constituencies, ten seats indirectly elected by a committee drawn
from elected members of local respresentative bodies, and thirty seats chosen
by functional constituencies, many of which included new or expanded
electorates that, in effect, gave most employed people in Hong Kong a "second
vote" beyond their votes in a geographic constituency. See Electoral Provisions
Ordinance, Cap. 367 (1994); see also supra note 74.
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Kong are prepared to go," the Governor explained, but "we
shouldn't be prepared to go less far" either.14 As further assur-
ance that the reforms would reflect the people's views, the
electoral laws that would govern the 1995 balloting, Patten
emphasized, would be approved by the existing Legco, which
represented "the balance of opinions within the community."85
Looking back on the process after his proposals passed Legco,
Patten asserted that "[t]here's never been a moment during the
months of debate [on the political reform plan when] anybody
could actually claim the public was not supporting [Patten's]
proposals." 6
During the 1994 Legco debates on Patten's reform package,
leading pro-democracy Legco members agreed with the
Governor's general assertion that the people desired
democratization. Meeting Point's Leong Che-hung proclaimed
that it was up to legislators to express the desires of the Hong
Kong people by casting votes that reflected their constituents' pro-
democracy feelings and the pro-democracy platforms on which
many members had run for their seats. Prominent Legco
Democrat Szeto Wah maintained that Legco members' voting for
democratic reform was necessary, lest "others think that the Hong
Kong people want to surrender, don't want democracy and are
willing to kowtow, give in and cede."17  Any such thoughts,
Szeto's colleague Martin Lee emphasized, were misplaced because
the Hong Kong "people recognize that the difference in approach
to... democracy" in Hong Kong from that in China was among
the "greatest threat[s]" transitional Hong Kong faced.8
When it came to the details, however, many of the territory's
pro-democracy leaders and lawmakers argued that the Patten
reforms fell short of popular preferences. They warned that,
notwithstanding the Governor's claims, the British authorities in
the early 1990s were continuing their tradition of providing less
'4 Patten To Follow Will of HK People in Reform, Agence France Presse,
Dec. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
85 Id.
86 Chris Yeung & Fung Wai-kong, Democracy Cannot Be Stopped, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 27, 1996, at 3.
17 What the Legislators Said, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1994, at
6.
88 Martin Lee, From Tiananmen to Hong Kong: The Next Human Rights
Tragedy Is Arriving on Schedule, WASH. POST, June 22, 1994, at A21.
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democratization than the people wanted. Amid the bitter and
ultimately fruitless Sino-British negotiations that preceded
Governor Patten's submission of his proposals to Legco, Meeting
Point's Cheung Bing Leung charged that Britain and China were
doing plenty of "thinking about their interests," but were not
giving enough consideration to the interests of the Hong Kong
people. 9 With the outline of the Patten plan on the table, a pro-
democracy politician argued that "[p]eople in Hong Kong remain
dissatisfied because their democratic wishes have been continuous-
ly ignored" amid a Sino-British collaboration to seek "con-
verge[nce] with a post-1997 political system set down in the Basic
Law" which "falls short of [the Hong Kong people's] require-
ments.
" 90
Accordingly, pro-democracy politicians advocated reforms that,
they claimed, better reflected popular preferences as they under-
stood them. Independent Legco member Emily Lau proposed,
and almost won a majority for, a substantially more democratic
alternative to Governor Patten's bill.91 As Martin Lee character-
ized the intramural struggles of the years preceding the 1995
Legco elections, Hong Kong's Democrats had "consistently pushed
for genuine democracy over [both] Britain['s] and China's
objections ... because that is what the people of Hong Kong
want." 92  The pattern of Hong Kong politicians pressing for
more than the colonial government was prepared to grant
continued after the enactment of the Patten reforms and amid
China's preparations to replace the Legco elected in 1995. Most
notably, Frontier, a political organization founded by several pro-
democracy legislators in 1996, declared that its platform included
equal and universal suffrage and the right of the Hong Kong
people to draft their own constitution - one that presumably
would surpass the Basic Law in reflecting the Hong Kong people's
'9 Louise do Rosario, Raising the Ante, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 9, 1993,
at 14.
o Time for Us To Command Respect, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 15,
1992.
"' See Louise do Rosario, Patten's Progress, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 14,
1994, at 20; Chris Yeung, Patten Wins; 4:35 a.m.: Narrow Defeat of Emily Lau's
Bill for Full Democracy Ends Legislators' Longest Day, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 30, 1994, at 1.
92 Edward A. Gargan, Pro-China Party Appears Big Loser in Hong Kong
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at AS.
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democratic preferences. 93
Although they differed over the details of the form of
democratization best suited to the wishes of the Hong Kong
people, the colonial government and the territory's liberal and
pro-democracy politicians united in arguing that the public was
opposed to China's plans to undercut and ultimately dissolve the
Legco selected under the Patten reform laws. At the time of the
1995 balloting, Patten remarked:
It seems to me to be an astonishing way [for China] to win
the hearts and minds in Hong Kong to say at the moment
when the people of Hong Kong are taking part in the
most credible and democratic elections in our history that
you are going to give the whole thing the thumbs
down. 4
Governor Patten later commented that the plan to replace the
Legco chosen in those elections with a Provisional Legislature was
not only unlawful, but was also "plainly wrong.., in the eyes of
Hong Kong people."95
Legco member Szeto Wah attacked China's moves to establish
the Preliminary Working Committee, which was initially designed
as part of a pro-China shadow government for pre-reversion Hong
Kong, and the Provisional Legislature, which was to succeed the
elected Legco at reversion and which functioned as a rival
legislature during the final months of colonial rule. Szeto pressed
Legco to declare these moves to be contrary to the aspirations of
the Hong Kong people, as well as incompatible with the Basic
Law and the Joint Declaration. Similarly Democratic Party
member Lo Chi-kin commented that "public opinion is on our
side" in the fight against a Provisional Legislature.9 7
In the same vein, Martin Lee stressed that China's establish-
' See Lawmakers Create Pro-Democracy Group, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug.
27, 1996, at 7.
91 Gargan, supra note 92, at A8.
91 Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3.
96 See Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, PWC Adamant on Body To Run
Territory, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at 1.
' Louise do Rosario, Hollow House, FAR E. EcON. REv., Nov. 24, 1994,
at 26.
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ment of appointed legislative and quasi-legislative bodies manifest-
ed a profound disregard for popular preferences. He complained
that China's moves displaced Hong Kong's already established,
"well-tested, respected and effective method for knowing what
Hong Kong people think. Not an appointment system - but
genuine democratic elections." 8 Moreover, Lee asserted that the
people of Hong Kong had shown a serious "lack of confidence in
Beijing's plans"" to displace elected bodies. Elaborating on this
theme, Lee added that "the pandering of Hong Kong P.W.C.
members" to China's policies on Legco and other matters had
"shocked and saddened [the] Hong Kong people." 10° Further-
more, the pro-democracy critique continued, the Legco members
who supported the Preparatory Committee's formal decision to
establish a Provisional Legislature had abandoned the mandate
from the people of Hong Kong who had elected them to of-
fice.1
01
The ties that bound liberal politicians and colonial authorities
together in asserting the unpopularity of plans to roll back
democratization began to fray when the territory's most ardent
democrats perceived the colonial government to be softening in its
unwillingness to compromise with China on the dismantling or
displacement of Legco' 02  These pro-democracy politicians
condemned the Patten administration for "selling out" the
electorate and "duck[ing] the issues of greatest concern to Hong
Kong people."0 3
Despite their disagreements on some issues, colonial govern-
ment officials and Hong Kong's pro-democracy politicians pointed
to many of the same indicators as evidence supporting their
98 Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10.
Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67.
Lee added that it was up to Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office director Lu
Ping, as head of the P.W.C., to explain and presumably to rectify this popular
lack of confidence. Id.
" Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10.
. See id.; Fung Wai-Kong & Quinton Chan, Democrats Warn of 'Puppet
Legislature" 'It's not Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong but Hong Kong People
Ruining Hong Kong,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 26, 1996, at 4.
102 See Martin Lee, The Sell-Out that Has To Stop, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 1, 1995, at 19 (criticizing Governor Patten's consideration of a
D.A.B. leader's proposal for fresh elections for a legislature under procedures
more acceptable to Beijing).
103 Fung & Won, supra note 31, at 1.
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (U7)
contention that the people of Hong Kong wanted democratic
reforms in the early and middle 1990s and opposed China's plans
to roll back such changes. Despite China's vocal opposition from
the beginning, Governor Patten's proposals fared quite well in
early public opinion surveys, in anecdotal measures of popular
sentiment, and, indirectly, in the Governor's buoyant approval
ratings. °4  Pro-democracy candidates' near sweep of the most
broadly elected constituencies in the 1995 elections prompted
Martin Lee, Patten, and others to proclaim a popular mandate for
the democratic reforms and the parties and legislators who had
backed them."5 The pro-China daily Ta Kung Pao appeared to
concede the popularity of the democrats' platforms. It reacted to
the 1995 elections by suggesting that the democrats' victories at
the polls showed the wisdom of Chinese senior leader Deng
Xiaoping's 1987 comment that popularly elected leaders might not
be the best choice to rule Hong Kong.""
According to some observers, popular opposition to China's
establishment of a full-fledged "second stove," a shadow govern-
ment to rival the colonial governor and Legco structure, was so
strong and so obvious that it prompted the P.R.C. to retreat to
the more temperate measure of establishing only the P.W.C. in
104 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Cleared for Action, FARE. EcON. REV., Oct. 22,
1992, at 20-21 (describing popular support for Governor Patten's policy speech);
Lim Soon Neo, Hong Kong: Patten Fights a Rearguard Action, BUS. TIMES
(Singapore), Oct. 5, 1994, at 4 (discussing a survey finding Patten's approval
rating at 59.6% in his first year in office and 56.7% in his second yer); Tai
Ming Cheung, Pressure Tactics, FAR E. EcON REV., Nov. 5, 1992, at 8-9
(discussing polls and public hearings indicating popular support for Patten re-
forms).
105 See, e.g., Gargan, supra note 92, at A8 (discussing Martin Lee's comments
linking Democratic Party victories in the elections to support for democratic
reform); Sheila Tefft, How One Bold Man Stands Up to China, CHRISTIAN S¢i.
MoNrroR, Oct. 3, 1995, at 1 (quoting Martin Lee's comment, "[i]f this election
shows anything, it shows that the Hong Kong people want Legco to defend
them against China's anti-democratic plans); Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at
3 (quoting Governor Patten's comments, a few months after the election, that
60%-70% of the people supported the democrats in Legco).
106 See Louise do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, FAR E. EcON. REv.,
Sept. 28, 1995, at 16-17. The Deng-prescribed policy of Hong Kong people
ruling Hong Kong meant a rule by people who loved the mother and and loved
Hong Kong - aiguo aigang, in the usual formulation. This criterion of
Chinese patriotism imposed an additional requirement beyond popularity with
the people of Hong Kong or success in open elections. See id.
1997]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
response to the Patten reforms."l 7  Public opinion surveys
seemed to confirm liberal-democratic claims that the people
disliked and mistrusted the P.R.C.'s new appointive organs. One
poll found that nearly two-thirds of the respondents believed that
the P.W.C. was not working in the interests of the Hong Kong
people as it laid some of the groundwork for Legco's replacement
by a Provisional Legislature."' Another poll conducted only
months before reversion indicated that fewer than one in six
Hong Kongers expected the Provisional Legislature to perform
better than Legco. 1 9
Nonetheless, liberal and pro-democracy leaders and officials in
Hong Kong could not completely discount signs that popular
support for Patten-style or more radical democratization was
always soft and had eroded in the face of China's increasingly
shrill and clearly uncompromising opposition during the middle
of the 1990s. Many of the Hong Kong people who supported
democratic reform in general wanted an arrangement that would
be acceptable to China and thus leaned toward compromise and
a more moderate rate of democratization.10 In addition, the
democratic landslide of 1995, like that of 1991, occurred in an
election in which only a little more than one-third of the
registered voters, and a still smaller share of the eligible electorate,
turned out."'
These facts suggested that the absence of popular support for
107 See Tai Ming Cheung, Frontal Assault, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1,
1993, at 10-11; see also Tai Min Cheung, Stalling for Success, FAR E. ECON.
REV., July 1, 1993, at 22 (describing the P.W.C. as a possible component in the
"second stove").
10. See do Rosario, supra note 21, at 18; see also Lee, Why the PWC Failed,
supra note 67, at 10 (claiming that the P.W.C.'s credibility with the Hong Kong
people reached its nadir on the eve of its supersession by the Preparatory
Committee).
109 See Andy Ho, All's Well on the Economic Front, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 31, 1996, at 17.
110 See, e.g., Danny Gittings & Dick Chan, Push Ahead on Reforms, Says
Survey, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 20, 1994, at 1 (describing the mixed
picture of support for democracy and disagreement about the pace of change
in an early 1994 poll); Hong Kong's Clash of Wills, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992,
at 16 (describing the slight fall in popular support for Patten reforms in the
wake of weeks of P.R.C. criticism).
"' See, e.g., Hong Kong: Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, supra note 26,
at 11; C.K. Lau, Democracy Is Out for the Count, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 11, 1995, at 17.
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the institutional arrangements favored by the P.R.C. did not
reliably translate into ardent popular support for Governor
Patten's or Legco democrats' positions. Even the most zealous
opponents of China's plans conceded that popular attitudes about
the legislature and democratic reform included a desire to avoid
fruitless conflict with the territory's future masters and a pragmat-
ic inclination not to challenge a fait accompli. At the very least,
Hong Kongers' apparent confidence in the territory's economy
and moderate and stable emigration rates suggested that there were
limits to the intensity of the Hong Kong people's opposition to
the expected fate of democratic reforms and the last colonial
Legco.
Faced with these difficulties, adherents to the liberal or pro-
democracy line argued that unfavorable indicators about the
people's actual preferences were misleading. Partisan commenta-
tors attributed low voter participation rates not to a lack of
support for the Patten reforms or other models of democratiza-
tion, but to other factors. Among the alternative causes cited
were the sudden and dramatic expansion of the eligible electorate
to include a vast number of inexperienced potential voters, a
cumbersome registration procedure, the illiteracy of nearly ten
percent of the potential electorate, the failure to strike emigres
from the voter rolls, the lack of an absentee ballot option, a desire
to register discontent with the colonial government by refusing to
participate in its elections, and a sense that voting would be futile
because Legco had never had much power in Hong Kong's
executive-led government or because the arrival of July 1, 1997
would bring the dissolution of the 1995-elected legislature.
112
Liberals and democrats further argued that the opinion polls
showing mixed or waning support reflected disagreements among
the people about the appropriate extent or pace of democratiza-
tion, not a genuine lack of popular enthusiasm for democracy.
Pro-democracy leaders also suggested that the seemingly weak
112 See supra note 111; see, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Colonial Standoff: Reforms
Bill Passed as Sino-Britisb Talks Stalemate, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 10, 1994,
at 22-23; do Rosario, supra note 89, at 14; Louise do Rosario, Sharp Distinction,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 7, 1995, at 28-29 [hereinafter do Rosario, Sharp
Distinction]; Hong Kong: Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, supra note 26;
Lau, supra note 111, at 17. In the 1995 elections, 2.6 million votes were cast,
or 36% of the much larger electorate than that which turned out at a 39% rate
to cast 1 million votes in the 1991 Legco elections. See Bruce Gilley, Old
Game, New Strategy, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 23, 1996, at 31-32.
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public support merely showed the people's reluctance to advocate
openly positions that China had sternly rejected, not a true lack
of popular sympathy with these positions.
113
Colonial officials and liberal politicians also predicted that,
regardless of what measures of public opinion might seem to
indicate, rolling back democracy after reversion would bring
instability to Hong Kong. One democratic politician warned
early in the debates over democratic reform, "[U]nless, and until,
Britain and China are both willing and ready to address the issue
... [t]here will continue to be discontent, which will bubble to
the surface at regular intervals." 4 Patten asserted that if China
went forward with plans to roll back democratic reforms, it
would face the difficult task of having "to explain that to the
hundreds of thousands of people in Hong Kong who will have
taken part in elections in a calm, sensible and competent
way." 1 15  Failing to accomplish the nearly impossible task of
convincing the people of the need to take such measures, Patten
implied, would be costly to China and its Hong Kong allies.
Patten, Emily Lau, and others were more blunt and strident in
their comments about the Provisional Legislature arrangement on
the eve of reversion, dubbing it a recipe for "chaos" in Hong
Kong.
116
Colonial government officials and Hong Kong's pro-democra-
cy politicians also recognized that they needed to cultivate, rather
than simply to assert or predict, popular support. Accordingly,
many of their arguments to and about the Hong Kong people
seemed designed to alter popular preferences. When Governor
Patten and the liberals in Legco made impassioned and highly
public proclamations that the people supported their proposals -
especially when they proudly recounted Hong Kongers' successful
113 For one version of the "silent majority" argument, see Wong, supra note
61, at 14.
114 Time for Us To Command Respect, supra note 90.
11 The China Prism, FAR E. ECON. REV, Oct. 13, 1994, at 16 (interviewing
Governor Patten).
116 See Bruce Gilley, Standing Pat: Governor Patten Won't Bend to Tycoon's
Pleas, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 30, 1996, at 16 (quoting Governor Patten on
the unacceptability of compromise proposals on the Provisional Legislature);
Yojana Sharma, Hong Kong: Two Legislatures, One in Hong Kong, One in
Shenzhen, Inter Press Serv., Dec. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File (quoting Emily Lau on the coexistence of the Provisional Legislature
and Legco).
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participation in democratic elections, or invoked the special and
distinct interests and character of the Hong Kong people - these
skilled politicians were surely seeking to persuade the people, and
not just to depict popular attitudes accurately. Hong Kong
government and liberal warnings that reversing democratic
changes after 1997 would trigger popular discontent also can not
be taken entirely at face value. They suggested a darker side of
the liberal-democratic strategy to develop mass support: the dire
predictions of "chaos" appeared to be, in part, attempts to move
the people to support democratization by appealing to their fears
of instability.
At times, colonial officials and pro-democracy politicians were
more explicit about the transformative nature of their project. In
the Legco debates over Patten's proposals to reform the election
laws, Szeto Wah commented, "A vote today can decide the
attitude of the Hong Kong people towards 1997 - whether it is
to kowtow or [to show] no fear." 17 It was a matter of leading,
as well as reflecting, popular attitudes."' Much later in the
endgame, Emily Lau was a good deal more blunt about the task
and perhaps less confident about the Democrats' ability to
accomplish it. She noted that Hong Kong people still needed to
be shown that democracy was "a good system that produces good
results. If I can instill in the hearts of the people of Hong Kong
a determination and desire for democracy," Lau added, "then I
will have succeeded."" 19
The colonial authorities' and liberal politicians' attempts to
shape popular opinions also included arguments that linked
China's rejection of late colonial democratic reforms to the
prospect of a betrayal of promises of autonomy and continuity in
a legal, economic, and social order that the Hong Kong people
valued. Governor Patten asserted, "If the Chinese dismantle
[Legco electoral] arrangements which everybody accepts are fair
and open, then it would be a step back from what Hong Kong
has been promised."12 Patten suggested that for Beijing not "to
117 What the Legislators Said, supra note 87, at 6.
"s See id.
119 Kristin Choo, Days of Rage: The Voice of Democracy for Hong Kong
Throws Down the Gauntlet, Again, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1996, at 3.
120 Nick Rufford, China Watches as Colony Holds Last Election, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 1995, at 21.
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allow a fair vote for those who run our territory" would cast into
serious doubt China's professed principle of allowing Hong Kong
people to rule Hong Kong and China's intention to "honour the
undertakings given to the [Hong Kong] people" in the Joint
Declaration."' Martin Lee asserted that the adoption of the
Provisional Legislature arrangement had "shattered" the P.R.C.'s
"solemn promises" in the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration of
"'a legislature constituted by elections' and 'a high degree of
autonomy.'" ' 2 Lee warned more specifically that a Provisional
Legislature unaccountable to the people of Hong Kong could not
be expected to safeguard the people's human rights, which the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law had also promised to
preserve. lf Lee added that the Provisional Legislature, like the
P.W.C. before it, would endorse laws that served the interests and
implemented the will of Beijing, without regard for the needs and
wishes of the people of Hong Kong.124
A final strand in liberal politicians' and colonial officials'
arguments targeting the people of Hong Kong drew upon the
basic rule-of-law ideas that bound together the broadly liberal-
democratic perspective on legal and institutional issues in
transitional Hong Kong. This line of argument sought to
combine persuasive statements of elements of the liberal-democrat-
ic camp's vision of a just legal and institutional order for Hong
Kong with assertions that the people of Hong Kong did or could
embrace those principles. Thus, Governor Patten explained that
the Sino-British negotiations over his electoral reform plan had
stalled in 1993 when they "came to the heart of the Chinese
position," which was to insist upon the exclusion of the Demo-
cratic Party from a legislature that would survive the transition.
Given what the governor took to be sixty to seventy percent
popular support for the Democratic Party, the Chinese stance was,
as Patten saw it, irreconcilable with both the views of the Hong
Kong people and with minimal democratic principles. Patten
added that replacing the elected Legco with an appointed Provi-
1 Fung & Won, supra note 31.
Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67.
1 See HK's Lee Says Colony Must Elect Own Legi.lature, Reuters, June 29,
1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi F"e.
124 See Yojana Sharma, Democrats Disheartened by Beijing's Selction, Inter
Press Service, Dec. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(quoting Martin Lee); Fung & Chan, supra note 101, at 4.
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sional Legislature was not only unpopular but also "plainly
wrong.""25 Patten further argued that rolling back democratic
reforms would stifle the "natural momentum of the development
of civic consciousness and the creation of the institutions of civil
society in Hong Kong," and also would ignore the recently
expressed preferences of millions of voters.126
At the beginning of the Patten administration, Emily Lau had
offered an argument similarly grounded in both normative
principles and purported public preferences. She asserted that
leaving behind strong democratic institutions in 1997 was
"necess[ary] and desirab[le]" in its own right, as well as essential
to the realization of the true "aspirations" of the Hong Kong
people.1 27 Just months before reversion, Lau argued that "with
the end of colonial rule the only way to set up a legitimate
legislature is to allow the Hong Kong people to elect it through
universal suffrage" - a process that was uniquely able to yield a
law-making body that would reflect the people's positions on
democracy and other issues. In the same vein, Martin Lee
articulated his view that the position of representative of the
people of Hong Kong, even if held only by virtue of Beijing's
appointment, was a position that imposed a "solemn responsibili-
ty" to reflect accurately the popular will and to "defend Hong
Kong's way of life" and the Joint Declaration, including its pledge
to allow democratic elections. 29
125 Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3; see also Lawrence Chung, China,
Britain Trade Verbal Broadside as Votes Cast for Assembly, Agence France Presse,
Dec. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing
Governor Patten's and Foreign Secretary Rifkind's criticism of the election of
the Provisional Legislature as an assault on democracy and a disregard for the
expressed preferences of the Hong Kong people).
126 The China Prism, supra note 115, at 16.
27 Emily Lau, Letter from Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 9, 1992,
at 24 (emphasis added).
12 Hong Kong Protestors Condemn Interim Legislature, Reuters, Dec. 20,
1996 (emphasis added), available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; cf.
"Business as Usual" Post-1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1996, at 1
(quoting Chief Secretary Anson Chan's comment that "'[i]t goes without saying
that a legitimate and trily representative le&islature will do much to give confi-
dence to the people of Hong Kong"). While the Hong Kong government did
not view a representative legislature as one necessarily based on universal
suffrage, the lifiking of legitimacy and democratic representation is similar to
that reflected in Emily Lau's comments.
.29 Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10; see also Connie Law &
Louis Won, Pledge To Stand Firm on Party Principles, S. CHINA MORNING
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In this line of argument, appeals to Hong Kongers' emergent
sense of local pride and political competence provided a crucial
bridge between invocation of liberal-democratic principles and
inculcation of popular preferences. For example, Governor Patten
initially explained his democratic reform proposals as "commit-
ment[s] to a system of values ... which has near its core the
proposition that the average man and woman of [Hong Kong] are
a great deal better than the average." 130 The territory's most
prominent legislator made a similar point a few years later when
he proclaimed, in the wake of the 1995 Legco elections, "We are
capable of being masters of our own house and of our own
destiny."131
Appeals to the people's self-confidence and sense of distinctive
accomplishment and character also served to rebut the China and
pro-China side's powerful plays to Hong Kongers' sense of
Chinese nationalism. Governor Patten derided China's "de[nunci-
ation of] fair elections in Hong Kong as something alien imported
into Hong Kong against the will of the people" and countered
that the turnout of millions of voters in the 1995 elections had
shown China's claim to be groundless.1 2  Facing strongly
nationalist criticism from China and its allies, Martin Lee carefully
explained that he was pro-reunification, pro-Hong Kong, pro-Joint
Declaration, and not pro-British. To support this contention, Lee
and other democrats could point to their considerable record of
disagreements with the territory's colonial rulers on democratiza-
tion and a host of other legal and political issues, and to the
Chinese-sovereignty-accepting premises of many of their criticisms
of the pro-China side.133 There were, this line of argument
indicated, no inevitable contradictions among liberal-democratic
values, loyalty to Hong Kong's interests and values, and Chinese
nationalism.
POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at 5 (noting Martin Lee's view that members of the
Preparatory Committee "must act as if they are the true representatives of the
people of Hong Kong even though they have not been elected by [the]
people").
130 A Different Style, supra note 44, at 22.
1 Gargan, supra note 92, at A8.
132 See Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3.
1 Law & Won, supra note 129, at 5; see Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra
note 67, at 10.
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22.3. The Court of Final Appeal, the Rule of Law, and
Other Popular Values
While the colonial government and Hong Kong's pro-democra-
cy politicians differed discernibly over "the people's" attitudes
toward democratization, the Bill of Rights, and related legal
reforms, a split between these two wings of the "liberal" or "pro-
democracy" forces was a central feature of the dispute over what
the people would or should think about proposed arrangements
for the S.A.R.'s Court of Final Appeal. Officials of the British
and colonial governments and Hong Kong's leading democratic
politicians agreed that the C.F.A. question was entwined with the
preservation of a rule of law for Hong Kong that was popular
with the territory's citizenry and vital to a just and viable order
for post-reversion Hong Kong. They differed over whether to
accept a Court established under the terms the Sino-British agree-
ments adopted in 1991 and in 1995 (after Legco had rejected
legislation to implement the 1991 accord).
More specifically, the U.K. and the Patten administration
backed, but prominent liberal and pro-democracy politicians
opposed, a C.F.A. arrangement that effectively limited to one the
number of foreign judges on the five-member bench, excluded
"acts of state" such as foreign affairs and defense from the court's
jurisdiction, and permitted the Court to be established a few years
before reversion, under the 1991 deal, or immediately after
reversion under the 1995 agreement. British and colonial officials
assured the territory's residents that a C.F.A. set up in accordance
with the Sino-British agreements was "in the interests of all the
people of Hong Kong."1 34  Central to those interests was the
preservation of the rule of law that Hong Kong people seemed so
clearly to value. Attorney General Mathews explained that "[t]he
Government has no doubt it is in the best interests of the people
13 Kate Chattaway, Hong Kong Council Urged To Back Court Deal, Press
Ass'n Newsfile, June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(quoting Baroness Chalker of the Foreign Office); see also A Court To Safeguard
Hong Kong, TIMES (London), June 14, 1995 (presenting a letter from Governor
Patten describing his conviction that the C.F.A. agreement was good for Hong
Kong"); HK Governor Leads Chorus of Calls To Pass Court Bill, Agence France
Presse, June 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting
Patten's statement that the 1995 deal was "'profoundly in the interests of the
people of Hong Kong").
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of Hong Kong to implement the 1991 agreement," in large part
because China had consented to continuance of an institution that
would serve as a "crucial symbol and an embodiment of the rule
of law."13 The Secretary for Constitutional Affairs conceded
that the 1991 deal might not be all that everyone wanted, but he
urged Legco members to accept that a "moderation of aspirations"
was in order. 136 Urging acceptance of the second deal, Patten
assured the territory's citizens, whom Patten elsewhere character-
ized as drawn to Hong Kong by its rule of law, that the 1995
agreement was still "a good one for... the rule of law in Hong
Kong."13 The bill to implement the 1995 accord, argued Chief
Secretary Anson Chan, would "ensure[] continuity of the rule of
law in Hong Kong through the transition" and "safeguard public
... confidence in Hong Kong."13
Rejecting the claims of democratic politicians, Hong Kong
government officials argued that the Court bill, in both the 1991
and the 1995 versions, gave the people of Hong Kong no reason
to conclude that the government was compromising, at the
eleventh hour, the rule of law.139 Rather, the Court bill would
give the Hong Kong people a stronger local legislative foundation
for the legal continuity that the framework legal arrangements for
the reversion promised them. Attorney General Mathews argued
that the bill to implement the 1991 deal was fully "consistent with
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law."1' Although "some
members of the legal profession," including many of the terri-
tory's leading liberal politicians, doubted this conclusion, Mathews
stressed that it was "supported by a number of authoritative
independent opinions."' 4' In London, the Foreign Office took
135 Courting the Right Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 2, 1995, at 13.
136 Stacy Mosher, Court of Contention, FAR E. EcON REv., Dec. 19, 1991,
at 10.
137 A Court To Safeguard Hong Kong, supra note 134.
138 Chris Yeung et al., Fight Not Over, Says Martin Lee, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 27, 1995, at 1.
139 For an example of colonial authorities' opposition to, and exasperation
with, such arguments, see, for example, Maggie Farley, Britain's Governor Chris
Patten: Unmade in Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at A4 (citing Patten's
statement that with "[o]ne deal with China and suddenly, Martin Lee and
others are saying, 'It's all over, the game is up.'").
14 Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13.
141 Id.
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the same position with respect to the 1995 bill.'42 In the same
vein, Patten assured Hong Kongers that the legislation to
implement the 1995 accord provided for "a court that will, subject
to the Basic Law, have precisely the same function and jurisdiction
as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" in London,
which served as Hong Kong's highest court under colonial
rule.143 Government accounts stressed that the bill's provision
excluding acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs from the
Court's purview exactly tracked the language of the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law. Legco critics' claims that the
legislation took away something the people of Hong Kong
otherwise would have enjoyed were, the Attorney General
charged, "bizarre in the extreme, ... wholly irresponsible, ...
totally misleading and very damaging to confidence of Hong
Kong's future."' 44 The limitation on the number of foreign
judges, this line of argument continued, was consistent with the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and thus not a cause for new
worries among the people. In those legal texts, the Attorney
General explained, the references to foreign "judges" easily meant
one judge at a time and, the provisions permitting foreign judges
to be invited "as required" did not mean "as it [i.e., the Court] re-
")145quires.
142 See, e.g., Chattaway, supra note 134. Compare Court of Final Appeal
Ordinance (1995), reprnted in 35 I.L.M. 207 (1996) with Basic Law, supra note
21, arts. 80-96 and Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art. 3(3), annex I, S III.
143 Simon Holberton, Hong Kong Law Under Chinese Law: The Interface
Between Basic and Common Law, FIN. TIMEs, June 12, 1995, at 3. Governor
Patten's qualifying phrase "subject to the Basic Law" troubled liberal and
democratic politicians who viewed it as a possible sign of acquiescence in
China's efforts to restrict the Court's jurisdiction and thereby undermine the
rule of law. As these critics saw it, the "acts of state" provisions in the C.F.A.
bill and the Basic Law and the rovision in the Basic Law that assigned
interpretive power to the N.P.C. threatened to leave the Court with too little
power. Patten's qualifying phrase suggested that Patten was accepting that
arrangement. Elsewhere, however, Patten was less equivocal and stated that he
would never support "the establishment of a court which failed to continue the
jurisdictional rol-e of the Privy Council." Frank Ching, Patten Accord: A Mixed
Blessing, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 29, 1995, at 36; see also Danny Gittings,
Leaks Reveal Real Deception, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 10, 1997, at 10
(describing Patten's disclosure that he believed the inclusion of the "acts of
state" exception was a mistake by the British).
144 A-G Rejects Attack on Rule of Law, supra note 34, at 5.
141 Kevin Hamlin, Law: Agreeing with Whatever Peking Wants, INDEPEN-
DENT (London), Dec. 20, 1991, at 16. Mathews' argument about the number
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The question of the people's views about the date of the
Court's establishment was trickier for proponents of the C.F.A.
deals. When the 1991 deal still held the prospect of setting up the
Court well in advance of reversion, Hong Kong government
officials stressed that this early establishment should and would
appeal to the territory's residents. The Attorney General, the
Chief Secretary, and others emphatically stated the government's
position that implementing the 1991 agreement and setting up a
C.F.A. before 1997 was "in the best interests of the people of
Hong Kong."' 46 When China backed away from the 1991
accord in the months before the second deal, Patten warned of the
consequences of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Director
Lu Ping's suggestion that judges appointed to a Court established
under an ordinance belatedly implementing the first agreement
might not be allowed to remain on the S.A.R.'s highest bench.
The Governor cautioned that these remarks, which he saw as
inconsistent with a meaningful pre-reversion establishment of the
Court, would create confusion among the people of Hong Kong
and undermine their confidence in the territory's rule of law. 47
If the court were not set up before 1997, an official government
statement similarly warned, there would be a "judicial vacuum" at
the time of reversion and "public... confidence in Hong Kong's
legal system" would be "seriously undermined."
14 1
When the 1995 accord decisively eliminated the possibility that
the Court could be set up with P.R.C. consent before reversion,
Hong Kong government proponents of legislation to implement
the new deal had to offer different arguments for why the people
would or should find an immediately post-reversion establishment
date appealing. The principal claim was that the Hong Kong
of judges drew additional support from a much-noted ambiguity in the Chinese
text, in which the relevant term "faguan" translates equally well as "judge" and
"judg~es." See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 82.
Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13 (quoting the Attorney
General); see also RJ.F. Hoare, Bill Does Not Contravene Joint Declaration, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 19, 1994, at 20 (presenting similar comments
from the Director of Administration of the Government Secretariat R.J.F.
Hoare, a frequent spokesman for the government's position on the C.F.A.
bills); Louis Won & Lok Wong, From Politicians: Outrage, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 10, 1995, at 3 (quoting the Attorney General and Chief Secretary).
"' See Fung Wai-kong, Court Row Threatens Rule of Law - Patten, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 1994, at 1.
14 Louise do Rosario, No Appeal, FARE. ECON. REV., May 18, 1995, at 22.
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people did or must recognize that failing to implement the deal
would leave important matters dangerously unsettled. Attorney
General Mathews explained that "[t]he alternative of rejecting the
bill [would] leave the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after 1 July
1997, creating damaging and unnecessary uncertainty about the
eventual form of the Court of Final Appeal." Chief Secretary
Anson Chan warned that supporting the symbolic "no confi-
dence" motion that Legco democrats introduced to demonstrate
their opposition to the 1995 C.F.A. bill would shake foreign
investors' confidence in the territory, leaving "the ordinary men
and women of Hong Kong [to] suffer." 15° On the other hand,
Chan argued, passing the 1995 bill would eliminate the "uncertain-
ty about the establishment of the Court" that had plagued people
in Hong Kong for "too long" and had had "a damaging effect on
confidence in the judicial system."151 As the U.K.'s Foreign
Office phrased argument, Legco's acceptance of the 1995 Court
deal would allow "this matter [to be] cleared up for the sake of all
the people of Hong Kong."
152
These arguments from government sources in Hong Kong and
London were primarily efforts to persuade a public that the
C.F.A. bills' proponents recognized was not favorably disposed to
the Court deals. Raising the specter of the damage to Hong
149 HK Governor Leads Chorus of Calls To Pass Court Bill, supra note 134;
see also Diane Stormont, Hong Kong Legislators Set To Back Court Bill, Reuters,
July 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (q uoting Mathews'
description of the consequences of not accepting the 1995 bd1 as "continuing
uncertainty, continuing anxiety, continuing doubt and consequent loss ot
confidence"). The uncertainty that attended the absence of establishing the
C.F.A., a senior Hong Kong government official explained, had "been a source
of great concern to the people of Hong Kong." R.J.F. Hoare, Passing Bill in
Best Interests of HK, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1995, at 16 (presenting
a letter from the Director of Administration of the Government Secretariat).
150 Chris Yeung & No Kwai-yan, Governor Survives Vote, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 13, 1995, at 1; see also Fanny Wong, Reaction to Censure
Reflects Concern, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 19, 1997, at 14 (quoting
Patten's criticism of Martin Lee for spreading misleading messages about Hong
Kong by speaking ill of the 1995 C.F.A. agreement). Governor Patten asked
rhetorically "What good can it possibly do to shake people's confidence in
Hong Kong?" Id.
l5' Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1; see also A Court To Safeguard Hong
Kong, supra note 134 (quoting Patten that the 1995 "agreement avoids ...
further uncertainties for Hong Kong people").
152 Chattaway, supra note 134.
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Kong's society, economy and hallowed rule of law that would
attend the proposed legislation's rejection was a tactic that sought
to pressure, not merely to describe, the public. More subtly, the
proponents' repeated invocation of the people's "interests" -
rather than the people's "will" or "preferences" - suggested that
the aim was to persuade the people to act and think in ways that
departed from their immediate inclinations. Nonetheless, British
and colonial authorities did not concede that the C.F.A. deals ran
seriously afoul of popular preferences. Their arguments concern-
ing the proposed legislation's efficacy in maintaining the rule of
law proceeded from the premise that the people in fact were
deeply attached to that rule of law. Further, the robust belief in
popular rationality that ran through the public comments of
senior colonial government officials suggested that they believed
the people would ultimately bring their preferences into line with
their interests.
Moreover, outwardly at least, officials of the British and Hong
Kong governments at times expressed considerable confidence that
the Hong Kong people already shared their views on the Court
deals, or would do so after minimal explanation. A senior British
negotiator opined that "people will agree we have done the right
thing" once they "look at the alternatives" of leaving decisions on
the Court's formation to be made after 1997 or acting unilaterally
to establish a Court that would likely not survive the transi-
tion."53 Similarly, Patten commented on Legco's passage of the
1995 C.F.A. bill: "I am sure it will be welcomed by the whole
community.., as a vote of confidence in Hong Kong's future."
Patten also pointed to an early poll showing "three to one
support" for the 1995 agreement as a basis for his conviction that
"most people in Hong Kong believe[d]" that the deal was "a good
one.
" 15%
Hong Kong's most prominent pro-democracy politicians
maintained that the British and colonial authorities thoroughly
mischaracterized the choices facing the people of Hong Kong and
... Louise do Rosario, A Court Too Far, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995,
at 20.
154 Diane Stormont, HK Legislators Pass Final Appeal Court Bill, Reuters,
July 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; A Court To
Safeguard Hong Kong, supra note 134; see also, Hoare, supra note 149, at 16
(presenting a senior colonial government official's comment that "the people
of Hong Kong" had given the 1995 C.F.A. deal "a warm welcome").
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the people's probable attitudes toward the situation. They too
accepted that there were close connections between arrangements
for the S.A.R.'s highest court and the preservation of the rule of
law, but they argued that the relationship was not the one that
proponents of the C.F.A. legislation asserted. Democratic Party
leaders charged that the Court deal that the British pushed
through in 1995 spelled the "downfall of the rule of law in Hong
Kong," and was a "calculated condemnation of the Hong Kong
people to the grimmest possible future.""'5 They asserted that
the Court deal bargained away the rule of law, "Hong Kong's
most prized possession."156 In the wake of the 1995 C.F.A. bill's
passage, Martin Lee argued, "[I]t seems that hope is lost - not by
Hong Kong people, who know only too well the value of our
rule of law and way of life - but by the British Government and
Governor Christopher Patten, who have now compromised
irretrievably what would have been their greatest legacy to Hong
Kong.""'7 For Lee's Legco colleague Emily Lau, the colonial
master had asked the "Hong Kong people" not to "look a gift-
horse in the mouth" when it presented them with a deal that
"compromised" their "interests."158
More specifically, these liberal legislators and politicians argued
that Britain had "actually agreed with the Chinese Government to
extend" the act of state exception to the Court's jurisdiction "to
cover things which we know nothing about at the moment. "159
The common law, which was at the core of Hong Kong's rule of
law, thereby would be converted from "the common law as we
know it to a common law with Chinese characteristics,"', ° in
violation of the Joint Declaration's pledge that the existing
common law would "survive the transfer of sovereignty."161
Under this arrangement, the argument continued, "Hong Kong
people will never be able to challenge the Government" after
155 Yeung & No, supra note 150, at 1 (quoting Legco member Cheung Man-
kwong.
156 Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67;
see also do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20 (quoting Martin Lee).
157 Lee, supra note 102, at 19.
158 Emily Lau, Testing Timefor Political Players, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 24, 1995, at 18.
159 Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3.
160 Id.
161 A-G Rejects Attack on Rule of Law, supra note 34, at 5.
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1997,162 and the "public would not be protected by the rule of
law" that the people cherished and upon which they depend-
ed. 163
From the perspective of Hong Kong's leading liberal politi-
cians, the 1995 deal's postponement of the Court's establishment
date, coupled with the retention of the 1991 accord's limit on
foreign judges, posed equally serious threats to the rule of law that
the people desired. To a degree, the colonial authorities had
assessed correctly the need to implement the 1991 agreement.
Setting up the C.F.A. before reversion would heed a "clear call"
from the Hong Kong public,' 64 and was "desperately need[ed]
... to preserve" the people's freedoms.' 6 If China would not
agree, the Hong Kong government's unilateral establishment of
the C.F.A. before 1997 was the necessary and appropriate
course.
166
According to this line of argument, failure to have the Court
up and running before reversion, an outcome mandated by the
1995 agreement, would leave Hong Kong with a Court staffed by
judges who had attained their positions only after political
screening and selection by China or its lackeys in the undemo-
cratic and unlawful Provisional Legislature. Pro-democracy
independent legislator, lawyer, and columnist Margaret Ng
concluded that this arrangement would remove the last "built-in
safeguard of the independence of the Judiciary" and of the rule of
law. 6 1 It was, in Ng's view, the final absurdity of the transition
awaiting Hong Kong's public. 6
Leading pro-democracy politicians and legislators also rejected
British and colonial authorities' arguments that the people of
Hong Kong should and would welcome the 1995 Court bill
162 In a State of Legal Confusion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 17, 1995,
at 17.
163 Clauses Raise Worries on Human Rights After '97, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 27, 1995, at 5.
164 Louise do Rosario, Cold Shoulder, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 1, 1995, at
24-25 (quoting the spokesperson for independent, liberal Legco member
Christine Loh).
165 Martin C.M. Lee, Enter the Dragon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at A27.
166 See Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note
67.
167 Ng, supra note 42, at 21.
168 See id.; Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra
note 67.
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because it would reduce uncertainty. It was "not true that any
Court of Final Appeal which is certain to survive 1997 is better
than uncertainty," argued one prominent Legco member. 69
Legco members from the political parties with the strongest
popular support in Hong Kong similarly concluded that "remo-
v[ing] the uncertainty about our legal system.., at the cost of the
rule of law itself" was not compatible with their constituents'
interests or wishes, and accordingly opposed the 1995 bill.170
From this perspective, the fact that Legco passed the 1995
C.F.A. legislation said little about the people's preferences. After
all, Legco had rejected a slightly more appealing bill in 1991. In
addition, the government rushed the 1995 bill through before the
1995 elections could bring more democrats into the chamber, and
the government had presented the 1995 bill to Legco as a fait
accompli not open for debate or revision. 171 Moreover, although
Martin Lee failed to win passage of a no-confidence motion against
the governor for supporting the 1995 C.F.A. legislation, he
asserted that he had nonetheless succeeded "in showing Hong
Kong people how Mr. Patten had betrayed the rule of law."
1 72
He pledged that the Democratic Party would "continue to fight
for a real Court of Final Appeal and the preservation of the rule
of law" and "to see to it that Governor Patten and the British
Government are judged in the court of public opinion."173
On the whole, liberal and pro-democracy legislators' and
politicians' arguments about popular attitudes toward the C.F.A.
often assumed or asserted significant existing popular opposition
to the Court deals, or at least to what liberal critics claimed the
169 Margaret Ng, Undermining the Right to Legal Redress, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 20, 1995 at 21.
170 Martin Lee, The Courtship of Mr. Hoare, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 27,
1995, at 4. For support for the proposition that the parties were attuned to
their constituents' preferences on this issue, opponents of the bill could point
to public opinion surveys suggesting extremely low expectations of the Court
system that would be provied under the Sino-British accords. Even in 1993,
when the 1991 deal was still consideredpossible, a poll found that more than
half of the territory's residents thought it would not be possible to sue
successfully the government after July 1, 1997, and nearly half thought it would
not be possible to sue successfully mainland companies after 1997. See
Jacqueline Leong, A Few Points of Law for Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at 11.
171 See, e.g., Ching, supra note 143, at 36.
172 Yeung & No, supra note 150, at 1.
173 Lee, supra note 102, at 19.
1997]
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
C.F.A. bills portended for the rule of law. Nonetheless, there
seemed to be significant limits to their confidence that the Hong
Kong people were already solidly on their side. Many of the
foregoing analyses of the C.F.A. arrangements' flaws emphasized
the people's "interests," with only occasional invocations of the
people's existing preferences. That feature often made the critics'
arguments, like those of their opponents in the British and
colonial governments, sound more like efforts to persuade the
people and less like descriptions of established popular views, with
implicit cautions about the costs of disregarding them.
The somewhat crusading, even quixotic, tone of Lee's com-
ments in the wake of the failed no-confidence motion further
suggests some recognition in liberal and democratic quarters that
popular support for their position on the Court deals was shaky
and that persuading the people to back the critics' positions would
be difficult. Compared to the individual rights issues at stake in
the controversy over the Bill of Rights and the principles of
democracy at issue in the conflict over electoral reform, the
C.F.A. controversy raised less immediate and emotional concerns.
The court that the C.F.A. was supposed to "replace," the Privy
Council in London, doubtless seemed a remote legal institution
compared to recently enacted local rights legislation and the
territory's highly visible and recently invigorated legislature.
Moreover, for all the evident popular embrace of the rule of law,
there was relatively little love for the heavily expatriate, procedur-
ally prolix, and predominantly English language-based judiciary
that democrats and liberals said was at risk.'74 In any event, the
alliance of the P.R.C. and the British authorities in favor of the
C.F.A. bill surely appeared formidable, perhaps even futile to
oppose.
Faced with such obstacles to securing firm popular support,
liberal and democratic leaders in the territory sought to link the
Court issue not only to popular rule-of-law concerns but also to
other values that they thought were appealing to the Hong Kong
people. Arguments reflecting this strategy also produced addition-
al points of conflict with the British and colonial government
authorities in the battle over popular attitudes toward the Court
'4 See, e.g., Ming K. Chan, The Imperfect Legacy, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 133, 135-40 (1997); "Dickensian" System Adds to Frustration, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 28, 1994, at 6; Leong, supra note 170, at 5.
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bills. Liberal and pro-democracy political leaders asserted that,
contrary to claims from the colonial administration and London,
the Sino-British deals concerning the C.F.A. compromised the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and thus portended a broader
betrayal of legal promises that the people held dear. Legco
opponents of the 1991 bill argued that the dispute over foreign
judges was not just about the number of foreign judges that the
Joint Declaration or the Basic Law required, or even about
whether the provision on the Court's composition fatally
undercut the special ability of politically insulated foreign judges
to protect the rule of law that the people valued. Beyond these
important issues, the controversy was also about the broader
integrity of the S.A.R.'s framework legal arrangements which, if
breached with respect to the Court, would unravel further and
lead to the Hong Kong people's loss of many other rights and
freedoms through Sino-British collusion.175
In the view of prominent pro-democracy politician and
journalist Emily Lau, the "C.F.A. saga" was "symptomatic of
political developments in Hong Kong in general" in which
"Chinese pronouncements which are in breach of the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law" were routinely accepted and "the
interests of the Hong Kong people" were regularly "compro-
mised." 6 With the 1995 deal implemented, Martin Lee opined,
the Hong Kong people had reason to, and did, fear a final two
years of British rule marked by repeated sacrifices of their
interests on the altar of Sino-British cooperationY77 More
specifically, this line of argument asserted that the "act of state"
provisions that the proponents of the C.F.A. deals sought to
dismiss as innocuous threatened the rights and liberties of the
territory's citizens. Martin Lee asserted that the failure to
circumscribe these "political" exceptions to the Court's jurisdic-
tion raised the prospect that "Hong Kong people" would be
"treated the same way" as their compatriots in China - a
frightening and troubling prospect for a people who, in the
controversies surrounding the Bill of Rights, showed that they
were "extremely concerned over any deprivation of individual
175 See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 136, at 10.
176 Lau, supra note 158, at 18.
1"7 See Lee, supra note 102, at 19.
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liberties."78
Liberal and democratic opponents of the C.F.A. bill argued
that the Court arrangement also imperiled the move toward
democracy and autonomy that the territory's citizens prized.
Patten's submission of the two, especially the first, C.F.A. bills to
Legco could be cast as a step forward for democracy in the
colony, giving the people's representatives a voice in the resolu-
tion of the Court issue.' 9 There was also some force to Solici-
tor General Daniel Fung's point that an insistence on more than
one foreign judge on the C.F.A. suggested an insulting lack of
confidence in Hong Kongers' abilities to staff their own legal
institutions. 1 0 Nonetheless, some pro-democracy politicians and
legislators viewed such factors as counting for little in light of a
C.F.A. deal-making process that "made a mockery" of Legco's
law- making powers,' 1 and confined "all decisions" to "secret
Sino-British negotiations" that went on "above Hong Kong
people's heads"8 2 and "treated the people of Hong Kong with
contempt."' From this perspective, the prospects for the
Court going forward into the S.A.R. period were equally bleak:
the Court's delayed, post-reversion establishment meant that the
democratically chosen representatives of the people would have no
say in the selection of the first C.F.A. judges. 84 Instead, the
undemocratic Provisional Legislature would confirm their
nominations. More fundamentally, and especially troubling given
the prospect of weak S.A.R. institutions, the Basic Law provisions
178 Linda Choy, We Fear Losing Rule of Law, Martin Lee Tells U.S. Bar, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at 4; see also Clauses Raise Worries on
Human Rights After 1997, supra note 163, at 5 (stating Martin Lee's concern
that the G.F.A. might not be able to hear cases such as the arrest of a Hong
Kong member of a local organization supporting democracy movements on the
mainland).
179 See Stacy Mosher, Right of Rejection, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 31, 1991,
at 13.
180 See Stacy Mosher, LocalJustice, FAR E. ECON REV., Oct. 10, 1991, at 11-
12.
181 Stormont, supra note 149.
182 Stephen Vines, Patten Shrugs Off Motion of No Confidence, INDEPEN-
DENT (London), June 23, 1995, at 15.
183 Stormont, supra note 149.
184 See Ng, supra note 42, at 17; No Kwai-yan, Fears Raised of Mouthpiece
Risk to Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 28, 1996, at 6 (describing the
views of leading liberal lawyer Gladys Li).
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conferring significant and seemingly "judicial" interpretive power
on the N.P.C. foretold that "the voice of the people in Hong
Kong would be excluded or ignored" on vital questions about how
Hong Kong would be governed."' 5
Liberal and pro-democracy political leaders' assertion of links
between the C.F.A. question and issues of rights and democracy,
like their more narrowly focused arguments stressing the connec-
tions between the terms of the Court's creation and the preserva-
tion of the rule of law, also blended normative arguments rooted
in a liberal-democratic vision of law and legality with arguments
addressed to the people's positions on the concrete legal and
institutional questions of the Court's composition, powers, and
establishment. Officials of the British and Hong Kong govern-
ments did the same thing in pursuit of an opposite result. Both
the colonial authorities and their antagonists among Legco
members and local political leaders asserted that their positions on
the proposed C.F.A. arrangement and its implications for other
politically charged, rule-of-law-related issues were right, as well as
actually or prospectively popular.
Although their shared normative principles were, thus, close
to the surface in such arguments, the intramural rift among
adherents to the broadly liberal democratic perspective persisted
with respect to the concrete legal and institutional questions at
issue. Thus, for example, Attorney General Mathews argued that
the government should establish a Court in keeping with the 1991
accord even if China had offered no guarantees of continuity, for
it was "clearly right, and clearly in the best interests of Hong
Kong" and the Hong Kong people to do so.186 Local liberals
and democratic politicians countered that they hoped that Britain
would forego choosing "what is expedient" over "what is right"
and would establish a Court with the powers and personnel that
liberal critics of the Sino-British C.F.A. deals thought were neces-
sary and proper.1 7  Martin Lee warned that Democrats would
"not allow the British government to betray Hong Kong people"
by acquiescing in the kind of practically and normatively
inadequate Court deal that the colonial government and London
185 Louise do Rosario, Papa Don't Preach, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 26,
1995, at 21.
186 Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13.
18 See id. (quoting a liberal solicitor); Lee, supra note 165, at A27.
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were pushing the Hong Kong people to accept."'
2.2.4. The Chief Executive. (Un)democratic Selection,
Substantive Positions, and "Representing Hong
Kong"
Although the split was less acrimonious and dramatic than in
the context of the conflict over the Court of Final Appeal, British
and colonial officials and liberal and democratic politicians in
Hong Kong also differed over the views that the Hong Kong
people held or should hold concerning the selection of the first
Chief Executive for the S.A.R. Legislators from the Democratic
Party, their pro-democracy independent colleagues, and liberal
commentators attacked the selection process and its outcome as
undemocratic and unpopular. These critics pointed out that
official Chinese sources had made clear that China would not
tolerate any surprises in the process and would insist on a
candidate acceptable to Beijing."9 They stressed that China had
summarily dismissed the idea of selecting the Chief Executive by
universal suffrage in Hong Kong, which some Legco democrats
had urged.1' 9 Commentators routinely noted that pro-China
politicians dominated the Selection Committee that chose a
nominee for appointment as Chief Executive by the Central
People's Government in Beijing. In addition, these commentators
also noted, the Selection Committee's nominal choice was from
among a handful of candidates on a short-list that P.R.C. officials
had developed. 91 Hong Kong liberals saw further evidence of
188 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1.
... See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Playing Favourites, FAR E. EcON. REV., Feb. 8,
1996, at 22-23 [hereinafter Giley, Playing Favourites] (describing the secretive
search process for candidates conducted under the auspices of Xinhua's Hong
Kong branch, and quoting pro-China and China-connected business leaders'
comment that China's preferences would weigh heavily in the Chief
Executive's selection); Bruce Gilley, The Common Touch, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Nov. 21, 1996, at 34 [hereinafter Gilley, The Common Touch] (quoting P.R.C.
Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Deputy Director Wang Fengchao's
statement that "[t]here will not be any more major tremors" in the Chief
Executive selection process, and describing Beijing's role in rejecting potential
candidates).
190 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Fight for Universal Suffrage Continues, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 5, 1996, at 18 (presenting the comments of the pro-
democracy legislator).
191 See, e.g, Frank Ching, Split in Beijing over Hong Kong, FAR E. EcoN.
REV., Apr. 13, 1995, at 34; Gilley, The Common Touch, supra note 189, at 34;
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONG'S END GAME (U)
the closed and predetermined nature of the selection process in the
event that Hong Kongers perceived to be the determinative public
signal of Tung Chee-hwa's selection for the post. By singling out
Tung for the first handshake among a delegation of Hong Kongers
in Beijing, Chinese Party chief Jiang Zemin was, in pro-democracy
legislator Emily Lau's words, "using his body language to tell us
all to shut up" months before the Selection Committee was to
vote.
192
According to the liberal critics, attempts by China, its Hong
Kong allies, and others to portray the process as democratic and
reflective of the views of the Hong Kong people were unconvinc-
ing and even preposterous. One columnist asserted that "no one
in Hong Kong today believes that Hong Kong people will be able
to choose their chief executive." 93 In Emily Lau's assessment,
efforts to portray a genuinely contested race were "a slap in the
face to the people of Hong Kong, who kn[e]w full well that they
[would] have no say over the choice of Chief Executive."194
When the Selection Committee met to choose Tung, it was, Lau
added, a sham election in which the people of Hong Kong had
been "denied the right to self-determination and democracy."9'
The liberal critics' claim that the people were unhappy with
the selection process found some support in a variety of indicators
of popular preference. The group of nominees considered by the
Selection Committee conspicuously omitted Chief Secretary
Anson Chan, who routinely finished ahead of all others in surveys
of public opinion, but who had an apparently disqualifying
history of spats with Beijing and especially strong ties to the
British colonial administration.196 Moreover, public opinion
polls found considerable popular dissatisfaction with the process
Emily Lau, What Race for Chief Executive?, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Sept. 12,
1996, at 6.
192 Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 34.
193 Frank Cling, China Interfering in Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Dec. 28, 1995 & Jan. 4, 1996, at 31.
194 Lau, supra note 191.
195 Choo, supra note 119, at 3 (quoting Emily Lau). A no-confidence
motion offered against the new Chief Executive-designate was supported by
most Legco liberals but fell short of a majority. See id.
196 For reports of some of the many polls showing Anson Chan easily out-
distancing the field of actual and potential candidates, see, for example, Lo Tak-
shing Seeks To Govern in Hong Kong, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1996; 7he Trials of
Martyr Lee, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 27, 1996, at 5.
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used to choose the S.A.R.'s first leader.19 Still, even ardent
democrats recognized that widespread disaffection did not
automatically generate meaningful popular pressure to correct or
ameliorate perceived deficiencies or their consequences. Generally,
liberal critics' frequent assertions that the Chief Executive
selection process was undemocratic and excluded the people
seemed meant to rouse the people to anger, not merely to reflect
their established discontent. Seemingly conceding that existing
public sentiment might provide inadequate support for the
liberals' and democrats' positions, Emily Lau stated that the
people of Hong Kong "may be too smart to fall for" so "blatant
[a] ploy" as Beijing's claim to provide democracy, but they still
needed to "learn that they have to assert themselves if they want
to have some say over their destiny."198
Although they shared liberal and pro-democracy politicans'
conclusion that a highly undemocratic method for selecting the
Chief Executive would run afoul of popular interests and
preferences in Hong Kong, the territory's departing colonial
masters had no desire to pursue an agenda of persuading the
people to offer more assertive opposition to the process and its
outcome. Compared to Legco liberals and democrats, British
authorities struck a less confrontational stance and presented a
more modest account of the people's desires and the requirements
of an adequate selection process. The Hong Kong government
had pledged early on to cooperate with a Chief Executive-
designate to be chosen under the framework set forth in the Basic
Law.'99 Indeed, Patten had urged an early selection of an
occupant for the post in order to permit a smoother and more
orderly transition and resolution of legal and other issues of
concern to Hong Kongers.2' Moreover, a colonial administra-
tion that could not claim a democratic mandate from Hong
Kongers for its top officials was in a poor position to do more
197 See, eg., Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-'97 Lis Survey Shows, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 5 (finding one-third of respondents
saying that the selection process was fair and an equal share saying it was
unfair).
198 Lau, supra note 191.
199 For a restatement of that position on the eve of the selection, see The
Policy Address, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1996, at 4 (providing a text
of Governor Patten's final annual policy address).
20" See Gilley, supra note 116.
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than to press temperately the notion that the selection process
should not disregard democratic norms and the views of the
people. Patten expressed "hope that the process of selection,"
conducted under the framework China had put in place, would be
"as open, fair, and broadly based as possible." Patten explained
that a process that fell short of this standard would lead many to
"wonder with some justice what all the fuss has been about," and
would leave Hong Kong with a Chief Executive who likely would
lack public credibility, popular support, and the loyalty of the
Hong Kong people. Such a result, the governor cautioned, would
be neither well-received in Hong Kong nor sensible for
Beijing.20 1
Recognizing that they had little hope of altering the selection
process or affecting its outcome, Hong Kong liberals and pro-
democracy politicians focused on how the people might view
Tung Chee-hwa's use of the office. They sought to rally popular
sentiments that would press Tung Chee-hwa to pursue policies
that liberals and democrats saw as acceptable. They argued that
Tung's embrace of the P.R.C.'s positions on the key legal-institu-
tional issues of the endgame was making Hong Kong people
worried and disaffected and leaving Tung without vital popular
support. Specifically, Emily Lau argued that the process that
yielded Tung's appointment had "left Hong Kong people feeling
powerless and alienated" and "with the sagging feeling that Hong
Kong's free lifestyle and the rule of law will be undermined after
China takes over." 02 Adherents to this line of argument assert-
ed that Tung's early actions as Chief Executive-designate were
convincing the people that the "sagging feeling " was well-
founded. They claimed that Tung's support for cutting back the
Bill of Rights and overturning late colonial amendments to civil
and political liberties legislation abruptly ended Tung's "honey-
moon period with the Hong Kong people" and showed him to be
a "mouthpiece of Peking."2 3 One liberal commentary concern-
ing the same issue maintained that Tung was "ignoring the wishes
of the general public" when he endorsed proposals to roll back
201 Fung Wai-kong, Patten Pushes Open Selection, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 29, 1996, at 4.
202 Lau, supra note 191.
203 Lau, supra note 53; see also Ng, supra note 42, at 17 (noting a decline in
Tung Chee-hwa's popularity).
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changes to the Public Order and Societies Ordinances. 2?4 Other
liberal and democratic politicians and commentators added that
Tung's endorsement of the Provisional Legislature also severely
undercut his standing with the people.205
These critics of the Chief Executive-designate's early use of his
future office noted visible indications of public sentiment. One
prominent commentator pointed to the storm of criticism that
attended Tung's censure of Martin Lee for attacking Tung's views
on individual rights and the legislature. The commentator
suggested that this showed that Tung had failed to perceive
"people's underlying fears about the future" and therefore "may
have underestimated the public reaction to his remarks. "12, 6
Polls and conventional wisdom indicated that the values critics
claimed Tung was endangering ranked extremely high on Hong
Kong people's lists of what they wanted the Chief Executive to
help preserve. 207  Liberals and democrats were quick to point
out that Tung's popularity did sink noticeably in the wake of his
pronouncements on controversial legal issues of the endgame, and
to assert that a "silent majority" of Hong Kongers might be more
critical of Tung than his relatively strong approval ratings seemed
to suggest. 2°
Prominent liberal and pro-democracy politicians and like-
minded commentators pressed Tung not to pursue ill-conceived
and unpopular positions on key legal and institutional questions.
They urged him to represent the interests of the Hong Kong
people and to act as if he were the properly elected leader of the
territory's citizens. Thus, Martin Lee called on Tung "to change
204 Sharon Cheung & Angela Li, Protestors Tell Tung To Make Public
Apology, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at 6.
20. See, e.g., Linda Choy, Hong Kong Backs Shadow Body, Says Tung, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1; Peter Humphrey, Hong Kong Hit
by Handover Quarrels, Reuters, Feb. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (describing criticisms of Tung by Martin Lee and t e
Democratic Party); Ng, supra note 42, at 17.
206 Fanny Wong, Reaction to Censure Reflects Concern, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 19, 1997, at 14.
207 See Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-97List, Survey Shows, supra note 197
(showing that 90% of respondents identified judicial independence and Hong
Kong's autonomy as top priorities and 87% cited freeaom of speech and
expression).
20' See, eg., Ng, supra note 42; Popularity of Future HK Leader Hits New
Low - Poll, Reuters, Apr. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File; Wong, supra note 61, at 14, at 17.
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the unhappy fate that awaits Hong Kong" and to press China to
reconsider its decision to disband a legislature that enjoyed
popular support and had been popularly elected. °9 Emily Lau
argued that "[i]nstead of" accepting the Chief Executive's "follow-
ing the Chinese government's pronouncements rigidly" on the Bill
of Rights and other legal matters, "Hong Kong people expect Mr.
Tung to look at such proposals objectively and then to urge
Peking to respect local public opinion."210 Commenting before
Tung's formal selection, pro-democracy, independent legislator
Christine Loh stressed that the Chief Executive had to appear
"unequivocally to be acting in Hong Kong's interest." Loh
explained that this required being accountable to the people of
Hong Kong as well as to Beijing, and "tak[ing] the territory's side
if need be" to preserve the elected legislature and to protect
against the watering down of the Bill of Rights, which enshrined
the freedoms that "the public treasures." With such argu-
ments, the territory's leading liberal and pro-democracy politicians
again seemed to seek to do more than to tap existing popular
opinion to support their position on the legal-institutional issue
immediately at hand. By linking aspects of the Chief Executive
question with the fate of other rule-of-law-related values that
seemed to have strong popular appeal, they sought also to
cultivate strong backing among the people that their positions on
the Chief Executive question, more narrowly defined, might not
otherwise attract.
Committed to working with the incoming Chief Executive to
achieve an orderly transfer of governmental authority and
apparently disinclined to engage in another fruitless confrontation
with the P.R.C. over legal and institutional issues, British and
colonial officials took a much less forceful and expansive line than
the territory's pro-democracy politicians. For example, following
the N.P.C.'s vote to reject portions of the Bill of Rights and other
rights-protecting legal changes of the 1990s, Patten did not move
immediately to portray Tung's acceptance of the outcome as a
potentially decisive indication of the character of Tung or his
office. Rather, Patten urged Tung to consult openly with the
209 Humphrey, supra note 205.
210 Lau, supra note 53.
211 Christine Loh, Local Interests Must Take Priority, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 12, 1996, at 18.
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people before introducing new local legislation on civil and
political liberties.212 Similarly, on the eve of a visit to the
territory, British Foreign Secretary Rifkind was markedly cautious
and sympathetic to Tung's predicament, noting that Tung's
handling of the controversy surrounding the rights laws contro-
versy was "bound to be a very difficult and controversial task"
that would make it "difficult" for Tung to "please all of the
people."2 13 Rifkind hoped that Tung's consultation with Beijing
"could reduce the damage caused by the repealing of these
ordinances."214
At least implicitly, the arguments from both wings of the
divided liberal-democratic camp also intermingled claims about
what was right and just with claims about what was actually or
prospectively popular. When Hong Kong's most ardently liberal
and pro-democracy politicians focused many of their initial
criticisms of the Chief Executive selection process on issues of
democratic legitimacy, and when they linked their arguments
concerning the early use of the office-to-be with the normatively
charged conflicts over the fate of the Bill of Rights, democratic
reforms for Legco and more diffuse notions of representative
government, they were making the Chief Executive issue a part of
the broader debate about what a just and proper legal and
institutional order required. While this feature was more
prominent, and at times explicit, in the analyses and assertions of
legislators, activists and commentators who were highly critical of
the selection process and its aftermath, it was also present in the
arguments of British and colonial officials. In accepting or
defending the selection process and its results, the governments in
Hong Kong and in London were hardly prepared to dispute that
norms of democracy, liberty, and autonomy were, in some form,
right for Hong Kong and important to Hong Kongers. They and
their critics in Legco and among Hong Kong's liberal political
circles openly parted company only with respect to the narrower
and more concrete questions of what arrangements relating to the
office of Chief Executive were required by those normative
" See Fung Wai-kong, Patten Fears for Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 25, 1997, at 4.
13 Greg Torode & Duncan Hughes, Qian Sticks to His Guns in Final
Meeting with Ri/kind, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1.
214 Id.
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principles, backed by extant or plausibly emerging popular
demand, and permitted by transitional Hong Kong's circumstanc-
es.
2.3. The Hong Kong People and the China and pro-China Hong
Kong Vision of the Rule of Law
During the 1990s, Chinese officials and pro-China elements in
Hong Kong accepted that the rule of law was important to the
people of Hong Kong. Official Chinese and pro-China statements
assured the Hong Kong people that the S.A.R. would provide a
rule of law adequate for the citizenry of the territory. China
repeatedly stressed, especially in response to charges that some
P.R.C. moves imperiled vital legal and institutional arrangements,
that Hong Kong's rule of law would survive the territory's
reversion to Chinese rule. For example, Hong Kong and Macao
Affairs Office Director Lu Ping explained that the Chinese
government was well-prepared to effect a smooth transition in
Hong Kong's rule-of-law system, one that would keep Hong
Kong's laws "entirely different" from those of the mainland."'
Similarly, Prime Minister Li Peng declared that the territory's rule
of law would remain unchanged after July 1, 1997.216
While top official P.R.C. sources rarely went much further,
some pro-China Hong Kong sources more openly expressed an
appreciation of the rule of law's importance to the people of
Hong Kong. For example, Cheng Kai-nam, a leader of the
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong ("D.A.B."),
said that the rule of law was a vital part of what would "bring
about a better tomorrow" for Hong Kong.217 D.A.B. leader
Tsang Yok-sing, an often-quoted source for pro-China views,
commented that "[t]he importance of upholding the rule of law
[in Hong Kong] cannot be over-emphasized."218
Chinese officials and their allies in Hong Kong did not
promise the same rule of law, however, that Hong Kong's liberal
or pro-democracy politicians, or its colonial masters, asserted that
21 See Lu Ping Reiterates China's Policy on Hong Kong, Xinhua, June 18,
1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
216 See id.
217 Cheng Kai-nam, Need for Confidence, WINDOW, Sept. 27, 1996, at 16.
212 Tsang Yok-sing, Prophets of Doom Shooting HK in Foot, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 11, 1997, at 14.
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the people of Hong Kong wanted or needed. China and its closest
supporters in the territory did not accept that a rule of law for
Hong Kong had to satisfy substantively liberal notions of a just
and good legal order, or could disregard the limits that the Basic
Law imposed. Rather, they envisioned the rule of law as a set of
specific arrangements that the Chinese sovereign and its delegate,
the S.A.R. government, would provide through proper exercises
of discretionary sovereign authority, prudentially taking into
account the preferences and interests of the Hong Kong people.
Many of the key provisions of the Basic Law embodied this
positivist conception. The promised continuity in Hong Kong's
rule of law was to be provided to the Hong Kong people
primarily by implementation of the Basic Law's undertakings to
maintain Hong Kong's prior laws (including the common law)
and judicial system, preserve Hong Kong's capitalist system,
permit the extension of the territory's separate membership in
international legal regimes, continue protection of the rights
enshrined in the principal United Nations human rights covenants
(which were applicable to colonial Hong Kong), and accord the
territory a high degree of autonomy in legislative, executive, and
judicial affairs (and thus the capacity to preserve legal continu-
ity).
2 19
Comments from pro-China sources reflected a similarly
positivist perspective on Hong Kong's post-reversion legal order.
D.A.B. leader Cheng Kai-nam explained that it was the Basic Law
that would provide the necessary "protective talisman for [the]
Hong Kong people against any injustice."' 0  Cheng's colleague
Tsang Yok-sing asserted that the task China and the S.A.R.
government-in-waiting faced in answering doubts about the rule
of law was primarily "to convince people that the Basic Law
[would] be fully implemented." 1 Such comments suggested
219 See, e.g., Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 160 (concerning laws previous-
ly in force); d. art. 81 (concerning the maintenance of the judicial system); id.
arts. 150-52 (concerning the U.N. human rights covenants); id. art. 5 (concern-
ing the maintenance of the capitalist system); id. art. 2 (concerning the high
degree of autonomy); Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art. 3; see also id. annex
I, S I 1, 11, VI, XI, XIII (concerning the high degree of autonomy, the
maintenance of laws previously in force, the preservation of the judicial system,
the capitalist system, international legal relations, and the applicability of
standards set forth in the U.N. human rights covenants).
220 Cheng, supra note 217, at 16.
221 Tsang, supra note 218, at 14.
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little interest in, or tolerance for, appeals to fixed principles of
justice or sovereign obligation as measures of the propriety of
specific legal or institutional arrangements for the S.A.R.
Especially at moments of heightened tension between China
and British authorities or Hong Kong democracy activists, official
Chinese statements hedged even on a commitment to a narrowly
positivist vision, and suggested that a relatively robust rule of law
might not be important to the people of Hong Kong. This
tendency was especially pronounced in the comments of senior
Beijing leaders with portfolios not limited to Hong Kong. For
example, Chinese Politburo Standing Committee member Li
Ruihuan pointedly refused to attribute Hong Kong's success to
features the British had provided to the colony, including Hong
Kong's rule of law. Indeed, Li argued that the British did not
even "govern themselves very well" at home.' Party chief
Jiang Zemin said more explicitly that the rule of law had little to
do with Hong Kong's accomplishments.3 Li and Jiang asserted
that the key to the territory's success lay instead in the ability and
energy of the Hong Kong people, which presumably could survive
in the absence of many of the elements of the late colonial rule-of-
law regime.2 4 The D.A.B.'s Secretary General was more re-
strained in his analysis, but he nonetheless deemed the "special
quality of the Hong Kong people" to be more important than the
concededly significant rule of law in accounting for Hong Kong's
remarkable prosperity and vitality.m
Suggesting a broadly similar skepticism about the need to
preserve Hong Kong's prior rule of law, the pro-China press
provided extensive and highly favorable coverage when China's
choice for Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, embraced a version
of the "Asian values" theme in sketching his vision of Hong
" Text of Li Ruihuan's Remarks to Hong Kong and Macao Representatives
to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, WEN WEI P0, Mar. 14,
1995, at B5.
' See Frank Ching, Danger Signals for Hong Kong, FAR E. EcON. REV.,
Oct. 17, 1996, at 36.
24 See i.; Text of Li Ruihuan's Remarks to Hong Kong and Macao
Representatives to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, supra
note 222, at B5.
I Cheng, supra note 217, at 16.
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Kong's future." 6 Against the background of Singaporean senior
leader Lee Kuan Yew's long-standing critique of Western-style
rights-centered legality and after the Bangkok Declaration's more
formal articulation of an Eastern challenge to allegedly Western
human rights norms, "Asian values" had become a code word for
the rejection of many of the principles underpinning the rule-of-
law regime that Hong Kong's liberal and pro-democracy camp
claimed Hong Kongers needed and wanted.m In rejecting
Western criticisms and concerns, Tung seemed to be working
within this framework when he commented, "We are going to
find our own way forward, but it may not be the way you
like."2n Adopting this line of analysis, a leading pro-Beijing
newspaper in the territory quoted Tung's statements extensively
and endorsed the view that a legal order in line with Hong Kong's
unique and substantially Chinese culture and values would be in
accord with the true preferences of the Hong Kong people and
would assure the territory's continued stability and prosperity. In
both respects, this argument claimed, Tung's version of legality
would be superior to the uncritical perpetuation of a colonial
order.229
Confidence that the people would accept a species of legality
that was less than what liberals wanted and was compatible with
what China would countenance seems to have been high with
respect to the major concrete legal and institutional issues of
transitional Hong Kong's endgame. In these areas, China and its
Hong Kong supporters argued, the colonial government and
liberal politicians were trying to introduce changes that not only
exceeded what China had authorized or would accept, but also
went beyond what the people of Hong Kong had previously




29 See Tung Chee-hwa Clarifies Seven Points of Misunderstanding, Stressed
Hong Kong SAR Will Make Laws on Its Own, TA KUNG PAO, Feb. 5, 1997, at
A12 (presenting the Chief Executive-designate's description of Hong Kong as
a "mature community" that could "choose values suitable to itself" and "need
not copy" the West). For a contrary view from an independent legislator who
frequently sides with the Democrats, see Christine Loh, The Rights Stuff, FAR
E. ECON. REV., July 8, 1993, at 15 (arguing that indigenous Asian human rights
movements refute the claims from the P.R.C. that human rights are "foreign"
or "Western" concepts).
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (11)
enjoyed and could be presumed to want or require. China's sense
that, despite recent changes, Hong Kong's citizens remained
economic creatures who would accept any system that continued
to generate prosperity likely reinforced such views? 0°
2.3.1. The Bill of Rights and the People's Values and
Interests
When the Bill of Rights Ordinance emerged to the agenda of
Hong Kong politics, China and its allies made few public attempts
to assert or to build opposition to the proposed Ordinance among
the citizenry of Hong Kong. The colonial government, backed by
Parliament, appeared committed to adopting a Bill of Rights.
Popular distrust and dislike of the Beijing leadership were at peak
levels in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident. The institutional
mechanisms for nurturing and mobilizing mass public opinion
beyond a core of loyal activists in Hong Kong were in an even
weaker state on the pro-China left than they were on the
government's and pro-democracy politicians' side.2 ' China thus
tended to content itself with clear signals of its views to sympa-
thizers and warnings to prospective antagonists, via statements of
Beijing's opposition to the Ordinance and its intention to
overturn legal changes that it considered to be in conflict with the
Basic Law's requirements?.12  Beyond this, a few pro-China
members of Legco cautioned that the proposed Ordinance was not
adequately understood by the Hong Kong people and would
provoke an undesirable and ultimately unpopular confrontation
21 See Gilley, supra note 59, at 16.
231 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 24, at 72, 76 (describing belated moves to
establish a united front group to win over younger Hong Kongers who have
little experience or trust in the mainland); Emily Lau, Peking's Tune, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Aug. 23, 1990, at 22 (describing the struggles of fledgling pro-
China parties founded in response to new pro-democracy groupings); Stacy
Mosher, Liberal Landslide, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 12, 1991, at 19 (describing
the rout of pro-China candidates in elections for Legco held a few months after
the enactment of the Bill of Rights).
22 See, e.g., Zbang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion on Bill of Rights
Reasonable and Legitimate, WENWEI Po, Oct. 21, 1995, at Al (describing the
Chinese Foreign Ministry's "solemn statement" in 1991 expressing China's
disagreement with the colonial government's action and stating that China
reserved the right to take corrective action in the future).
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with China. 3 Official P.R.C. sources later derided the colonial
government for having ignored considerable opposition in Hong
Kong at the time of the Ordinance's enactment.23
As 1997 drew nearer, China clarified its plans to reverse some
key Bill of Rights provisions and amendments to the Societies and
Public Order Ordinances, which previously had imposed restrict-
ions on political activities and organization. At the same time,
the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies developed more elaborate
arguments concerning support among the people of Hong Kong
for Chinese and pro-China positions on the threatened rights
legislation.
One principal argument simply asserted that the masses had no
great or deep-seated love for the laws in question. Proponents of
this argument could point to a variety of indicators suggesting that
such a claim was plausible. As early as 1991, popular enthusiasm
for the human rights agenda had begun to wane in the wake of
China's opposition to the Bill of Rights and other legislation.235
In 1994, three courses on human rights at Hong Kong's top
university had to be dropped due to low enrollment.2 s At
times, liberal defenders of the Bill of Rights and other legislation
had to scramble, claiming support from a "silent majority " 217 or
desperately urging people to defend their rights.
China and pro-China sources argued further that apparent
popular support for the Bill of Rights and other civil liberties laws
was the product of the colonial authorities and others having
duped the Hong Kong people. Specifically, the pro-China
newspaper Ta Kung Pao explained, "Some people... affected by
Chris Patten .. .wrongly think" that repealing amendments to
the Societies Ordinance and Public Order Ordinance will affect
residents' freedom or that post-reversion legal limits on subversive
233 See Emily Lau, Better Late than Never, FAR E. EcON. REv., July 12,
1990, at 16.
' See Linda Choy, Qian Maps Out Legality of Power, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 10, 1997, at 1 (quoting Vice Premier Qian Qichen).
23' See Stacy Mosher, Selective Suffrage, FAR E. EcON. REV., Aug. 29, 1991,
at 17 (quoting human rights activist Ho Hei-wah).
236 See Linda Choy, Courses on Human Rights Dropped Due to Student
Apathy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 27, 1994, at 3.
17 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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"advocacy" would place freedom of speech under siege. 31 More
generally, proponents of this line of argument asserted that the
government and sympathetic media had misled the Hong Kong
people into holding unfounded fears that their liberties were in
danger, and offering ill-considered support for positions on the
Bill of Rights and related matters that departed from the people's
true beliefs, as well as their interests. 29
As the attacks on Patten and others for misleading and
confusing the people underscored, China and its allies perceived
that there was considerable, albeit misplaced, support for the Bill
of Rights Ordinance and related legal reforms. Their arguments
thus sought to pressure the people to accept pro-China positions,
not just to proclaim their existing preferences and to bring those
preferences to bear in the conflict over rights laws. Even
seemingly descriptive statements about popular attitudes had some
of this character. When official Chinese sources and Hong Kong
sources with strong China ties claimed that the people were not
strongly attached to late colonial rights legislation or that the
people would abandon their current attachments after a little
reflection on their deeper values and interests, the expected and
intended effect was to erode existing popular support for those
laws. By sending clear signals of China's displeasure with the
existing laws and its intention to demand changes to them, such
21' Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, TA
KUNG PAO, Jan 24, 1997, at A2; see also If the British Side Knew This Would
Happen, It Should Not Have Done It in the Beginning, supra note 50, at A2
(asserting that the Preparatory Committee proposal urging the N.P.C. Standing
Committee to "restore old laws" was a 'deliberate act taken to mislead the
public"); Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity,
WEN WEI Po, Feb. 14, 1997, at A4 (deriding British Foreign Secretary
Rifkind's remarks "accus[ing] the S.A.R. of repealing the Bill of Rights
Ordinance" as "aimed at maliciously misleading the public" into thinking that
"there are no more civil rights in Hong Kong"); Why Does Chris Patten
Advocate "Freedom ofAdvocacy?,"TA KUNG PAO, Oct. 22, 1996, at A2 (stating
that "because Patten has continued to mislead the people.., some people have
misgivings" about questions of freedom of speech in post-reversion Hong
Kong).
,39 See, e.g., Andy Ho, fitters over the Media, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 3, 1995, at 19 (describing the remarks of Hong Kong Xinhua Deputy
Director Zhang Junsheng); Sun Chengbin, Behind the Banner of "Human
Rights Xinhua, Oct. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(commenting on the storm over Hong Kong's Bill of Rights); Chris Yeung, The
War over Sir Ti Liang's Words, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at
17.
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statements seemed designed to achieve acquiescence from a
populace that was thought to be reluctant to seek confrontation
with China, especially when there seemed to be little hope of
altering outcomes. Other arguments from China and Hong
Kong's pro-China elements more transparently aimed to pressure
and persuade the people, often by portraying the impact that
revising, or failing to revise, rights laws would have on the
realization of other values that the Hong Kong people held dear.
Thus, China and pro-China sources tried to appeal to the
assumed popular desire for order and stability. They argued that
leaving some of the eleventh-hour colonial amendments in place
was a formula for chaos. The Societies Ordinance and Public
Order Ordinance that the British sought to impose on the S.A.R.
would make it "difficult to maintain the social order and social
stability."2' Reversing the recent changes would be beneficial
in "guaranteeing the freedoms of the majority of the people" of
Hong Kong.241 Left unrevised, the Bill of Rights Ordinance
would not "guarantee Hong Kong people's rights ... but rather
[would] disrupt Hong Kong's social stability."242 Its "arbitrary
application" would pose "a direct threat to... the security of the
Hong Kong people."243 Indeed, on this view, the Bill of Rights'
attempt at super-legislative entrenchment of vague individual
rights was "crippling Hong Kong's existing legal system" and
threatened to create a safe haven for criminals who would be free
to disrupt the safe and peaceful society that the people of Hong
Kong valued.244
240 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals ofLegal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2.
241 Id.
242 Zbang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Reasonable and
Legitimate, supra note 232, at Al; see also Fanny Wong, No Way for China To
Win Hearts and Minds, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 1, 1995, at 14 (noting
similar comments from a visiting delegation of P.R.C. legal experts in Hong
Kong).
243 Hong Kong Newspaper Says Bill o/Rigbts Disturbs Legal System, WEN WEI
PO, Nov. 11, 1995, at A2, translated in BIC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Nov. 21, 1995, available in, LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
244 See ZbangJunsbeng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill ofRights Reasonable and
Legitimate, supra note 232, at Al; see also Hong Kong Newspaper Says Bill of
Rights Disturbs Legal System, supra note 243, at A2 (stating that many people
feared that the Bill of Rights would "totally destroy" Hong Kong's legal and
judicial systems); So Lai-Tun & Connie Law, Right Bill Aids "Bad Guys," S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at 1 (quoting Hong Kong and Macao
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China and its allies supplemented this effort to play on the
people's fear of disorder with an attempt to play the nationalism
card. In its favorable reporting on the Chief Executive-designate's
views and in its own comments, the pro-China Hong Kong press
argued that the Societies Ordinance, as amended by the colonial
authorities, would permit Hong Kong political organizations to
become the agents of foreign forces.245 Official Chinese sources
also attacked the Bill of Rights by asserting that it would "open
room for the activities of international anti-China forces and the
agents of the British side after 1997. "246 These were potentially
powerful appeals in light of the considerable anti-colonial senti-
ments and welling sense of national pride that had taken hold
among Hong Kongers, including those who generally distrusted
the P.R.C. As independent legislator and prominent columnist
Margaret Ng observed, "[E]voking the Chinese identification" in
Hong Kong was "a great political weapon." It was possible, Ng
elaborated, to stifle "reasonable discussion" and audible dissent in
Hong Kong by recasting issues in a patriotically provocative form.
Thus, a question such as, "Would you like to have the P.R.C.
govern Hong Kong?" yielded answers more appealing to China
and its supporters once the inquiry was rephrased as, "Should
China have sovereignty over Hong Kong?"24
Seeking to appeal to other aspects of Hong Kongers' emergent
sense of identity, pro-China voices in Hong Kong asserted that the
rights laws China favored would better reflect the "shared values"
of the people of Hong Kong.24 The pro-China press quoted,
and endorsed, Tung Chee-hwa's description of a markedly Confu-
cian-sounding set of Hong Kong values that had developed from
Affairs Office chief Lu Ping's criticism of the side effects of the Bill of Rights).
245 See Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra
note 238, at A2.
246 Gilley, supra note 56, at 36.
247 Margaret Ng, Cultural Pride of the Hong Kong Chinese, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 25, 1983.
24s See HK's New Chief Spells Out What Is Needed To Move Forward, STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 24, 1996, at 20; see also Balancing Act over First Big
Decision, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 17, 1997, at 17 (noting Tung's
description of "trust, love and respect for our family and our elders; integrity,
honesty and loyalty towards all; commitment to education; a belief in order
and stability; an emphasis on obligations to the community rather than rights
of the individual; a preference for consultation rather than open confrontation"
as shared Hong Kong values).
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a unique mix of Chinese and Western influences.2 49 Rolling
back excessively liberal provisions in late colonial legislation, pro-
China commentaries on Tung's remarks continued, would allow
Hong Kong to achieve "the right balance" between the rights of
the individual and the "interests of the entire community,"'
and a set of laws better suited to the Hong Kong people.
Finally, in seeking to shape popular attitudes toward the Bill
of Rights and related legal issues, proponents of China's position
also turned to the basic positivist principles that underlay the
China and pro-China side's approach to the legal and institutional
questions of the endgame. According to this line of argument, the
positivist guarantees of citizens' liberties that P.R.C. and S.A.R.
laws would provide would be enough for the territory's residents,
even if there was considerable popular support in Hong Kong for
the substance of the Bill of Rights and other legislation that was
slated for reversal. As a leading pro-China daily phrased the
argument, the "'[f]reedoms of [the] Hong Kong people' would not
be restricted" by planned legislative changes, for an elaborate
framework of substantively similar laws would be in place. 21'
Article 39 of the Basic Law and parallel undertakings in the Joint
Declaration provided that the laws of the S.A.R. would retain the
state's legal obligation to protect the rights set forth in the
principal U.N. human rights covenants - the very same set of
rights that the Bill of Rights Ordinance's substantive sections
incorporated. 2 2 Indeed, these sources noted, the Basic Law also
249 See id. (providing excerpts of Tung's speech); see also Tung Chee-hwa
Clarifies Seven Points of Misunderstanding Stressed Hong Kong SAR Will Make
Laws on Its Own, supra note 229, at A12 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa stating that
"Hong Kong people know how to learn from the advantages of China and the
West" and that Vong Kong was "nurtured" by both Chinese and Western
cultures).
2' Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals ofLegal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2.
251 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals ofLegal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2; see also Jiang Enzhu Says Hong Kong SAR's Future Laws All Must
Accord with the Basic Law, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 19, 1995.
252 See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 39; Joint Declaration, supra note 39,
art. N(), annex I, S XfIH; Sun, supra note 239 (asserting that the Basic Law
provided adequate human rights protection for the Hong Kong people); Xinhua
Official Says tat Human Rights Commission Unacceptable to Chinese Side, TA
KUNG PAO, May 26, 1994, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
May 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (arguing that a
human rights commission was unnecessary and inappropriate for Hong Kong
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specified additional rights.3 In its laudatory coverage of Tung
Chee-hwa's explanation of the S.A.R. government's agenda on
rights issues, the pro-China Hong Kong press reported that these
P.R.C.-provided laws, "stipulate[] that residents enjoy very
extensive freedom," "fully guarantee[] human rights" for the
territory's inhabitants, and reflect the Chinese government's "great
respect for human rights in Hong Kong."'
In the end, pro-China sources added, there also would be
adequate, positivist mechanisms to ensure that Hong Kongers'
preferences were considered. Once the N.P.C. eliminated a
narrow range of provisions that violated the Basic Law, the S.A.R.
government - a government of Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong - would use legislative and executive processes consistent
with the Basic Law to determine the content of post-1997 Hong
Kong laws governing individual rights and civil and political
liberties.25 Inevitably lurking beneath the surface of this last
line of argument for persuading the people on the issue of rights
laws was the less accommodating core of the China and pro-China
perspective: Whether or not these claims about positivist
guarantees persuaded the people, such guarantees were the only
species of legal promise the people were going to get.
2.3.2. The Patten Reforms, the Provisional Legislature,
and the Popularity of Stability
Faced with the colonial government's moves to accelerate
democratic constitutional reform in Hong Kong, China and its
allies in the territory responded with attempts to find and to
foster popular support for their opposition to the reformers'
agenda. Their methods for asserting and creating enthusiasm
because the Basic Law already would provide adequate human rights protection
for the Hong Kong people).
" See Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 24-42.
2 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup are Good, supra note
238, at A2; see also Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Tight Police Controls on
Protests, Ban on Political Group's Foreign Links 'Necessary for Social Order,' S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa as stating
that the proposed changes to the Bill of Rights were only technical in nature").
2" See, e.g., If the British Side Knew This Would Happen, It Should Not Have
Done It in the Beginning, supra note 50, at A2; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy,
Preliminary Working Committee Adamant on Body to Run Territory, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at 1.
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among the people paralleled their approach to the question of
popular attitudes toward the Bill of Rights and related issues.
Their strategy also mirrored and sought to counter each of the
main elements in the efforts of the colonial government and Hong
Kong "pro-democracy" politicians to claim and to cultivate
popular backing on democratic reforms.
With the memory of Tiananmen still fresh in the minds of the
territory's residents, the P.R.C. and its allies made relatively
limited public moves to claim a popular mandate for their
opposition to rapid democratization at the beginning of the 1990s.
Before Patten began to pursue in earnest his plans to reshape the
electoral laws for the territory's representative bodies, China and
pro-China voices in the colony remarked on the declining
attendance at pro-democracy rallies,' 6 sang the praises of the
newly-adopted Basic Law (including its provisions concerning
elections), and opined that the people of Hong Kong wanted only
moderate reform to impose modest checks and balances on a
government that they were content to see run by bureaucrats who
proficiently pursued stability and prosperity.157
Once the Patten reforms were squarely on the political agenda,
however, official Chinese and pro-China arguments about the
attitudes of the Hong Kong people became more aggressive and
elaborate. They claimed that the Patten proposals lacked popular
support and that the people of Hong Kong embraced or at least
accepted China's alternative arrangements. A leading pro-China
newspaper asserted that "[t]he British side now suddenly wants to
practice its 'democratization' programme" because it faced a
declining and near-desperate "situation in Hong Kong [that] has
gradually developed in favor of the Chinese side."258 According
to the pro-China view, Patten planned to "wage 'a public opinion
war'... to force China to change the Basic Law" to make it
256 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Backroom Betrayal, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Mar. 1,
1990, at 14-15 (noting a pro-China commentary's assertion of poor attendance
at pro-democracy ies.
257 See id.; Mosher, supra note 235, at 17 (citing political analyst Lau Siu-kai
on the electoral law reforms for the 1991 elections and his belief that they were
compatible with popular preferences).
2s Ta Ko, Why Is the Britisb Side 'Playing Rough' in the Games?, WEN WEI
P0, Nov. 1, 1992, at 11.
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compatible with his plans for constitutional reform. 2 9  While
the territory's new self-styled "democrats" might well back the
Governor, their efforts would be to no avail. Patten and his allies
would be unable to overcome "the growing discontent of the
residents with the extremist opinions and actions of a small
number of people" who supported such moves.2 ° Official and
pro-China media added that "people from all walks of life" were
"criticizing,"261 and "the masses of Hong Kong residents" were
"resist[ing] and oppos[ing]," the Patten proposals shortly after
their announcement. 262  "Outwardly," this line of argument
continued, "Patten is trying to get more democracy for Hong
Kong people, but, actually, his ill intent is obvious and known to
all."
26 3
As the P.R.C. and its most reliable supporters in the territory
saw it, the enactment of the Governor's constitutional reform
package was not convincing evidence of popular support. The
Legco vote passing the Patten's proposals by a "slender majority,"
Vice Premier, Foreign Minister, and Preliminary Working
Committee Chairman Qian Qichen contended, did not reflect the
will of the majority of the Hong Kong people; to claim that it did
was, simply, "a lie."2 6' To the contrary, the more modest and
gradual democratization that China had proposed in the bilateral
talks on the Patten proposals "reflected the general wishes of the
people of Hong Kong" and the fruits of China's consultations
with Hong Kong people during the negotiations.65  In the same
'59 A Policy Speech Unfavorable to Convergence, WEN WEI P0, Oct. 8, 1992,
at 1.
260 Id.
261 Mr. Patten's Choice, TA KuNG PAO, Oct. 18, 1992, at 2.
262 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Stance on Hong Kong, New China News
Agency, Domestic Serv., Mar. 18, 1993, transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Mar. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(quoting Xinhua Hong Kong Director Zhou Nan).
263 A Political Gamble that Contravenes the Sino-British Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law, WEN WEI P0, Nov. 8, 1992 (quoting N.P.C. Standing
Committee member Wu Dakun).
264 Linda Choy, Supportfor Reform 'z Lie'. S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
8, 1994, at 1.
265 Text of Chinese Statement on the Breakdown of Sino-Britisb Talks on Hong
Kong, Reuters, Mar. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see
also Li Hsiao-ping, Lu Ping Says Hong Kong People Have Full Say in the Political
System Issue, WEN WEI PO, May 6, 1993, at 12 (discussing the Hong Kong and
Macao Affairs Office Director's description of the channels for collecting
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vein, China and its allies claimed a popular mandate for the entity
that China created in response to the Patten reforms and autho-
rized to help lay the groundwork for replacing the Legco elected
under the Patten reforms with a Provisional Legislature. They
argued that the P.W.C. had "secured the approval, trust and
support of many Hong Kong people [by] increasing communica-
tion with Hong Kong people" and "pool[ing] the wisdom of the
masses."
266
Official China and pro-China Hong Kong sources further
asserted that the Hong Kong people supported the decision to set
up a Provisional Legislature. At the body's first meeting, several
months before reversion, Xinhua Hong Kong Director and
Preparatory Committee Vice Chairman Zhou Nan told the
members of the legislature-in-waiting, "The broad ranks of Hong
Kong people have placed their trust and hopes in you."
267
"[S]upport from the majority" of the people of Hong Kong, Zhou
had explained earlier, was a key source of the Provisional
Legislature's authority.26  Although such claims of popular
enthusiasm might be open to doubt, the pro-China press insisted
that the Hong Kong people had at least acquiesced in the outcome
on the eve of the interim body's creation: "[T]he great majority
of residents have expressed their understanding and acceptance of
the establishment of the Provisional Legislature. Even those who
were opposed to it have changed their position one after another
and are willing to accept the reality of establishing the Provisional
Legislature."269  Other official Chinese and Hong Kong pro-
popular input from the Hong Kong people amid Sino-British negotiations on
political reform).
Fruitful Initial Preparatory Work, RENMIN RIBAO, Dec. 9, 1995, at 5; see
also Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary
Working Committee Work, WEN WEI PO, June 10, 1995, at A2 (asserting that
"more and more . .. Hong Kong people" had "acknowledged" the "fruitful
results" the P.W.C. had attained and the "important role" it would exercise in
the transition).
267 Text of Zhou Nan's Speech to First Meeting of Provisional Legislature, TA
KUNG PAO, Jan. 26, 1997, at A2.
268 Frank Zhang, Rita Fan Elected President of Hong Kong's Provisional
Legislature, Agence France Presse, Jan. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File.
269 A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legislative
Council, TA KUNG PAO, Dec. 21, 1996, at A2; see also Linda Choy, Hong Kong
Backs Shadow Body, Says Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1
(describing Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-hwa's assertion that the Provi-
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China sources added that the Hong Kong people would spurn
opponents of the Provisional Legislature,' who would be
"hard-pressed to face the people after 1997." t
China, with its allies and sympathizers in Hong Kong, found
substantial indications of support for these outwardly confident
assessments of popular opinion regarding democratization, the
Patten reforms, and the Provisional Legislature. Official Chinese
sources pointed to the apparent weakness of popular support for
democratization. They cited a dismal turnout of less than one-half
of the registered electorate and less than one-quarter of potential
voters in the Legco elections that were held less than a year before
Patten tabled his reform proposals.?2 These sources argued that,
with so few citizens participating, the democrats' victory did not
represent the "main trend of Hong Kong public opinion" which
likely included a disproportionately non-voting majority more
sympathetic to China's views2 3 As China and its Hong Kong
supporters saw it, similar patterns of voter participation in the
1995 Legco elections suggested the same conclusions, as did public
opinion polls that found relatively few citizens believed that
Patten had the Hong Kong people's interests at heart when he
pursued electoral law reforms?' 4
Despite their failure to deliver winning margins for pro-China
candidates in Legco's most broadly elected constituencies, leftist
sional Legislature was "accepted and supported" by the people of Hong Kong);
Unreasonable Demand IsJustifiably Rejected, WEN WEI Po, June 13, 1997, at A4
(asserting that Hong Kong residents accepted and supported the establishment
of the Provisional Legislature and citing a poll finding that half of the 40% of
respondents who did not find the Provisional Legislature acceptable at first had
changed their minds).
270 See Gilley, supra note 112, at 31-32 (presenting Wen Wei Po comments
on Martin Lee).
271 Gilley, supra note 38, at 14-15 (quoting a statement from the P.R.C.
State Council).
'2 See Chen Chien-ping, Lu Ping Stresses Basic Law Cannot Be Amended
Before 1997, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 9, 1991; Mosher, supra note 81, at 19-20
(discussing P.R.C. comments on low voter turnout); Mosher, supra note 235,
at 16 (commenting on low voter registration rates).
2,- Chen, supra note 272.
274 See, e.g., Battle for Hon£ Kong Opinion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec.
6, 1993 (describing opinion polls); do Rosario, Sharp Distinction, supra note 112,
at 28-29; do Rosario, supra note 106, at 16 (concerning voter participation); Lau,
supra note 111 (noting the low registration rate, particularly 37% in functional
constituencies that formed the crux of the Sino-British dispute over the Patten
reforms of electoral laws for Legco).
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organizations, along with a variety of conservative groups that
were willing to cooperate with Beijing, provided a considerable
pro-China base in the battle over popular attitudes toward
democratization and the legislature. The Hong Kong Federation
of Trade Unions dominated organized labor and had been one of
the territory's more formidable mass political institutions since
well before the colonial government instituted democratic
reforms." Backed by Beijing and committed to participating in
the elections mandated by late colonial electoral reforms, the pro-
China Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
emerged as the territory's third most popular party.26 Xinhua
Hong Kong Director Zhou Nan claimed a still broader network
of supportive organizations, saying that "[a] few hundred influen-
tial organizations from the industrial and commercial circles and
labour circles, as well as people's organizations, political organiza-
tions and public figures" sided with China in the disputes over the
Patten reforms.2m
China and its Hong Kong allies also found visible indications
of popular support for the Provisional Legislature. They pointed
to "the fact that people of various circles have signed up for the
election of the Provisional Legislature," and to the rise in opinion
poll ratings for the body upon selection of its members.27 They
also deemed significant a long-term decline in Patten's popularity
ratings that accompanied his protracted conflict with China over
political reform legislation.7
s See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Between Two Stools, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Sept. 14, 1995, at 26-27 (describing the Hong Kong Federation of Trade
Unions).
276 See id.; Peter Lim, China Plans To Gather its Supporters To Form
Provisional Legislature, Agence France Presse, Apr. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
277 Xinbua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Chinese Stance on Hong Kong, Xinhua
Domestic Service, Mar. 18, 1993, transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Mar. 22, 1993, at Al, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File.
I A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legislative
Council, supra note 269, at A2; Bruce Gilley, Tung Sets the Course, FAR E.
EcoN. REV., Jan. 9, 1997, at 22 (describing a poll showing a decline from a
46% to a 25% opposition to the Provisional Legislature and a rise in support
to 37%).
279 See id.; Louise do Rosario, Down but Not Out, FARE. ECON. REV., July
27, 1995, at 27 (describing a fall in Patten's popularity from a nearly two-thirds
favorable rating in July 1992 to a 54% favorable rating three years later, accord-
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It was hard, however, even for the most ardent supporters of
Beijing's line to ignore signs that the colonial government's and
Hong Kong democrats' agenda for legal and constitutional reforms
appealed to the public. A prominent N.P.C. member, for
example, was reduced to a defensive argument acknowledging the
force of democratic sentiments in Hong Kong while urging
patience in pursuing democratic change: "As is known to all,
China has consistently favored developing democracy in Hong
Kong. However, people with even a glimmer of political
knowledge know that a democratic political system cannot be
developed overnight [and] should proceed from Hong Kong's
actual reality. "280
With election results, public opinion polls, and public
demonstrations offering little evidence of firm or fervent mass
backing for their positions on the Patten reforms, the Provisional
Legislature and related matters, China and pro-China voices in
Hong Kong advanced arguments that went beyond straightfor-
ward assertions that existing popular opinion weighed heavily in
favor of the outcomes Beijing preferred. China and its allies
sought to discount the significance of the popularity their
opponents' positions enjoyed. They argued that it reflected their
antagonists' ability to deploy unparallelled resources to manipulate
the Hong Kong people and Hong Kong's political and legislative
processes. The pro-China press contended that the British had
deceived the people and won ill-founded support by claiming that
Patten's political reform package conformed to the Joint Declara-
tion, the Basic Law, and a series of Sino-British agreements. 81
These sources charged that Patten's argument that elections under
his rules were essential to the rule of law and to the prevention of
corruption in Hong Kong was an "exaggeration to scare people"
ing to surveys conducted by the impartial Ming Pao newspaper).
280 A Political Gamble that Contravenes the Sino-British Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law, supra note 263 (quoting N.P.C. Standing Committee member
Wu Dakun).
281 See Douglas Hurd Threatens To Push Unilaterally for Constitutional
Reform, WEN WEI P0, Oct. 3, 1993, at 2; see also Noise in Policy Address, TA
KUNG PAO, Oct. 13, 1995, at A2 (charging Patten with "deceiv[ing] the people
of Hong Kong on constitutional issues" by a variety of means, including his
assertion that the 1995 elections represented the fulfillment of the Joint
Declaration and were in conformity with the Basic Law).
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into supporting the British plan."2
The pro-China indictment added that the colonial authorities
had not been content to rely on such tactics of deception, but had
also rigged the outcome so that they would win despite a lack of
popular support. Pro-China sources claimed that the British side
"let Patten draw up his package while leaving the Hong Kong
people in the dark, then let the colonialist-manipulated Legco pass
the package."" 3  The colonial authorities then made ample use
of their "unique techniques in forcing implementation of the
Patten package and selectively exaggerating certain 'opinions'
against convergence with the Basic Law." 4 In addition, official
Chinese and pro-China sources charged that the elections held
under the Patten rules were unfair, unreasonable, disorderly, and
the subject of "many complaints.""5 In China's view, the 1995
polling could not be said to "truly reflect[ the will of the Hong
Kong people."26
The China and pro-China side also argued that popular
support for their positions and confidence in their promises,
although possibly weak, would strengthen over time. For
example, when Patten first outlined his reforms, the pro-China
paper Wen Wei Po explained, "Maybe some Hong Kong people
cannot see the harm of this practice for the time being, but, as
time goes by, most Hong Kong people will see through its nature
and make a cool-headed judgment and a correct choice." 217
Similarly, pro-China elements in Hong Kong maintained that
while the idea of a Provisional Legislature initially might have
enjoyed only limited backing from the ordinary people of Hong
Kong, its creation and operation would boost popular confidence
282 Comment on Chris Patten's "Theory of Infiltration of Corruption," TA
KUNG PAO, Oct. 27, 1993, at 2.
283 The Three-Tiered Structure Must Be Reorganized in 1997, WEN WEI PO,
Dec. 28, 1993, at 2.
284 Commenting on the British Cabinet Meeting, WEN WEI PO, Nov. 11,
1993, at 2.
285 No Kwai-yan and Simon Beck, Legco Poll Not Will of the People, China
Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at 6.
286 Andrew Higgins, The Vanishing Trick, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19,
1995, at 17.
287 Just Keep a Watch over Mr. Chris Patten's Performance, WEN WEI PO,
Oct. 21, 1992, at 2.
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in the arrangement. 8
As these arguments showed, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong
agents and allies appreciated that it was important to build new
backing, and not just assert existing support among the people for
their positions on democratic reform and the legislature. They
thus sought to convince the Hong Kong people to accept the
decision to reject the Patten reforms and to "render great support
to the... Provisional Legislature in discharging [its] responsibili-
ties. " "9 To a degree, the China and pro-China camp's nominal-
ly descriptive arguments also advanced the project of persuading
the people. As was true in the debates over the Bill of Rights,
official P.R.C. and pro-China Hong Kong statements that
condemned the colonial government's constitutional reform
package, underscored China's determination to reverse its effects,
or praised Hong Kong groups that opposed extensive democratic
changes, also sent clear and potentially effective signals to a
populace that presumably would fear the possible adverse
consequences, and foresee the likely futility, of active support for
late colonial democratic reforms.
In P.R.C. and pro-China arguments that more obviously
sought to create popular backing or acquiescence, a principal tactic
was to link acceptance of the China and pro-China views on
democratization and the legislature to the preservation of
prosperity and stability that everyone thought the people of Hong
Kong held dear. The pro-China press declared, in sweeping terms,
"Hong Kong people who are born and grow up on this land all
wish to maintain prosperity and stability in Hong Kong forev-
er."290 Similarly, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office head Lu
Ping proclaimed that most of the Hong Kong people wanted
stability, prosperity, and close cooperation with the central
28 See, e.g., Fan Summarizes Work of Provisional Legislature as "Essential,"
MING PAO, Feb. 13, 1997, at A6 (quoting Provisional Legislature President Rita
Fan); cf The Resolution' Shatters British Illusions, WEN WEI Po, Sept. 1, 1994,
at A2 (describing the N.P.C. Standing Committee's formal decision to reject
bodies selected under the electoral laws as reformed by Patten and to authorize
the Preparatory Committee to establish an interim legislature as moves that
"will encourage the people of Hong Kong to cooperate with and support the
Preparatory Committee").
219 Zhou Nan Urges Supportfor Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 18,
1997, at 4 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong chief Zhou Nan).
290 Mr. Patten's Choice, supra note 261.
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authorities in Beijing.29 1 In the same vein, Xinhua Hong Kong
chief Zhou Nan asserted that the people wanted "stability,
prosperity, [and] cooperation" with China. 92 Patten's reforms,
according to this line of argument, put these popular aims
profoundly at risk. Elaborating the argument, Zhou added that
"[t]he great masses of Hong Kong compatriots" did not want
Hong Kong to become "a center for political struggle."293 Such
a development "would ruin Hong Kong's stability and prosperi-
ty "22 4 and preclude a smooth transition from colony to S.A.R.
China and pro-China sources also argued more explicitly that
the Patten reforms would hurt Hong Kongers' interests and
frustrate their hopes. They asserted that the Basic Law and the
P.R.C.'s proposals during the Sino-British negotiations over
Patten's political reform plan were adequate to assure the popular
package of stability, prosperity, convergence with the Basic Law,
and avoidance of political conflict. 95 They argued that Patten's
reforms would threaten to unravel this arrangement. Patten's
political reform program, Zhou Nan asserted, "undermined Hong
Kong's stability and prosperity and damaged the vital interests of
Hong Kong residents."29 Chinese Premier Li Peng derided
Patten's proposed electoral reform legislation as an effort "to
create disorder and impede the smooth transfer of power."
297
The pro-China press warned that Patten's Joint Declaration-
291 See Chen, supra note 272.
292 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Stance on Hong Kong, supra note 262.
293 Gilley, supra note 112, at 31-32; Diane Stormont, China Envoy Paints
Rosy Picture of Post-1997 Hong Kong, Reuters, Apr. 12, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
294 Gilley, supra note 112, at 31-32.
295 See, e.g., What the Legislators Said, supra note 87 (quoting a pro-China
Legco member's comments during a debate on Patten reforms that the Basic
Law and not "Patten's fantasy" was the route to stability). The Text of Chinese
Statement on Breakdown of Sino-British Talks on Hong Kong, supra note 265,
described Chinese proposals as "designed to facilitate a smooth transition" and
to "ensure [Hong Kong] residents a happy and peaceful life" and as "conducive
to convergence with the Basic Law" and "the general wishes of the Hong Kong
people." Id.
296 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Stance on Hon Kong, sipra note 277; cf.
Noise in Policy Address, supra note 281 (presenting the pro-Cliina Hong Kong
press' similar criticism of Patten in a commentary on the Governor's 1995
annual policy address).
297 Jonathan Karp, Through Train Slows Down, FAR E. EcON. REV., Mar.
25, 1993, at 12.
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breaching and Basic Law-violating reforms entailed "using Hong
Kong people's interests as pawns" and increasing "uncertainty and
instability."298 This line of argument added that the people of
Hong Kong, not Patten, would suffer the consequences of the
Governor's irresponsible games. Patten would "simply go away
after June 30, 1997 and the chaotic situation stirred up by him"
would have to be "cleared up by the people of Hong Kong. "299
The "silent majority [of Hong Kong people] who seek nothing
more than to get on with their lives" would be like "the innocent
children" who inevitably "suffer most" in a "broken family."
3
1
After the Patten reforms became law, China and its Hong
Kong allies continued their efforts to build popular support for
their positions by linking the laws and policies they opposed to
outcomes inconsistent with the people's interests in, and yearnings
for, stability and prosperity. In the campaign preceding the 1995
Legco elections, pro-China voices cautioned voters that the
democrats were "trouble-makers" who would fail to work for the
interests of the public and a smooth transition and thus would do
Hong Kong no good.301 After the elections, a leader of the pro-
China D.A.B. darkly warned that pro-democracy candidates'
victories were a result that the Hong Kong people would "have to
pay" for by having a legislature incapable of communicating with
China and thus unable to serve the people's interest in a smooth
transition.3°2
The controversy over the Provisional Legislature brought forth
similar arguments. The pro-China camp charged that the
democrats' attacks on the Provisional Legislature "opposed China
29' Just Keep a Watch over Mr. Chris Patten's Performance, supra note 287,
at 2.
Li Dahong, How Long Can the 'Last Governor' Hold Out, LIAOWANG,
Feb. 28, 1994, at 48-49 (presenting the quasi-official Beijing publication's
comments on Patten's electoral reform legislation).
3' Legco Members Stress that Patten's Actions Hurt Ordinary Hong Kong
Citizens, New China News Agency, Beijing, Feb. 24, 1994, reprinted in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (quoting Legco member Elsie Tu).
301 See Louise do Rosario, Thorn in the Side, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 20,
1995, at 28 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong Deputy Director Wang Rudeng); do
Rosario, supra note 275, at 26 (citing D.A.B. leader Cheung Kai-nam's
comments to Wen Wei Po).
302 See Higgins, supra note 288, at 17.
1997]
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
and brought disorder to Hong Kong" [fanhua luangang].3 °3 In
the same vein, a pro-China newspaper warned that Governor
Patten's statement that any laws passed by the Provisional
Legislature "would inevitably be vulnerable to subsequent legal
challenge in the courts" was tantamount to "encouraging some
people to oppose the laws enacted by the Provisional Legislature"
and "aim[ed] to undermine Hong Kong's future social stabili-
ty. "
304
China and its Hong Kong allies had reason to be confident
that their arguments, explicitly linking their opponents' laws and
policies to harms to Hong Kong's interests and Hong Kongers'
true preferences, would achieve some of their intended effect on
public opinion in the territory. The Hong Kong people could be
expected to understand that China and its Hong Kong allies and
agents were capable of causing many of the adverse political and
economic developments that P.R.C. and pro-China arguments
predicted would follow from support for democratic reforms.
Moreover, China and pro-China statements frequently stressed,
the derailing of the through train for the 1995 Legco and the
establishment of the Provisional Legislature were simply an
undeniable and intractable "reality" of transitional Hong Kong's
legal and political order that the colonial administration, liberal
politicians, and ordinary Hong Kongers would do well to
accept. 05
This array of "scare tactics" and appeals to material interest did
not, however, exhaust the China and pro-China side's strategy of
linking support for its preferred positions to the preservation or
advancement of other values thought to be embraced by the Hong
Kong people. Chinese authorities and their most reliable backers
in Hong Kong also sought to cultivate popular support by
appealing to a loose notion of Chinese nationalism that could be
expected to resonate with the Hong Kong people. P.R.C. and
303 Gilley, supra note 112, at 31.
3' Provisional Legislature Must Be Set Up as Scheduled, TA KUNG PAO, Oct.
8, 1996, at A2.
3 0 See, e.g., A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional
Legislative Council, supra note 269, at A2; Lawrence Chung, China, Britain
Trade Verbal Broadsides as Votes Cast for Hong Kon Assembl, Agence France
Presse, Dec. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting
Qian Qichen's statement that "[riegrettably, Britain lacks the courage to face
[the] reality" that the Provisional Legislature must be accepted).
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pro-China sources thus attacked the Patten reforms as attempts to
make Hong Kong a "base for subversion."3 They condemned
Hong Kong democrats for seeking foreign backing to oppose
moves to derail the "through train."307 They also criticized
Hong Kong democrats for wanting to ape Western institutions
without paying attention to Hong Kong's ways and interests. 8
The people could be expected to distance themselves from such
activities, if they believed the charges, and to perceive another
signal of China's strong opposition to the liberals' and democrats'
agenda, even if they rejected the charges as false.
Finally, the China and pro-China side's strategy targeting the
people in the battle over democratic reform and the fate of the
legislature included another, more complex dimension. This line
of argument partly accepted that democracy appealed to the Hong
Kong people, and sought to construe the idea of sufficient
democracy for Hong Kong in a manner compatible with the
positivist and nationalist vision of domestic sovereignty over
Hong Kong that formed the core of the official Chinese and pro-
Chinese Hong Kong perspective.
A degree of accommodation to popular preferences for
representative democracy was implicit in the official P.R.C. and
pro-China assault on the legislative decisions and elections that the
colonial adminstration oversaw in the early and middle 1990s. By
arguing to the Hong Kong people that the particular procedures
the colonial authorities adopted were unfair or unrepresentative,
"6 Tai Ming Cheung, Glacial Thaw, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 22, 1993, at
13 (quoting pro-China think-tank head Shiu Sin-por). See also, Be Vigilant
Against Instigating Political Confrontation, TA KUNG PAO, July 10, 1996, at A2
(charging that Patten wanted S.A.R. government institutions "to be trusted by
the United Kingdom and [to] work for extending British rule").
307 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 38, at 31-32 (noting pro-China press
condemnation of Martin Lee's trip to North America to seek foreign support
for his agenda on the Provisional Legislature and other matters); Attempts To
Foster "Pro-British Force" Will Have "Unfavorable" Consequences, TA KUNG PAO,
May 31, 1992, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (criticizing U.D.H.K. for seeking
support of British people to press China to amend the Basic Law to accommo-
date democratic electoral reform); c. Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks are Beneflial to
Hong Kongs Prosperity, supra note 238, at A4 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's
similar criticism of Martin Lee's trip to Europe).
308 See, e.g., Catherine Ng et al., Final Verdict on Legco, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 25, 1996, at 1 (quoting Qian Qichen); Simon Holberton,
Populism at War with Political Correctness, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 1993,
at 9 (quoting a Xinhua commentary).
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China and its allies, at least implicitly, conceded that the Hong
Kong people wanted democratic elections and an active legislature.
Accommodation of local democratic values was more nearly
explicit in Chinese and pro-China arguments that the institutions
and processes that the P.R.C. directly and indirectly created for
transitional Hong Kong were democratically legitimate and
adequately representative. Broadly, China and its Hong Kong
allies asserted that China had followed a principle of "facing and
relying on the Hong Kong people" throughout the protracted
struggles over democratic reforms and the Provisional Legisla-
ture3°9  The territory's pro-China press dismissed the colonial
government's and pro-democracy politicians' charge that China
did "not trust[] the Hong Kong people," saying that the falsity of
the accusation was "perfectly obvious and could not be denied by
anyone. 
3 10
More specifically, China and its Hong Kong allies pointed to
the P.W.C., the P.C., and more informal P.R.C.-established
methods for "solicit[ing] opinions of the local people," "listening
to opinions from all social circles," and "relying on the Hong
Kong people."31 1  Official China and pro-China sources argued
that these mechanisms demonstrated China's sincere commitment
to "advanc[ing] Hong Kong's democratic progress" and were
sufficient to give the Hong Kong people a "full say" in establish-
ing S.A.R. law-making institutions.3 According to this line of
argument, the selection of the Provisional Legislature had similar
virtues. Qian Qichen explained that the Selection Committee
chose the legislature through a "just, fair and open ballot."
313
The Selection Committee, a prominent pro-China Hong Kong
politician pointed out, was composed entirely of Hong Kong
people and had "many candidates" from which to choose.314
309 Be Vigilant Against Instigating Political Confrontation, supra note 306, at
A2.
310 Id.
311 China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, Xinhua, Dec. 11, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
312 Id.; see Fruioful Initial Preparatory Work, supra note 266, at 5; see also Li,
sup a note 265, at 12 (describing Lu Ping's belief that Hong Kong people had
"a full say in important issues, such as Hong Kong's future").
313 Sharma, supra note 116.
314 Saki Ouchi, Democrats Concerned over Basic Law Interpretation, DAILY
YOMIUmI, Jan. 1, 1997, at 7 (quoting Tsang Yok Sing).
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The Provisional Legislature itself, Qian added, was representative
of the Hong Kong people in that its members came from "all
walks of life."
315
A few prominent pro-China voices in Hong Kong, including
D.A.B. leader and Provisional Legislature member Tsang Yok-sing
and prominent social scientist and Preparatory Committee
member Lau Siu-kai, went further in accepting the apparent
popular preference for representative democracy, and in seeking
to articulate a democratic claim to popular support for pro-China
positions. They argued that the Provisional Legislature's legitima-
cy stemmed, in part, from the fact that more than half of its
members were members of the Legco elected in 1995, and thus
had won the endorsement of the Hong Kong people who formed
the relevant electorates. 316  They further argued that the Hong
Kong people had no reason to fear that the Provisional Legislature
would be democratically unresponsive, as most of its members
would want to run for reelection to the first full-term S.A.R.
legislature in 1998.31" After the last colonial Legco was clearly
doomed, but before the final decision to establish a Provisional
Legislature, the D.A.B.'s Tsang had even suggested fresh elections
before July 1, 1997 to give the first S.A.R. law-making body a
solid electoral pedigree (even though he accepted that the new
ballotting might produce yet another legislature with a large block
of democrats).318
Beneath these sometimes divergent moves on the pro-China
side to accommodate popular preferences and pressures for
democratization, there remained a firm insistence on the positivist
principles that were central to the vision of law that the P.R.C.
and its Hong Kong allies shared. The institutions and processes
that China and pro-China sources claimed were sufficient to
satisfy Hong Kongers' democratic demands, and any legal and
institutional arrangements that China would provide or tolerate
for Hong Kong, had to be rooted in positivist grants by the
315 Sharma, supra note 116 (quoting Qian Qichen).
316 See Sharma, supra note 124.
317 See Ouchi, supra note 311; Yeung & Choy, supra note 96, at 1.
313 See Gilley, supra note 38, at 14-15 (describing Tsang's recognition of the
likelihood of the democrats' victory in fair elections); Lee, supra note 102, at
19 (describing Tsang's proposal for fresh elections); Tai Ming Cheung, Common
Front, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 17, 1992, at 19 (describing Tsang's acceptance
of the need to defer to the majority view if it supported Patten reforms).
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Chinese sovereign and could not compromise the requisites of
Chinese sovereignty. In Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian's
most blunt formulation, only the P.R.C. government, as the
repository of sovereign authority over all Chinese citizens
including those in Hong Kong, could speak for the people of
Hong Kong during "the transition period."319  Questions
regarding the institutions and forms of democracy for Hong Kong
were, on this view, ultimately for China itself to decide, or for
China to delegate the decision to the S.A.R. government or the
Hong Kong people.320 Official sources explained that the P.R.C.
endorsed the development of democracy in Hong Kong in
accordance with the P.R.C.'s chosen principle of "gradual and
orderly progress" proceeding from Hong Kong's "reality," which
included the attitudes and values of the Hong Kong people.321
More specifically, pro-China sources stressed that the Provi-
sional Legislature derived its legitimacy primarily from the
authorizing enactments of the N.P.C. and the P.C., as well as the
support of the Hong Kong people.3 2 Most broadly, the P.R.C.
position was that the policy of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong" [gangren zhigang], and its implementation through S.A.R.
laws and institutions, reflected China's sovereign choices. The
policy doubtless had greater popular appeal than the alternative of
more centralized control over Hong Kong, but its popularity was
significant primarily as a factor in the sovereign's prudential
calculations concerning which policy to choose. Moreover, China
required that those "Hong Kong people" who were to rule Hong
319 Philip Bowring & Emily Lau, Turning Up the Heat, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Feb. 14, 1991, at 23.
320 See, e.g., Stacy Mosher, Basic Flaw, FAR E. EcON. REv., June 11, 1992,
at 18 (arguing, on the eve of Patten's arrival, that China believed that China,
not Britain, could grant the people of Hong Kong greater democracy); Tung
Chee-hwa Clarifws Seven Points of Misunderstanding, Stressed Hong Kong SAR
Will Make Laws on Its Own, supra note 229, at A12 (discussing the Chief
Executive-designate's comments that the S.A.R. would make its own laws under
the arrangement provided by the Basic Law); Chris Yeung, Lu Puts the Case for
His Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 8, 1996, at 17 (describing Lu
Ping's explanation that the Chinese government is committed to giving Hong
Kong its autonomy after the end of British rule); see also Gilley, supra note 38,
at 14-15 (describing proportional representation, as opposed to single-member
districts, as a structure China might adopt for S.A.R. legislative elections).
321 A Political Gamble that Contravenes the Sino-British Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law, supra note 263.
3 See Zhang, supra note 268.
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Kong had to be ones who "loved China and loved Hong Kong"
[aiguo aigang] and thus could be trusted not to undermine China's
sovereignty over the territory.3
In sum, many of the China and pro-China side's arguments
endorsed some accommodation of the Hong Kong people's
democratic preferences and interests, and they often seemed
carefully phrased to appeal to local pride and sentiment. None-
theless, they also revealed the limits to accommodation that the
P.R.C.'s and its allies' core conception of law and sovereignty
imposed in the battles over the people's attitudes toward demo-
cratic reform and Hong Kong's legislature.
2.3.3. The Court of Final Appeal: Of Alternatives,
Baselines, and Popular Concerns
China and its Hong Kong allies made only modest visible
efforts to develop or demonstrate broad public support for the
initial Sino-British agreement on the Court of Final Appeal,
reached in 1991. To be sure, P.R.C. sources expressed discomfort
with Patten's submitting the deal's fate to a vote in Legco. China
and its allies worried that Patten had thereby made implementa-
tion of the Court deal dependent on the whims of a body hostile
to China, and had assigned Legco a role that undercut established
principles of executive-led government that the S.A.R. was slated
to inherit 24 The kind of arguments that P.R.C. officials and
pro-China leaders in the territory stressed in connection with the
1995 accord, however, were not as prominent in the early 1990s.
Hong Kong residents' still-fresh memories of the Tiananmen
Incident presumably suggested that it might be counterproductive
to launch an open, full-scale official P.R.C. or pro-Chinese effort
to promote a C.F.A. arrangement that liberals derided as under-
323 See Fruitful Initial Preparatory Work, supra note 266, at 5 ("It should be
pointed out that patriots should constitute the bulk of those 'Hong Kong
people participating in administering Hong Kong.'"); Higgins, supra note 288,
at 17 (noting Ta Kung Pao's resurrection ofthe Deng quotation); Chris Yeung,
For the Love of Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 15
(similarly noting Tung Chee-hwa's embrace of the aiguo aigang standard).
32 See Li Haiting, "Basic Law" Essentially Ensures Democracy for Hong Kong
People, Xinhua, Jan. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File;
Mosher, supra note 136, at 10; Chris Yeung & Fannie Wong, Wen the Lights
Go Out at Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at 21 (describing
a broader pro-China concern with the erosion of executive-led government and
heralding the prospect of its restoration).
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mining the rule of law and endangering the liberties of Hong
Kong citizens. Additionally, especially in the days before the
political reform row had revealed a newly feisty Legco, Chinese
officials perhaps were confident that the colonial government's
commitment to implementing the arrangement to which the
British government had agreed would be enough to secure passage
of the necessary local legislation.
When the second C.F.A. accord was on the agenda, China and
its supporters in the territory made more forceful and extended
efforts to claim or to create public support or acquiescence,
although less than they did in the context of the conflicts over
political reform and the Bill of Rights, where the British authori-
ties were more adversaries than allies. A principal purveyor of
P.R.C. orthodoxy in the Hong Kong press asserted that the
signing of the 1995 agreement "merit[ed] the Hong Kong people's
feeling pleased."3z2 The "small handful of politicians" who
sought to undermine the accord were engaged in acts that "r[a]n
counter to the principle of Hong Kong people running Hong
Kong," and the pro-China press expressed confidence that the
Hong Kong people were "completely capable" of distinguishing
between such people and the supporters of the deal who "genuine-
ly represent[ed] the interests of the Hong Kong people."
326
From the P.R.C. and pro-China perspective, popular support
for the 1995 deal was to be expected, in part because the accord
mandated a court that would satisfy the apparent wishes and
assuaged the apparent worries of the Hong Kong people concern-
ing their post-reversion judiciary. In the words of Zhao Jihua,
head of the Chinese delegation to the Sino-British Joint Liaison
Group ("J.L.G.") that reached the agreement, the 1995 deal was
"good news" for "the Hong Kong public" which was "concerned
about the question of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and
about Hong Kong's future rule of law." 3' A P.R.C. Foreign
Ministry spokesman explained that the C.F.A. agreement would
help ensure that Hong Kong enjoyed "an independent and
s Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary
Working Committee Work, supra note 266.
32 Id.; cf Lu Ping Says It's Not China's Fault that the Court of Final Appeal
Issue Is Not Yet Resolved, MING PAO, Mar. 26, 1995.
" Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal Agreement, WEN
WEI Po, June 10, 1995, at A2.
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complete judicial system."' A leading pro-China paper in
Hong Kong asserted that the renewed Sino-British cooperation, in
which the 1995 Court accord played a central part, would assure
Hong Kong's smooth reversion, the preservation of the territory's
stability and prosperity, and the full realization of the principles
of "'one country two systems,'" "'Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong,'" and "'a high degree of autonomy.'" These were "wishes
of most Hong Kong people" that China hoped to see realized
under a policy of trying "to please the Hong Kong people."3 29
The China and pro-China side's confidence that the terms of
the 1995 Court deal enjoyed popular support was limited,
however. In their arguments about the attractions for the Hong
Kong people of a Court in keeping with the accord, China and its
Hong Kong allies frequently mixed claims about the people's
"interests" with assertions about their established preferences.
This at least suggested doubt about whether the people's wishes
were already in line with their asserted interests. Other argu-
ments more strongly suggested that the Court accords' proponents
perceived a need to build, and not simply to identify, popular
support for the deal. In this vein, official Chinese and pro-China
sources attempted to draw connections between the Court accord
and broader issues of concern to the people of Hong Kong. They
argued that, even if the C.F.A. arrangement was not all that some
in Hong Kong had hoped for, the structure it prescribed would be
a step forward for values embraced by Hong Kong residents,
including many who did not ordinarily endorse much of the
P.R.C.'s agenda. More specifically, according to this line of
argument, the Court deal would advance democracy and autono-
my.
P.R.C. sources stressed that with the establishment of a Court
of Final Appeal in keeping with the 1995 agreement, Hong Kong
would enjoy, for the first time in its history, the power of final
adjudication. A court consisting primarily of Hong Kong people
would sit in Hong Kong to exercise the highest judicial power
328 China Hopes Court Deal Will Boost Sino-British Ties, Agence France
Presse, June 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
329 Paper on Renewed Sino-British Cooperation on Handover, TA KUNG PAO,
July 1, 1995, at A2, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 7,
1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see also Full Text of
Remarks by Ambassador Zhao Jihua, Chinese joint Liaison Group Team Leader,
supra note 325.
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over the territory.30 A leading pro-China newspaper boasted
that, in contrast to Hong Kong's departing colonial masters,
China was confident that "the Hong Kong people" were "entirely
capable" of setting up an adequate Court.331 On this view, the
C.F.A. deal "created the conditions for the Hong Kong people to
participate in Hong Kong affairs before 1997 and also laid a solid
foundation for the Hong Kong people to administer Hong Kong
after 1997. "332 A Court composed predominantly of Hong
Kong judges, approved by a Provisional Legislature of Hong Kong
members representing Hong Kong people was "conducive to the
practice of Hong Kong's being ruled by Hong Kong people."
333
For those who might not be persuaded by such effusive and
expansive claims, pro-P.R.C. sources pointed to more modest and
less immediately rule-of-law-related virtues of the C.F.A. accord
that could be expected to hold some appeal for the people of
Hong Kong. A Legco member from the D.A.B. argued that the
1995 accord was a good arrangement because it would allow the
Hong Kong people to have a clear picture of the Court before
China's resumption of sovereignty. Potentially disruptive
uncertainty would be reduced.3 34  Other pro-China sources
added that the breakthrough in Sino-British cooperation that the
Court accord heralded was also a harbinger of progress on a
number of concrete bilateral issues the resolution of which would
be welcomed by Hong Kong's citizens as an additional reduction
in transition-related uncertainty.335  Such accomplishments,
330 See Full Text of Remarks by Ambassador ZhaoJihua, Chinese Joint Liaison
Group Team Leader, supra note 325.
331 Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary
Working Committee Work, supra 266.
332 Id.
333 Id.; see also Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 90; A Statement from the British
Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legislative Council, supra note 269; Chinese FM
Denies Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, Agence France Presse, Nov.
15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alasi File (concerning the
Provisional Legislature's role).
331 See Won & Wong, supra note 146.
335 See, e.g., Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of
Preliminary Working Committee Work, supra note 266, at A2 (arguing that the
accord merited "Hong Kong people's feeling pleased" largely because it
portended additional Sino-British cooperation on various issues); Hon Kong:
Paper on Renewed Sino-British Cooperation on Handover, supra note 327 (linking
the C.F.A. accord with broader Smo-British cooperation and satisfaction of the
Hong Kong people's wishes); Jonathan Sprague, Top Hong Kong Official Meets
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proponents of this line of argument understood, were important
to the territory's economy and thus would be likely to appeal to
ordinary Hong Kongers' sense of their material interests.3 36
Although some of the arguments that China and its allies
made concerning the people's actual or prospective views on the
C.F.A. at times parallelled the arguments from British and
colonial government proponents of the Court accords, the P.R.C.
and pro-China arguments nonetheless proceeded from different
premises and were intertwined with a line of argument that
turned to different fundamental principles. Similar to the
arguments they advanced in the conflicts over popular attitudes
toward other legal issues of the endgame, the P.R.C. and pro-
China side's arguments about the people's views and the Court of
Final Appeal insisted that a Court arrangement for the S.A.R. be
consistent with China's and the pro-China camp's basic positivist
concept of domestic legality, as well as sufficiently appealing to
secure acceptance from the people of Hong Kong.
Thus, the "special arrangements" for the establishment of the
C.F.A. that would surely please the people of Hong Kong were,
J.L.G. team leader Zhao reminded Hong Kongers, arrangements
that China had agreed to make "precisely on account of the
decision of the Chinese government to allow the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to enjoy a high degree of autono-
my, including [the] power of final adjudication."337  Similarly,
the 1995 accord's requirement that the Provisional Legislature
confirm the first C.F.A. judges was both an advance for broadly
democratic values popular in Hong Kong and a corrollary to the
principle that the judges would derive their power from the
legislative body that derived its authority from positive sovereign
enactments of the P.R.C.338 Finally, a pro-China Legco member
Chinese Leaders, Reuters, July 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File (attributing an upswing in Hong Kong popular attitudes toward
China to the breakthrough on the C.F.A. deal).
336 The economically vital new airport project, a victim of repeated snags
at the Joint Liaison Group ("J.L.G."), was one important area that would
benefit from improved bilateral cooperation.
117 Full Text 9f Remarks by Ambassador Zhao Jihua, Chinese Joint Liaison
Group Team Leader, supra note 325.
31 See, e.g., A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional
Legislative Council, supa note 269; Agreement on Court of Final Appeal
Embodies Results of Preliminary Working Committee Work, supra note 266;
Chinese FM Denies Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, supra note 333.
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explained that the fundamental protection of the popularly prized
common-law rule of law under the Court deal was the Basic Law's
provision that the N.P.C. Standing Committee would take
common law practices fully into account when it exercised its
power to determine whether cases raising potentially difficult
political and structural issues fell within the Court's jurisdic-
tion.339
2.3.4. The Chief Executive: Democratic Advances, Local
Values, and Granted Powers
P.R.C. officials and China's allies and agents in Hong Kong
claimed and sought popular support for, or acquiescence in, the
Chief Executive selection process initially by defending the process
as one that provided ample means for reflecting the will of the
Hong Kong people and that fit reasonably well with popular
preferences for democratic processes. Thus, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry and the official Chinese press asserted that the process
for selecting a candidate was democratic, fair, and open.3,°  In
his speech to the initial session of the Selection Committee that
was to nominate the Chief Executive for formal appointment by
the Central People's Government in Beijing, Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen insisted that the members of the committee were
free to make their "own decision about selecting the candidates"
and should "ignore the rumours that the candidates were hand-
picked from the top."341 More boldly still, D.A.B. leader Tsang
Yok-sing commented that letting Beijing make the final choice
would "be very unpopular in Hong Kong" and therefore ill-ad-
vised.342
The P.R.C. and its Hong Kong supporters sought to present
the selection process as one that, as a matter of principle and in
311 See Yeung et al., supra note 138 (quoting Tam Yiu-cheng).
" See, e.g., China Says Britain Duty-Bound To Support New HK Chief,
Agence France Presse, Dec. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File (quoting a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman); China Welcomes Electionof First Chief Executive, sup-a note 306; cf. Full Text of Questions and Answers at
Tung Chee-hwa Nes Conference for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, WENWEI PO, Dec. 20, 1996 (reporting similar comments from Tung Ghee-hwa).
341 Chinese FM Denies Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, supra note
333.342 Straw Poll: Who Will Make the Best Chief Executive?, FAR E. EcoN.
REv., Feb. 8, 1996, at 28.
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practice, took into account the preferences of the Hong Kong
people. The Chinese position emphasized that the Selection
Committee that voted overwhelmingly for Tung Chee-hwa was
drawn from a broad spectrum of Hong Kong society.4  Lu
Ping commented two years before Tung's selection that the
person chosen for the post would have to enjoy "prestige among
HongKongers [sic]."3  Qian Qichen and Jiang Zemin stressed
that candidates for the position should face the people and should
be leaders whom the people of Hong Kong could trust.3 45 In
the run-up to the Selection Committee's balloting, the candidates
had clearly been made to understand that they were to campaign
among the public, listening to their views and soliciting their
support.346
Moreover, P.R.C. and Hong Kong pro-China sources remind-
ed the territory's residents that the Chief Executive Selection
process was much more democratic - and thus more immediately
reflective of Hong Kong people's preferences - than the process
of appointing colonial governors from London that it replaced.
The body that picked the nominee for Chief Executive was, Qian
Qichen argued, "chosen by the people of Hong Kong for the first
3 The position was, to a degree, enshrined in framework legal documents
for the S.A.R. See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 45 providing the framework
for the selection of the Chief Executive); id. annex I (providing for the election
of the Chief Executive by a "broadly representative election committee" of 800
members, "appointed by the Central People's Government" and drawn in equal
shares from "industrial, commercial and financial sectors," "the professions,"
"labour, social services, religious and other sectors," members of the legislature,
reesentatives of district organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the N.P.C.,
and representatives of Hong Kong members of the principal P.R.C. united
front organization); N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21, SS 34 (providing for a
Selection Committee of 400, drawn equaly from among the same four sectors
described in Annex I to the Basic Law, to nominate a candidate for appoint-
ment by the Central People's Government to serve as the S.A.R.'s first Chief
Executive).
'" Mary Kwang, Who Will Be the One To Lead HK Come 1997?, STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), July 24, 1994, at 8.
See Chris Yeung & Fung Wai-kong, Peter Woo: We Must Feel Safe and
Free, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 1996, at 6.
31 See, e.g., id.; China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note
308 (praising the three candidates for having "showed their dedication to Hong
Kong " and for having "worked hard to increase mutual understanding with
people in the various sectors of the region").
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time." 47  As never before, Hong Kong's people had been
consulted in the selection of the territory's top official. On this
view, the selection of the first Chief Executive-designate marked
the beginning of "the true development of democracy for Hong
Kong" and the laying of "a foundation for the establishment of a
democratic system" in Hong Kong.348
In addition, China and pro-China sources asserted that a
popularly accepted process had yielded a genuinely popular choice.
As the official Chinese press described it, "the smooth election of
the candidate for Chief Executive demonstrates that the type of
democracy adopted in Hong Kong according to the one country,
two systems principle and the Basic Law" had won "approval by
the Hong Kong people."349 According to P.R.C. officials, Tung
had won a landslide victory "thanks to the support of the Hong
Kong people"; his victory was a reflection of the wishes of "the
majority of Hong Kong compatriots."350  Providing some
evidence to support such claims, public opinion polls found high
initial approval ratings for Tung, and generally liberal commenta-
tors noted the dilemma that Hong Kong's pro-democracy
politicians faced in taking on a Chief Executive-designate who had
won something of a popular endorsement and was seeking to
build bridges to groups that had not initially supported him.35x
Nonetheless, official Chinese and unofficial pro-China
commentary could not completely dismiss or ignore the indica-
tions of popular disaffection, particularly once Chief Executive-
designate Tung began to press pro-China positions on the key
legal and institutional questions of the endgame. China and its
Hong Kong supporters accordingly advanced arguments that
conceded that they faced some unfavorable popular attitudes, tried
to minimize the significance of those negative views, and sought
311 Chinese FM Denies Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, supra note
333.
34' Id.; see China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 310;
cf China Says Britain Duty-Bound To Support New HK Chief supra note 340
(reporting similar comments from Tung Chee-hwa).
34' China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 311.
350 China Says Britain Duty-Bound To Support New HK Chief, supra note
340; China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 311.
351 See, e.g., Fung Wai-kong, The Dilemma Awaiting the Democrats, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 21; Chris Yeng, The Obligations of
Office, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 21.
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to persuade the people to accept the non-negotiable aspects of the
arrangement. Thus, the newly anointed Chief Executive-designate
stated that he would work to overcome weaknesses in his
popularity,35 2 but not, he stressed, to the extent of becoming a
slave to transient popular opinion or at the expense of "the long-
term and overall interest of Hong Kong."3 3 Concerning one of
the specific positions on controversial issues that undermined his
popularity, Tung was confident that the Hong Kong people would
be sensible and accept the Provisional Legislature and his use of
the Chief Executive's office to cooperate with and support the
new body.35- The official voice of Beijing in the territory, Hong
Kong Xinhua chief Zhou Nan reminded Hong Kongers that the
"Hong Kong people should render great support" both to the
Provisional Legislature and to the Chief Executive.355
Chinese and pro-China arguments that sought to persuade the
people to be "sensible" and to offer "great support" to the new
Chief Executive and his S.A.R. government often drew connec-
tions between those goals and the advancement or preservation of
other values that seemed to have a secure hold on the Hong Kong
people. In their appeals to local senses of pride and political
competence, the P.R.C. and pro-China arguments emphasizing the
democratic and autonomy-accepting virtues of the Chief Executive
selection process were partly in this vein. The controversy
surrounding Tung's endorsement of China's position on the Bill
of Rights and civil liberties provided a major occasion for a more
focused version of this line of argument. Where critics among
Hong Kong's liberal and democratic politicians charged capitula-
tion to China and betrayal of the will and interests of the Hong
Kong people, P.R.C. and pro-China backers of Tung's stance
depicted a Chief Executive-designate using his office to defend and
promote Hong Kongers' values. As portrayed in laudatory
coverage in the territory's pro-China press, Tung's position on the
Bill of Rights and related laws was in step with the partly Chinese
352 See e.g., Yeung, supra note 349 (describing Tung's efforts to build trust
and support in a community that had had no opportunity to vote for him).
311 Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Livelibood Top HK Concern, Claims Tung,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 1 (quoting Tung's comments).
3 See Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's News
Conference for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, supra note 340.
311 Zhou Urges Support for Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 18, 1997,
at 4.
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and non-Western values of the people of Hong Kong."6
Seen from this perspective, it was the liberals and democrats
who showed a lack of confidence in Hong Kongers' abilities to
rule themselves and harmed Hong Kongers' interests by speaking
ill of Hong Kong's incoming regime and new laws to foreigners.
Tung won great praise in Hong Kong's pro-China press for saying
that "Hong Kong people must respect their nation and the dignity
of the SAR government"35 - a quality that liberal critics of
Tung apparently lacked. Extending the argument, Tung criticized
Martin Lee and others for "go[ing] abroad to blacken the name of
Hong Kong, [for inciting] foreigners to come to Hong Kong and
tell us, the Hong Kong people, what to do"38 and for failing to
"sit down and talk about family matters in our own home."359
Pro-China commentaries argued that, in making such comments
and in urging liberal and pro-democracy politicians not to
besmirch Hong Kong, Tung was fulfilling his responsibility to
protect the interests of the Hong Kong people.3 °
As these defenders of Tung's positions saw it, liberal critics'
charges that Tung sold out Hong Kong's interests to China's
preferences asserted contradictions where none existed. Pro-China
sources explained that China and the people of Hong Kong had
compatible interests and that Tung was merely showing that he
possessed a key qualification for the office of Chief Executive: the
ability to bridge gaps in understanding between the people of the
S.A.R. and the leadership in Beijing.
361
11 See, e.g., Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's
Prosperity, supra note 238, at A4; Tung in a Legal Tangle, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 17 (connecting Tung's arguments about Hong Kong
people's values with reaction to his position on the Bill of Rights and related
reforms).
317 Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, supra
note 238, at A4.
351 Humphrey, supra note 204; see also Martin Lee Humbles Himself in the
United States, TA KuNG PAO, Apr. 17, 1997, at A4 (criticizing Martin Lee for
having "implored" U.S. politicians to "meddle in Hong Kong's affairs" and to
help prevent amendments to the Societies and Public Order ordinances).
... Yeung, supra note 323, at 15.
31 See Tung Cbee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity,
supra note 238; Humphrey, supra note 205; Yeung, supra note 323, at 15.
361 See Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's News
Conference for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, supra note 340 (quoting
Tung's statement that "[w]e must remember that Hong Kong's long term
interests are consistent with China's" and "all Hong Kong people, regardless of
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China and its closest Hong Kong supporters in the battle over
ordinary Hong Kongers' opinions did not preach infinitely
flexible accommodation of the preferences, or even the interests,
of the Hong Kong people with respect to the Chief Executive
issue. As with the other issues of the endgame, the Chinese and
pro-China position here too assumed that an answer to the key
legal and institutional questions that would be adequate for the
Hong Kong people also could be compatible with China's
conception of law and sovereignty. An insistence on positivist
principle was never far from the surface of P.R.C. and pro-China
Hong Kong arguments concerning the Chief Executive controver-
sy. Although presented in ways that sought to reflect or to
inculcate favorable attitudes among the Hong Kong people, the
Chief Executive selection process, its outcome, and the powers of
the office remained the products of Chinese sovereign action.
As the framework documents and official and unofficial
comments made clear to people in Hong Kong, China and its
allies regarded the office of Chief Executive and the Selection
Committee as creatures of P.R.C. statutes. The staffing of the
Selection Committee and the appointment of the Chief Executive-
designate were the actions of P.R.C. or P.R.C.-established bodies.
The underlying policies of according Hong Kong some form of
democracy (in the Chief Executive Selection process and more
generally), and of having Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong
(whether as Chief Executive or in lesser offices) were discretionary
choices and grants of authority from the P.R.C.
36 2
their viewpoints, should be united" and "reach a consensus on cooperation");
Kwang, supra note 344, at 8 (quoting comments of a member of the political
sub-group of the Preliminary Working Committee who noted that many Hong
Kong inhabitants had "a mental block about China" and that the Chief
Executive needed to be able to promote mutual understanding between Hong
Kong and China).
" See Basic Law, supra note 21, pmbl. (stating that the Basic Law is a
statute enacted by the P.R.C.'s National People's Congress); id. arts. 43-51
(providing for the existence, powers, criteria of eligibility, and method of
selection and appointment of the Chief Executive); id. art. 68, annex I
(providing for the constitution of the legislature by elections); id. annex I
(providing the method for selection of the Chief Executive); Joint Declaration,
supra note 39, annex I, pmbl., annex I, S II (elaborating "the basic policies of
the People's Re ublic of China regarding Hong Kong," including those of
"establish[ing] the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region," providing a
government and legislature composed of local inhabitants, and selecting t5he
chief executive through election or consultation and the legislature by
elections); id. S 3(4) (providing that "[t]he Government of the People's Republic
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3. RULE-OF-LAW VALUES (11) - THE BATTLE OVER HONG
KONG'S BUSINESS COMMUNITY
3.1. The Business Community and Prosperity
In addition to their struggles to win over the Hong Kong
people, the principal parties to the political wrangling over Hong
Kong's future laws and institutions also fought over a narrower
and more elite segment of Hong Kong society: the business
community. Here, too, each side sought to claim that its
preferred solutions to the issues of the endgame coincided with
what the target group wanted, needed, or could be convinced to
demand. The business community, particularly Hong Kong's
major local firms and multinational enterprises with a substantial
presence in the territory, received special attention in the contest
to shape the S.A.R.'s order for an important, if obvious, reason:
the confidence and support of the business community, which had
been so vital to the territory's past economic success, looked to be
the key to future prosperity as well.
3.1.1. Business and the Politics and Government of an
'Economic" City
The relatively elite business community arguably has had a
more dominant role in Hong Kong than have business communi-
ties in most other countries. The business community has been
especially central to the territory's economic life. For decades
preceding the end of colonial rule, Hong Kong's government
followed a policy of "positive non-interventionism." 363  Regula-
of China declares that the basic policies of the Peoples Republic of China regarding
Hong Kong" include that "[t]he Chief Executive will be appointed-by the
Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or
consultations" in Hong Kong and that the government "will be composed of
local inhabitants") (emphases added); N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21 (providing
for the nomination of the first Chief Executive by a Selection Committee
chosen by a Preparatory Committee established by the N.P.C.); see also supra
notes 353-55 and accompanying text (suggesting the limits to accommodation
of popular preferences).
363 See generally STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY
151-57 (1990) (discussing "positive non-interventionism.") "Positive non-
intervetionism," although coined by Philip Haddon-Cave, who served as Hong
Kong Financial Secretary from 1971 to 1981, nonetheless captures a general
policy that pre-dated and survived his tenure. See id. at 151.
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tion of business activities and international trade was minimal,
mostly limited to helping provide the certainty and transparency
on which markets depend.3" Until the recent establishment of
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, there had not been a
distinct public entity that performed many of the major functions
of a central bank. A handful of elite banks have issued the
territory's currency.36 Hong Kong also has had nothing resem-
bling the elaborate state industrial policies that have characterized
other East Asian "tiger" economies.366 Affirmative government
involvement in the economy concentrated on general support for
business activities (investments in housing, infrastructure, and
trade promotion), rather than company- or industry-specific
subsidies, state ownership of productive enterprises, or protection-
ism.
"Business" seemed to dominate the life of the territory so
thoroughly that the practices and norms of commerce and the
business community did much to define the Hong Kong "systems"
that the legal arrangements for the transition pledged to preserve.
This is likely a reflection of Hong Kong's success in creating
wealth and its failure in fostering alternatives to business as the
central element of Hong Kong society. The territory's rapid rise
as a major regional and global economic hub - a home base for
several business empires, host to branches of the largest interna-
tional firms, the world's eighth largest trading entity, and an
economy with per capita incomes rivaling those in the industrial-
ized West - naturally made the territory's leading business elites
a focal point of Hong Kong's identity.368
At the same time, a population made up largely of immigrants
with a relatively weak sense of a distinct local cultural identity
and a colonial system of government that precluded development
361 See MINERS, supra note 6, at 47-49 (discussing Hong Kong's ideology of
minimal interference in economic activity.
365 On monetary policy, financial regulation, and the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority, see, for example, Lui Yu-hon, Banking, Monetary Affairs and
Developments ofFinancial Markets, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S
CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 151-75.
"' See HAGGARD, supra note 363; MINERS, supra note 6.
367 See supra note 366.
36S See, eg., HONG KONG GOv'T INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 47-58,
79-81; Tang, Hong Kong in Transition: Globalization Versus Nationalization, in
THE CHALLENGES Op HONG KONG'S REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA, supra
note 7; deLisle, supra note 27, at 72-73, 75-76.
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of a strong local political leadership meant that economic elites
would have few rivals. Tycoons (in addition to the governor and
the ubiquitous movie stars) were late colonial Hong Kong's
leading celebrities. Business leaders were also the principal figures
in Hong Kong politics for much of the colony's recent history.
Prominent businesspeople and senior members of a pro-business
civil service whose ethos was anti-regulatory filled the Executive
Council and the Legislative Council - especially prior to the
electoral reforms of the 1990s.369 True political parties formed
and brought to the fore many more leaders drawn from the ranks
of the territory's lawyers, teachers, journalists, unionists, and
academics only in the aftermath of Tiananmen and with the
introduction of broad-based elections for Legco.370 Thus, at the
beginning of Hong Kong's endgame, a top Chinese official could
credibly characterize Hong Kong as an "economic" rather than a
"political" city.
71
Not surprisingly, the parties to the political clash over Hong
Kong's future saw the business community's actions and reactions
as crucial to the fate of any proposed answers to the legal and
institutional questions of Hong Kong's transition to Chinese rule.
Tellingly, business concerns caused Britain to raise the issue of
Hong Kong's post-1997 status more than a decade and a half
369 See generally MINERS, supra note 6, at 114-20 (discussing Hong Kong's
pro-business functional constituency electoral system and stating that "nowhere
else except in Hong Kong is the largest block of seats in the legislature set aside
to secure special representation for the richest and most privileged sectors of
the community"); IAN SCOTT, POLTICAL CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF
LEGITIMACY IN HONG KONG (1989); Stacy Mosher, The Governor's Men, FAR
E. ECON. REv., Oct. 3, 1991, at 11 (iscussing the appointment of conservative,
establishment figures to Hong Kon 's Legislative Council); Stacy Mosher, Out
of the Club, FAR E. ECON. REV., Iov. 7, 1991, at 12 (describing the appoint-
ment of conservative members to the Executive Council); Mosher, supra note
235, at 17 (noting that Hong Kong's electoral system reserves two-thirds of the
seats in the legislature to "well-entrenched" interests).
370 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17; Sonny S.H. Lo, Legislative Cliques, Political
Parties, Political Groupings and Electoral System, in FROM COLONY TO SAR:
HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 51-70; So, supra note 17.
371 See Louise do Rosario, Future Shock, FARE. ECON. REV., May 19, 1994,
at 24 (quoting Lu Ping, director of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs Office, as saying "'Hong Kong has always been an economic city, never
a political city'"); Stormont, supra note 293 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong
director Zhou Nan affirming Lu Ping's point); see generally LAu & KUAN,
supra note 1, at 63-118 (describing economic and political attitudes and the
relatively low levels of engagement with political issues).
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earlier: with the colonial government unwilling to grant develop-
ers leases extending beyond the expiration of the New Territories'
ninety-nine-year lease, business interests grew nervous about
making investments that would require more than fifteen years to
recoup. 72 A shared sense that business interests were important
and had to be accommodated was also evident in the aftermath of
Hong Kong Governor MacLehose's and Deng Xiaoping's first
formal discussion of the reversion issue in 1979: the one element
of Deng's response made immediately public was his message to
members of Hong Kong's business community that they should
"set their hearts at ease." 373
This solicitude for business interests reflected a recognition on
both sides of the principal political divide in pre-reversion Hong
Kong that the business community could make the territory
wither if business elites found the legal and institutional arrange-
ments for the transition unacceptable. Although "losing the
people" might raise the prospect of a flight of political refugees or
a harsh political crackdown, significant capital flight and a severe
economic slowdown could be equally devastating to the territory's
stability and prosperity. In addition, there was reason to think
that a fall in seemingly high, but potentially volatile, business
confidence presented a more credible threat to Hong Kong's
future than did a ruinous rise of popular discontent.
By the 1990s, a considerable share of Hong Kong's most
prominent firms had re-registered in offshore locations that would
be immune from the dangers of legal decay in Hong Kong.
Anecdotal evidence and common sense indicated that local
individuals and firms with large liquid assets had made contingen-
cy plans to move funds - and their business operations - safely
3" Under the 1898 Convention of Peking, China granted Britain a ninety-
nine year lease on the New Territories, includes more than 90% of Hong
Kong's current territory. The government's policy on leases was economically
important because nearly all land in the territory is held as long-term leases
from the government. By the 1980s, most of the open land available for major
development projects was in the New Territories. However, projects in the
more densely developed and smaller areas that Great Britain c aimed to have
a legal right to occupy in perpetuity (under the treaties ceding Hong Kong
Island andKowloon) were implicated as well because the British authorities had
long pursued a policy of treating the ceded territories and the leased New
Territories as part of a single integrated colony.
3 On this early phase of the negotiations, see, for example, ROBERT
COTTRELL, THE END OP HONG KONG 58-64 (1993); PERCY CRADOCK,
EXPERIENCES OF CHINA 161-68 (1994); SCOTT, supra note 369, at 167.
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out of Hong Kong in the event of a crisis. 3 4 The same was true
of international companies in Hong Kong, which comprise a large
and important segment of the business community. With a long
list of competing locations eager to lure away international capital
and regional or global headquarters, a realistic exit option was in
place for most of Hong Kong's key economic elites.375
Recognizing that legal and institutional arrangements that
promised to provide the requisites of continued prosperity were
crucial to convince business elites not to exercise their flight
option, the colonial authorities and Beijing gave business leaders
prominent roles in the process of crafting Hong Kong's post-
reversion order. Business interests continued occupy the lion's
share of the seats in Exco (the only Hong Kong entity formally
briefed about the progress of the talks leading to the Joint
Declaration) and Legco, and to enjoy other reliable channels of
influence with the colonial government through chambers of
commerce and industry groups." 6 Leading figures in Hong
Kong's business community also engaged in frequent informal
discussions with Chinese leaders and were appointed to all the
formal bodies established to make arrangements for the S.A.R.,
including the Basic Law Drafting and Consultative Committees,
the Preliminary Working Committee, the Preparatory Committee,
and the Selection Committee for the S.A.R.'s first Chief Execu-
tive.3'7 The business-heavy Selection Committee proceeded to
" See Carol Kennedy, Can Two Hongs Get It Right?, DIRECTOR, Feb. 1996,
at 3440 (quoting Jardines former director Nigel Rich); Michael Steinberger, Pact
on HKs Legal System Has Not Put Fears to Rest, Bus. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at 8.
Fearing how Hong Kong take-over and merger laws might be used against
it after 1997, Jardines delisted on the Hong Kong stock exchange after its
request for a formal exemption was denied. See Hong Kong: Business Communi-
ty Maintaining Optimism Despite Uncertainty About Its Future Post 1997,
EUROmoNEY SUPPLEMENT, July 16, 1991 (describing Hong Kong and Shanghai
Bank's restructuring under a UK holding company in 1991); Ian K. Perkin,
Primary Listing Is Now London, Says Jardines, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
8, 1991.
17s See Bruce Gilley, Just in Case .... FAR E. ECON REV., Aug. 8, 1996, at
53; Henny Sender, Politics, Not Profits, FAR E. ECON REV., Dec. 17, 1992, at
20; Gary Silverman, The Price of Success, FAR E. ECON REV., July 6, 1995, at
54; Michael Steinberger, Companies Ring-Fence Assets in Hong Kong Twilight
Raid, TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 1995.
37 See MINERS, supra note 6, at 114-20.
'77 See Chan, Democracy Derailed in the Hong Kong Basic Law, in THE
HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY
UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 3-35. More than half of the Hong Kong slots
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nominate prominent businessman Tung Chee-hwa as the initial
occupant of the S.A.R.'s top post and to elect many business and
pro-business candidates to the Provisional Legislature.
Providing these opportunities for business to make its demands
and preferences heard was but one front in a political battle to
claim and cultivate the loyalty of business interests. All major
parties in the political battle over Hong Kong's future order
recognized that a prosperity-sustaining solution for the problems
of Hong Kong's transition required a rule of law satisfactory to
the territory's business interests. Accordingly, the key political
players undertook extensive efforts to characterize, influence, and
predict this key group's preferences and requirements in ways that
were compatible with the divergent conceptions of the rule of law
and institutions that China, the colonial authorities, and emergent
Hong Kong politicians of all stripes saw as desirable, or at least
minimally acceptable. This battle over the elite business commu-
nity, like the broadly similar struggle over the people, was a
central feature of the endgame politics of shaping Hong Kong's
legal and institutional order beyond reversion.
3.1.2. Variety and Fragmentation in Hong Kong's
Business Community
The elite business community that formed the focus of this
conflict was itself quite diverse. Its Hong Kong-based components
included venerable hongs founded in the days of the opium trade
and often led by their founding families or fellow expatriates.3 78
The business community also included conglomerates and far-
flung holding companies dominated by Hong Kong Chinese
tycoons.379  Ethnic Chinese leaders of Hong Kong business
on the Preparatory Committee, which was established in 1996 to handle critical
transition-related tasks, went to business leaders, as did half the seats on the
committee that nominated and elected the S.A.R.'s first chief executive. See
N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21; Bruce Gilley, Down to Brass Tacks, FAR E.
EcoN. REV., Jan. 25, 1996, at 14-15.
379 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 374, at 34-40 (describing the management
of Swire and Jardines); Henny Sender, Fixed Assets, FAR E. ECON. REV., July
8, 1993, at 22 (contrasting the different image and style of Hong Kong's leading
hongs Jardine Matheson and Swire Pacific).
379 See Garth Alexander, Hong Kong's Top Taipans Get Ready for Takeover,
TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 1993, S 3, at 8 (noting the change in leadership at
some large Hong Kong firms from British to Hong Kong Chinese management
in preparation for the hand-over); Hutchison Whampoa Sets New $2bn HK
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included heads of well-established companies and fast-rising
entrepreneurs. 38" This "Chinese" segment of the elite business
sector took in some scions of pre-revolutionary Shanghai's leading
commercial families, others who were more purely Hong Kongese
or Cantonese, and a handful who had struck roots in the diaspora
of "overseas Chinese" in Southeast Asia. 8 Some of the Chinese
establishment's members had been educated in the United States
or Britain while others followed the more insular mode of the
traditional taipan82 The business community's fully "foreign"
Benchmark, EUROWEEK, July 15, 1997, at 1, 14 (describing Li Ka-shing's
Hutchison Whampoa as Hong Kong's second largest company, measured by
capitalization, and as one of Hong Kong's most diversified business groups with
interests in many sectors and countries); Jake Lloyd Smith, Mixed Reaction to
HSIReshuffle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 18, 1997, Business, at 1 (similarly
describing Li Ka-shing's business empire); see generally Who's Who in Hong Kong
- Tycoons at a Glance, Reuters, May 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File.
380 See, e.g., Owen Hughes, Who's Woo, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
27, 1994, Magazine, at 21 describing Peter Woo, who succeeded his father-in-
law, Sir Y.K. Pao, as chairman of the giant Wharf and Wheelock groups); John
Ridding, People: Hong Kong Telecomm Chief in Focus, FIN. TIMEs (London),
Apr. 15, 1996, at 9 (describing Linus Cheung, the first ethnic Chinese head of
Hong Kong's monopoly telecommunications service provider); Nick Rufford,
Hong Kong Tycoon Refuses To Kowtow, SUNDAY TIMES (London) Mar. 24, 1996,
(describing former clothing entrepreneur and Apple Daily and Next Magazine
publisher Jimmy Lai as a "former street urchin" and "self-made millionaire");
Thumbnail Sketches of Potential Hong Kong Leaders, Reuters, Nov. 16, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Who's Who in Hong Kong -
Tycoons at a Glance, supra note 379 (noting Linus Cheung's modest beginnings
as a goldsmith's apprentice and his rise at Cathay Pacific, Hong Kong's
principal airline).
31 See Asia, Profile. The Private Life of Robert Kuok, Reuters, Feb. 19, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describingthe business empire,
in Hong Kong and elsewhere of Malaysian-born ethnic Chinese tycoon Robert
Kuok); Lee Han Shih, A Tale of Two Tycoons: Kuok, Khoo Set To Expand Media
Groups, BuS. TIMES (Singapore, Feb. 24, 1996, at 6 (describing Robert Kuok's
role In the media business in Hong Kong and China); Melinda Liu, Revenge of
the Refugees, NEWSWEEK, May9 1997, at 36 (describing Run Run Shaw, Tung
Chee-hwa's father and other Shanghainese who became members of Hong
Kong's business elite); Who's Who in Hong Kong - Tycoons at a Glance, supra
note 379 (describing Linus Cheung as of Hong Kong origin); Sondra WuDunn,
Ho in Strategic Mainland Investment, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31, 1993,
at 1 (describing the business ventures of Hong Kong-born casino magnate
Stanley Ho).
382 See Edward A. Gargan, A Master Builder for Asia's Future, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17,1994, at D1 (describing Princeton-educated property developer Gordon
Wu; Barry Porter, Hong Kongers with the Midas Touch, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 23, 1994, Review, at 4 (describing Li Ka-shing as having only a high
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or "international" segment included leading firms from around the
world, most notably those from the United States, Great Britain
and Japan.
383
The territory's major companies also varied in their key
revenue sources. By the late 1980s, some were heavily dependent
on investments in China, while others relied significantly on
Hong Kong sources of income. Still others used Hong Kong
primarily as a base for regional or global operations.3 s4 Key
companies were also concentrated in significantly different
economic sectors. These ranged from relatively low-tech manufac-
turing, based in thousands of factories in China's Guangdong
province, to cutting-edge financial and investment services for
capital flowing to and from all corners of the world."' In
between, Hong Kong's traditionally preeminent activity as a hub
of international trade in manufactured goods remained a major
line of business for some of the territory's leading firms. A more
recent mainstay of the economy, namely property and infrastruc-
ture development both in the territory and in China, was at least
school education and Walter Kwok as one of three brothers educated at British
Universities who inherited their father's business empire).
311 See, &g., Tang, supra note 7, at 184; Giley, supra note 375, at 53.
3" See Hutchison Whampoa Sets New $2bn HK Benchmark, supra note 379
(describing Li Ka-shing's Hutchison Whampoa as one of Hong Kong's most
diversified business groups with interests in many sectors and countries);
Kennedy, supra note 376 (describing Swire's continuing focus on regional
business and Jardines' quest to become an Asian-based multinational corpora-
tion); Gargan, sup-a note 384 (describing the dependence of Gordon Wu's
Hopewell Holdings on massive infrastructure projects in mainland China);
Barry Porter, Sino To Make Its Debut in Infrastructure with Port Venture in
Dalian, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 30, 1996, at 1 (describing Robert Ngs
Sino-Lands recent move outside of its traditional specialty, property develop-
ment in Hong Kon); Porter, supra note 384 (describing Sino-Land as a Hong
Kong property development company).
385 See supra note 384; see also Tang, supra note 28, at 125-27 (describing the
shift of Hong Kong manufacturing to Guangdong and possible responses to it);
Hughes, supra note 380 (describing Sir Y.K. Pao's shipping-based Wharf and
Wheelock companies); Liu, supra note 381 (describing Ting Chee-hwa's family
shipping firm); John Ridding, HK Manufacturers Seek a Higher Profile, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 1997, at 3 (quoting heads of manufacturing-based
companies as favoring industrial policies to support revival of manufacturing
in Hong Kong). The financial services sector is one of Hong Kong's largest and
fastest growing, and includes many internationallyprominent institutions such
as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Bank of East Asia. See generally
HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 51-52, 70-92; Lui, supra
note 365.
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equally important for many of the business community's key
players.
The visible political leanings of Hong Kong's business elites
ranged widely as well. At one extreme stood the unabashedly
liberal and democratic commitments of one-time clothing
entrepreneur and Next Magazine and Apple Daily publisher Jimmy
Lai.3 6 A bit closer to the center was former head of the Gener-
al Chamber of Commerce and Legco member Jimmy McGregor,
whose support for political reform made him the target of a
successful campaign by pro-China firms to secure his ouster,
despite McGregor's having urged moderation and compromise in
disputes over democratization and arrangements for the judicia-
ry.3 7  At the other extreme were the relentlessly bullish and
strongly "pro-China" views (as the press routinely labeled them)
of real estate developer David Chu.8
Many of the territory's leading tycoons and its most promi-
nent businessmen-politicians occupied shifting positions between
these poles. Their political commitments often seemed simply to
track their current assessments of what would be best for their
businesses. For the territory's Western-based business elites,
positions on the issues of the transition presumably reflected
additional considerations. These factors included the pressure of
political views (whether their own or those of their customers,
shareholders, or governments) rooted in their home countries, and
a sense that as expatriates they were not proper players in the
territory's political struggles." 9 As well-connected or state-
owned P.R.C.-based companies became major participants in the
Hong Kong economy, the political views of the Hong Kong
316 See Rufford, supra note 380.
117 See Bitter Battle for the Business Seat, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13,
1991 (describing McGregor's generally liberal leanings and quoting his moderate
view that "we must minimise the possibilities of confrontation and maximise
the opportunities for consensus").
311 See, e.g., Andrew Neil, Hong Kong Surprise, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1997,
at 165-66.
389 See infra sections 3.2 and 3.3; deLisle & Lane, supra note 21 (citing
several examples of views expressed by indigenous and expatriate business
elites); cf Timothy A. Gelatt and Diane F. Orentlicher, Public Law, Private
Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 J. INT'L
L. BUS. 66 (1993) (discussing how political and legal pressures at home have
affected Western multinationals' approaches to investment in China and other
countries with poor human rights records).
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business community became more varied and complex. Mainland
firms emerged as a shadowy but important group, at times
inclined or required to hew to a "pro-China" line.39° While
purely P.R.C. companies were often implicitly excluded from the
focus of the endgame's political conflict over "business," mainland
firms' acquisition of substantial interests in major Hong Kong
companies made the former's positions relevant even in a struggle
that focused on a "business community" defined more narrowly
to include only "Hong Kong" or "multinational" firms and their
local leaders.391
Such considerable variety in the interests and views of leaders
of "the business community" helps to explain why both pro-China
and liberal forces were able to find comforting evidence and claim
victories in the political battle over the rule-of-law values and legal
and institutional preferences of Hong Kong's business elite. Basic
differences in political orientation, economic-sectoral and geo-
graphic concentration, cultural background, and even nationality
were likely to produce fault lines dividing the business community
along several dimensions, including: inclinations to support any
particular position on key rule-of-law-related questions, abilities to
exercise an exit option in the event of a "bad" answer to those
questions, and capacities to survive and thrive under any particular
version of the "rule of law" that emerged for post-reversion Hong
Kong.
Despite this diversity and apparent potential for division in the
territory's business circles, the major participants in the battle
over business cast their arguments and claims predominantly in
terms of an undifferentiated "business community." The only
significant exceptions to this pattern were occasional arguments
that focused specifically on the territory's international business
community. That the P.R.C., the British and colonial govern-
ments and Hong Kong political leaders and activists made so little
public effort to target smaller segments of the business world or
31 See Bruce Gilley, Great Leap Southward, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 23,
1995, at 60 (discussing China's rumored issuance of a directive to Chinese firms
in Hong Kong to increase purchases of businesses and real estate as a means of
shoring up economic health and confidence in Hong Kong and smoothing the
transition to Chinese rule); see also Henny Sender, Cash Dispenser, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 26 (describing P.R.C. entities as increasingly
powerful presences in Hong Kong's economy.
391 See Gilley, supra note 390, at 60; Sender, supra note 390, at 26.
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to secure the backing of particular sectors of the elite business
community - even as they turned to threats and blandishments
aimed at the business community as a whole - underscores the
peculiar political character of the efforts to assert or enlist business
backing in the endgame struggle to shape future Hong Kong laws
and institutions. For the principal participants in that struggle,
the basic clash of visions of law and sovereignty drove and defined
the battles over the business constituency, even to the near
exclusion of the ordinary politics of building seemingly promising
coalitions.
3.2. Business and the British, and Hong Kong Liberal-Democratic
Vision of the Rule of Law
During the last years before reversion, British colonial
authorities and Hong Kong's pro-democracy and liberal political
leaders claimed that Hong Kong's business community did or
must support the rule of law, in large part because it was vital to
prosperity. Hong Kong's Financial Secretary Donald Tsang
asserted that "the rule of law is absolutely important, . . . [a]
pillar[] underpinning Hong Kong's success, and the nature of...
Hong Kong-style capitalism."3 2 Speaking to a business audience,
Governor Patten similarly argued that "the rule of law is not an
optional extra. ... It is what makes Hong Kong different, it is
what makes Hong Kong successful ... without it, a lot of you
would not be here."
393
On this view, the decline of the rule of law would spell
economic disaster for Hong Kong and bring harm to the members
of its business community. Martin Lee warned the business
community that if Hong Kong's rule of law suffered "erosion,"
"business [would] no longer be conducted freely and fairly," and
"the health of the economic development in Hong Kong" would
be in jeopardy.3 4 Patten cautioned that if "[y]ou take away the
rule of law," major international firms doing business in Hong
392 We Just Cannot Go Back, "EUROMONEY, Sept. 1996, at 84. Tsang listed
"freedom of the press, freedom from corruption in public service, the hle of
law and a level playing-field" as the "four pillars." id.
Chris Yeung & Genevieve Ku, Patten Tells Businessmen To Stand Up for
Autonomy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at 1.
391 Martin Lee, Hong Kong: One Country, No System?, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 14, 1989, at 27.
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Kong would "be off to Taipei or Seoul or Tokyo."39 More
broadly, colonial officials' and liberal politicians' frequent
assertions that a failure to secure the rule of law for post-reversion
Hong Kong would leave the people worried, disaffected and
restive were addressed, in significant part, to a business communi-
ty that would presumably understand that deleterious economic
effects would follow from social instability or an exodus of human
capital.
The officials and politicians who made these arguments
envisioned a business-supported and business-supporting rule of
law of a particular type, although they differed over several crucial
questions of legal and institutional detail. They adopted the
position that a legal order sufficient to satisfy the wants and needs
of Hong Kong business would have to include clear rules for
economic behavior, administered and interpreted by fair and
neutral judicial and executive officers, and subject to amendment
by institutions that made and changed the laws in open, reasoned
and regularized ways. As was apparent in the battles over the
Hong Kong people's attitudes toward the rule of law, some of the
territory's most ardent pro-democracy leaders claimed that these
minimum conditions of legality needed to be undergirded by
democratic and locally accountable government institutions. This
perspective, including some of the variations within it, was
reflected in the general comments that Patten, Tsang, Lee and
others made concerning the business community's values and
interests and the rule of law. It was also consistent with the
arguments that they and other British and Hong Kong officials
and liberal and pro-democracy politicians deployed in their
struggles to claim or capture the allegiance of the Hong Kong
people. This consistency was perhaps politically and tactically
necessary, given the impossibility of achieving an acoustical
separation between arguments nominally addressed to "the people"
and to "the business community."
The parallels between the arguments that these key political
players pressed with respect to the people and with respect to
business also had more principled underpinnings, however, in the
liberal-democratic and natural-law-like conception of domestic
legal authority that British and colonial officials and many of the
... H.D.S. Greenway, Borrowed Time, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 1993,
Magazine, at 24 (quoting Governor Patten).
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territory's leading legislators and politicians broadly shared. At
a general level, this conception of legality and sovereignty did not,
and perhaps could not, differentiate sharply between what was
right and necessary for a rule of law for different groups in Hong
Kong. More subtle questions of what a liberal-democratic
perspective, and the Hong Kong business community, might
require of a rule of law - and intramural disagreements among
the perspective's adherents over such issues - emerged in the
endgame battles over business attitudes toward the major concrete
questions of laws and institutions for the S.A.R.
3.2.1. The Bill of Rights and the Value of Civil Liberties
In enacting the Bill of Rights Ordinance and amending other
Hong Kong laws to enhance protection of civil and political
liberties, the colonial government and liberal Hong Kong
politicians were able to gain support from business elites in the
wake of the Tiananmen Incident. They pointed to what the
brutal repression of the 1989 democracy movement in the
mainland seemed to portend for post-1997 Hong Kong, and to the
public outrage and fear that the events in Beijing had triggered in
the territory. The Hong Kong government and political leaders
supporting a Bill of Rights thus raised the specter of a prosperity-
undermining loss of confidence and stability unless the govern-
ment took dramatic action. With the public deeply worried about
the future and with some prominent business leaders having
expressed support for the Chinese student demonstrators,
significant segments of the indigenous business elite initially
backed the enactment of more robust and liberal civil and political
rights laws for Hong Kong.396 In an especially striking instance
of business support for rights-protecting legal reforms, business
and pro-business members of the Basic Law Consultative Commit-
tee proposed changes to the Basic Law to restrict Beijing's power
to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong, clarify the scope
of acts of state that were to be beyond the S.A.R. courts' domain,
entrench international covenants on human rights in the Basic
Law, and give Basic Law provisions a status in P.R.C. law
396 See, e.g., Lau, supra note 16, at 18 (noting generally pro-business Legco
and Exco members' and business leaders' heightened support for greater
democratic reforms).
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comparable to the provisions of China's state constitution.
In light of the public reaction in Western capitals to the events
at Tiananmen, the colonial government and Hong Kong's liberal
activists also could rely on the support or acquiescence of the
territory's international business community as they pursued
reforms in Hong Kong's laws that imposed illiberal restrictions on
civil and political rights. Ultimately, the Bill of Rights Ordinance
passed Legco without significant business opposition.398 After
the enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, proponents of a
liberal legal regime for civil liberties worked to cultivate business
support throughout the early and middle 1990s. They did so
primarily by linking the Bill of Rights, and other legal reforms
that they deemed essential for a just and adequate rule of law, to
the advancement or preservation of the business community's
assumed interests, especially its material interests. For example,
prominent barrister and, later, Solicitor General Daniel Fung
argued that business should welcome the Bill of Rights, not fear
it as a "pinko-liberal document."3 99 The Bill of Rights, Fung
explained, provided new ways for the territory's avowedly pro-
market business community to challenge government regula-
tion.400
More generally, Hong Kong government officials and pro-
democracy politicians argued that some of the rights protected by
the controversial Bill of Rights and other liberal amendments to
prior laws were in business' interest and that business should
recognize this feature. Martin Lee asserted that freedom of the
press and freedom of information were "things that the business
community knows they need."4°' The protection of these
freedoms, Lee added, was necessary for the preservation of "legal
integrity" upon which the protection of contracts and property
191 See Hong Kong: Group's Plan Tackles Flaws in Basic Law, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 6, 1989.
398 Indeed, some segments of the business community appear to. have
reacted negatively to China's initial op osition to the Bill of Rights, seeing in
it a possible threat to the vital indepen ence of commercial law after 1997. See
Hong Kong: Business Community Maintaining Optimism Despite Uncertainty
About Its Future Post 1997, supra note 374.
3" See Gareth Hewett, Hong Kong: Bill of Rights Poses Risks for "Uneducat-
ed" Businesses, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 12, 1991.
4 See id.
40' For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, ASIAWEEK,
Dec. 7, 1994, at 23.
19971
U. Pa. .. Int'l Econ. L.
also depended.4°2 Governor Patten similarly claimed that there
was a clear "relationship between.., a free press, and the rule of
law and Hong Kong's prosperity" that some people in the
business community would fail to recognize at their peril. 3
Articulating the claimed connection more fully, Hong Kong
liberals argued that, without the kind of protection the Bill of
Rights provided for "political" freedoms such as free expression,
business could not have confidence in the reliability and complete-
ness of economically relevant information that was vital to
commerce and investment. 4N
Perhaps perceiving that purely economic arguments for the
Bill of Rights and civil liberties laws seemed to fail to convince
the territory's business elites, colonial government officials and
liberal politicians sought to appeal to business leaders' non-
economic preferences as well. Specifically, they invoked views,
assertedly prevalent in the business community, that were
consistent with the requisites of the liberal-democratic rule of law
that they embraced. Faced with apparently low levels of support
for his agenda in the business community, Patten argued:
There is hardly a well-off businessman in Hong Kong who
doesn't want, for himself, the insurance of being able to
live in a free society ... . So I can't believe that those
businessmen don't understand the relationship between the
rule of law, between the values of pluralism, and being
402 Id.; see also Clarence Tsui, HK Politicians Urged To Avoid "Damaging
Talk, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at 4 quoting Martin Lee's
comment that, "[i]f you are a businessman, you need precise and reliable
economic information").
401 Greenway, supra note 395, at 14. Comments from the business
community offered some support for this position. See Louis Lucas, Hong
Kong Hopes for a Calm Voyage, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 441-66 (quoting
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Chairman Edgar Cheng Wai-kin's statement that
"Hong Kong's role as a regional centre for raising foreign capital" requires
"making sure there is freedom of flow of information and also the rule of law"
after 1997).
See Hong Kong's Lee Defies Colony's Future Leader, Reuters, Feb. 19,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Martin Lee);
Duncan Hughes, HK's Prosperity Dependent of Free Data Flow, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 30, 1997, Business, at 2.
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able to live a decent life.4°s
Martin Lee similarly asserted that, "[b]usiness people all cherish
their freedom more than anything else" and, therefore, could
hardly welcome a situation in which "[f]reedom will no longer be
protected by law."4
When the P.R.C. became more shrill and intransigent in its
threats to strike key provisions in the Bill of Rights and reverse
amendments to colonial legislation that previously had restricted
freedom of association and public demonstrations, British
authorities and Hong Kong liberals reiterated and extended their
grim predictions about what the absence of such robust legal
protections could mean for business and for Hong Kong. Many
of the dire warnings from Martin Lee and other liberal politicians
came in the wake of P.R.C.-appointed transitional bodies' and
P.R.C. state organs' formal endorsements of illiberal changes to
Hong Kong's rights laws.4°7 More broadly, the British position
was that any significant rolling back of the Bill of Rights or other
key rights legislation would cast doubt on the P.R.C.'s legal and
political commitments to Hong Kong and thereby "put[] at risk
the confidence on which Hong Kong's prosperity is based." 4°8
Focusing specifically on one incident, Governor Patten called the
Preparatory Committee's recommendations to overturn late
colonial reforms of rights laws "very disturbing," another instance
of "legal arguments hastily thrown together, policies made up as
we go along,"" and a move that threatened to create a "terrible
legal muddle."410 Such legal sloppiness and uncertainty could
hardly be welcomed by a business community that depended on
a transparent and predictable legal order. After local business
leaders attacked Patten for criticizing their lack of support for the
4s Graham Hutchings, "Tango Dancer" Patten Stamps on China's Toes,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 1996, at 10.
' Belinda Goldsmith, Hong Kong Party Leader Warns of Confidence Fall,
Reuters, Feb. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
o See supra Section 2.2.1; infra notes 412-14 and accompanying text.
40S Chris Yeung, UK Pledges Help for More than 50 Years, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 1997, at 6.
4 Keith B. Richburg, Chinese Approve Cutbacks in Hong Kong Civil
Liberties, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 3, 1997, at 4.
410 Quak Hiang Whai, Hong Kong: Tung Defends Plans by Beijing To A mend
HK Laws, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 24, 1997, at 6.
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endangered rights laws, British Prime Minister John Major backed
Patten's efforts to some extent. With modest success, the Prime
Minister pressured leading business groups in the territory to voice
public support for human rights and the rule of law.41 Major
warned that if the business community failed to do as he urged
and thus acquiesced in the undermining of the rule of law, the
outcome would not be in the best interest of Hong Kong and its
412business community.
British and Hong Kong defenders of the Bill of Rights and
related law reforms also sought to enlist the support of the
territory's international business community, where liberal-
democratic notions of legality were thought to have a strong hold.
Speaking to a forum in Singapore (a principal alternative site for
businesses wary of Hong Kong's legal future), British Foreign
Secretary Rifkind publicly condemned actions to repeal portions
of the Bill of Rights.413 Martin Lee, on a European tour, urged
Western investors to be alert to threats to freedom of the press
and other encroachments upon civil rights that could plague post-
1997 Hong Kong.414 He called on foreign business executives to
"ask their presidents, prime ministers and chancellors to insist that
China keeps its promises and maintains a free Hong Kong."415
Those heads of government, Lee presumably hoped, would request
or require business elites from their countries with interests in
Hong Kong and China to behave in a manner compatible with
the preservation of Hong Kongers' rights.
In addressing the Hong Kong business community's interna-
tional segment, colonial officials and liberal politicians again
emphasized the impact that a rollback of rights laws could have
on the immediate interests of the business sector. Martin Lee
warned that a lack of pressure on the P.R.C. to fulfil its pledge to
preserve Hong Kong's rights-protecting legal order could hurt
foreign businesses directly. As evidence, Lee noted that China's
"' See Louis Won, Business Leaders Take Up Major's Call, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 25, 1996, at 6.
412 See id.
413 See Greg Torode & Duncan Hughes, Qian Sticks to his Guns in Final
Meeting with Rfjkind, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1.
414 See Tung Chee-Hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity,
supra note 238, at A4.
415 C.K. Lau, Why Martin Won't Keep His Mouth Shut, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 16, 1997, at 11.
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lack of regard for "individual freedoms" had already led to the
kidnapping of foreign passport-holding, Hong Kong-based
executives. 6  More generally, Hong Kong Financial Secretary
Donald Tsang, who retained his post after the reversion despite
having confronted Tung Chee-hwa over Tung's pro-China stance
on rights issues, warned that international investors would pull
out of Hong Kong if China failed to provide a more convincing
case for the need to repeal or modify civil liberties legislation.4
Finally, the arguments that Hong Kong government officials
and the territory's leading liberal politicians made concerning
popular attitudes toward the Bill of Rights Ordinance and civil
liberties carried a strong message for the business community.
When British and colonial officials, Legco democrats and liberal
commentators asserted that the people were so attached to their
rights that a substantial roll-back would trigger deep disaffection
or considerable disorder, they were also warning, and seeking to
convince, the Hong Kong business community that moves to
revise portions of the Bill of Rights, the Societies and Public
Order Ordinances, and other laws would endanger crucial
preconditions for Hong Kong business' continued success. The
point appeared to register with some of the most politically
involved leaders in the business community. Business-linked
members of Legco and Exco had supported the initial enactment
of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and few of them were willing to
abandon it completely in later years. Businessman-politician,
Legco member, and leader of the pro-business Liberal Party, Allen
Lee stated in 1995, "Beijing will have to back off" from its
proposals to strip the Bill of Rights once Chinese authorities are
made to "understand how the common people here have accepted
the Bill of Rights. There is a perception that it protects them
from government abuses." 418  Lee maintained this view despite
China's increasingly clear and inflexible determination to overturn
parts of the civil and political liberties-expanding legislation of the
1990s, including the controversial amendments to the Societies and
416 See Hong Kong, The Future According to Martin Lee, EUROMONEY, Sept.
1996, at 82, 82.
417 See Amy Chew, HK's Tsang Blasts "Meddling" by China, Bus. TIMES
(Malaysia), Jan. 29, 1997, at 82; see also Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Hong Kong
Leader Backs Rights Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 1997, at A2.
418 Gilley, supra note 56, at 36.
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Public Order Ordinances. 419
Although some in the territory's indigenous and international
business circles worried that a hard line from Beijing on civil and
political rights in Hong Kong could be very bad for the local
economy, and mainstream Hong Kong business leaders sometimes
endorsed parts of the colonial government's rights agenda,
attempts to cultivate such sentiments faced an inhospitable
reception from a business community increasingly looking past
July 1, 1997.420 When Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-
hwa initiated his presumably Beijing-endorsed support for
legislative reversals in the name of prosperity, stability, and
suitability to Hong Kong's character and circumstances, the
liberal-democratic task became even more daunting. At least on
the surface, Hong Kong's business community had not been
persuaded that it needed, or that it would be worthwhile to
support, the preservation of a legal rights regime that adherents to
a liberal-democratic perspective claimed was essential both to a
just legal order for Hong Kong, and to a rule of law that would
be adequate for Hong Kong's business community.
3.2.2. Legco and Democratization: Of Interests and
Obligations
Claiming and cultivating business support for democracy-
extending constitutional change was arguably an even more
complicated and difficult project. This was particularly evident
for the more radically reformist proposals backed by some of the
territory's pro-democracy politicians, but it was also true for the
more limited Patten proposals. For the Governor, his subordi-
nates, and his sometimes reluctant allies among Legco's democrats,
the basic strategy was to link the programs that introduced just
and necessary changes in the institutions of representative
government with the preservation or augmentation of prosperity
and other ends that Hong Kong's business community could be
assumed to value. Shortly after presenting the outline of his plan,
419 See Richburg, supra note 409, at 4 (quoting Allen Lee who stated, "I
could not find anything that contradicts the Basic Law" in the legislation the
Preparatory Committee recommended overturning).
420 See, e.g., Paul Majendie, Investors Say HK Good Bet - China Wants It To
Succeed, Reuters, Jan. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
("There are very good reasons for believing the Chinese will do nothing to
upset the apple cart."); see also Won, supra note 413, at 6.
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Patten argued that "greater democracy helps to make communities
more prosperous." 421 Although favoring more extensive demo-
cratic change than the Governor proposed, Martin Lee made the
same general point, noting that "virtually every economically
advanced nation ... has recognised [sic] that prosperity and
democracy are not mutually antagonistic but are, in truth,
inseparable."4'
Addressing her audience's concerns in more detail, Hong Kong
Chief Secretary Anson Chan assured business leaders that Patten's
electoral reforms would "in no way weaken [the Hong Kong
government's] commitment to maintaining Hong Kong's attrac-
tion as the outstanding business location in this region. Indeed,
by strengthening our representative institutions, they can only
enhance investors' confidence . .. ."423 Chan also asserted that
the governor's proposals would not produce a Legco that would
change the Hong Kong government's traditional emphases on low
taxes, limited government spending, and the territory's economic
well-being.424 The Governor offered further reassurance and
promised to build a bridge between business and the democratic
politicians whose views worried business. Patten declared that he
did not see "any reason why a successful businessman should be
terrified of democratically elected politicians . . . ." Noting
that those politicians "have got to understand the business
agenda," Patten added that Hong Kong's business community
could rest assured that an empowered Hong Kong electorate, "a
community which represents better than any other the triumph
of market economy," would not "vote in large numbers for
politicians who work in the opposite direction."426
Martin Lee made similar arguments in support of democratiza-
tion generally and the Legco democrats' proposals for democratic
reforms more sweeping than Patten's plan. Lee explained that he
421 Frank Ching, Cleared for Action, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at
20.
41 Martin Lee, Tide of Democracy, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 26, 1992, at
31.
41 Chan Says Companies Should Not Fear Legco Bill, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 11, 1994, at 2.
424 See id.
41 Connie Law, Governor Bids To Bridge Gap, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 4, 1994, at 3.
426 Id.
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and the Democratic Party had made democratic and accountable
government their top priority precisely because it undergirded the
rule of law, which was "vital to Hong Kong not only because it
protects individual rights, but because it safeguards Hong Kong's
free-market system by guaranteeing the protection of contracts
and property necessary to continue our economic success.
" 427
Lee further argued that the free flow of information that business
required was dependent upon the existence of democratically
accountable institutions to make and oversee the enforcement of
appropriate laws.48
Pro-democracy politicians and colonial officials cautioned that,
if the business community stood in the way of democratic
changes, it would be hurting itself, as well as Hong Kong more
generally. If Hong Kong did not have "fair" and "credible"
elections, Patten warned, it would be impossible to "maintain the
rule of law," fight corruption, and maintain Hong Kong's
prosperity.42' Martin Lee echoed these concerns, arguing that
"without democratic and accountable government, we will never
be able to maintain the rule of law, and without the rule of law,
Hongkong [sic] will experience a surge in [P.R.C.-style] corruption
and guanxi [, reliance on personal connections, which].., would
threaten the free competition that is the very foundation of our
business success."43 Opposition to moderate electoral reforms,
Patten asserted, could harm business interests by fostering social
unrest. "[T]he business community," he said, "needed to consider"
whether it was "more destabilizing to try to accommodate, in a
modest way, people's political and democratic aspirations or to
block them off."431
After China made clear its inalterable rejection of the Patten
reforms, and thus increased pressure on the territory's business
427 Lee, supra note 32, at 11.
421 See For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra
note 403, at 23; see also Martin Lee, supra note 396, at 27 (arguing that a
democratic system of government is necessary to assure that the arle oflaw will
survive and therefore that business will still be conducted "freely," "fairly," and
not through "under the table arrangements").
429 Patten made these remarks in his 1993 state-of-the-territory address. See
Frank Ching, Confrontation in Hongkong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 21, 1993,
at 33; Comment on Chris Patten's 'Theory of the Infiltration of Corruption,' supra
note 284, at 2.
430 Lee, supra note 422, at 31.
411 Interview with Chris Patten, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 22.
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elites not to support the Governor's plan, proponents of demo-
cratic reforms continued to assert that the reforms would serve
the business community's material interests. The tone grew more
grim, however, and the arguments played more heavily on the
business community's fears, especially by linking the rejection of
democratic reform to the prospect of social unrest and instability.
Patten warned that "billionaires whose principal concern is that
they should go on being billionaires" risked, in their role as
China's principal advisers on Hong Kong, exacerbating Chinese
officials' dangerous "lack of understanding about what makes
Hong Kong tick."43 In the same spirit, pro-democracy indepen-
dent legislator Emily Lau commented after the 1995 Legco
elections, "I wish those tycoons whom Beijing likes to talk to so
much ... would speak out for what Hong Kong really
wants."433 The tycoons' failure to do so was "bad for business
and bad for prosperity" as well as bad for the people of Hong
Kong.434 On this view, if the territory's business elites insisted
on telling the central authorities in Beijing that neither they nor
the Hong Kong people needed or wanted democratic reform, the
Chinese leadership might well believe them and deny Hong Kong
the kind of electoral laws and constitutional order that Hong
Kongers ardently demanded and that Hong Kong business
ultimately needed.
The colonial administration and Hong Kong's leading pro-
democracy politicians continued this line of argument in address-
ing China's plan to replace the Legco elected under the Patten
reforms with an appointed Provisional Legislature. For business
to treat the derailment of the "through train" for Legco as a
minor, containable incident would be folly, Patten argued, because
"once you start to unpick the rule of law and all the things that
are associated with it, you start to find that the jumper is turning
rapidly into a ball of wool."435 Patten later commented that
432 Hutchings, supra note 405, at 10.
4" Andrew Higgins, The Vanishing Trick, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19,
1995, at 17.
43 Id.
435 The China Prism, supra note 115, at 16 (interviewing Governor Patten);
see also Fair Polls Seen as "Vitalfor the Future," S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
30, 1994, at 6 (quoting Hong Kong Chief Secretary Anson Chan saying that
electoral arrangements "which are less than open and fair, strike at the very
roots of the rule of law on which the whore fabric of this ... successful
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bowing to business pressures to compromise with China on
political reform, and to accept a less democratic Legco that China
might allow to survive the transition, would have been a recipe
for "pretty good chaos," something Hong Kong's business
community surely would not have welcomed.436 Pro-democracy
Legco members warned Hong Kong business leaders that China's
plan to replace the existing Legco with the interim body would
undermine the territory's "business environment" and the rule of
law, which was "the bedrock of Hong Kong's success."
437
Hong Kong government sources also addressed the impact of
the prospective establishment of the Provisional Legislature on
Hong Kong's vital links to the global economy, seeking to tap the
business community's fear of massive capital flight and to claim
support in the territory's international business circles. Patten
cautioned that China's lawless selection of a docile body could
give Hong Kong "the reputation that the rule of law was under
threat," which would prompt "the international business commu-
nity [to] move its cash elsewhere ... ,43 Chief Secretary
Anson Chan offered a similar, if more mild, warning when she
noted, "[a]s regards our legislature, there are clear concerns and
much will depend on China's action[s]" during the final year
before reversion, and "[ilt goes without saying that a legitimate
and truly representative legislature will do much to give confi-
dence to . .. international investors."439
A final strand in the colonial authorities' and pro-democracy
politicians' strategy to persuade the business community argued
that business leaders who undermined democratic reform were
betraying Hong Kong and democratic principles that were morally
obligatory and that were dear to Hong Kongers. In this vein,
Patten argued that Hong Kong's tycoons had a "social responsi-
bility" to stand up for Hong Kong, and urged business to
community depends").
436 Bruce Gilley, Standing Pat, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 30, 1996, at 16.
"" Angela Li & Vivian Lee, Business Lobby Under Fire for Patten Letter, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, May 23, 1996, at 6.
" Maggie Farley, Ditching the Colonial Past, SUNDAY TIm (London),
Feb. 6, 1994 (quoting Patten's statement to the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee). Patten added that 'it would not take very long" for the
international business community to move its assets. Id.
4" 'Business as Usual'Post-1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1996, at
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"understand it would not be in Hong Kong's interest to sell out
the Joint Declaration [including its provision promising democrat-
ic government] as a way of securing a quiet life." 440 Patten de-
nounced the business leaders who, as members of the Preparatory
Committee, supported the establishment of the Provisional
Legislature for "sign[ing] up to arrangements whose sole intention
is to choke off the voice of those who represent the majority of
public opinion." 441 Similarly, Martin Lee charged that for a
businessman to oppose Patten's reforms was "to display an
appalling lack of faith in the people of Hongkong [sic] who have
made their success possible."442 Such arguments sometimes
implied the familiar threat that reversing democratization would
trigger popular discontent and disaffection that would bring
material harm to business, but their principal and immediate focus
was a set of normative principles that were central to the liberal-
democratic vision of a rule of law for Hong Kong, and that
proponents of reform thought business should be ashamed to
betray.
Whether focusing on the business community's assertedly
underperceived material stake in a democratically grounded rule
of law, or appealing to the business community's sense that it
might owe something to Hong Kongers who had made business
elites rich, the varied arguments from the proponents of democrat-
ic reform sought primarily to persuade a business community
whose established preferences could not be counted upon to
produce support for Patten's or the Legco democrats' agenda.
Working from a concededly weak base, efforts to enlist or elicit
business support for democratic reforms of any sort drew
decreasingly enthusiastic responses during the final years preceding
Hong Kong's reversion. The Tiananmen Incident and the public
reaction to it in Hong Kong had produced business support for
electoral reform.443 Partly to forestall more sweeping reforms
440 Giley, supra note 436, at 16; see also Simon Holberton, Hong Kong
Reforms Upset Business Community, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 1994 (quoting Patten's
statement that "[w]e have got .. , to get business to understand it would not
be in Hong Kong's interest to sell out the Joint Declaration").
41 Mary Kwang, Rift Between Patten, Businessmen Likely To Continue Till
HK Handover, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), May 29, 1996, at 28.
442 Lee, supra note 422, at 31.
"3 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Out of Apathy, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 1, 1989
at 18 (discussing the political awakening of Hong Kong through demonstration
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of the sort that Patten and democratic politicians later advocated,
leading business figures, pro-business organizations, and business-
based or business-supporting members of Exco and Legco
endorsed plans to make a substantial portion of Legco's seats
directly elected.44  In addition, business interests organized
political parties to contest the elections held under the Patten and
pre-Patten reforms, running on platforms that embraced the
principle of democratic elections.445 One leading businessman-
politician commented after Patten had tabled his reform package
but before the 1995 Legco balloting yielded a landslide for
democrats, that Patten "quite rightly [felt] a mandate should come
from some form of representation" and that members of the
business community "should run for elections" if they "want to
make [their] views known."' Expatriate executives from some
of Hong Kong's most venerable business institutions were more
openly enthusiastic, and in some cases, they fully endorsed
Patten's proposals.' 7  One businessman-politician from their
responding to the mainland democracy movement and its suppression); Lau,
supra note 16, at 18 (discussing legislators' and business leaders' reactions to the
pro-democracy student protests in Hong Kong).
See, e.g., Emily Lau, Red Herring, FAR E. EcON. REV., Sept. 14, 1989,
at 26 (describing conservative and business support for making a substantial
portion of Legco's seats directly elected by 1997).
445 See id.; see also, eg., do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20 (describing the
support of the Conservative Resource Center, a pro-business quasi-party, and,
later, the Liberal Party, the territory's principal pro-business political party, for
modest expansion of the franchise); Emily Lau, Peking's Tune, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Aug. 23, 1990, at 22 (describing the formation of pro-business political
groups); Bellette Lee, Political Flag for Business, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
23, 1990 (discussing the platform of the Liberal Democratic Federation of Hong
Kong); Theresa Poole, Patten FacesPro-China Alliance, INDEPENDENT (London),
Jan. 20, 1993, at 11 (discussing business attitudes opposing Patten's reforms as
"confrontational" towards Cliina).
"" James Tien, HK Can Survive Under One Country,. One System, S. CHNA
MORNING POST, May 2,1993, at 11 (expressingthe views of General Chamber
of Commerce General Committee member and former Legco member James
Tien); see also Emily Lau, Political Shell Game, FAR E. EcoN. REV., April 5,
1990 at 25 (reporting a statement by leading Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing
that businessmen must take part in politics).
44' See Huang Chen-ya, jardines Salvo is HK Wake-Up Call, S. CHNA
MORNING POST, Dec. 20, 1992; see also Catherine Ong, No Slowing Down for
this Tough 'Last Taipan', BUS. Tam, July 1, 1994, at 17 (quoting out-going
Hutchison Whampoa chief Simon Murray as sharing Patten's bei? that
democratic reform is necessary to preserve Hong Kong's rule of law, and thus
the difference between Hong Kong and Guangdong); Doreen Cheung, Purves
Calls for Open and Fair Polls, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 5, 1993, at 2
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ranks declared that "the mainspring of our prosperity and stability
remains rooted in the rule of law... and a legislature safeguarded
by its accountability to the population.""'
Patten and Legco democrats were not able to make much use
of this early acquiescence and fragmentary support from the
business community in their protracted battle to enact electoral
and constitutional reform and to preserve a relatively democrati-
cally elected Legco's hope to become the first S.A.R. legislature.
Visible backing from business soon waned because of a variety of
factors. China was willing to stall progress on lucrative and
essential long-term infrastructure projects in the territory,449 and
to cast doubt on the fate of government contracts extending
through and beyond 1997,45 in order to press for the results it
wanted in the row over political reform. These moves raised
considerably the perceived costs to business of supporting Patten's
proposals for democratic change. China's rhetorical and financial
assault on Jardine Matheson, one of the most prominent corporate
supporters of the reforms, underscored the fact that China could
impose more direct and individualized costs on business that dared
to back Patten's program.4"' Caught between China's intracta-
ble opposition to reforms and local pressure to back democratiza-
tion, many in the business community, including some who
accepted democracy in principle, came to believe that the British
colonial authorities had put them in a difficult position by a
sudden and belated concern with democracy that smacked of
(quoting Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank chief Sir William Purves).
"s Bitter Battle for the Business Seat, supra note 387 (quoting Jimmy
McGregor).
"' See Emily Lau, Terminal Delay, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 21, 1991, at
11; Stacy Mosher, Creeping Intervention, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 18, 1991, at
10.
. See China Accused of Threatening Rule of Law, Reuters, Dec. 23, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Allasi Library, Asiapc File; Liu Shih-hsin, Lu Ping Talks
with Visitin&Textile Delegation from Hong Kong, WEN WEI PO, Dec. 1, 1992,
at 2 (explaining that contracts extending beyond 1997 must be "discussed" with
the P.R.C. or else parties will lack "legal protection"); Tai Ming Cheung, Push
Came to Shove, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 10, 1992, at 8.
45' See Chen Chien-ping, Quoting Out of Context and Misleading the Public,
WEN WEI Po, Dec. 7, 1992, at 2; Chen Chien-ping, China and Britain Should
Still Cooperate on Other Issues, WEN WEI P0, May 14, 1994, at A3; Tai Ming
Cheung, Silent Night, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 7, 1993, at 9.
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hypocrisy.4 2 The resulting resentment did not help reform
proponents' cause among Hong Kong business elites.
Several additional developments diminished the influence of
pro-political reform voices within the business community. These
changes included a continuing indigenization of the executive
ranks of leading Hong Kong companies, a growing circumspection
among some expatriate business leaders about foreigners' participa-
tion in the process of constitutional development for a post-
colonial Hong Kong, the striking success of pro-China "united
front" tactics in capturing the principal organs formally represent-
ing business interests in Hong Kong's corporatist politics, and the
creeping impact of P.R.C. entities' buying major stakes in
prominent Hong Kong companies.453  Moreover, the electoral
triumphs of Hong Kong's democratic parties and pro-democracy
independents increased business' fears that advancing political
reform meant inviting unchecked social spending and other
policies that would be costly and unpalatable to business inter-
ests. 45
4
452 See, e.g., Nigel Page, Hong Kong's Alternative Voice, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
May 1994, at 48 (quoting banker and Legco member David Li describing his
views as typical of the financial community).
453 See Bitter Battle for the Business Seat, supra note 387; Timothy Charlton,
Legco Reforms Create Problems, Says Fung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 4,
1994, at 1; do Rosario, supra note 91, at 22 (quoting Jardines' director and
reco member explaining that his abstention in the Legco vote on democratic
refrm is appropriate because "the scales should be tipped by people whose
home has been and will be Hong Kong for generations to come"); Fung
Wai-kong & Linda Choy, Chamber Spurns McGregor in Poll for Committee, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 27, 1994, at 1; Simon Holberton, China Tries To
Win Control of HK Chamber, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at 3; Mary Kwang,
Pro-China Lobby Out of the Backseat, STRArrs TIMES (Singapore), May 9, 1993,
at 14; Catherine Ong, No Slowing Down for this Tough "Last Taipan," BUS.
TRES, July 1, 1994, at 17 (describing Simon Murray's departure fiom Li Ka-
shing s Hutchinson Whampoa); Chris Yeung & Connie Law, China Hits Patten
forDeal with Jardines, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 1994, at 1 (de-
scribing a Jardines Matheson officer and Legco member's abstention that led to
the de eat of the pro-business Liberal Party's more modestly democratizing
alternative to Patten reforms).
411 See do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20 (noting business representatives'
worry that, if elected, pro-democracy politicians would press for expensive
government spending packages); do Rosario, supra note 301, at 28 (noting
criticisms of Democrats for raising populist expectations of tax cuts and welfare
spending); Increasing Tax in Disguised Form, and Shifting Misfortune to the Special
Administrative Region, WEN WEI PO, Dec. 17, 1993, at 2; Jonathan Karp, Man
in the Middle, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Oct. 13, 1994, at 16 (noting Deputy
Director of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Wang Fengchao's cautions
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Faced with such strong indications of a lack of support in the
business community, Hong Kong government offcials and pro-
democracy politicians sometimes asserted that appearances were
misleading, and that their programs for democratic reforms in fact
enjoyed the backing of the business community. They argued
that the seeming lack of support from the business community
was disingenuous, and that the business community's silence or
apparent opposition was the product of Chinese threats of
economic retaliation.4 5 More often, they acknowledged that
business' apparent attitudes were perhaps genuine, but benighted
and dangerous. Thus, one prominent pro-democracy politician
lamented that business leaders had taken the short-sighted and
mistaken view that "so long as they can establish good connec-
tions with Chinese officials, their profits are guaranteed."46
Similarly, Governor Patten regretted that "some people in the
business community who should know better ... underestimate
the importance of the rule of law"4"7 and a credible legislature
to Hong Kong's prosperity.
On either of these relatively pessimistic accounts of the
business community's subjective views, the advocates of democrat-
ic reform faced a difficult task of persuading business elites to
change their positions. They had to make business recognize, or
act on its recognition, that "[w]hat business needs above all, in the
long term, is the certainty of the rule of law - of laws democrati-
cally enacted and rooted in the community."4 " From the
liberal-democratic perspective that colonial officials and pro-
democracy politicians in Hong Kong shared, these elements that
business needed were also features that a just and adequate rule of
law for Hong Kong entailed. Although their comments about
business attitudes and actions sometimes sounded resigned or
about the burden that excessive welfarism would cause); Jonathan Karp, Money
Talks, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 17, 1994, at 18 [hereinafter Karp, Money Talks]
(quoting a Bank of China economist warning about "generous social spending");
William McGurn, Diminishing Returns, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 13, 1996, at
63 (noting that Joint Liaison Group Chinese team leader Chen Zuo'er likened
the "increases in spending to a... racing car spun out of control"); Yeung &
Wong, supra note 326, at 21.
... See For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra
note 403, at 22 (quoting Martin Lee); Lee, supra note 49.
456 Lee, supra note 396.
417 Greenway, supra note 397, at 24.
"I Interview with Chris Patten, FAR E. ECON. REV., supra note 433, at 22.
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desperate, the proponents of democratic reform consistently tried
to convince, scare, and bargain with business elites to get them to
do what was both right and self-interested. Thus, for example,
Patten followed up his vitriolic attack on business leaders, for
betraying Hong Kong's democracy with their endorsement of the
Provisional Legislature, with an offer to retract his remarks if
Hong Kong's businessmen spoke up for democracy and human
rights in Hong Kong.459
3.2.3. The Court of Final Appeal and the Requisites of
Confidence
The controversy over the Sino-British accords on the Court of
Final Appeal, and legislation to implement them triggered a public
split among adherents to a generally "liberal" or "pro-democracy"
perspective on the rule of law for Hong Kong. The schism over
the Court was deeper than the disagreements within the pro-
reform camp that marked the debates concerning business
attitudes toward the Patten reforms and Legco democrats' more
sweepingly democratic alternatives. On the Court issue, colonial
officials and prominent politicians engaged in a sometimes bitter
struggle over the business community's stance on a proposed
Court arrangement that Hong Kong government officials claimed
was sufficient to secure an adequate rule of law for the territory,
and that liberals in Legco and elsewhere denounced as a betrayal
of Hong Kong's rule of law.
Beginning in 1991 and again in 1995, Hong Kong government
officials faced a delicate and difficult task. They had to sell Hong
Kong's business community on controversial C.F.A. arrangements
while defending those arrangements against serious doubts about
their compatibility with rule-of-law values that the colonial
authorities claimed to support and that business might consider
important. The principal strategy was to capitalize on the Hong
Kong business community's considerable satisfaction with the
existing legal and judicial systems. Thus, Hong Kong government
proponents of the Court accords argued that the C.F.A. bills
would adequately preserve the established system of independent
courts and a common-law order protecting and advancing business
interests in a post-1997 system, as promised in the Joint Declara-
... See Mary Kwang, Rift Between Patten, Businessmen Likely to Continue
Till HK Handover, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), May 29, 1996, at 28.
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tion and the Basic Law. In a broad formulation of this line
of argument, Chief Secretary Anson Chan characterized the 1995
bill as one that "ensures continuity of the rule of law in Hong
Kong through the transition and will safeguard public and
international confidence in Hong Kong," which was routinely
acknowledged to be vital to Hong Kong's prosperity. 1
During the attempts to pass the second bill, government
officials added a less positive argument. Proponents of the 1995
legislation emphasized that the arrangements adopted in the
second Court deal at least had induced China to drop plans to
create a new quasi-judicial body, directly controlled by the P.R.C.,
to review C.F.A. decisions on a variety of potentially politically
sensitive issues. 2 Proponents of the second accord assumed that
this aspect of the deal would appeal to a business community that
was thought to view P.R.C.-style legality as vastly inferior to
Hong Kong's existing system, and that thus would welcome a
promise not to establish an entity potentially so corrosive of
Hong Kong's judicial autonomy.46
In addition to arguments focusing on the asserted substantive
merits of the proposed arrangement, proponents of the Court
deals consistently stressed the structural importance to business of
having some resolution in place before reversion. Colonial
government officials sought to elicit business support by address-
ing the business community's aversion to legal and institutional
uncertainty. They argued that the 1991 deal offered the prospect
of settling the matter of the Court's form and powers early, and
460 See generally Ching, supra note 37, at 173, 189-91 (discussing the politics
of the 1991 Sino-British accord on the C.F.A. and its reception in Hong Kong).
461 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1; see also Mathews Strikes at Opposition,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 15, 1995, at 6 (noting similar comments from
the Attorney General).
46 See, e.g., Hong Kong Court, FIN. TIMEs, June 12, 1995, at 19 (arguing
that the P.R.C. dropped plans to establish a review tribunal that would
override C.F.A. decisions because the P.R.C. feared that the proposal
threatened business confidence).
46 At the very least, no one had laid the political groundwork to make a
post-verdict review mechanism seem acceptable (or at least inevitable to Hong
Kong's business community). Although it was broadly similar in according
P.R.C. institutions a role in the interpretation of Hong Kong law, such a
proposal stood in considerable contrast to the rather carefully crafted and long-
standing provisions in the Basic Law concerning the power of the N.P.C., its
Standing Committee, and the Central People's Government to amend,
interpret, and implement the Basic Law.
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would permit the establishment of the Court well before July 1,
1997. This would give the Court time to gain experience,
establish a record, and develop precedents in advance of reversion
- all virtues that business could appreciate.'" In May 1995, on
the eve of the second Sino-British deal concerning the Court,
Attorney General Mathews was still urging support for an
arrangement that he expected would permit the establishment of
a Court by mid-1996 to avoid a "judicial vacuum" that would
"seriously undermine[]" economically vital "international confi-
dence in Hong Kong's legal system."45  Uncertainty about the
Court was, Mathews argued, "already having a damaging effect on
confidence in Hong Kong," prompting businesses to draw up
commercial contracts "with clauses aimed at avoiding resort to
Hong Kong courts."4 6 It was "clearly harmful to Hong Kong's
reputation as a commercial and financial services center" that
"investors [were] showing [such] a lack of confidence in [Hong
Kong's] judicial system."'14 7  Even at this late date, Mathews
argued, legislation implementing the 1991 deal and setting up the
court "as soon as possible" was imperative, for it would bring a
pre-reversion end to the devastating "[u]ncertainty over when and
on what basis [this] crucial symbol and embodiment of the rule of
law" 468 would be established.
Hong Kong government officials could not invoke some of
these advantages in their quest for business support for the 1995
deal, however. Their arguments had to rest on the perils that
would befall business if the deal were rejected and a Court
acceptable to China could not be established as of July 1, 1997.
Proponents of the 1995 Court bill thus stressed the more modest
certainty that the legislation would provide: the Court's powers
and composition, no worse than in the 1991 deal, would be clearly
set forth and accepted many months before the reversion, and the
business community therefore would not have to bear the risks or
464 See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 136, at 10 (indicating the British desire to
establish a court in 1993 so that it would be operating smoothly prior to
reversion); Mosher, supra note 179, at 13 (mentioning the considerable
desirability to organize the court promptly to establish its international
reputation).
465 do Rosario, supra note 148, at 22.
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endure the continued uncertainty that would attend having to rely
on unilateral P.R.C. legislation or post-reversion S.A.R. legislation
to establish the C.F.A. and define its powers. In a somewhat
disingenuous characterization of the British authorities' preferred
option, Governor Patten articulated this line of argument: "[T]he
choice we have is either we don't have a court before 1997, or we
set up a court [unilaterally] which is changed or thrown out in
1997, or we give [Legco] the opportunity of determining the
nature of the court which will begin to operate on July 1, 1997"
by approving the C.F.A. bill.469  Stating the government's
argument for the 1995 bill, Anson Chan maintained that the
proposed legislation made "absolutely certain" that there would be
a "proper" court in place at reversion, and would immediately end
the "uncertainty about the establishment of the C.F.A." that had
gone on "for too long" and had had "a damaging effect on
confidence." 470
Pro-democracy legislators and prominent liberal voices in
Hong Kong rejected the government's arguments that a C.F.A. set
up in accordance with either of the Sino-British accords would be
a "proper" Court, as judged by a broadly liberal-democratic notion
of the rule of law, or an adequate Court, as measured against the
needs and wants of Hong Kong's business community. Backed by
the Hong Kong Bar Association, which represented the territory's
barristers, and, initially, by the Hong Kong Law Society, which
represented the colony's solicitors, Legco liberals and democrats
worked to discern and develop opposition to the C.F.A. bills in
the business community. They argued that the planned arrange-
ments for the C.F.A. eviscerated the court-dependent and
common law-based rule of law upon which Hong Kong business
depended, and that, by abandoning the Joint Declaration's and
Basic Law's pledges of legal continuity, the Court deals also
portended a broader unravelling of much that business valued.471
469 Yojana Sharma, Britain Agrees To Deal with China on New Court for
Hong Kong, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 9, 1995, at 12; see also Patten Deal with
China Aims To Save Doomed Legislature, ASIAN POL. NEWS, July 17, 1995
(explaining the political stances taken on the 1995 deal). The British had made
similar arguments that rejecting the 1991 accord would allow China to set up
whatever C.F.A. it sought after 1997. See Ching, supra note 37, at 190.
470 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1.
471 See, e.g., Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3 (quoting Legco member
Emily Lau stating that the deal "undermine[s] the Joint Dec aration"); Chris
Yeung & No Kwai-yan, Governor Survives Vote, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
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(Indeed, Legco Democrats and some pro-democracy independents
considered the shortcomings of the 1995 bill to be so serious that
they both voted against the bill and pressed, albeit unsuccessfully,
for a symbolic Legco vote of no-confidence in the Patten govern-
ment.)
More specifically, Martin Lee argued that the failure to
establish an adequate, rule-of-law-protecting Court would produce
a judicial system that Hong Kong's business community would
surely find uncongenial. In Lee's dark scenario, disputes between
Hong Kong and Chinese companies would be adjudicated by
S.A.R. judges who would be "subject to constant pressure" by the
Chinese government and the Communist Party and unable to
make "an independent and fair judgment." 2 The Court deals'
narrow restrictions on the number of foreign judges with
international reputations and foreign passports suggested that such
problems could extend to the judiciary's highest levels. Lee and
others argued that the business community had equally good
reason to fear, and to oppose, the provisions in the C.F.A. deals
and implementing legislation that denied the Court jurisdiction
over "acts of state" and failed to define clearly the scope of those
acts of state. In the eyes of the Court accords' critics, these
provisions raised the prospect that Hong Kong courts would not
be open to Hong Kong companies and individuals seeking judicial
relief from adverse actions by S.A.R. officials or breaches of
contract by Chinese state-owned corporations. 4  Similarly,
while China's decision to forego creating a new P.R.C. entity to
review C.F.A. judgments was to be welcomed, Hong Kong
liberals and democrats concluded that China's having contemplat-
ed establishing the body at all was an ominous signal to the
business community and others that only a weak and docile Hong
Kong Court might be acceptable to China.4 4
Like the arguments that sought to claim and to cultivate
July 13, 1995, at 1 (quoting Democratic Party Legco member Cheung Man-
kwong stating that the C.F.A. deal signalled the "downfall of the rule of law
in Hong Kong").
472 Lee, supra note 396; see also, Hong Kong, The Future According to Martin
Lee, supra note 418, at 82, 82; Lee, supra note 32, at 11.
4 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 24, at 72, 74; Hong Kong, The Future
According to Martin Lee, supra note 416, at 82, 82 (discussing Lee's fears and
hopes for the territory's legal and judicial future).
47' See do Rosario, supra note 148, at 22.
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business support for the Bill of Rights and democratic reforms,
Legco democrats' and liberals' arguments that the arrangements
contemplated in the C.F.A. deals would fail to satisfy the business
community's requirements attracted initial support from the
business community that declined over time. The 1991 bill failed
in Legco, in part because pro-business members voted against it,
and some business leaders had publicly expressed concerns about
the bill that parallelled Legco Democrats' arguments against the
legislation.47 By the time the Hong Kong government present-
ed the 1995 deal, however, the balance appeared to have shifted.
Some pro-business politicians and foreign officials who claimed to
understand the views of the territory's international business
community continued to argue against parts of the Court bill. 76
Most politically influential voices from the territory's business
community, however, supported the legislation to implement the
second Sino-British accord on the Court. British and colonial
government arguments about the perils of a second rejection
appeared to have swayed or silenced local and international
business interests. Attorney General Mathews could confidently
proclaim that the business community in Hong Kong and abroad
gave the 1995 accord a warm welcome. 477 In the end, the
475 See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 136, at 10 (discussing Legco's rejection of
the 1991 deal); Page, supra note 454, at 48 quoting prominent banker, Basic
Law Drafting Committee, and Legco member David Li, who stated that a
failure to resolve the court issue threatened "[tihe judiciary's independence"
which "is vital to Hong Kong's continued prosperity" but who appeared
unwilling to endorse the 1991 accord); A Rosy Future for Hong Kong's Legal
System?, LLOYD'S LIST, Dec. 11, 1992 (presenting similar views rom members
of the international business community); see a so do Rosario, supra note 153,
at 20 (describing Legco democrats' and pro-business members' combining to
defeat the 1991 bill); Mary Kwang, HK Govt Faces Tough Fight on Appeal Court
Bill, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), June 10, 1995, at 17 noting that the business
community sided with liberal politicians' objections to a the late starting date
for the Court of Final Appeal).
476 See, eg., China's Chill Wind, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 18, 1995, at 5
(noting that the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong thought that the
restriction on the number of foreign judges and the possibility of a post-verdict
remedial mechanism controlled by China would threaten a dilution of the rule
of law that would "certainly drive away" foreign investors); Kwang, supra note
477, at 17; Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3 (describing splits among Legco
members from the generally pro-business Liberal Party over whether to support
the 1995 bill, given the restrictions on foreign judges' serving and the late
establishment date for the Court).
7 See Mathews Strikes at Opposition, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 15,
1995, at 6 (describing the relief of international and local business at the
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legislation passed Legco, with most of the members from the pro-
business Liberal Party voting for it, and without triggering an
outcry from any major sentiment of the territory's business
community. 48
Even so, opponents of the C.F.A. accords still argued that
apparent acquiescence did not represent the true views of
business.4 9 According to some of Hong Kong's leading liberal
and pro-democracy politicians, the business community in fact
recognized its need for a Court that exceeded what the Sino-
British deals would provide, and a Court that more nearly
approached Hong Kong liberals' and democrats' conception of the
requisites of an adequate rule of law and a just legal order. They
argued that, in the face of the combined pressure of the territory's
present and future masters, business had only outwardly suc-
cumbed to calls to support the 1995 bill. There was, on this view,
little reason to think that the level of business distress over the
1991 bill had rapidly dissipated and been replaced by genuine
support for a 1995 bill that was, after all, identical to the 1991 bill
in several respects, and less favorable than the earlier legislation on
the crucial question of the Court's establishment date. The visible
splits among pro-business legislators over the 1995 bill provided
further support for this line of argument.
Liberal and democratic critics of the Court deals also pointed
achievement of a Court deal, and the other deals it made possible); Politics of
a New Era, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 449; Stephen Vines, Beijing, London
Sign Agreement on HK Court of Final Appeal, Bus. TIMES, June 10, 1995, at 3.
478 See Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1, (describing the Legco alignment
on the C.F.A. Bill); Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3; Chris Yeung & Linda
Choy, Issue "Back to Square One," S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 4, 1995, at
1 (noting liberal Legco member and G.C.C. head Jimmy McGregor's switch
from opposing the 1991 bill to supporting the 1995 bill).
Patten, while critical of business' stance on other issues, praised the
territory's business community for being very helpful in securing a deal on the
Court. See Hutchings, supra note 407, at 10; Chris Yeung & Genevieve Ku,
Patten Tells Businessmen To Stand Up forAutonomy, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 11, 1996, at 1; see also Rule ofLaw Uncertain, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 2, 1994, at 20 (describing the prospect that the parties would fail to
achieve and implement a C.F.A. agreement before reversion as risking the
creation of a "legal vacuum" that "could seriously damage investment in the
territory" - a prospect that should prom pt "businessmen ... [to] do their
utmost to convince [P.R.C.] officials of the lolly of undermining Hong Kong's
judicial system, however temporarily").
... See, e.g., Yeung & No, supra note 150, at 1; Steinberger, supra note 377,
at 8.
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to less "political" and, perhaps, more reliable indicators suggesting
that business held pessimistic views of the second Court deal and
continued to demand, albeit not very visibly, a more robust rule
of law. Thus, Martin Lee asked rhetorically, of the firms that had
shifted their corporate domiciles to other countries for fear of
Hong Kong's rule of law, "How many companies which left are
coming back now that we have such a good Court of Final
Appeal agreement?" 4 0 He could also have asked how many
more of Hong Kong's local and foreign firms were ready and able
to take flight if the Court deal proved to be as bad as he and like-
minded politicians claimed and feared.
3.2.4. The Chief Executive: From Process to Substance
Like the debates over the C.F.A. bills, the controversy
surrounding the selection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive
brought another visible split between Hong Kong's British
colonial authorities and its most ardently pro-democracy politi-
cians. While each group insisted that the Chief Executive
selection process and its outcome had to be compatible with the
broad notions of accountable government and the rule of law that
they shared, they differed over what those principles required in
this context. Accordingly, British and Hong Kong governments,
on one side, and the Legco democrats and liberals, on the other
side, made quite different arguments about what Hong Kong's
business community should think about the Chief Executive
question.
Pro-democracy critics of the selection process primarily sought
to secure business support by arguing that the selection process
and its outcome threatened the business community's immediate
material interests. They argued that Beijing had so thoroughly
orchestrated Tung Chee-hwa's undemocratic selection that it
would be very difficult for him to protect the interests of Hong
Kong business (or of anyone else in Hong Kong) in the face of
pressure or neglect from Beijing. From this perspective, Tung's
moral debt to the territory's new masters, for having bailed out
his family's troubled shipping business, further weakened the
Chief Executive-designate's ability to stand up for Hong Kong and
its business community's needs. With critics of the process having
48. Steinberger, supra note 375.
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accepted the inevitability of Tung's selection long before his
formal nomination or appointment, Hong Kong liberals' and
democrats' arguments to the business community did not seek to
affect the outcome. They attempted instead to rally business to
push Tung to defend Hong Kong's interests generally, including
the preservation of Hong Kong's promised autonomy from
prosperity-threatening interference from Beijing.
Hong Kong's colonial authorities had to craft a more complex
strategy to pursue business support for the closed and preordained
Chief Executive selection process and its outcome, without at the
same time compromising the Hong Kong government's enhanced
commitment to liberal-democratic norms in the struggles over
rights legislation, democratic reform and the legal and institutional
issues of the endgame more generally. Crafting an appropriate
and effective approach to business was an especially difficult and
delicate task for a colonial government that had pledged early on
to cooperate with the Chief Executive-designate, and that arguably
had an even shakier claim than Tung to a democratic or electoral
mandate to rule Hong Kong. Within the constraints that these
positions imposed, Hong Kong government officials sought to
portray Tung as appealing to business because of his ties to
established government institutions and public policies of late
colonial Hong Kong.48' Patten and others stressed the impor-
tance to the business community of Tung's experience in Exco
and his retention of Anson Chan, Donald Tsang, and other key
civil servants in senior offices.
482
In their proponents' view, these arguments served, perhaps
primarily, to emphasize an important symbolic thread of continu-
ity with what the colonial authorites saw as the just, legitimate,
and accountable institutions and rule of law regime of the past
that had served business interests well. These arguments, however,
also made a more narrow and direct appeal to the interests of
their business audience. They emphasized to the Hong Kong
business community the reassuring and appealing prospects of
481 See Bruce Gilley, Henry... Who?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 9. 1997, at
82.
481 See Linda Choy & Angela Li, Chan Congratulates Friend Tung, S. CHNA
MORNING POST, Nov. 19, 1996, at 6; Fung Wai-kong, Governor and Tung Set
to Meet on Monday, S. CHNA MORNING POST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 1; John
Ridding & Louise Lucas, Tung to Keep Top HK Officials, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 21
1997, at 8.
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continuity in economic policy and the predictability of familiar
faces and experienced hands in government.
On the Chief Executive selection issue, as on the other major
legal-institutional issues of the endgame, arguments in favor of
relatively robust liberal and democratic reform initially struck a
chord with the territory's business elites, but resonated much
more weakly with that vital audience as the date of Hong Kong's
reversion drew near. During the protracted speculation over who
might seek the post and have a realistic chance of winning it,
leading figures in the territory's business community at times
appeared to echo Hong Kong's democratic politicians. Some
openly worried that selecting one of their own to the post would
raise the prospect of a merger of political and economic power
that could generate serious conflicts of interest and threaten to
upset Hong Kong's much-praised (if not always present) "level
playing field." Many among the colony's business elite voiced
support for distinctly non-business candidates drawn from institu-
tions closely associated with the territory's rule-of-law establish-
ment, including top civil servant Anson Chan and Chief Justice
Yang Ti-liang.
483
By the time of Tung's appointment and certainly by the date
of his formal selection, however, expressions of support for the
choice had replaced such expressions of concern among the
territory's business leaders. The business community appeared to
accept not only the process that chose Tung, but also many of the
policies that Tung said he intended to pursue (including roll-backs
of rights and civil liberties legislation and close cooperation with
the Provisional Legislature).
Faced with such developments, the Hong Kong politicians
who had long criticized the Chief Executive selection process, and
the colonial goverihment that had long accepted the arrangement,
tried to convince business to support a moderate use of the office
by Tung, one that would not undermine features of late colonial
493 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Tung: A Reluctant Candidate, FAR E. ECON.
REV., July 25, 1996, at 40 (discussing business groups' concerns about Tung's
ties to powerful tycoon Li Ka-shing); Angela Li, Businessman Expresses Doubts
over British Links, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at 6 (describing a
business leader's concerns over Tung's ties to the powerful Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank and noting some business leaders' support for Yang's candidacy);
Straw Poll: Who Will Make the Best Chief Executive?, supra note 342, at 28
(presentin views of several business leaders on appropriate Chief Executivecandidates)5.
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Hong Kong's laws, institutions, and nascent reforms that adher-
ents to a broadly liberal-democratic vision of legality considered
vital to a rule of law for Hong Kong that satisfied both the
demands of a just and proper order and the real needs of the
business community. 4 4 They did not pursue this agenda princi-
pally through arguments that narrowly addressed the Chief Execu-
tive question. Rather, they relied on their arguments about why
business should not support a reversal of Bill of Rights provisions
and an overturning of civil liberties legislation, and why business
should not be an accomplice to the Provisional Legislature's
betrayals of Hong Kong's interests and recent legal and constitu-
tional accomplishments.4 5
3.3. Business and the China and "Pro-China" Hong Kong Vision
of the Rule of Law
During the several years leading up to Hong Kong's return to
Chinese rule, official Chinese statements and "pro-China"
individuals and organizations in Hong Kong, accepted the idea
that business wanted and needed the rule of law to survive in
post-reversion Hong Kong. Official Chinese and Hong Kong pro-
China comments repeatedly stressed to business audiences that
Hong Kong's legal system and its prior laws generally, and its
business-related laws and policies specifically, would remain in tact
after the establishment of the S.A.R., just as China had promised
in the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and elsewhere.486
China, these sources assured the business community, knew
better than to undermine the essential legal and institutional
414 See, e.g., Ng, supra note 42; Emily Lau, Letter to Hong Kong (Hong Kong
radio broadcast, Dec. 15, 1996), transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Dec. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
411 See supra Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2; see also Gilley, supra note 59, at 15
(describing liberal arguments against and business worries about Tung's
policies).
486 See Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 85, 160 (providing for continuity
in the laws and the legal system and autonomy of local legal institutions); Joint
Declaration, supra note 39, S 3(3), annex I, art. II; Basic Law, supra note 21,
arts. 5, 105-19 (providing for the preservation of Hong Kong's capitalist
economic system and continuity and autonomy in Hong Kong's property
rights, fiscal, monetary, financial, and foreign trade regimes); Joint Declaration,
sup-a note 39, S 3(5)-(10), annex I, arts. V-VII; see also, Hsieh Ming, "The Death
of Hong Kong"? To Hell with "Fortune", TA KUNG PAO, June 15, 1995, at A9
(refuting a Fortune magazine article foreseeing the decline of Hong Kong after
"everying" changes in 1997).
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elements of Hong Kong's economic success. Politburo Standing
Committee member Li Ruihuan compared Hong Kong to a
priceless yixing teapot which would lose its value if scrubbed too
hard in an effort to clean it.4 7 A senior Chinese official report-
edly assured a prominent Hong Kong businessman that China
would not repeat the economically harmful mistake it had made
in Macau of becoming "far too involved"4 8 in local affairs.4 9
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Lu Ping assured
the territory's General Chamber of Commerce that "a prosperous
Hong Kong means a prosperous China" and that China would
accordingly do what was necessary to preserve Hong Kong's
economic health.410 More specifically, senior Foreign Ministry
and other Chinese officials, along with pro-China voices in the
territory, frequently reassured international business leaders that
foreign business interests would continue to be protected by Hong
Kong's prior laws after 1997.491
In promising a rule-of-law system adequate to satisfy the needs
and wants of the territory's business elites, China and its Hong
Kong allies contemplated a set of rule-of-law values, coordinate
laws, and institutions that were quite different from those which
colonial authorities and Hong Kong's liberal and democratic
politicians claimed were necessary to satisfy and sustain the
business community. At the very least, constructing an S.A.R.
legal order acceptable to business could not impose such extensive
restrictions on China's sovereign discretion or derive its authority
from institutions or procedures so insulated from legitimate
control by the central Chinese government that it threatened to
"' See Text of Li Ruihuan's Remarks to Hong Kong and Macao Representa-
tives to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, supra note 222,
Mar. 14, 1995, at B5.
4s Gilley, supra note 24, at 72 (quoting a prominent local businessman's
account of a discussion with a senior Chinese official).
49 See id.
" Lau, supra note 449, at 11.
491 See, e.g., Chinese Foreign Minister: Foreign Interests in Hong Kong To Be
Protected by Law, WEN WEI P0, July 24, 1996, at A12, translated in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, July 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Lib rary, Allasi File(quoting Foreign Minister Qian Qichen); HK's New Chief
Spells Out What Is Needed To Move Forward, STRAITS TMES (Singapore), Dec.
24, 1996, at 20 (citing Tung Chee-hwa's statement that "[w]e must particularly
reaffirm to our international friends the integrity of our legal framework" and
the "level playing field" it provides).
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exceed the limits demanded by the generally positivist vision of
domestic legal authority that China and its political agents and
allies in Hong Kong shared.
China and its allies in the territory envisioned that a set of
laws and institutions acceptable to Hong Kong's business commu-
nity would stop short of testing these limits. To varying degrees
and at different times, they suggested that the maintenance of
prosperity in Hong Kong, and the confidence of the business
sector on which prosperity depended, required only a fairly
modest rule of law. The notion of a sufficient rule of law for
business sometimes could sound very crabbed, especially when
articulated by some members of the top echelons of the leadership
in Beijing or at moments of particularly tense relations between
the P.R.C. and British or Hong Kong officials and politicians.
Chinese leader Jiang Zemin stressed that "Hong Kong's prosperity
in the past cannot be attributed... to an independent judiciary
and a free system of the press."492 An editorial in the resolutely
pro-China newspaper Wen Wei Po, amid some of the sharpest
conflicts over Patten's constitutional reforms, commented that
China's growing economic prowess, and not the careful preserva-
tion or extension of the colonial legal and institutional order, was
"the fundamental guarantee for Hong Kong's smooth transition
and continued prosperity.
" 411
Further, some China and pro-China sources hinted that the
specter of a somewhat "politicized" allocation of business
opportunities under Chinese rule would not be fatal to business
confidence in Hong Kong. Indeed, official Chinese sources charged
that the British authorities had already introduced political
considerations into economic dealings with the territory's
businesses during the transition and, in doing so, had merely
extended a long-standing pattern of cozy relationships between the
colonial government and its favored companies, often ones with
41 Ching, supra note 223, at 36 (quoting remarks of Jiang Zemin); cf Zhu
Rong 'i Meets Hong Kong Delegation, Xinhua, Jan. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File (ieporting senior Chinese official's comments that
Hong Kong's success depeded greatly on Hong Kong's links to the mainland's
economic development).
4" Preparation Means Success; No Preparation Means Failure, WEN WEI PO,
Dec. 12, 1993, at 2.
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British roots or ties.494
The China and pro-China camp's apparent confidence that
business would ultimately accept a rule-of-law regime that was also
acceptable to China likely stemmed in part from the statements
and actions of much of the territory's indigenous and internation-
al business elites. Aside from a few brief downturns, these elites
had kept Hong Kong's securities markets and bond ratings
buoyant throughout the transition. Many of the business
community's most audible voices routinely and loudly expressed
confidence in Hong Kong's future prosperity. The broader
business community continued to invest, in what critics derided
as a lawless mainland China. In making and managing many of
those investments through their offices in Hong Kong, members
of the territory's elite business community also made China-linked
ventures, and the legal and political risks they entailed, an
increasingly central part of their business in Hong Kong.495
Except for occasional intemperate comments and despite a
possible belief that Hong Kong business might not demand a very
strong rule of law, China and Hong Kong's pro-China forces
usually remained fairly circumspect in their discussions of business
attitudes and the rule of law. Through comments directed at the
territory's business community, and through repeated invocations
of relevant provisions in the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration,
they regularly offered reassurances that legal protections for
investors would survive the transition. They also argued that
controversial legal changes planned for post-reversion Hong Kong
494 See, e.g., Ma Ling, Lu Ping Talks About Three Issues, Criticizes British Side
for Lacking Sincerity in Cooperation, TA KUNG PAO, Jan. 18, 1994, at 2
(reporting Lu Ping's view that the British used colonial governmental powers
to advance British business interests); Yeung & Law, supra note 453, at 1
(discussing Xinhua Hong Kong's accusation that the colonial government
granted business favors based on political considerations).
491 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 24, at 72 (outlining China's business
involvement in Hong Kong prior to July 1, 1997); Hong Kong's Experiences in
Investing in the Hinterland, TA KuNG PAO, Nov. 24, 1994, at 9 (quoting Li Ka-
shing); Jonathan Sprague, S&P Says H.K. Credit Safe Amidst Sino-British Rows,
Reuters, Feb. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (noting
Standard and Poor's upgrade of Hong Kong's currency rating); The Shadow over
Honf Konf, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1993, at 37 (noting the rise in the stock
market following what some saw as a threat of increased Chinese government
intervention); U.S. Businesses Confident on Hong Kong and China, Reuters, Nov.
23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (noting U.S. business
confidence in Hong Kong's future after the territory's reversion to China).
19971
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
posed no threat to the rule of law that business needed and
wanted. As China and its allies saw it, those changes primarily
would be mere reversals of prosperity-threatening, Basic Law-
violating and Joint Declaration-breaching innovations that Hong
Kong's colonial masters had irresponsibly introduced on the eve
of their departure.
Still, the version of legality that China and its Hong Kong
supporters articulated in their public statements and in their
interpretations of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law did not
imply that the S.A.R. would provide a legal order that was as
liberal and robust as Hong Kong had enjoyed during the 1980s or
before. Although cautiously expressed, the China and pro-China
view remained fully consistent with pursuing a retrenchment not
only from late colonial innovations, but also from Hong Kong's
more modestly liberal and democratic pre-Tiananmen Incident
baseline of laws and institutions.
While Chinese officials and Hong Kong's pro-China elements
thus shared the view that business would support or accept an
arrangment that China could provide in an exercise of its
discretionary sovereign authoirty over the territory, and that
China would be willing to accept as consistent with the require-
ments of preserving China's sovereignty, the controus of that legal
order did not emerge fully in general discussions of a rule of law
for Hong Kong. They took clearer shape, amid occasional splits
and shifts in the "China camp's" positions, in the endgame battles
over business attitudes toward the concrete legal and institutional
arrangements for the S.A.R.
3.3.1. The Bill of Rights, the Reversal of Late Colonial
Laws, and the Requisites of Order
Although China clearly objected to the enactment of Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance, the leadership in Beijing appears
to have recognized that there was little chance of preventing the
colonial government's adoption of the Ordinance in the wake of
Hong Kong's reaction to the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989
and China's violent suppression of them. China initially made
little overt effort to point out or draw forth business support for
its position on the Bill of Rights or other reforms to liberties-
restricting colonial laws. Early on, official P.R.C. statements did
little more than put the business community and everyone else on
notice of China's displeasure and its reserved right to review and
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repeal any legislation it deemed incompatible with the Basic
Law.9 The Chinese authorities thus reiterated the basic positiv-
ist point that, whatever portion of the newly enacted liberties
Hong Kong's business community and ordinary citizens would
retain after reversion, they would possess such legal rights as the
product of direct or delegated exercises of the P.R.C.'s sovereign
power.
Later in the 1990s, China and pro-China elements in Hong
Kong began to work harder to garner business support on rights-
related issues. China and its Hong Kong allies pointed out the
dangers that business would face if the S.A.R. were to leave in
place liberal changes to laws governing political associations, rallies
and free speech, and sections of the Bill of Rights allowing courts
aggressively to interpret or strike down rights-limiting laws. They
further argued that the colonial government's eleventh-hour
changes in Hong Kong's laws risked, in Lu Ping's phrase,
transforming Hong Kong from an "economic city," where
business had flourished, into a "political city" beset by social
unrest and declining prosperity.49  Chinese and pro-China
sources cautioned that the colonial government's supposedly
liberty-protecting reforms to the Societies and Public Order
Ordinances would protect law-breakers and hinder the S.A.R.
government's ability to provide the social order that the business
community wanted and needed.498
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Lu Ping and
the glowing coverage in the pro-China press of Chief Executive-
designate Tung's early comments on rights issues asserted that
reversing late colonial changes to the Public Order and Societies
Ordinances would not abolish the rights that enjoyed undeniable
popularity in Hong Kong or produce popular discontent and
unrest that would threaten business interests. The changes that
496 See, e.g., Zhang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Is
Reasonable and Legitimate, supra note 232, at Al noting the Chinese Foreign
Ministry statement issued at the time of the introduction of the Bill of Rights
legislation in Legco).
4 See Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Leal Subfroup Are Good, supra
note 238, at A2; Be Vigilant Against Instigating Politica Confrontation, supra
note 306, at A2.
498 See Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra
note 238; Be Vigilant Against Instigating Political Confrontation, supra note 306,
at A2.
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the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies favored would merely help
to reestablish a proper balance between individual rights and
society's interest in order4  - something that business elites
sensitive to both rights and economic issues could surely appreci-
ate. P.R.C. sources and commentaries in Hong Kong's pro-China
press (frequently quoting Tung) insisted that the changes were
relatively modest and did not portend a general rejection of
human rights, which were amply protected under the Joint
Declaration, the Basic Law, and Hong Kong laws that would
survive the transition.5 0° Further, Xinhua Hong Kong Branch
Deputy Director Zhang Junsheng suggested that the planned
moves to eliminate late colonial legal changes implied no threat to
any rule of law valued by Hong Kong business elites. Rather, just
as China had argued in opposing the enactment of the Bill of
Rights Ordinance in 1991, these changes would only correct the
colonial authorities' moves to "introduce a law overriding the
Basic Law and other Hong Kong laws" and to "cripple Hong
Kong's existing legal system." 5°1
China and pro-China sources urged the business community
not to take seriously the colonial government's and Hong Kong
liberals' alarming predictions about the consequences of changing
rights laws that had been adopted or amended during the 1990s.
Contrary to the arguments Governor Patten, Martin Lee and
others pressed, the impending repeal of late colonial legislation
was no threat to Hong Kong's prosperity. Rather, the pro-China
newspaper Wen Wei Po editorialized, the real risk to Hong Kong
business was the possibility that foreign investment and trade
might fall in response to the fantastical horror stories about the
consequences of altering rights laws that British and colonial
... See Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended by
British Hong Kong Government Is Intended To Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity
and Stability, WEN WEI PO, Jan. 26, 1997, at All.
" See, e.g., Ray Bashford, Core Confidence Edges Out Doubt, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 1997, at 2 (noting positive market performance after
the N.P.C. decision to reject several rights laws); Quak Hiang Whai, Tung
Defends Plans by Beijing To Amend HK Laws, Bus. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1997, at 6
(quoting Tung Chee-hwa's statement that Beijing's plan to repeal laws would
enhance social order).
501 ZhangJunsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Is Reasonable and
Legitimate, supra note 232, at Al.
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officials and Hong Kong politicians were spreading abroad. 2
P.R.C. sources and China's allies in Hong Kong also suggested
that the apparent public support for the laws facing repeal was not
a reason for business to oppose moderate retrenchments that
would otherwise be acceptable or appealing to business leaders.
They asserted that any popular support for the doomed laws was
merely the transient and shallowly-rooted product of a propaganda
apparatus controlled by the colonial authorities., 3
Whether they simply captured underlying business attitudes,
or persuaded business to adopt China's position on late colonial
rights laws, or convinced business that its best option was to
acquiesce in the P.R.C. and pro-China camp's agenda, these
arguments provoked little audible opposition in the business
community and won considerable support. In contrast to the
relatively muted business voices supporting the Bill of Rights and
related legislation on the eve of reversion, many of the pro-China
business leaders in the territory picked up some of the central
points of the arguments favoring retrenchment and asserted that
the P.R.C. and pro-China perspective resonated with business'
views. Developer and P.W.C. and P.C. member David Chu
proclaimed that the relaxation of restrictions on civil liberties and
other "things . . . done in the name of freedom and democracy"
had deleterious "side-effects" to which the government had paid
too little attention.5°4 Moreover, Chu suggested that the China
side's argument about the impropriety of major last-minute moves
to liberalize Hong Kong law was something his fellow participants
in commerce should appreciate: "You don't want the current
owner making drastic changes after you've already signed the
deed.", 05
If the broader business community did not share Chu's views,
it likely understood the message from China and its closest Hong
Kong allies: China and the S.A.R. government would exercise
legislative authority over Hong Kong to roll back some late
5"2 See Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity,
supra note 238, at A4.
503 See id.; Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are' Good,
supra note 238, at A2.
51 For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note
401, at 22, 22.
"5 Maggie Farley, Wary of China, Text Publishers Stop the Presses, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A5.
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colonial legal changes, with relatively little regard for the modest
opposition - or support - that such moves might engender in
Hong Kong business circles. Chu's analogy to a real estate
transaction also suggested at least an intuitive understanding in the
business community of a more fundamental feature of the P.R.C.
and pro-China approach to the controversy over Hong Kong
rights laws. For China and its closest supporters and agents in
Hong Kong, the content of rights legislation, like many of the
terms of a real estate contract, was a matter of choice and discre-
tion, not the reflection of fundamental truths or the implementa-
tion of fixed substantive norms.
3.3.2. The Legislature, the Patten Reforms, and the Costs
of Opposition
Like their arguments concerning the Bill of Rights and civil
liberties, the arguments that China and its supporters deployed to
induce business to oppose Patten's electoral reform package and
to support China's decision to replace Legco with a Provisional
Legislature sought to appeal to the narrow self-interest of the
territory's business elites and their ability to calculate costs and
benefits. On these issues of democratization and the legislature,
intramural and temporal variations within the China and pro-
China camp over the details of how to address the business
community were somewhat more visible than they were in the
debates over rolling back rights legislation. Various official
Chinese and pro-China Hong Kong sources disagreed mildly or
changed their opinions slightly about the established or instillable
views and values of the business community and their implications
for the degree of democratic change that the P.R.C. and the
S.A.R. governments, as the wielders of sovereign power, would be
prudent to accept in order to insure a smooth transition, a
prosperous and stable Hong Kong, and the preservation of China's
ultimate sovereign power and discretion.
Official P.R.C. spokespeople and China's closest compatriots
in Hong Kong warned that, much like the late colonial changes
to civil and political liberties legislation, Patten's reforms to the
electoral laws would result in economically harmful social
instability. The pro-P.R.C. newspaper Ta Kung Pao cautioned
that the Governor's plans would "jeopardize prosperity and
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stability"- and would harm the economic interests of foreign and
domestic investors. Surely, the territory's business leaders would
not welcome such a result. Moreover, the pro-China press
asserted that some of the predicted "turbulence" had already
materialized and had weakened the economy in the immediate
aftermath of Patten's proposals, even before those proposals had
become law or been implemented.5 07 Lu Ping underscored the
point, asserting that the Chinese side would never cause chaos
harmful to Hong Kong, while the British side's political reform
proposals already had.s'8
China and pro-China sources argued further that the broad-
ened franchise that Patten planned to introduce threatened to
produce a Legco dominated by politicians hostile to business
interests. Official Chinese commentaries asserted that Patten's
expansion and restructuring of functional constituencies to give
nearly all working Hong Kongers a vote in those constituencies
(in addition to their votes in universal suffrage geographic
constituencies) constituted a devastating attack on a system of
representation that had "ensure[d] business and financial sectors
and those organizations and professionals that play a special role
in Hong Kong will be represented in the Legislative Council.")
Simply stated, these P.R.C. and pro-China voices argued to
business leaders that Patten was trying to silence the business
elites' prominent voice in the territory's government.
Moreover, Chinese spokesmen and prominent pro-China
voices in Hong Kong argued, Patten's moves would assure that
anti-business voices would grow louder and more influential in the
halls of Hong Kong government. They charged that, under
Patten's electoral regime, in the place of reliably pro-business
representatives, the voters comprising the expanded electorate
were sure to place "a lot of radicals in the legislature."510 P.R.C.
o Mr. Patten's Choice, supra note 261, at 2.
507 See Deng's Remarks Have Practical Significance, and Those Who Label
Them Outdate"Are Making a Big Mistake, WEN WEI PO, Sept. 27, 1993.
... See Liu, supra note 450, at 2.
" Text of Chinese Statement on the Breakdown 9f Sino-British Talks on Hong
Kong, supra note 265 (stating the Chinese position on the reasons for the
stalemate in Sino-British talks on constitutional and electoral reform in Hong
Kong).
510 do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20; see also Yeung & Wong, supra note 324,
at 21 (quoting Shiu Sin-por, head of a pro-China think tank, stating that
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and pro-China Hong Kong sources warned that the new Legco
members sure to be chosen under Patten's rules would join with
Patten's government to pursue laws and policies that were
anathema to Hong Kong's pro-free-market and anti-regulatory
business community. In particular, criticisms of the Patten
reforms stressed that the colonial administration-Legco democrat
government would engage in excessive social spending that not
only would require raising taxes, but also would sap Hong Kong's
vital and formidable work ethic. 511 A leader of the territory's
leading pro-China party opined that the business community was
quite worried about this possibility."'
In addition to these arguments addressing the assumed
preexisting material interests of the business elite, China took a
number of steps to structure the incentives facing business.
China thus delayed progress on the airport and infrastructure
projects that business saw as vital to the territory's continued
prosperity (as well as a source of lucrative contracts for some of
Hong Kong's biggest companies). China was clear that it did so
largely in response to the British authorities' intransigence on
political reform. 13 Guo Fengmin, of the Chinese delegation to
the Sino-British Joint Liasion Group, explained the policy and its
grounding in P.R.C.-style positivist legal principles. Wen Wei Po
paraphrased Guo's comments:
business would welcome a more "balanced" legislature).
511 See, Karp, Money Talks, supra note 454, at 18 (quoting Bank of China
economist Xu Yongfu, that government's social spen ing plans threatened to
sap Hong Kong's "spirit of diligence" and would create "a welfare society"); see
also do Rosario, supra note 301, at 29 (citing business fears that Democratic
Party proposals coild "harm Hong Kong's free-market spirit").
"'2 See do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20; see also For Many Corporate Chiefs,
1997 Cannot Come Sion Enough, supra note 401, at 22 (quoting business leader
Vincent Lo's statement that business had serious concerns regarding social
spending).
513 See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Incoming Fire, FARE. EcON. REv., Dec. 16,
1993, at 20 (describing political reform issues and infrastructure projects mixing
politics and economics at J.L.G. sessions); Stacy Mosher, Straight Talk, FAR E.
ECON. REv., July 2, 1992, at 19 (describing the entanglement of the airport
issue with Chinese objections to pre-Patten political reform plans of British
side; Tai MingCheung, Glacial Thaw, FAR E. ECON REv., July 22, 1993, at
13 (discussing ihe progress on airport issue and on electoral reforms at bilateral
talks); James Tien, Hong Kong Can Survive Under One Country, One System,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 2, 1993, at 11 (criticizing China's postpone-
ment of infrastructure projects in opposition to Patten's reforms).
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China, is very clear on its position on Christopher Patten's
move to table his so-called constitutional reform package
to Legco. Although the J.L.G. has its own agenda and
issues, these are all conducted on the basis of the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law. J.L.G. work will of course
be affected if this basis is undermined [by the adoption of
reform proposals that failed to conform to the Basic Law
and Joint Declaration.]
14
Although Chinese and pro-China arguments generally
addressed the business community as a rather undifferentiated
whole, China's actions specifically targeted Hong Kong firms
backing the Patten proposals for more particularized retaliation,
and warned British companies that they could see their interests
and prospects in Hong Kong and China suffer if the colonial
government did not back down on political reform."' Raising
the stakes further, Chinese officials indicated that reversion-
straddling government contracts might require approval from
China, essentially as a proxy for the S.A.R. post-reversion
government. 16 Amid some of the sharpest conflicts over the
political reform issue, Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji even
threatened that Patten's failure to compromise might leave China
free to disregard the Joint Declaration, thus removing a crucial,
positive law underpinning of the legal order on which business
depended.
517
The calculus that China expected Hong Kong business to
undertake was surely clear to the territory's business elites.
514 Yu Chi-ping & Tai Pao-erh, Joint Liaison Group Meeting Ends with
Agreeing on Next Session, WEN WEI P0, Dec. 10, 1993, at 11.
515 See Huang Chen-ya, Jardine's Salvo Is HK's Wake-Up Call, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 20, 1992; Li, supra note 299, Feb. 28, 1994, at 48-49
(asserting that "a considerable number of British-invested financial groups had
found that their London background had become a 'burden' in China trade";
Nick Rufford, Patten Worries the Money Men, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July
3, 1994; Tai Ming Cheung, Frontal Assault, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 1, 1993,
at 10 (describing the comments of P.R.C. Minister of Foreign Trade Li
Lanqing); Yeung & Law, supra note 453, at 1.
516 See Tai, supra note 451, at 8.
517 See Tai Ming Cheung, Embattled Governor, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov.
26, 1992, at 10.
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Business leaders with interests in Hong Kong, or even in China,
that were supporting Patten's or Hong Kong democrats' agenda
could expect, individually or collectively, to pay a heavy
economic price. Still, Chinese officials, especially those directly
involved in the handling of Hong Kong affairs, typically stopped
well short of Zhu Rongji's threats and sometimes retreated from
aggressive positions that seemed to be shaking business confidence.
They tried to reassure business that China's resort to such hard-
ball tactics in opposing changes to constitutional and electoral law
should not be interpreted as indicating a willingness or inclinaton
to undermine the core commercial legal order that the Chinese
side- recognized business required. Thus, Lu Ping explained that
the problem with contracts that extended through and beyond
1997 did not include "non-governmental contracts," and that
China hoped that governmental contracts "will extend beyond
1997, and that the people concerned will be able to set their minds
at rest.""'8 Lu added, "[A]s we constantly declare, we protect
and support various types of private capital ... in Hong
Kong."" 9 An official Chinese statement similarly pledged that
"China would take a positive attitude in examining and approv-
ing" the problematic contracts. 20 Indeed, Lu Ping explained,
China demanded that government contracts extending beyond
1997 "must be discussed with the Chinese government" precisely
because that was necessary to provide parties to those contracts
with "legal protection."
5 21
China and its Hong Kong agents and supporters also suggested
to the business community that the apparent popularity of
democratic reform in the territory was no reason to side with the
Patten program.5 They argued that what seemed like genuine
popular sentiment in favor of the governor's agenda was really the
result of Patten temporarily duping many people into believing
518 Liu, supra note 450, at 2; see also Tai, supra note 450, at 9 (quoting an
official Chinese statement that "the Chinese Government reiterated that
investments in Hongkong [sic] by private capital from both Chinese and
foreign sources remain welcome").
519 Liu, supra note 450, at 2.
520 Tai, supra note 45o, at 9.
521 Liu, supra note 450, at 2.
" See Just Keep a Watch over Mr. Chris Patten's Performance, supra note 287.
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that his reforms were not harmful.5-2 Once the people learned
the truth about how dangrous the Patten reforms were (or how
futile supporting them would be), ordinary Hong Kongers would
not respond to a rolling back of those reforms by wreaking havoc
on Hong Kong's economy. Moreover, Chinese and pro-China
soucres added that the implementation of reformed electoral laws
produced rather unimpressive voter turnouts despite the propagan-
da blitz that the colonial government was uniquely positioned to
deliver on their behalf.
524
China and pro-China commentaries further assured business
that, to the extent that "democracy" was genuinely popular,
opposition to the Patten plan was still a sensible position, because
rejecting Patten did not mean rejecting democracy. According to
this line of argument, adequate democracy for Hong Kong would
be provided, in proper positivist fashion, under arrangements that
China had endorsed and helped to create, including the Basic Law
which provided the essential framework for the smooth and
orderly development of democracy. P.R.C. and pro-China sources
stressed that this democracy would be far more extensive than
what the British colonial authorities had heretofore provided in
a century and a half of ruling Hong Kong, and not far short of
the modest proposals that leading business figures and pro-business
members of Legco and Exco had backed in the wake of the
Tiananmen Incident. s2s  If mere words were not enough to
convince the business community that China and its allies would
accept democracy sufficient to satisfy the business community's
demands or to assuage the business community's fears about the
consequences of unsatisfied popular demands, there were actions
as well. As tangible evidence of their tolerance for the degree and
form of democracy that the business community required, China
" See id. (asserting that Patten ignores the Basic Law and attempts to dupe
the Hong Kong people).
524 See Chen, supra note 272; do Rosario, Sharp Distinction, supra note 112,
at 29; do Rosario, supra note 106, at 16; Gilley, supra note 24, at 72.
525 See Lau, supra note 256, at 14-15, supra note 445, at 26-27. Xinhua Hong
Kong Deputy Director Zhang Junsheng argued that the controversy over the
Patten electoral reforms was not about "democracy or the pace of democracy";
rather, it was about whether the British would live up to their agreement to
make the last colonial Legco one that complied with the conditions for
becoming the S.A.R. 's first legislature under the Basic Law. See H.D.S.
Greenway, Hong Kong Chief Defends Reform Moves, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21,
1993, at 19.
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and pro-China voices in Hong Kong could point to pro-China
parties' full participation in the final colonial era elections, and to
pro-China Legco members' frequent support for laws and policies
that the business community favored. 26
By pressuring and persuading the business community to back
China's positions, or by emboldening business leaders to express
their pre-existing opposition to Patten's reforms, these arguments
and actions from official Chinese sources and Hong Kong's pro-
China circles seemed to acheive some of their aims.5  Shortly
after Patten proposed his reforms, many business leaders began a
sustained call for their withdrawal or rejection by Legco.
528
One expatriate executive urged Patten to "forget about democracy
for the time being" and return the focus to Hong Kong's
"fundamental law" of furthering the territory's economic prosperi-
ty.529  Bankers Trust Managing Director William Overholt
warned that pressing forward with the reforms could give China
a sense of "moral and legal right to destroy the rule of law,
democracy and autonomy which we all want for Hong
Kong."530 Among the Hong Kong Chinese business elite,
businessman and politician James Tien inveighed against Patten's
526 See, e.g., do Rosario, supra note 275, at 26-27 (discussing Chinese support
for political candidates); Louise do Rosario, Board Game, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Sept. 8, 1994, at 18-19 (noting China's encouragement of pro-China candidates);
do Rosario, supra note 301, at 28 (noting China's and pro-China press' support
for the D.A.B.); see also Tai, supra note 318, at 20 (quoting D.A.B.'s Tsang Yok-
sing's statement that his party would have to defer to majority support for
Patten's reforms if such support were shown to exist).
" Compare Martin C.M. Lee, Beijing's Tiananmen Mentality Augurs Ill for
Hong Kong, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23, 1994 (arguing that business had been
pressured and cowed into adopting a "pro-China" line), with Chris Yeung &
Fung Wai-kong, Liberals Look' To Take Lead in Legco, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 1, 1994, at 25 (arguing that business interests were already very
much opposed to Patten's reforms .and, indeed, lobbied Beijing to support
business' opposition).
52 See Edward Mortimer, Divide and Rule: Businessmen Lean Towards
Beijing, but the People Favour Patten, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at 16; Rufford,
supra note 517; Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Chinese Stance on Hong Kong,
supra note 277 ("A few hundred influential organizations from the industrial
and commercial circles ... issued statements opposing the Hong Kong British
authorities' political reform programme.").
529 HK Must Speak with One Voice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1,
1992, at 10 (quoting Sir Gordon Macwhinnie, former chairman of the Hong
Kong Jockey Club).
530 Louise do Rosario, Democracy's Pros and Cons, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Mar. 24, 1994, at 24.
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONG'S END GAME (H1)
attempts to "redefine all the grey areas" in the Basic Law in an
effort to find a legal basis for his reforms.5 3' Vincent Lo,
chairman of the Business and Professionals Federation ("B.P.F.")
and of a major real estate and property development firm, argued
that "democracy is important, but it is not the only goal. A
smooth transition is more important. "532
Hong Kong's pro-China press praised the B.P.F. view and
other endorsements of "convergence" between Hong Kong's pre-
1997 political development and the initial S.A.R. order that China
and its allies favored as "pragmatic" rejections of the Patten
proposals, and as indicative of "a profound understanding" of the
requisites of Hong Kong's political stability and the economic
prosperity that political stability made possible.533 A P.R.C.
commentary smugly noted that it was hardly surprising that
"British business circles, which always set great store by business
interests, are dissatisfied with Patten."534  Presumably, non-
British firms with substantial interests in the territory were no
more supportive of Patten's reforms, but were not as well
positioned to make their views matter with Hong Kong's colonial
rulers.
China and its Hong Kong allies found further evidence of
business support for their positions on political reform at the
points where buisness and politics were most closely entwined.
Business and pro-business officeholders in Hong Kong took a
position similar to that of many vocally pro-China members of
the group they represented. Several of the business leaders in the
cabinet-like Exco failed to defend the Patten package, and one, the
chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, called for
its defeat. 35 Liberal Party and other pro-business members of
Legco joined pro-China representatives in a nearly successful effort
to vote down the bill Patten tabled.536
531 Tien, supra note 446, at 11.
532 Tai, supra note 517, at 10.
5" The Strong Points of Business and Professional Circles Are Precisely the
Weaknesses of Chris Patten, WEN WEI Po, Nov. 11, 1992, at 2.
5' Li, supra note 299, at 48-49 (recounting criticisms of Patten in the
British press).
515 See Andy Ho, Why Patten's Exco Might Still Come to the Party, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 21, 1994, at 17.
536 See Mary Kwang, What Victory?, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore) July 2,
1994, at 4; Lu Ping Interview on Need for Urgency in Dealing with Hong Kong's
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Once the through train for Legco had been decisively derailed
by China's determination to dissolve the body selected in the
elections held under the Patten reforms, China and its Hong Kong
allies argued that the business community should and would
welcome the Provisional Legislature that would replace Legco.
"Business will find it a blessing to have a [Provisional L]egislature
which is supportive of the [S.A.R.] administration," is not
dominated by the Democrats, and which is able to "provide a
breathing space and a relatively stable government," said the head
of the pro-China One Country Two Systems Economic Research
Institute."' China's and its Hong Kong allies' assurances that
the new legislature would have the requisite pro-business and pro-
China leanings took tangible form with the selection of members
of the Provisonal Legislature and the powerful S.A.R. cabinet. A
generous share of the seats in both organs went to politically
reliable members of the territory's business elite.538
The China and pro-China arguments to the business communi-
ty also emphasized more structural features of the planned
Provisional Legislature arrangement. The replacement of Lego by
the interim body was heralded as a return to the traditions of
"executive-led" government that had served business so well and
that Patten, on the China and pro-China side's reading, had
undermined when he expanded Legco's role in government by
submitting the first C.F.A. bill, the electoral law reforms and
other important matters for the formerly docile body's unfettered
consideration.
With the dissolution of the 1995 Legco irrevocably decided,
the new legislature's early establishment and readiness to begin
work by July 1, 1997 would avoid the dreaded "legislative
vacuum" and assure the "normal operation" of the S.A.R.
government, all of which the China and pro-China camp expected
Transition (China Central Television broadcast, July 5, 1994), transcribed in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (quoting the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
Director's statement that "[a]though Patten's constitutional reform packages
was passed today, there [were] quite a few negative votes... [showing] that
there is a substantial dissenting voice in the British Hong Kong Legco"); Tai,
supra note 104, at 8; Yeung & Fung, supra note 527, at 25.
117 Yeung & Wong, supra note 324, at 21 (quoting Shiu Sin-por).
538 See Rhonda Lam Wan & Rodger Lee, Team a "Reward"for Pro-China
Politicians, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 3.
[Vol. 18:3
HONG KONG'S END GAME (II)
the business community, with its aversion to uncertainty, to val-
ue. 39 The Provisional Legislature's controversial consideration
of new legislation before Hong Kong's reversion date was, China
and its Hong Kong allies asserted, merely a method of serving this
goal, not a departure from the commitment to a positivistically
valid, N.P.C.-authorized, and Basic Law-abiding arrangement for
a transitional legislative body.
On the question of the Provisional Legislature, as in the
controversy over the Patten reforms, prominent business voices
expressed assent to the views China and its allies were promoting.
David Chu again embraced the P.R.C.'s positions, arguing that the
"legal vacuum" that would exist "[i]f we did not have a provisional
body ... would be a far greater threat to business confidence"
than any of the concerns or conflicts attending its creation.'
The president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong
Kong declared that the Provisional Legislature was acceptable to
U.S. businesses in the territory, whose leaders were confident that
China would not tamper with the key legal requisites of Hong
Kong's thriving capitalist system s41  Hong Kong's General
Chamber of Commerce urged the governor to cede the legislative
initiative to S.A.R. bodies-in-waiting, calling on Patten to limit
himself, during the last months of British rule, to "essential
legislation for the immediate good government of Hong Kong and
enhancing the transition process to Chinese sovereignty."- 42
Developer and B.P.F. head Vincent Lo looked forward to the
reestablishment of a "much more balanced political structure" that
would retrench the expanded role Patten gave to Legco.m3
To the extent that these expressed business views were not
genuine or representative of the broader business community,
... See Provisional Legislature Must Be Set Up as Scheduled, supra note 304,
at A2.
s4 Gilley, supra note 38, at 14.
541 See Hong Kong's Dwindling Hopes for Democracy, Bus. WK., May 11,
1992, at 57; Vivian Lee, US Investors Shun Debate, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 21, 1996, at 6.
54' Simon Pritchard, Chamber's Nervousness a Worrisome Pointer, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 1996, at 12; see also Louis Won, The Lines Are Drawn
over Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 24, 1996, at 23 (quoting James
Tien, ur in Patten to "accept reality" and allow senior Hong Kong govern-
ment officials to cooperate with the Provisional Legislature).
5' For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note
401, at 22.
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China and its Hong Kong associates indicated that any reluctance
among business elites to accept the Provisional Legislature would
not alter the result. China and pro-China sources sought to cow,
if not to convince, business circles by signalling that opposition to
the arrangement would be at best futile; it could at worst create
risks of instability, unpredictability, and harm to the economy.
Qian Qichen and Lu Ping stated the point most succinctly: "the
rice was cooked" - that is, Hong Kong's sovereign had made its
choice and duly authorized the Preparatory Committee to create
a Provisional Legislature, and everyone in Hong Kong simply
would have to accept that.s 4
3.3.3. The Court of Final Appeal: Of Pragmatism and
Predictability
Attempts to assert or acquire business support for China's
position on the Court of Final Appeal question broadly resembled
those made to solicit the business community's backing on other
key legal and institutional issues of the endgame, although there
were some subtle differences. With the colonial government
pledged to support the Court deals and with the Hong Kong
business community initially recalcitrant, China and pro-China
Hong Kong elements' arguments concerning the C.F.A. deal, and
legislation to implement it, tended to be simpler, sparer, and more
often made by official P.R.C. sources in this context than in the
controversies over rights laws and democratic reforms.
China left the job of implementing the 1991 Court deal very
much to the British. That approach failed when Hong Kong's
colonial rulers allowed Legco to kill the legislation that would
implement the accord, with Legco members who represented or
had strong ties to the business community forming part of the
majority. Once a second accord was reached, China and its allies
undertook more visible and aggressive efforts to claim and to
cultivate support from a business community that apparently
feared that the C.F.A. accords' restrictions on the Court's
jurisdiction and the composition of the bench threatened the
' See Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's News Conference (China Central
Television broadcast, Mar. 11, 1996), transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Mar. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(quoting Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Qian Qichen); David Chipp, China
Says No Room for More Talk on Hong Kong Handover, Reuters, Apr. 29, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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security of the rule of law and an independent judiciary."'
In pushing for acceptance of the second Court deal, China and
its Hong Kong allies told the business community that its
concerns were simply misplaced. Zhao Jihua, the leader of
China's delegation to the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group that
crafted the 1995 C.F.A. accord, asserted that the arrangement
would assure Hong Kong "an independent and complete judicial
system."- On this view, a C.F.A. established in conformity
with the agreement would be fully consistent with the Basic Law
and the Joint Declaration, and the promises made therein that the
Hong Kong laws and legal institutions important to business
would survive the territory's transition from British colony to
Chinese Special Administrative Region. Lu Ping maintained that,
despite what the C.F.A. deal's opponents claimed, the accord did
not preclude the Court from including more than one judge from
the pool of expatriate common-law jurists in whom business
seemed to place such trust- 47 China and pro-China sources
asserted that the proposed C.F.A.'s jurisdictional limits (including
the much-discussed "act of state" exclusion) gave business no
reason to fear that commercial disputes involving public entities
or Chinese state-owned enterprises would become non-justiciable
in Hong Kong courts. Addressing one aspect of this concern, a
pro-China Legco member explained that the Basic Law assured
that the N.P.C. Standing Committee would consider fully
common law practices and standards when it decided whether a
case would be within the C.F.A.'s jurisdiction.s
Facing again the likely opposition of some generally pro-
business members of Legco who had helped to defeat the 1991
bill, and lingering fears in the business community that the 1995
Court deal threatened the rule of law,-49 Chinese officials and
spokespersons sought to focus the attention of the territory's
business elite on the undesirable consequences for business of
545 See Mosher, supra note 179, at 13.
5" Zhao Jibua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal Agreement, WEN
WEI P0, June 10, 1995, at A2; cf China Hopes Court Deal Will Boost Sino-
British Ties, supra note 328 (noting that the cooperation between Britain and
China in establishing the C.F.A. should ease cooperation on other transition
related issues).
S See do Rosario, supra note 164, at 26.
548 See Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1.
so See do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20; Kwang, supra note 477, at 17.
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rejecting the 1995 deal. If China and its allies failed to persuade
the business community that the proposed C.F.A. would fully
satisfy business' wishes for a rule-of-law-supporting Court, the
P.R.C. and its friends in Hong Kong still could assert other
connections between acceptance of the C.F.A. deal and the
tangible interests of the territory's business community. Thus, Lu
Ping noted how the protracted wrangling over the Court deal had
made the business community nervous about the risk of a "legal
vacuum" that would occur if July 1, 1997 passed without a new
Court being established.5 0 The 1995 C.F.A. legislation offered
an easy and early end to that troubling prospect (even though it
was no longer possible to set up the Court before the
handover).511  The claim, echoing an argument that had been
made on behalf of the 1991 legislation, was that the proposed
Court law at least would save the Hong Kong economy from the
dangerous uncertainty that would accompany easily revocable,
unilateral action by the colonial government to establish a Court,
or no action at all.
Accepting the 1995 Court accord and its implementing
legislation meant that China at least would not exercise its
legislative discretion to establish a new reviewing body that would
stand above the C.F.A. and outside Hong Kong, and would surely
threaten a more serious departure from the prior judicial and legal
system that business found so appealing. As Beijing appears to
have assessed the situation, the end of appeals to Britain's Privy
Council and the vesting of powers to interpret and amend the
Basic Law - and thus to override Hong Kong law - in organs of
the central Chinese government might be troubling to business.
These concerns, however, were surely less troubling than the same
arrangements plus the heretofore undiscussed and more immedi-
ately judiciary-displacing mechanism that the Chinese side floated
in the 1995 negotiations over the C.F.A.552 Moreover, in the
550 See do Rosario, supra note 164, at 26.
551 See id.; see also Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal
Agreement, supra note 327, at A2.
552 In a speech surely welcomed by the China side, Chief Justice and later
Chief Executive candidate Sir Ti-liang Yang argued to a business summit that
"[p]essimism is our greatest enemy .... A sound legal and judicial infrastruc-
ture is in place.... [W]e have every reason to anticipate the continuation of
a legal and judicial system which has served us well." Duncan Hughes,
Protection Adequate,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at 1.
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politics of the endgame as China had structured them, the China
and pro-China side had made clear to the territory's business
community that acquiescing in the Court deal also would lead to
more rapid progress on issues of immediate material interest to
business, including infrastructure development projects that Hong
Kong business circles clearly wanted to see move forward.5 3
On the C.F.A. question, as with rights legislation and
democratic reforms for the legislature, the positions that China
and its allies in the territory set forth (in this case with consider-
able support from the Hong Kong government) achieved some of
the desired results. Much of the business community expressed
relief, although perhaps little more, that the 1995 deal promised
to provide badly needed certainty, and, on that basis, strongly
supported the 1995 bill's passage 54 Some, although not all, of
the generally pro-business members of Legco voted to approve the
legislation. With Hong Kong's economy continuing to thrive and
business confidence in the territory's economic future soaring,
China and its strongest supporters in the territory seemed to have
ample reason to discount the significance of what their adversaries
saw as portents of doom, including many prominent Hong Kong
companies' registration, relisting, or taking options on office space
in jurisdictions where the Privy Council in London would retain
ultimate appellate jurisdiction beyond 1997.5ss If such moves by
the business community were, as pro-China sources and some
... See Hong Kong Court, supra note 462, at 19; Politics of a New Era, supra
note 477, at 449-51. Tellingly, along-standing impasse over the aiort deal was
resolved in the J.L.G. within three weeks after the 1995 C.F.A. deal. See id.
554 See, e.g., do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20 (recognizing that the C.F.A.
accord will unfreeze Sino-British relations and restart cooperation on transition
matters, such as those relating to business and nationality questions); Hong
Konl Court, supra note 462 (positing that the C.F.A. deal resolves an issue that
had -een threatening to undermine business confidence during the transition
to Chinese rule); Kwang, supra note 475, at 17 (noting the business commun-
ity's support of the deal but desire for the court to begin operation sooner);
MichaelSteinberger, Pact on HK's Legal System Has Not Put Fears to Rest, Bus.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at 8 (noting that the Business community's enthusiasm for
the Court accord is tempered by concern for the legal system's future); Stephen
Vines, Beijin& London S1gn Ageement on HK Court of Final Appeal, BUS.
TIMES, June 10, 1995, at 3 describing the General Chamber of Commerce and
Federation of Industries' belief that the agreement avoids the possibility of a
"legal vacuum"); Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3 (noting that the agreement
would end the uncertainty surrounding the rule of law).
555 See, e.., Steinberger, supra note 554 (citing views discounting the
significance of shifts in registration and listing sites by Hong Kong companies).
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members of the business community claimed, merely "cheap
insurance" that firms did not expect to need, or even to be able to
use, then there were indeed strong signs that Hong Kong's
business community accepted both the substantive terms of the
C.F.A. arrangement, and the underlying principle that a P.R.C.-
provided institutional arrangement, presented as the product of an
exercise of China's positivist sovereignty, could provide a rule of
law adequate for the business community. For China and its
allies, the implicit claim and hope was that hard-nosed and
pragmatic business leaders were not prepared to flee Hong Kong
because of minor unpalatable changes in the legal system, or
because of a commitment to the abstract legal and political
principles that animated Hong Kong liberals' and democrats'
arguments about the Court.
3.3.4. Selecting and "Selling" the Chief Executive
As they had done with respect to the other key legal and
institutional issues of the endgame, Chinese officials and their
allies in the territory sought to assert and to build support in
Hong Kong's business community for their position on issues
concerning the selection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive. In
this context, however, arguments familiar in substance were
presented in forms that were not very elaborate or sustained.
With the Chief Executive selection process confined to the last
months before reversion and tightly controlled by Chinese
authorities and the arrangements mandated by the Basic Law and
other N.P.C. enactments, there seemed to be fewer occasions to
craft an extended appeal to the business community. China and
its allies may also have seen relatively little need for such efforts,
given the British authorities' general acceptance of China's
positions, Hong Kong liberals' focus on other issues (such as the
Provisional Legislature and the fate of the Bill of Rights), and the
business community's spontaneous support or cowed compliance
on the Chief Executive issue, in the aftermath of the extended
battles over the other key issues of the period.
Still, elements of a strategy to find or to fashion support in the
business community were visible. To a significant degree, China
and its allies appeared to rely on the expectation that much of the
business community would welcome one of its own as the first
head of the territory's post-reversion government. In the most
highly visible manifestation of this assumption, Jiang Zemin
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announced to a delegation of Hong Kong business leaders in
Beijing early in 1996 that the first Chief Executive should be a
businessperson. Jiang presumably chose that generally friendly
occasion to articulate that policy because he believed his immedi-
ate audience would welcome the statement 5 6
To be sure, not all candidates for the post of Chief Executive
drawn from the ranks of business leaders would fare well with the
business community. China and its Hong Kong allies recognized
the difficulty.5 7 They appear to have understood the fear in
Hong Kong business circles that, if the job went to one of the
territory's top tycoons with business interests concentrated in
Hong Kong (or perhaps in the mainland), it might lead to
economically disruptive self-dealing on a massive scale, tilting the
"level playing field" that the rule of law provided in Hong
Kong.5 8 To make sure that such concerns were taken into
account, or more generally to make the selection process more
appealing to the elite business community, China carefully
consulted and included Hong Kong business elites in the selection
process at several levels. These mechanisms for hearing, reassuring
and perhaps winning over business leaders included an informal
screening committee run through Xinhua's Hong Kong branch,
meetings between members of the central party and government
leadership in Beijing and visiting delegations of business leaders
from the territory, and a prominent business membership on the
Selection Committee that formally nominated the first Chief
Executive. At the very least, these arrangements gave business
elites a priority not accorded to the territory's more ordinary
citizens, and thus special reasons to hope and expect that the
person chosen for the office would be someone who understood
the wants and needs of the business community concerning the
556 See Giley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 23.
157 Maggie Farley, Tsang Yok-sing on the Role of Democracy, Communism in
Chinese Hong Kong, L.A. TIMEs, July 6, 1997, Section M, at 3 (noting D.A.B.
leader Tsang Yok-sing's criticism that a business leader serving as Chief
Executive would face inevitable conflicts of interest).
"I Legco member and business executive Henry Tang drew the link
explicitly: "Favourtism in business is really a rule-of-law issue. These two
things go hand in hand." Gilley, supra note 59, at 15; see also Li, supra note
485, at 6 (expressing concern regarding a "level playing field" for business if a
leading business figure became Chief Executive).
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rule of law and other vital issues.5 9
China and pro-China sources further argued that, whatever
minor concerns Hong Kong's business community might have
about the selection process or its coutcome, the business commu-
nity should welcome the naming of a Chief Executive-designate
well in advance of July 1, 1997 because it would advance the
interests and preferences of the business community in several
ways. They asserted that the early selection of an incumbent for
the vital post would reduce uncertainty and, with the promised
cooperation of the out-going regime, provide a smoother transi-
tion. More specifically, Chinese commentaries stressed the
importance of having the Chief Executive-designate appointed in
time to participate in the final months of colonial governance,
including the preparation of the 1997 budget.5' As on other
key issues of the endgame, here too prominent voices in the
business community in the end showed support for China's
positions on a potentially controversial issue. The General
Chamber of Commerce, for example, asked Patten on the eve of
his final policy address to seek prior consultation with the Chief
Executive-designate before pursuing new legislation. Business
executive and legislator James Tien also urged Patten "to make
things easier for the chief executive"56' by involving him in
government immediately.562
Tung Chee-hwa's informal, but widely recognized, anointment
as the choice for Chief Executive-designate added new dimensions
to the P.R.C. and pro-China side's campaign to sell Hong Kong's
business community on the Chief Executive selection process and
its outcome. Tung possessed several of the qualities that, in the
abstract, China and its Hong Kong allies had expected the business
... See Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 23. P.C. member and
prominent businessman Tsingtong Tsui noted the relative lack of attention to
popular preferences stating, Ideally the candidate should also be the most
acceptable to the Hong Kong people. But to be honest, I think that will be
impossible." Id.
60 See, e.g., Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 23 (explaining that
the P.R.C.'s aim was to appoint a Chief Executive by the time preparation of
the 1997 budget got under way); see also Ridding, supra note 562, at 2 (noting
indications of a rise in investors' confidence in Hong Kong's economy after
Tung's selection).
561 Pritchard, supra note 542, at 12.
562 See Bruce Gilley, Obstacle Course, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 19, 1996,
at 19.
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community to welcome in a Chief Executive. He was a sufficient-
ly prominent figure in business circles to have the respect of the
business elites whom he would have to govern - a potentially
vital condition to retaining a fair and law-governed business
environment. On the other hand, Tung was not a dominant
economic figure and his company's income came primarily from
overseas shipping rather than from local Hong Kong or mainland
investments - traits that would seem to lessen the opportunity
and inclination for the self-dealing and favortism that many
business leaders feared. In addition, Tung's experience as a
member of Exco suggested an understanding of, and a degree of
commitment to, past laws and policies that business favored.
Tung's relative silence on the legal-political controversies of the
1990s, despite his Exco membership (with its attendant expectation
of a degree of visible support for colonial government policy),
suggested that he would not roil the political waters in ways that
would strain Hong Kong-Beijing relations and threaten business
opportunities. Except for a possible moral debt to Henry Fok (a
pro-China businessman who had helped to bail-out Tung's
company) and to China (which had helped to fund that rescue),
and ties to Li Ka-shing (one of the territory's most powerful
magnates) that were close enough to make some business figures
uncomfortable, most of the territory's business elite found no
compelling grounds to oppose Tung's selection, especially after
China's commitment to his appointment became clear. 63
China and its Hong Kong allies and agents - which on many
accounts now included Tung - worked to assure the business
community that Tung would preside over a congenial government
committed to a legal and institutional order that business would
find acceptable. Specifically, they stressed that the S.A.R.
government would be an "executive-led" government, with a
business leader and former Exco member at the head of the
executive branch, a cabinet stocked with leading pro-business
figures, and economically sensitive government departments led by
hold-overs from the previous business-friendly and rule-of-law-
supporting administration.5' Amid great fanfare from the
563 See Ching, supra note 483, at 40; Bruce Gilley, The Great Helmsman,
FAR E. EcoN. REv., Dec. 19, 1996, at 18.
s6 See China Will Not Pressure Hong Kong Civil Servants To Declare
Political Stand, WEN WEI Po, Dec. 29,1996, at A3, translated in BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Dec. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
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territory's pro-China press, China's choice for Chief Executive
quickly staked out positions on key legal and policy issues that
the business community supported or had come to accept as
inevitable. The effusive coverage in the pro-China press stressed
comments from Tung that seemed, at best, especially designed to
appeal to business, and, at worst, to reiterate positions on
controversial legal questions that China and its allies, in other
contexts, pressed business to accept: a commitment to prosperity
and stability, a pledge of continuity in economic policy, and
acceptance of the Provisional Legislature and the roll-back of civil
liberties legislation. 65
Finally, the pro-China press's praise of Tung's stances on
rights legislation and the legislature pointed to a less accom-
modating strand in China's and its Hong Kong allies' message to
the business community on the question of the Chief Executive.
China was not simply giving business interests preference in an
assertedly "democratic" selection process. As pro-China business-
man, P.W.C. and P.C. member David Chu noted, China's
interests inevitably weighed heavily in the selection of the Chief
Executive. The choice had to be someone Beijing knew and
trusted. The business community clearly understood this point,
as was reflected in the nearly universal perception in Hong Kong
that the public moment of Tung's selection came in Ting's
January 1996 handshake in Beijing with Jiang Zemin. 66 But
comments like David Chu's, Tung's initial post-selection presenta-
tion of his future administration's stance on late colonial rights
legislation, Tung's prior post as a vice chairman of the Preparato-
ry Committee, and the widely known P.R.C.-orchestrated rescue
File (quoting Zhang Junsheng, deputy director of Xinhua's Hong Kong office,
that the civil service would not be politicized); Ching, supra note 483, at 40
(describing Tung's background in Exco); Text of the Speec by Qian Qichen at
the Closing Ceremony of the Plenary Session of the Preliminary Working
Committee on June 24, 1995, WEN WEI P0, June 25, 1995, at A4.
... See Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's News
Conference for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, sua note 340; Lu Ping
Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended by British Hong Kong
Government Is Intended To Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and Stability, supra
note 499, at All; John Ridding, Hang Seng Sees Reduction in Risk, FIN. TvEs,
Dec. 28, 1996, at 2; Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are
Good, supra note 240, at A2.
'66 See Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 22; In the Running, FAR
E. ECON. REv., Feb. 8, 1996, at 27.
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of his family's shipping company in the 1980s all underscored the
obvious point for business: business had to expect and should
welcome a figure with ties to Beijing. 67
This was the same type of argument that Chinese officials and
their allies made to the business community in connection with
nearly all of the controversial legal and institutional issues that
arose during the endgame. Once again, the P.R.C. side held most
of the cards and sought to play a hand that would win sufficient
support or acquiescence among the business community for
China's preferred outcomes, without risking the minimal
requisites of China's positivist sovereignty and sovereign discretion
with respect to Hong Kong.
4. HONG KONG'S ENDGAME AND THE S.A.R.'s BEGINNING
The battles over "the Hong Kong people" and Hong Kong's
business community confirm what the more purely legal-political
struggles among the British authorities, the P.R.C. and Hong
Kong liberals, democrats and pro-China elements suggested. The
main participants' actions and strategies generally were consistent
with their pursuit of S.A.R. laws and institutions that reasonably
appeared to be both feasible under the circumstances and accept-
able in terms of their visions of sovereignty and domestic legality
for Hong Kong. Recognizing that they faced an endgame in the
generic sense of the approach of Hong Kong's formal transition
from British colony to Chinese Special Administrative Region,
these key political participants both clung to their core visions,
and turned to address legal and institutional issues for which those
visions yielded no single, clearly mandatory answer and with
respect to which the views of increasingly politicized social
constituencies might therefore matter a great deal. Their argu-
ments and approaches to the issues and to these constituencies
were also broadly consistent with perceptions that they faced an
endgame in any of three more specific senses. While evidence
from the pre-reversion struggles over the rule of law, specific laws
and institutions, and the views and values of the people and the
business sector also appeared to be consistent with the conclusion
that Hong Kong in fact primarily faced any of the three versions
of an endgame identified in Endgame I, developments during the
567 See In the Running, supra note 568.
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S.A.R.'s first months suggest that the "end of the game / on-going
games" model best fits transitional Hong Kong.
4.1. Summing Up Hong Kong's Endgame
The approaches that the key political players took in the
struggles to shape concrete laws and institutions for the S.A.R.
are, in large part, intelligible as strategies in what the participants
could see, reasonably, as an endgame in the "colloquial" sense of
a race against the July 1, 1997 deadline to reach feasible deals that
were superior to a "no deal" option and that would be binding
beyond reversion. For the British and Hong Kong's liberal and
pro-democracy politicians, the legal and institutional arrangements
they pressed for during the pre-reversion endgame appeared
superior to a "no deal" option in the context of a colloquial
endgame. From their liberal-democratic and broadly natural law-
like perspective, the Bill of Rights and civil liberties laws and
democratic reforms to electoral laws were preferable to leaving
such issues to be settled by the P.R.C. or the post-reversion
S.A.R., provided that such pre-reversion arrangements could
constitute, in effect, a deal on which the S.A.R. and the P.R.C.
would not renege. Some of their arguments, and perhaps most
clearly those less closely tied to core normative principles, made
sense as attempts to tap relatively promising deterrents to
"reneging" or "roll-backs." For example, efforts to cast the rights
laws as necessary to secure conformity with the international
human rights norms incorporated in the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law and as consistent with the established roles of Hong
Kong's courts and legislature, and efforts to present the Patten
reforms as compatible with the Basic Law and the Joint Declara-
tion, seemed crafted to increase the costs of defection for China
and the S.A.R. Such arguments sought to make use of the
P.R.C.'s and its allies' repeated pledges to Hong Kong and the
world that the basic policies set forth in those framework legal
documents were sacrosanct.
Splits and shifts within the liberal-democratic camp may be
equally comprehensible in terms of a colloquial endgame. For
example, while Hong Kong's liberal and pro-democracy politicians
apparently understood non-derogable principles of justice and
sovereign obligation to require arrangements for the Court of
Final Appeal and the Chief Executive that exceeded most feasible
compromises, their strong opposition to the Court bills, and their
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sustained criticism of the Chief Executive-designate's office as a
nascent P.R.C.-surrogate, suggested that they believed pre-
reversion "deals" could indeed structure post-reversion reality.
Asserting that the same set of liberal-democratic principles could
tolerate much more modest arrangements for the C.F.A. and the
Chief Executive, the U.K. and colonial Hong Kong governments'
arguments for accepting the Sino-British accords on the Court and
the Chief Executive selection process and its outcome clearly were
premised on a claim that the deals thus struck would bind in a
way that unilateral action by Hong Kong's departing masters and
doomed legislature would not, and that such deals were therefore
worth the concessions the China and pro-China camp exacted.
Alternatively, the divisions within the liberal-democratic camp
may have been more matters of tactics and assessments of the
relative dangers of "holding out" and foregoing worthwhile deals
and of "caving in" and accepting too little. 68
British, colonial government and liberal and pro-democracy
politicians' drives to claim and to cultivate popular and business
support for their favored positions also make sense as colloquial
endgame tactics of mobilizing whatever political forces (or
perceptions of potential political pressure) they could deploy to
increase the likelihood that the binding deals made at the last
6. Patten's later comments that he believed that accepting the act of state
provision in the C.F.A. deal was a mistake for Hong Kong arguably suggests
that the divisions in the liberal-democratic camp were at most tactical and
perhaps not even that, and that some on the British side regarded the U.K. and
colonial government position as disingenuous. See Gittings, supra note 143, at
10; Danny Gittings, When Denial Is Deceptive, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
13, 1997, at 10. This level of complexity and possible deception still seems
exceptional, and should not obscure areas of agreement, such as the British
authorities' and liberal and democratic politicians' common distress at the first
pre-reversion legislative actions of the Provisional Legislature. See, e.g., Frank
Zhang, Cbina's Assembly for HK Makes First Law-Making Move, Agence France
Presse, Apr. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting
Emily Lau's statement that "[t]his is a very, very sad day, a very black day for
Hong Kong" and "an act of complete lawlessness," and noting the U.K.'s and
Patten's "vow[s] to have nothing to do with" the body). Complexity and
fragmentation of another sort, however, should not be discounted in this
context. The fact that so many individuals and groups comprised articulate
segments of the liberal-democratic camp, and evidence from the authors'
interviews with numerous participants in the struggles of Hong Kong's
endgame strongly suggest that different actors may have perceived themselves
and Hong Kong to be facing different types of endgames. Similar factors
suport the expectation that the same holds true for the China and pro-China
side.
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minute would track as closely as possible their notions of legal
and institutional arrangements that were both viable in practice
and acceptable in principle. If their aim thus was an eleventh-
hour, instrumental "blitz" of real or credibly asserted pressure
from key social constituencies, the key political participants on
the liberal-democratic side acted sensibly when they made an
eclectic combination of arguments that appealed to normative first
principles and to the material interests and deep-seated fears of the
people and the business community. It was equally sensible for
them to have eschewed the pursuit of deals that might have been
superior to a "no deal" option but that concededly fell short of
the asserted minimal requisites of a just and proper legal order,
and the ordinary politics of coalition building that was likely to
produce such inadequate deals.
The colloquial endgame scenario also provides a plausible
interpretation of what the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies and
surrogates said and did. From the particular positivist perspective
of the China and pro-China camp, no principle precluded the
China camp's political and legislative commitment to provide
arrangements that the British or colonial governments or others
in Hong Kong found preferable to a "no deal" option, so long as
the terms did not alienate or fatally undermine the P.R.C.'s
sovereign discretion. The "deals" on the C.F.A. and on the Chief
Executive (principally reflected in the Basic Law provisions
governing the selection process and in agreements with colonial
authorities to collaborate in a smooth transition) and, arguably,
the unilaterally imposed but pre-announced decisions to establish
the Provisional Legislature and to revise rights laws, could hold
considerable appeal for the China and pro-China camp if such pre-
reversion commitments credibly portended post-reversion
constraints or their adversaries that substantively similar P.R.C.
or S.A.R. actions after July 1 might not provide. That China and
its allies pursued such deals and made such pronouncements
suggested that they expected that, where the British authorities or
Hong Kong leaders agreed (or even where they only acquiesced),
these pre-reversion "deals" and decrees could in fact weaken their
potential antagonists' post-reversion authority to press for more
sweepingly liberal arrangements, principally by denying them the
legal and moral high-ground that they might otherwise claim.
Internal divisions and changes of position in the China and
pro-China camp on key legal and institutional issues also can be
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understood in terms of a colloquial endgame scenario. They may
simply have reflected, for example, disagreements (especially
between the central leadership and some of Hong Kong's leading
pro-China politicians) about how much accommodation of Hong
Kong liberal-democratic preferences was prudent, or changing
assessments of whether the other side was willing or able to offer
much, or to make promises with credible post-reversion effect, in
return for new commitments from China.6 9
Chinese officials' and Hong Kong pro-China forces' efforts to
assert and to develop support or acquiescence among the people
and in the business community for their preferred outcomes are
intelligible as an effort to blunt, undercut or counter the "blitz"
of pressure from social constituencies that the adherents to a rival
vision and agenda sought to deploy in order to affect the course
of a possible final flurry of deal-making. If they were seeking to
use such pressure to steer colloquial endgame deal-making in a
direction that was compatible with their notion of sovereignty
and that maximized their preferences for S.A.R. legal and
institutional arrangements, members of the P.R.C. and pro-China
camp were acting sensibly in using a mixture of appeals to popular
and business constituencies' material interests and fears of
instability and uncertainty, explanations of the asserted adequacy
of P.R.C.-style positivist guarantees, and ultimate insistence on
positivist principle wherever it might diverge from popular and
business preferences. With the stakes as high and the end of the
game as near as the colloquial endgame scenario posits, and with
China and reliably pro-P.R.C. Hong Kongers able to impose post-
reversion arrangements unilaterally, the pre-reversion turn to
potentially persuasive if not strongly vision-based arguments made
sense, so long as such arguments did not countenance a compro-
59 Tsang Yok-sing's comment that China could have accepted late colonial
amendments to civil and political liberties laws, but refused to do so because
"the positions of both sides had be[come] so entrenched," suggests one
important instance of divergent assessments in the China and pro-China camp.
Farley, supra note 557, at M3. Similarly, Tsang's willingness to contemplate a
fresh round of pre-reversion legislative elections stood in particularly stark
contrast to arguments from the pro-China press that the interim body's
establishment and pre-reversion legislative work were "necessary measures" and
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's elaborate articulation of the positivist basis for
the Provisional Legislature's creation. See, e.g., Unreasonable Demand Is
Justifiably Rejected, supra note 269, at A4; Choy, supra note 234, at 1 (quoting
Qian Qichen).
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naise of the perceived essential requirements of the vision in
pursuit of a marginally better but still unacceptable deal.
Many of the arguments and much of the behavior of the
central players in pre-reversion Hong Kong's struggles over
specific laws and institutions for the S.A.R. also make sense as
responses to participants' reasonable perceptions that they faced
an endgame in the "technical" sense that the advent of a final
round of their reiterative dealings had removed deterrents to
"defection" or "cheating" that were vital preconditions to effective
deal-making. For the British and for Hong Kong liberals and
democrats, it quite plausibly appeared that no reliable, enforceable
deals were possible concerning the specific legal and institutional
issues at stake during a protracted technical endgame. With the
U.K. preparing to cede governmental power over Hong Kong, and
the territory's liberal and pro-democracy politicians facing
exclusion from the S.A.R. administration and from the legislature
for a year or more (during which many crucial decisions concern-
ing S.A.R. laws, institutions and the rule of law were likely),
members of the liberal-democratic camp would have few endoge-
nous means for enforcing any bargains struck during the endgame.
Britain could expect to have little practical prospect of enforcing
P.R.C. pledges as treaty rights under the Joint Declaration.
Consigned to the political sidelines, liberal and pro-democracy
politicians could expect to have little direct influence in Hong
Kong law and policy-making. Understanding that the P.R.C. and
the S.A.R. administrations would have much less need for their
cooperation or acquiescence in the aftermath of reversion, the
British authorities and the pro-democracy Legco block also could
anticipate that their potential bargaining partners in a pre-
reversion endgame would not be deterred from post-reversion
reneging by the prospect that cheating would make the British
and Hong Kong liberal and democratic politicians less willing to
bargain with them in future rounds.
Moreover, the colonial administration and liberals and
democrats in Legco arguably made no real deals with the P.R.C.
or its Hong Kong agents, just as the technical endgame model
would predict. The Bill of Rights, reforms to other rights laws,
and the Patten electoral reforms were adopted without the
P.R.C.'s and pro-China Hong Kong elements' cooperation and
despite their opposition. The arrangements for the Chief
Executive and the C.F.A. deal (once rejected by Legco) can
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plausibly be characterized as unilateral P.R.C. impositions in
which the Hong Kong and U.K. authorities nominally and
incompletely acquiesced, with elements of both arrangements
rendered non-negotiable by their entrenchment in the Basic Law
that the N.P.C. enacted before the commencement of the
endgame.
Divisions in the broadly liberal-democratic camp also appear
consistent with its members' understanding that they faced a
technical endgame. The British authorities' somewhat greater
willingness to compromise and to accommodate Chinese and pro-
China demands may have reflected their assessment that getting
China and its Hong Kong agents and allies to commit to deals
that were unenforceable "within" the terminated game still offered
the best hope of bringing political pressure to bear "outside" the
game. That is, having secured the C.F.A. deal and, perhaps, some
more diffuse P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. pledges to develop democracy
and protect rights in the S.A.R., the British might have anticipated
that they would be in a stronger position to hold China and its
supporters to account in informal fora of political opinion.
Reneging by the P.R.C. and the S.A.R. then would be more than
a betrayal of controversial principles of justice and the substantive
moral obligations of a good sovereign; it could also harm the
P.R.C.'s - and the Hong Kong government's - jealously-guarded
reputation for honoring "international" legal commitments. On
this reading, that the British did not strike such deals more
broadly, and on issues where the Chinese side was more intransi-
gent, merely underscores their commitment to the minimal
requirements of a proper legal order, understood in liberal-
democratic and natural law-like terms. Alternatively, but equally
consistent with a "technical endgame" interpretation, the British
may have recognized that they could not wield or mobilize
effective pressure after July 1, 1997, and they thus struck some
unenforceable deals and eschewed others in a complex pattern that
sought to maximize their ability to claim that they both had been
true to liberal and democratic values and had achieved a reason-
ably good deal for their wards in Hong Kong.
In contrast, Hong Kong's most strongly liberal and democratic
politicians may have read the options in a technical endgame
differently, concluding that ideological purity and a more
uncompromising insistence on strongly liberal-democratic
outcomes would allow them to claim the moral high-ground and
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to make more simple and compelling arguments in the post-
reversion era. They might plausibly have concluded that this
strategy (and the strict rejection of conventional coalition-building
appeals to segments of the major constituencies that it implied)
would provide the most promising mechanism for cultivating and
mobilizing exogenous political pressure after the end of the
technical endgame.
While the "outside the game" or "post-game" political pressure
that the British and Hong Kong politicians might hope to deploy
after reversion could come in part from themselves and from the
international community, social constituencies in Hong Kong
were likely a more obvious source. Efforts by members of the
broadly liberal-democratic camp to find and to foster support
among the territory's people and its business community thus also
are comprehensible as responses to the conditions of a technical
endgame. British and colonial authorities' and liberal and pro-
democracy politicians' resort to arguments that appealed, some-
times crassly, to a wide array of popular and business interests and
fears made sense as tactics to construct and to rally social and
economic forces that might be able to generate significant political
pressure, and to impose substantial economic and political costs,
on the P.R.C. or S.A.R governments if they departed too sharply
from what a liberal-democratic perspective demanded of a legal
and institutional order for post-reversion Hong Kong. On this
interpretation, splits between the British and prominent Hong
Kong politicians in the battle over these key constituencies
reflected different assessments of what was politically possible or
different judgments about what their shared vision of law and
sovereignty minimally required. For example, the British perhaps
regarded efforts to find popular and business support for relatively
modest deals or unilateral actions as a way of formalizing
standards that were likely to have popular support and that, once
formalized and despite their unenforceability as "deals," might
help to make up for the lack of enforcement mechanisms. That
is, they might become standards that Hong Kong people and
businesses would expect and demand that the P.R.C. and the
S.A.R. honor. In contrast and equally plausibly, local politicians
may have seen such tactics as risking the abandonment of
fundamental values in a sweeping accommodation of the some-
times-suspect, and potentially malleable, existing preferences of the
people and business elites.
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The P.R.C. and its closest supporters in Hong Kong also
reasonably could have perceived that they faced a technical
endgame and acted and argued in a manner consistent with such
circumstances. Chinese and pro-China charges that the colonial
government was undertaking unilateral last-minute moves to erode
government authority, social order and economic health, that the
U.K. was violating earlier bilateral accords on democratization and
other matters and seeking insidiously to perpetuate its influence
in post-reversion Hong Kong, and that the ranks of liberal and
democratic politicians included subversives who were determined
to harm Hong Kong, all suggested that the P.R.C. and its allies
and agents expected that their potential bargaining partners would
defect from any significant deals that might be struck during the
endgame. With the British authorities' departure from the
territory and the liberals' and democrats' exclusion from the
legislature imminent, the P.R.C. and the pro-China camp could
plausibly conclude that there was little to deter the U.K. or local
politicians from defecting and trying to force reconsideration of
supposedly settled issues, and that the liberal-democratic camp had
little to offer in return for any concessions or accommodations
that the P.R.C. side might be willing to make on the eve of its
resumption of the exercise of sovereign prerogatives over Hong
Kong.
Further, the P.R.C.'s moves arguably -fit the technical endgame
pattern of reaching no real deals with the British or with Hong
Kong's liberal and democratic leaders. Especially in the view of
the P.R.C. and its allies, the excision of portions of the Bill of
Rights and other civil liberties laws was ultimately a unilateral
action by the P.R.C., effected by the N.P.C. The decision to
establish the Provisional Legislature was equally not the result of
any "deal." Despite being formally the products of processes in
which the U.K., the colonial government and Hong Kong
politicians and legislators played some role, the C.F.A. legislation
and the Chief Executive selection process and its outcome can be
characterized quite credibly as legal and institutional arrangements
that the P.R.C., with backing from the territory's pro-China
forces, imposed on Hong Kong by means of the enactment of the
Basic Law before the endgame and additional unilateral determina-
tions during the endgame.
Signs of splits and shifts in the China and pro-China camp's
approaches to the legal and institutional issues of the endgame are
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also compatible with the conclusion that the camp's members
perceived and faced an endgame in the technical sense. Especially
for the pro-China elements in Hong Kong who were relatively
sensitive to subtle changes in Hong Kong politics, and the P.R.C.
officials who were most familiar with Hong Kong affairs and most
directly responsible for them, it was plausible to conclude that a
fairly accommodating stance toward laws to protect civil and
political liberties, laws providing for democratic elections and the
like was (at least at some points in the endgame) a sensible
strategy even if it was generally impossible to make enforceable
deals embodying those arrangements. Getting the colonial
government and prominent Hong Kong politicians to accept such
terms publicly (as the British did with the C.F.A. and the Chief
Executive), or at least to acquiesce in them before reversion,
promised to defuse post-reversion criticism that otherwise might
shake confidence in the stability and substance of the S.A.R.'s laws
and institutions. On this view, even purely unilateral pre-
reversion announcements of relatively moderate and accommodat-
ing post-reversion legal and institutional arrangements could
constitute pre-commitments that were credible enough to enhance
relevant audiences' certainty and confidence in Hong Kong's
future. Such moves thus could appear to be prudent exercises of
China's sovereign discretion to shape the political landscape of
Hong Kong's endgame in favorable ways.
On the other hand, and particularly among central P.R.C.
leaders who might be less attuned to the evolving situation in
Hong Kong and might be more zealous in asserting sweeping
notions of China's sovereign discretion and in emphasizing
China's role in Hong Kong's success, adherents to a Chinese-style
positivist perspective could have a very different, but equally
intelligible, response to the apparent circumstances of a technical
endgame. Seeing no prospect of striking deals that could bind the
other side or exact significant concessions (especially during the
moments of sharpest bilateral conflict), and fearing that unilateral
commitments by the China and pro-China side might have little
credibility with relevant audiences, members of the China and
pro-China camp could believe that there was little point in taking
even modest risks of alienating or undercutting sovereign
discretion through unenforceable deal-making or reputation-
staking unilateral pronouncements.
The approaches that the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies took
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in the battles over the people and the business community also
made sense as technical endgame strategies for pursuing a legal and
institutional order that satisfied the minimum requirements of
their primarily positivist vision and maximized the achievement
of the specific outcomes they sought. In such circumstances, it
made sense for official P.R.C. and unofficial pro-China forces to
make threats and appeals to social constituencies' immediate
material interests and their broader concerns with uncertainty and
instability, and to argue that the P.R.C.'s and the S.A.R.'s
promised positivist guarantees of rights, democracy and the rule
of law were adequate for business and the people and were all that
business and the people were going to get. Simply, where no
desirable and credible deals were possible, this grab-bag of
attempted persuasion and coercion of social constituencies might
substitute for enforceable deals. It offered a promising route to
cultivating and to mobilizing social forces to provide political
support for or acquiescence in legal and institutional arrangements
that would be more difficult and costly to defend or impose in
their absence, or if China and its allies ceded the field of popular
and business opinion to their liberal and democratic antagonists.
On this analysis, differences within the pro-China camp over how
much to accommodate and how much to reject or disregard these
key constituencies' views reflected a familiar and understandable
set of disagreements about what a positivist vision of law and
sovereignty demanded, about what the business community and
the people of Hong Kong required, or about the relative risks and
potential benefits of tactics that placed different emphases on those
two concerns.
During Hong Kong's endgame, British, P.R.C. and Hong
Kong political organizations and leaders also acted and argued in
ways that were consistent with a conclusion that they faced the
end of one game in a series of on-going games. That is, their
approaches also could be understood as responses to a situation in
which cheating and defection were less likely than in a technical
endgame, deals were less clearly reliable and enforceable than in
a colloquial endgame, and players expected to have on-going
dealings but while playing changed roles, under altered rules and
with differently distributed resources. As the developments
examined in the next section of this Article confirm, participants
on both sides of the political divide in endgame-era Hong Kong
could reasonably expect that the post-reversion period would be
1997]
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
marked by the significant, but incomplete, continuity in actors,
roles and issues that characterize the third type of endgame.
As we argued in Endgame I, if the major political participants
plausibly perceived that they faced an "end of the game / on-going
games" type of endgame, patterns of argument and action that
would be sensible responses to either of the polar types of
endgame would be, almost afortiori, intelligible as responses to
the third, intermediate type of endgame. Expecting to play a
more limited but continuing role in the aftermath of reversion,
Hong Kong liberals and democrats could sensibly pursue semi-
enforceable deals on key legal and institutional issues, but they
would not be willing to compromise very much because even
modest and uncertain reputational concerns could deter them
from making broad pre-reversion concessions from which they
might find it imperative to defect, and which could thus imperil
their claim to the post-reversion moral and legal high-ground.
The British authorities could engage in a similar calculus, but their
expectation of a sharper decline in their post-reversion influence
or their genuinely more modest sense of what a liberal-democratic
vision required could be expected to push them, respectively, in
the direction of a technical endgame or a colloquial endgame
perspective, and toward different answers to the legal and
institutional questions of the endgame.
In such circumstances, British and colonial government
authorities' and liberal and pro-democracy politicians' approaches
to the battles over the people and the business community make
sense as strategies to cultivate and accumulate social constituency
assets that they could deploy in the endgame to seek favorable and
semi-reliable deals and in new "games" to press for the enforce-
ment of old deals and the creation of new ones beyond reversion.
Differences in the approaches that members of the broadly liberal-
democratic camp took in addressing the people and the business
community then could be understood as reflections of divergent
assessments of how valuable these "assets" would be and how
feasible it was to cultivate and accumulate them.
On the other side, the approaches of the P.R.C. and its Hong
Kong stalwarts can be understood in similar terms. This side's
broad, but not absolute, unwillingness to strike compromise deals
makes sense in the face of the complex factors at play in an
endgame of the third type: concern that a failure to perform an
endgame deal would make dealings with prior partners in new
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games more difficult; perceptions that pre-endgame deals could
offer a modestly reliable mechanism for facilitating the establish-
ment of preferred laws and institutions, as well as pose a non-
trivial threat to impede the unilateral, post-endgame implementa-
tion of such arrangements; and confidence that China and its allies
could impose adequate and acceptable legal and institutional
solutions after reversion in the absence of an acceptable and
enforceable pre-reversion deal.
Shifts and splits within the China and pro-China camp over
precisely what agenda to pursue on the concrete legal and
institutional questions of the endgame then appear to be the
predictable consequences of different assessments of what this
complex environment would portend for relatively purist or
relatively accommodationist approaches. Finally, in the context
of an intermediate endgame, the P.R.C.'s and pro-China elements'
sometimes-divergent approaches to claiming and cultivating
popular and business support look closely analogous to their
liberal-democratic antagonists' asset-cultivation strategy. While
one might expect that the shifts in role and power among key
political actors would make such social constituency assets less
vital to the P.R.C. and its allies than to the U.K. and Hong Kong
liberals and democrats, such differences would be ones of degree
and not of kind in the context of the ending of one game in a
series of changing games among repeat players with potentially
variable assets.
In whatever terms the principal political participants under-
stood the pre-reversion endgame, their most prominent leaders
made statements at the moment of Hong Kong's reversion that
restated long-held visions of sovereignty and legality and contin-
ued familiar efforts to claim and cultivate support among the
people (in some cases quite explicitly) and among the business
community (although often only implicitly or indirectly). In his
final speech as governor on June 30, Christopher Patten asserted:
Our own nation's contribution here was to provide the
scaffolding that enabled the people of Hong Kong to
ascend. The rule of law. Clean and light-handed govern-
ment. The values of a free society. The beginnings of
representative government and democratic accountability.
Hong Kong's values are decent values. They are universal
values. They are the values of the future in Asia as
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elsewhere, a future in which the happiest and the richest
communities, and the most confident and the most stable,
too, will be those that best combine political liberty and
economic freedom as we do today."70
Democratic Party Chairman Martin Lee's "July 1 Declaration"
made similar, and equally familiar points:
Democracy has taken root and flourished here in Hong
Kong.... We ask our Chinese rulers to give Hong Kong
more democracy, not less, now that we are reunited with
our motherland.... [T]he Beijing leaders cannot win the
trust of the people of Hong Kong by rejecting a legislature
elected by Hong Kong citizens... ; or by rolling back
individual freedoms and our Bill of Rights; or by striking
down other laws that have the support of our people....
Elections have ensured stability in Hong Kong, they have
protected our freedoms and underpinned our economic
success. In order to preserve the rule of law, we must not
only have an independent judiciary, but good laws. To
have good laws, we must have democratic elections to
guarantee that our legislature is accountable to us, the
people.... We believe that people everywhere share our
love of freedom and democracy and that these values will
ultimately triumph - not only in Hong Kong - but
across Asia and the world .... Freedom exercised to the
full, and guaranteed by the rule of law [are the source of
Hong Kong's] lustre and indeed its value to China and the
world.
71
On the other side of the principal divide in the struggles to
shape a legal and institutional order for the S.A.R., top P.R.C.
officials hewed closely to positivist principle and touched upon
their pre-reversion arguments concerning the people and the
570 Christopher Patten, Farewell Remarks (July 1, 1997), in Edward A.
Gargan, In a Former Colony, the Dawn Is Red, INT'L HERALD TRIM., July 1,
1997, at 1.
571 Martin Lee, The July 1 Declaration (July 1, 1997), in We Pledge to Be the
Voice of the People, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1997, at 17.
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business community. After reciting a list of rights and powers
that the Basic Law conferred upon Hong Kong and Hong
Kongers, Chinese Premier Li Peng declared:
The Basic Law... was formulated in accordance with the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China and by
taking into full account the history and reality of Hong
Kong. A democratic system that is consistent with the
provisions of the Basic Law and suits Hong Kong's reality
will surely enjoy extensive rights and freedom unparalleled
during colonial rule. With the return of Hong Kong, the
Hong Kong compatriots have become the real masters of
the land and they are fully capable of creating an even
better future by giving full play to their wisdom and
talent.572
Sketching some of the details of that future, P.R.C. President
and Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin stated that "Hong Kong
will gradually develop its own democratic systems that will be
suited to itself and will maintain stability according to the Basic
Law."
573
In somewhat more detailed remarks stressing related themes,
Xinhua Hong Kong Deputy Director Zhang Junsheng asserted:
Together with the majority of Hong Kong people, we
successfully accomplished the preparation and organization
of the [S.A.R.], thus finally realizing the smooth transition.
The Chinese government's determination and sincerity for
firmly carrying out the policies of "one country, two
572 Speech by Premier Li Peng at the Reception in Beijing Celebrating the
Return of Hong Kong to the Motherland, BEIJING REv., July 14-20, 1997, at 24,
24-25; see also Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Party Celebrating the
Establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 16, 18; Speech by President
Jiang Zemin at the Public Gathering to Celebrate Hong Kong's Return, BEIJING
REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 27, 27-30 (providing the text of President Jiang
Zemin's speeches making points similar to Li Peng's).
" Paul Harrington, Hong Kong's New Chinese Leaders Get Down to Work
on First Day, Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (quoting Jiang Zemin's speech on the occasion of Hong
Kong's reversion).
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systems," "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and
"a high degree of autonomy" were fully reflected in the
process of preparing and organizing the [S.A.R.]. The
principle of "fairness, openness and impartiality" was
implemented and democracy brought into full play in
course of setting up the Selection Committee ... and
electing the Provisional Legislat[ure] .... The implementa-
tion of the Basic Law will surely offer an effective legal
guarantee for carrying out the "one country, two systems"
policy [because] the Basic Law accurately reflects the
general principle of "one country, two systems" and
China's specific policies toward Hong Kong[,] ... has a
high legal status . . . [, and is subject to strict] procedures
for revising [its provisions]. 7 4
Comments from a leading pro-China daily in Hong Kong
were in the same familiar China and pro-China spirit of positivism
and attention to issues relevant to popular and business attitudes
and reactions:
The key to ensuring Hong Kong's stable transition lies in
implementing the guiding principle determined by Deng
Xiaoping and persisting in handling affairs in accordance
with the principle and spirit of the Basic Law of the Kong
Kong SAR. The key to maintaining Hong Kong's prosper-
ity and stability in the coming fifty years or more lies in
persistently implementing the Basic Law to the letter...
The Basic Law legalizes the concept of "one country, two
systems." It was praised by Deng Xiaoping as a "creative
masterpiece." However, all great masterpieces are bound
to bring various interpretations .... Therefore, it is neces-
sary to formulate various specific rules and regulations in
accordance with the principle of the fundamental laws. ...
The Basic Law was enacted in accordance with the guiding
principle of respecting history and reality, and its legisla-
tive spirit lies in seeking truth from facts. . . . If Hong
" Zhang Junsheng, Guarantee for Post-1997 Prosperity and Stability in Hong
Kong, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 31, 31-32.
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Kong people interpret the [Basic Law in this spirit], they
will reach unanimity.... This will enable them to jointly
implement and defend the Basic Law.'75
In his first speech as Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Tung
Chee-hwa sketched a vision of the S.A.R.'s legal and institutional
order in terms that were compatible with China's positivist and
sovereignty-protecting vision of legality, that built upon his earlier
comments which had been warmly praised in official Chinese and
pro-China press commentaries, and that seemed to seek at once to
coopt and to rebut liberal-democratic arguments. Tung stated:
Through a solemn act of law, the central people's
government has granted Hong Kong a high degree of
autonomy, unparalleled anywhere in the world. We value
this empowerment, and we will exercise our powers
prudently and responsibly....
For the first time in history, we, the people of Hong
Kong, will be masters of our own destiny. The [S.A.R.]
government is fully committed to preserving the Hong
Kong way of life, maintaining Hong Kong's free and open
economic system, upholding the Rule of Law, and building
a more democratic society...
Democracy is the hallmark of a new era for Hong
Kong. The [S.A.R.] government will resolutely move
forward to a more democratic form of government in
accordance with the provisions in the Basic Law.... The
[S.A.R.] government will adopt an open attitude and be
accountable to the public....
... [W]e now have the opportunity to chart our own
destiny. Under 'one country, two systems,' we will move
forward with conviction, prudence and determination. We
will work together for a better future.
Implement Basic Law in a Practical Way, TA KUNG PAO, July 14, 1997,
at A2 (discussing the Basic Law in the context of the early post-reversion
controversy over immigration, and, in part, paraphrasing remarks of Jiang
Zemin and N.P.C. Chairman Qiao Shi).
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For a long time, Hong Kong has embraced the Eastern
and Western cultures. We will continue to encourage
diversity in our society, but we must also reaffirm and
respect the fine traditional Chinese values .... 576
While such statements suggest that the key established
participants in the political struggle over the S.A.R.'s legal and
institutional order remained broadly consistent in their principled
perspectives and in their social constituency-targeting strategies
throughout Hong Kong's endgame, the end of the endgame left a
good deal of uncertainty about what kind of endgame Hong Kong
had been facing, and about the prospective roles of emergent post-
reversion players such as the S.A.R. administration. Post-
reversion developments promised, eventually, to dispel some of
that uncertainty.
4.2. The S.A.R.'s Beginning
Only a few months have passed since Hong Kong's formal
return to Chinese rule. It is still too early to reach firm conclu-
sions concerning the law and politics of post-reversion Hong Kong
and what they reveal about the nature of transitional Hong
Kong's endgame and its implications for the rule of law.
Nevertheless, legal and institutional developments since July 1,
and debates concerning the propriety and popularity of those
developments, suggest a potentially telling mix of continuity and
change. Most of the key participants have remained on the scene,
but much about the scene they inhabit, and their places in it, is
different. The issues of the early post-reversion period in many
respects have been the direct descendants of the contentious issues
of law and institutions of the pre-reversion endgame, but they
have also raised new questions and concerns. The arguments that
the principal political players have made in favor of their
preferred resolution of those issues, and in addressing the attitudes
576 Speech by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at the HKSAR Inauguration
and Swearing-In Ceremony, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 15, 15; A Future
of Excellence and Prosperity for All, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 20, 23
(presenting text of speech by Tung at the party celebrating Hong Kong's
reversion); Peter Lim, Chinese Values Take Over in Hong Kong, Agence France
Presse, July 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting
Tung).
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of the people and the business community, have been broadly
consistent with the arguments of the early and middle 1990s, but
not identical to them.
4.2.1. Players and Roles
All of the major actors in the pre-reversion political struggle
to shape Hong Kong's post-reversion laws and institutions have
remained on the stage, although their roles and influence have
changed considerably and in different ways. Predictably, Great
Britain has been pushed to the wings. With the U.K. no longer
claiming sovereignty or exercising governmental power over Hong
Kong, the formerly prominent British voice in the broadly liberal-
democratic camp has been subdued or silent on the details of
Hong Kong's legal and institutional affairs since July 1, 1997. Yet,
the former colonial ruler has been careful to assert that its final
exit is not imminent. Official British statements have consistently
insisted that London still has a supporting role to play in securing
for Hong Kong the requisites of a just and proper legal and
political order 5s 7 In what critics have taken as a reflection of
the U.K.'s new impotence, however, British officials have offered
little criticism of the S.A.R. government's controversial moves on
election laws and other issues.
57 8
" See, e.g., Hong Kong's New Chinese Leaders Get Down to Work on First
Day, Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Aliasi (ile (quoting Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's statement that "[t]oday is
not the end of Britain's long connection with Hong Kong, but a new
beginning," and that the U.K. "will walk with [the people of Hong Kong]
through the 50 years for which terms of the handover remain in legal force"S;
Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former Sovereign, Agence France Presse, July 31,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting the British
government's semi-annual report to Parliament on the implementation of the
Joint Declaration, which stated that "[t]he government is determined to protect
the cornerstones of Hong Kong's success," including "the rule of law, an
independent judiciary, a level playing field, an honest, efficient and politically
neutral civil service... and te free flow of information"); Chris Yeung, UK
Pledges Help for More than 50 Years, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 1997,
at 6 (quoting Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's pledge that "Britain's
politica and moral commitment to Hong Kong will ... last... beyond the
50 years of the Joint Declaration['s]" pledge to retain Hong Kong's "system"
unchanged).
578 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Masters Do Not Need to Pull the Strings, S. CHNA
MORNING POST, Aug 4, 1997, at 18 (criticizing Foreign Minister Derek
Fatchett for stating that the freedom accorded demonstrators during the
S.A.R.'s first month had given the British government "a great deal of
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The P.R.C.'s role has changed as well. In some ways, it has
expanded considerably. The departure of the British colonial
authorities and the dissolution of a highly critical Legislature have
removed key practical impediments to ensuring that the exercise
of governmental authority over Hong Kong is acceptable to the
P.R.C. In China's view, the coming into force of the Basic Law
has established new legal and legitimate avenues for central
Chinese authorities to exercise sovereign authority directly. For
example, the N.P.C. and its Standing Committee are now
formally empowered to revise the Basic Law (after consultation
with the Basic Law Committee) and to interpret the Basic Law.
Hong Kong's Chief Executive is now formally accountable to the
Central People's Government in Beijing (as well as to the S.A.R.),
some of its legislature's enactments subject to invalidation by the
N.P.C. Standing Committee, and its Court of Final Appeal bound
to seek and accept the N.P.C. Standing Committee's interpreta-
tions of some key Basic Law provisions.579 In the first hours of
the S.A.R. era, the entry of P.R.C. troops into Hong Kong and
the P.R.C.-approved Provisional Legislature's ratification of
measures to implement P.R.C.-mandated changes to Hong Kong
law provided dramatic symbols of China's expanded role.580
On the other hand, China's visible presence in the post-
reversion debate over S.A.R. laws and institutions also has shrunk
in key respects. Explicit exercises of China's sovereign authority,
or even a widespread perception of pervasive informal interven-
tion, on matters that are legally committed to the discretion of the
S.A.R. government, or that seem vital to Hong Kong's legal and
institutional autonomy, now seem to pose an increased risk of
triggering international approbation or a ruinous fall in public and
investor confidence in the territory's future. Perhaps reflecting
this concern, Chinese official and pro-China statements since July
I have been especially careful to stress legal and policy restrictions
on P.R.C. state organs' meddling in the territory, and the official
reassurance," and that it was "possible to have open and fair elections" in 1998).
s See Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 17, 43, 158, 159.
580 The principal vehicle for effecting the legislative changes in Hong Kong
was the Reuiification Ordinance. See, e.g., Hong Kong Reunification Bill Passed,
New China News Agency, Domest. Serv., July 1, 1997, transcribed in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(describing the Provisional Legislature's unanimous passage of the bill, at 3:55
a.m. on Jily 1, to ratify thirteen bills it had approved prior to July 1, 1997).
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and staunchly pro-China press has confined itself ever more
narrowly to praising the accomplishments of Tung Chee-hwa's
government.5 8'
Within Hong Kong, changes of role have- been complex.
Democratic Party and liberal independent politicians and activists
remain a formidable force, leading public rallies critical of the
government, making now-familiar arguments about the requisites
of democracy and the rule of law, and planning their campaigns
for the 1998 elections for the S.A.R. Legislature. On the other
hand, they have lost their former power and platform as the
largest block in an assertive legislature. No longer able to focus
primarily on the relatively easy targets of a foreign and insuffi-
ciently liberal and democratic colonial government, or an
ideologically alien and resolutely illiberal group of P.R.C.
authorities, these critics have had increasingly to turn their fire to
the far more ambiguous target of a fairly popular Hong Kong
Chinese-led S.A.R. administration, and to signs of relatively subtle
P.R.C. influence on that administration.82
s' See, e.g., John Ridding, Hong Kong's Solid Start, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 8, 1997, at 22 (noting held-over government officials' praise of Ma
Yuzhen, the P.R.C. Foreign Ministry Representative in Hong Kong, for his
low-key and cooperative role, and quoting new Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office Director Liao Hui's description of himself as a " oalkeeper" who
rotects Hong Kong from mainland interference); Speech 9 President Jiang
Zemin at the Party Celebrating the Establishment of the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative Region of the People's Republic of China, translated in BEJING
REv., July 14-20, 1997, at 16, 17 (setting forth President Jiang Zemin's pledge
that "no central departments of localities [of the P.R.C.] shall interfere or be
allowed to interfere in the affairs administered by the S.A.R. in accordance with
the Basic Law"); Tsang Yok-sing, Uncertain Role for Lu Ping's Old Office, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 2, 1997, at 18 (expressing expectation that Liao
Hui would abandon pre-reversion practice of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office Director making "authoritative remarks about SAR affairs"); cf. Jonathan
Braude, It's Time for a Little Trus4 Says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 3, 1997, at 11 (noting Martin Lee's expression of surprise at the silence of
Beijin and the Hong Kong Xinhua branch during the first months of the
S.A.R.).
582 See Chris Yeung, Chinese Rule Okay So Far, Says Martin Lee, S. CHNA
MORNING POST, Sept. 6,.1997, at 6 (noting Martin Lee's mild comments about
S.A.R. governance so far, and expressions of concern that Hong Kong's new
dictatorship may stop being so benign); Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (noting
similar comments from Martin Lee and quoting Lee's view that the advent of
the S.A.R. "at least has localized the fights" over Hong Kong's future and made
them an intra-Hong Kong affair); Linda Choy, Tung's Political Say Limited, Says
Szeto Wah, S. CHNA MORNING POST, Aug. 18, 1997, at 4 (noting leading
Democrat Szeto's view that Tung likely had to toe China's line on any
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"Pro-China" forces in the territory have similarly remained
important players while facing significant changes of role and
context. Most notably, the D.A.B.'s representation in the
Provisional Legislature and its expected share of the Legislature to
be chosen in 1998 significantly exceed its small contingent in the
last colonial Legco. Yet, the return of Hong Kong to China has
not been an unmitigated boon for the territory's pre-eminent pro-
China party. The D.A.B. received a strikingly small share of the
seats on the pro-China Provisional Legislature, has sometimes been
on the losing side of key post-reversion votes in that body, and
has been largely excluded from a big business-dominated executive
branch in the S.A.R.'s executive-led government.8 3
Finally, "pro-business" politicians' roles seem to have changed
substantially in the wake of Hong Kong's handover. In the pre-
reversion endgame, they had been Legco's swing vote without a
clearly developed legal and institutional vision, or the conduits for
the business community's considerable influence with the colonial
government, or the most visible barometers of the attitudes of a
key constituency over which the more assertive players in the
public politics of pre-reversion Hong Kong fought. In the post-
reversion period, many of them - including Tung Chee-hwa -
have occupied the top positions of the executive-led government,
as well as a significant share of the seats in the Provisional
Legislature. Perhaps inevitably, their accession to these influential
offices has coincided with new pressures to articulate a legal and
political vision for Hong Kong. For Tung and many of those
around him, the vision that began to take shape before reversion,
"political question"); Andy Ho, End of the Honeymoon, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 15, 1997, at 21 (noting that liberals' expulsion from the legislature
shifted their focus to "protests outside the institution" and efforts "to amplify
public grievances and discontent in the run-up" to 1998 elections).
183 See do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, supra note 106, at 17
(reporting that D.A.B. won six of sixty seats in the 1995 Legco elections); Bruce
Gilley, Men Who Matter, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 3, 1997, at 20 (describing
the dominance of business elites on the Executive Council and in senior policy
posts, and the ground D.A.B. lost to less docile pro-China parties in appoint-
ments to the Provisional Legislature); Chris Yeung, Keeping a Tight Rein on
Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1997, at 15 (describing one
academic's argument that the plan for S.A.R. governance was to limit the
influence of both D.A.B. and the Democratic Party in an effort to enhance the
power and discretion of the Chief Executive, and quoting D.A.B. leader Ma
Lik's statement that D.A.B. would be happy to retain the ten seats it had in the
Provisional Legislature in the 1998 legisiative elections).
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and that has emerged more fully since, is one that looks rather
like a Singapore model. Compared to pre-reversion Hong Kong,
the S.A.R. order that pro-business political leaders seem to
envision has a more extensive industrial policy, a greater govern-
ment role in housing and other sectors, and weaker protection of
civil liberties (often justified as appropriate to ensure the protec-
tion of social order and harmony with local cultural values).'"
4.2.2. Issues and Conflicts
Established participants' new or altered roles in post-reversion
Hong Kong have begun to take shape in the context of controver-
sies over general rule-of-law concerns, and specific legal and
institutional questions, during the S.A.R.'s first months. Like the
participants themselves, the issues with which they have wrestled,
so far, appear to exhibit a mixture of continuity and contrast with
those of Hong Kong's pre-reversion endgame. The key political
players' arguments about those issues seem to reflect a broad
continuation - although with possibly significant alteration - of
the pre-reversion endgame's patterns of a basic clash of visions of
domestic legal-political authority, substantial intramural disagree-
ments among adherents to each vision over specific legal and
institutional arrangements, and a focus on how key social
constituencies might line up in the political battles over laws and
institutions for the Hong Kong S.A.R.
Strong assurances that Hong Kong's post-reversion rulers
understand the importance to Hong Kong of the rule of law, and
especially the rule of law for the economy, remain the order of
the day in official Hong Kong circles. Anson Chan, continuing
in her post as Hong Kong's top civil servant, has spoken of the
rule of law in terms that generally echo those of top officials in
the colonial government, describing it as "central to Hong Kong's
114 See A Future of Excellence and Prosperity for All - Speech by Tung Chee
Hwa, First Chief Executive of the HKSAR, at the Celebration Party, reprinted in
BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 12-23 (briefly setting forth Tung's agenda for
the S.A.R. government's policies and legislative program); supra note 576 and
accompanying text (discussing Tung's Asian values theme); see also deLisle &
Lane, supra note 22, at 35-36, 60-62, 67-68 (discussing a "Singapore model" of
the rule of law for Hong Kong); Chris Yeung, A Trade-Off with the Rule of
Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19, 1997, at 17 (quoting pro-China
academic and former P.C. member Lau Siu-kai's analysis of the Tung
administration's agenda as favoring business, and not the middle and upper-
middle classes or the poor).
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economic and social success," and a top priority of the S.A.R.
administration "from the Chief Executive downwards," "inextrica-
bly linked to our democratic institutions," and a vital asset which
"must be protected and preserved by all of us." 85  In the same
vein, Tung Chee-hwa has commented that the "rule of law
underpins our free market, the work of our civil service and the
quality of our community" and "must be preserved by all
means."
586
Despite such signs of continuity in the "Hong Kong govern-
ment" position, shifts in context and emphasis suggest that the
S.A.R. government officials' primary conception of the rule of law
departs from the liberal-democratic one endorsed by the colonial
authorities. It appears to have some of the features of the rule of
law that China and its Hong Kong allies appear to have endorsed
during the initial S.A.R. era, and that they strongly supported
during the pre-reversion endgame. The democratic institutions to
which Chan linked Hong Kong's post-reversion rule of law are
less sweepingly democratic than the ones Patten and pro-democra-
cy politicians envisioned in the early and middle 1990s. Indeed,
they approach the model the P.R.C. favored during the same
period. Chief Executive Tung's account of an adequate rule of
law, like that found in contemporary P.R.C. sources, often has
seemed narrowly economic and business-focused.587  Moreover,
585 Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, Hong Kong
SAR web site, Sept. 15, 1997, transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Anson
Chan); Elections Called Stepping Stone to Universal Vote, New China News
Agency, Sept. 15, 1997, transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library Allasi File (quoting Anson Chan).
586 Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move Towards More
Democracy, Hong Kong SAR web site, Sept. 10, 1997, transcribed in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(quoting Tung Chee-hwa); Linda Choy, Tung Pledge on Law, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at 1 (quoting Tung).
587 See Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra
note 585 (Presentin& Anson Chan's account of democratic elections for post-
reversion S.A.R. legislatures); Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes
as Move Towards More Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's
comments drawing a connection between Hong Kong's rule of law and its
financial autonomy and free market); Li Shangzhi, Zhao Wei & Wu Ming,
Hong Kong Will Be Even Better Tomorrow, New China News Agency, July 2,
1997, translated in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File (presenting official P.R.C. commentary stressing the
economic benefits provided by Hong Kong's "relatively complete legal and
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S.A.R. officials' and pro-China sources' explanations of the
guarantees of the rule of law's survival typically have placed heavy
emphasis on the positivist guarantees provided by the Basic Law
and other P.R.C. legal commitments, and the P.R.C. interests and
practices that support those commitments - all features central to
pre-reversion P.R.C. and pro-China arguments."'~
Liberal and pro-democracy politicians seem to have continued
to adhere to their pre-reversion vision of the rule of law, including
their view that an adequate rule of law must be grounded in
robust democratic institutions. Britain has at times offered muted
support for their positions. The explicit foci of liberal-democratic
concerns, however, have changed somewhat since the establish-
ment of the S.A.R. While liberals and democrats still have seen
the P.R.C.'s meddling and the Provisional Legislature's existence
and activities as significant threats to the rule of law and its
democratic underpinnings, their post-reversion comments have
placed unprecedented emphasis on the dangers of an executive-
dominated government. Leading former Legco members have
expressed their worries that the rule of law will degenerate into
rule by law, or lawless personal rule. Several of them have argued
that this unraveling of legality is likely to take place through the
specific mechanism of the emergence of a government in which
the legislature and the courts are the docile agents of an overween-
supervision systems and adequate protection for economic activities").
... See Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move Towards
More Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's comments
asserting that the 'one country, two systems' approach was "China's idea" and
"deeply in China's interest"); Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former Sovereign,
supra note 577 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's assertion that the S.A.R. government
and the Central People's Government were both committed to implementing
fully the legal guarantees of Hong Kong's autonomy and to preserving the rule
of law); Ridding, supra note 581, at 22 (quoting Financial Secretary Donald
Tsang's comment that China has not interfered with or exerted pressure on
him); Safeguard the Authority of the Basic Law, TA KUNG PAO, July 5, 1997, at
A2 (derting the Basic Law as a "constitutional document" for Hong Kong
which "embodies China's state will," "expresses China's state needs" and
"stipulates that the central government will implement the basic principles of
'one country, two systems' and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong");
Tsang, supra note 581, at 18 (presenting D.A.B. leader's assertion that the Basic
Law "clearly defines the fiw areas ... which are outside Hong Kong's
autonomy" and with respect to which "the Central Government can take
decisions").
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ing Chief Executive, with the legislature willing to pass any
legislation (including laws with retroactive effect) favored by the
Chief Executive or China, and the courts willing (or required) to
leave the protection of citizens' basic rights to the discretion of
the executive."8 9
In the general debates over the rule of law during the opening
months of the S.A.R. era, battles over the attitudes and allegiances
of the people and the business community appear to have
continued as well. In asserting that the rule of law is alive and
well, and in arguing that business and popular confidence in the
new regime is high, Tung and other S.A.R. sources have extended
a pre-reversion strategy of claiming and cultivating support from
these key sectors for the version of the rule of law that the S.A.R.
government and the P.R.C. are establishing for Hong Kong. On
the other side, prominent liberal and pro-democracy political
leaders have continued to seek popular and business community
backing for more critical and skeptical perspectives on the rule of
law that the S.A.R. has promised or seems likely to provide. At
a general level, they have argued that there are still reasons for the
people to be concerned about the longer term prospects for the
rule of law, and that it is still too early to tell whether Hong
Kong's business community will enjoy business as usual.90
... See Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee's comments that
he is "still worried about the rule of law" and that some of his pre-reversion
"fears [about the fate of the rule of law] have materialized"); Lau, supr a note
578, at 18 (charging that the S.A.R. government had been "high-handed" in its
handling of key legal issues, and had engaged in "excesses" that the Provisional
Legislature that the courts proved "incapable of checking"); Margaret Ng,
Executive's Cloak of Legality, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 22, 1997, at 19
(presenting pro-democracy former Legco member's charge that the executive is
using thelegislative process to give its bare will the cloak of legality," and that
this d-evelopment marks the "beginning of the rule by law, supplanting the rule
of law," portends new barriers to judicial redress, and signals a new and
dangerous dependence on the benevolence and generosity of the S.A.R.
executive, which "must not be confused with the protection of rights");
Margaret Ng, Setting a Precedent in Retrospect, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
27, 1997, at 23 (presenting pro-democracy former Legco member's eve-of-
reversion denunciation of the S.A.R. government for having "no respect for the
rule of law" and the legislature, as was reflected in the government's "assum[p-
tion] that what the executive pronounces is already law or as good as law").
590 See, e.g., Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (noting Martin Lee's belief that
people are "more aware of their freedom" than before and thus perhaps more
likely to defend it against the significant threats to that freedom and the rule
of law in the S.A.R.); Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move
Towards More Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's remarks
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Liberals and democrats also have articulated more specific
arguments about the prospects for the rule of law in post-
reversion Hong Kong, and about the views of the people and the
business community, in the context of controversies over more
concrete laws and institutions that have marked the first months
of the S.A.R. era. S.A.R. government officials, Hong Kong's pro-
China circles, and, occasionally, Britain and China have done
much the same. The issues that have been the foci of their
conflicts have been closely connected, but not identical, to the
four principal legal and institutional questions of the pre-reversion
endgame.
4.2.2.1. Laws Governing Rights and Civil Liberties
Laws regulating civil liberties, political activities and other
rights of Hong Kong residents have remained a focus of conflict
in the S.A.R.'s first months. Most controversially, the Reunifica-
tion Ordinance enacted legislation, which the Provisional
Legislature had approved before July 1, to reverse late colonial
reforms to the Public Order and Societies Ordinances and other
rights-related laws. The new legislation restored some pre-reform
provisions and authorized restrictions on expressive and associa-
tional freedoms when government officials determined that an
action or organization posed a danger to "national security" - a
term that the government construed broadly with respect to
public demonstrations in a set of administrative guidelines that it
issued during its first weeks in office. 91
asserting high levels of confidence, and reasons for that confidence, in the
business community, and citing polling data indicating a 78% poular
confidence rating); Karen Lowe, Hong Kong Democracy Activist Derides Tung
Chee-hwa's Election Law, Agence France Presse, Sept. 12, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing Emily Lau's view that it was still
to early if business would continue as usual in Hong Kong, given the prospect
of rising corruption and political repression).
591 See, e.g., Hong Kong S.A.R. Government Issues Administrative Guidelines
on 'National Security,' TA KUNG PAO, July 19, 1997, at A2 (describing the
S.A.R. government's guidelines interpreting "national security" exception in
Public Order Ordinance as permitting bans on demonstrations that are likely
to disrupt public order or immediately harm social stability, or that advocate
splitting the P.R.C., including by granting independence to Taiwan or Tibet);
Priority Task for S.A.R. Is to Make a Success of its Work, TA KUNG PAO, June
16, 1997, at A2 (describing the Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion approval
of amendments to the Societies and Public Order Ordinances); Provisional
Legislature Hears Readings of Societies Bill, New China News Agency, May 17,
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While Hong Kong's colonial government had sharply
denounced plans to reverse and revise terminal colonial laws
governing civil liberties and political rights, the S.A.R. govern-
ment has defended the changes, with reliable support from the
pro-China press but with very little public commentary from
official P.R.C. sources. Their arguments generally have been
followed the China and pro-China camp's approach to the Bill of
Rights and related issues during the final years before reversion.
S.A.R. officials and unofficial pro-China commentaries have
argued for the validity of the post-reversion rules on rights
primarily in positivist terms: The Provisional Legislature, which
P.R.C. and pro-China sources have long claimed to be a legitimate
law-making body, duly enacted the new laws by passing the
Reunification Ordinance. On this view, the Provisional Legisla-
ture's pre-reversion consideration and approval of the rights
legislation was necessary because the bills otherwise would not
have been ready for enactment by means of the Reunification
Ordinance. Absent such action by the Provisional Legislature, a
dreaded "legal vacuum" would have occurred when the Basic Law
came into effect as Hong Kong's local constitution and provisions
of the Public Order and Societies Ordinances and other colonial-
era rights laws, which the N.P.C. Standing Committee had
declared to be incompatible with the Basic Law and not to be
adopted as S.A.R. law, ceased to be law in Hong Kong. (On this
view, the Basic Law itself has remained the principal, and fully
adequate, positivist guarantee of Hong Kongers' civil and political
1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing amendments to the Societies Ordinance
that would permit registration officers to deny an organization's request for
registration or exemption from registration where necessary in the interests of
national security, public safety, public order, protection of the rights of others,
or because of applicant's connections with a foreign political organization);
Provisional Legislature Studies Public Order Bill, New China News Agency, May
17, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing amendments to the Public Order
Ordinance that would authorize prohibition of public demonstration where
necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, public order, or
protection of the rights or others); Xinhua Comments on Need for Provisional
Legislative Council, New China News Agency, June 30, 1997, translated in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(listing the thirteen bills, including amendments to the Societies and Public
Order Ordinances, examined by the Provisional Legislature before reversion
and slated for enactment into S.A.R. law by the Reunification Ordinance).
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rights.) S.A.R. officials also argued for the national security
guidelines in similarly positivist terms, as proper administrative
interpretations of the new legislation that did not, and in principle
could not, expand the grounds for restricting liberties beyond
those provided in the revised Public Order Ordinance. 9 2
These claims about the validity of the new laws and adminis-
trative guidelines doubtless have aimed, in part, at assuaging
concerns among the people and in the business community that
legal rights they valued were facing a broader erosion. Other
arguments from Hong Kong officials and established pro-China
elements (with occasional backing from official P.R.C. sources)
have more obviously sought to develop or assert popular or
business support. Parallelling arguments familiar from pre-
reversion conflicts, they have asserted that the adoption of the
new rights laws followed an adequate process of consultation with
the Hong Kong people (including, presumably, the especially
heavily consulted business community), and that the new laws
enjoyed genuine support in Hong Kong (except from those who
had been duped by the British or who still carried excessive fears
592 See, eg., Martin Lee Humbles Himself in the United States, TA KUNG
PAO, Apr. 17, 1997, at A4 (arguing that imposing statutory "state security"
limitations on political freedoms is within the discretionary power, and
consistent with common practices, of sovereign states); No Kwai-yan, Amend-
ments to Changes in Rights Laws to be Accepted, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May
18, 1997, at 2 (describing defense of Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion
action by Hong Kong colonial government official seconded to the S.A.R.
administration-in-waiting); Elsie Leung Oi-sie, Freedom ofSpeech Alive and Well,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 19, 1997, at 21 (presenting argument by
S.A.R. Secretary for Justice that the national security guidelines "did not, and
could not, give the police greater power than that set out in the Public Order
Ordinance"); Rational Balance Between Personal Rights and the Public Interest,
WEN WEI Po, Apr. 10, 1997, at A4 (describing the N.P.C. Standing Committee
decision to reject late colonial amendments to Societies and Public Order
Ordinances as in accordance with article 160 of the Basic Law, and asserting
that the Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of new legislation
on the same matters was necessary to prevent a legislative vacuum); Reaching
Common Understanding Through Consultation, WEN WEI PO, May 2, 1997, at
A2 (citing, in discussion of revisions to the Public Order and Securities
Ordinances, the Basic Law as the key guarantee of civil liberties and social
order in Hong Kong); Jonathan Sprague, Future HK Government Blasted Over
Freedom Curbs, Reuters, Apr. 10, 1997 (describing "legal vacuum" argument
made by a source in Tung Chee-hwa's office); Tsang Yok-sing, Basis for a Curb
on Political Affiliations, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 15, 1997, at 20
(presenting D.A.B. leader's version of the "legal vacuum" argument).
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rooted in the Tiananmen Incident).' 93 According to S.A.R.,
P.R.C. and pro-China commentary, the new laws governing
political liberties are suited to the needs and distinct values of
Hong Kong people, reflect a proper balance between social and
individual interests, and stand as a bulwark against social instabili-
ty and foreign influences that might threaten state security -
much as Tung, China and pro-China sources had argued in
debates over rights laws during the pre-reversion endgame- 94
93 See, e.g., HKSAR to Preserve Peoples Freedom: Tung Chee-hwa, New
China News Agency, Apr. 16, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Alasi File (quoting favorably
Tung's statement, "I hope the consultative exercise will bring our communitytogether to reach a broad consensus"); C.K. Lau, Hollowness in Mr. Tung's
Words, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 5, 1997, at 19 (describing Tung's callon Hong Kong people to put down the 'June 4 baggage'); Li Huailn, HK
People Support Amendment Proposals, New China News Agency, Apr. 28, 1997,
translated-in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (asserting that many local associations have issued
statements . ., to express support" for the proposed amendments to rights
laws); Martin Lee Humbles Himself, supra note 592, at A4 (In the view of most
people, the direction and principles of the amendment proposals are correct.");
No, supra note 592, at 2 (reporting future S.A.R. official s description of the
proposed amendments to rights laws as the fruits of consultation" that had
already taken into account public opinion); Rational Balance Between Personal
Rights and the Public Interest, supra note 592, at A4 (praising the Chief
Executive-designates decision to pursue broad consultation" with the public
in crafting legislation to amend thie Public Order and Societies Ordinances as
indicating importance" of public opinion" to the S.A.R. government and as
assuring that the amendments "will have a solid foundation 
public opinion");
Reaching Common Understanding Through Consultation, supra note 592, at A2(criticizing colonial authorities and Hong Kong democrats 
for making
misguided[-and alarmist claims that the proposed reforms would significantly
diminish Hong Kongers' rights); Sucessful Consultation on Revision OfOrdinances, TA KUNG PAO , Ar 30 1997, at (t 
the majority
of inhabitants" had participatedin the consultation process and expressed their
support," and "realized the need" for the amendments to rights laws).
ofica ta rgt am ndmns wencs sr bcuse HogKogwamalopn ao d throre "lerable tudo ext 'nal forcaes"); ew Cha Proose to
To Hong Kong Ordinances, New China News Agency, 
May 15, 1997,
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available 
in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (descriing the three fudamental 
principles" underlying
proposed revisions to Public Order and Societies Ordinances 
as striking "a
proper balance between civil liberties and social order," 
upholding the Basic
Law and the application of the principal Uha.N. human 
rights covenants, and
guarding against "interference by foreign political forces"); 
Successul Consulta-
tion on Revision of Ordinances, supra note 593, at A2 
(asserting that the hiong
Kong people "are not willing to see Hong Kong become 
a politcal city in noisy
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Moreover, S.A.R. officials have frequently asserted, and P.R.C.
and pro-China sources have reported, that the new laws have not
changed prior policy or practice. Post-reversion events, they have
argued, have made clear that there was no reason for the people
to fear that their right to demonstrate would be curtailed, or for
the business community to worry that disorderly protests might
follow the moves to alter the rights laws.59
Reflecting a similar pattern of broad continuity with the pre-
reversion era, prominent adherents to a liberal-democratic
perspective have attacked the S.A.R.'s new rights laws and
regulations, largely on the natural law-like grounds that the new
legislation is incompatible with obligatory substantive norms.
Emily Lau, Martin Lee, and Margaret Ng, respectively, denounced
the new laws as a threat to "important universal values" of "civil
and political rights," "a step backward for freedom" and basic
rights, and a reflection of wilful blindness to the importance of
criticism in an open society.96 While British colonial authori-
ties joined in the liberal chorus of condemnation and concern
when the specific plans for post-reversion changes to rights laws
became clear during the final months before the handover, U.K.
responses to the S.A.R.'s enactment of the new laws have been
much more restrained. While continuing to criticize the retrench-
ments, British statements have also sounded cautiously optimistic
that the S.A.R. will provide adequate protection for civil and
political rights that her majesty's government still officially views
as essential for a good and adequate order in Hong Kong.5 7
disorder" and support changes to rights laws to prevent such developments).
595 See, e.g., Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law,
supra note 585 (presenting chief civil servant Anson Chan's statement that
"Hong Kong people continue to demonstrate, disagree, debate and argue" and
that, since the handover, there have been some 150 demonstrations, and not
a single arrest"); Ridding, supra note 581 (quoting Financial Secretary Donald
Tsang's statement, "We have an average of 20 demonstrations a week"); No
Policy Change Towards Demonstrations, New China News Agency, Oct. 4, 1997,
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (quoting S.A.R. official's statement, "Peaceful demonstra-
tions have remained pretty much a way of life after 1st July").
596 Lowe, supra note 590 (quoting Emily Lau); Liz Sly, Laws Okd to
Restrict Hong Kong Freedoms, CHICAGO TRiB., June 15, 1997, at 4 (quoting
Martin Lee); Ng, supra note 589, at 19.
5 Compare Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong Residents Protest China's Plans
to Limit Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at A15 (quoting colonial
government statement that "the existing provisions of the Societies Ordinance
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In the debates over rights laws after the handover, Hong Kong
liberals and democrats have also continued to address the attitudes
of the people and the business sector, and to rebut their adver-
saries' arguments about popular and business views. Democratic
Party leaders and other liberals, with some initial support from
the departing colonial authorities, denounced popular consultation
on proposed rights legislation as "a fake." They have derided the
new laws as regressive, "chilling," and likely to allow the state to
take away the rights of the people through manipulation of the
national security provisions and other tactics. 98 These critics
conceded that perhaps little had happened in the S.A.R.'s first
weeks, especially in areas of immediate concern to the business
community. Nonetheless, they have insisted, the threat is real.
As liberals and democrats have seen it, the national security
provisions hang like a sword of Damocles over the heads of
and the Public Order Ordinance do not call for any changes"), and Li Hsuan-
chu, Legislative Revision Consultation has Profound and Far-Reaching Sign fi cance,
WEN WEI Po, Apr. 18, 1997, at A16 (criticizing Patten for asserting that
planned revisions would deprive Hong Kong people of their liberty), with Lau,
supra note 578, at 18 (noting U.K. Foreign Minister's view that first month of
S.A.R. was reassuring because demonstrations were allowed to occur), and
Quinton Chan, Repeal "Won't Hurt Rights," S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
5, 1997, at 6 (describing U.K. report to U.N. Human Rights Committee
declaring that S.A.R. amendments to the Bill of Rights Ordinance would not
have significant legal implications, but that amendments to laws on civil
liberties were "unnecessary and unjustifiable").
598 Many of these arguments emerged in connection with the Provisional
Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of the proposed legislation that the
Reunification Ordinance was to enact. See, e.g., Sharon Cheung & No Kwai-
yan, Tung's Consultation Fake, Say Democrats, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr.
19, 1997, at 6 (quoting Democratic Party vice chairman's statement that
consultation was "a fake" because senior Exco members declared that key
principles in the proposed bills were not open to change); Linda Choy & Chris
Yeung, Bar Chairman Warning on Defining New Laws, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 23, 1997, at 6 (quoting Bar Association chairperson's concern about
consequences of Chief Executive's failure to offer clear definition of "national
security"); Li, supra note 597, at A16 (noting Patten's accusations that there was
not a "true consultation"); Margaret Ng, Threat to Our Civil Rights, S.CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at 23 (presenting former Legco member's view
that the proposed rights legislation is a "reversal" of the policy of liberalization
and pursues the "chilling" purpose of strengthening means to monitor and
control political organizations and activities); Chris Yeung & No Kwai-yan,
National Security Terms attacked by A-G, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 19,
1997 (reporting colonial government Attorney General's criticism of Tung's
assertion that there is no authoritative common law definition of national
security).
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anyone who might question the territory's new masters. All that
has prevented the sword from falling, with potentially ruinous
consequences for Hong Kong, is the discretion and uncertain
benevolence of the Chief Executive, or of P.R.C. leaders who can
pressure the Chief Executive.599 According to this line of
analysis, the S.A.R. has thus failed to establish a rule of law for
rights that is sufficiently robust to offer much protection to the
people or to the business community.
In attacking post-reversion changes to rights laws, some liberal
critics have turned to positivist styles of argument that were not
very prominent features of their pre-reversion approach. Thus,
for example, they have attacked revisions to the Bill of Rights,
Public Order and Societies Ordinances on the grounds that they
are the products of a legislature set up in violation of the Basic
Law. Similarly, they have charged that the S.A.R. government's
national security guidelines fail to conform even to the minimal
positivist standard of legality that requires conformity with the
underlying statues.
The post-reversion extension of pre-handover clashes over
amendments to late colonial rights laws has not been the only
recent major clash over rights-related laws in Hong Kong. Other
moves by the Provisional Legislature during the S.A.R.'s initial
weeks involved rights issues that were less closely connected to the
conflicts of the pre-reversion endgame. Covering matters of labor
and immigration law and raising questions about the legislative
process, these actions divided the principal Hong Kong players
along accustomed lines, and prompted them to make arguments
that adapted old themes to new issues. During the first days of
the S.A.R., Hong Kong's interim law-making body suspended the
operation of several laws that the last colonial Legco passed during
its final weeks, suspending their effect until the Provisional
599 See, e.g., Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee); Lau, supra
note 578, at 18 (presenting comments of Emily Laui); Joice Pang, National
Security "Knife Hanging Over Us," S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 16, 1997,
at 3 (quoting spokesman for the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democrat-
ic Movement in China, a group labelled "subversive" by the P.R.C.).
' See Margaret Ng, We Don't Need Judge Pao Here, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 5, 1997, at 27 (arguing that the administrative guidelines "have
grossly exceeded even the power set out in the [revisec[ Public Order]
Ordinance" and are therefore "ultra vires and unlawful"); C. Choy & Yeung,
supra note 599, at 6 (quoting Bar Association chairperson's concern about Chief
Executive's failure to offer clear definition of "national security").
1997] 1011
U. Pa. f. Int'l Econ. L.
Legislature could reconsider and revise them. The most contro-
versial of the affected laws addressed rights of collective bargaining
and other union-related issues.6°I Hong Kong liberals, including
several members of the Legco that had passed the frozen laws,
attacked the Provisional Legislature's moves, often in terms
familiar from pre-reversion conflicts. They criticized the interim
body's undeliberative methods and its undemocratic spirit in
overturning the actions of the democratically legitimate former
Legco and in moving to restrict Hong Kongers' associational
rights on yet another front. They added another argument that
was more distinctly characteristic of the post-reversion period
when they warned that the legislature's hasty accession to the
government's request was a harbinger of an "executive hegemon-
ism" that could seriously erode Hong Kongers' rights by replacing
the rule of law with rule by personal will." 2 While such argu-
ments were to a significant degree about basic rule-of-law
principles, as the liberal-democratic perspective understood them,
they also sought to draw forth support from a quiescent public
that valued the rule of law, if not from a business community that
seemed likely to welcome the substance of post-reversion labor
laws that the freeze seemed to foreshadow.
S.A.R. officials, the local pro-China press and official P.R.C.
601 The three labor-related ordinances that were "frozen" protected workers
against dismissal for participation in union activities, permitted unions to fund
political activities, and granted, to unions whose members comprise 15% of an
employer's employees, rights of consultation and rights to represent employees
in collective bargaining with the employer. The Labour Advisor Board later
recommended repealing the first two laws. See, e.g., Sharon Cheung, Board
Scraps "Frozen" Labour Laws Passed by Former Legislative Council, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 16, 1997, at 6; Legislators Freeze Four Laws Approved
Before the Handover, New China News Agency, July 18, 1997, translated in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File; Tsang Yok-sing, U-Turn Bad for Labour Relations, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 22, 1997, at 16.
' Lau, supra note 578, at 18 (criticizing the "lightning speed" with which
the Provisional Legislature voted to suspendthe labor laws and a law to extend
the Bill of Rights to cover private actions); Chris Yeung, A Trade Off with the
Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19, 1997, at 17 (describing former
Legco president's charge of "executive hegemonism" and liberal Hong Kong
Economic Journal's warning that the mentality of replacing law and rules by
rule by man would undermine the rule of law); c. Philip Bowring, What's
Changing in Hong Kong, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Aug. 27, 1997, at 8 (describing
the Provisional Legislature as acting as a "rubber stamp" when it "'froze' labor
protection legislation.. . which did not suit the fat cat groups who dominate"
the legislature).
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sources defended the freeze. They answered liberals' charges by
asserting that the pre-reversion Legco's eleventh-hour passage of
the suspended legislation was certainly no less hasty, and was
much less responsible, than the Provisional Legislature's defensive
moves to prevent the legislation's going into effect. In part
seeking popular and business support for the Provisional
Legislature's action, these sources further argued that the suspend-
ed legislation was incompatible with the interests of the people
and the business community in Hong Kong.' °3
Neither Hong Kong government officials nor the region's
traditional "pro-China" elements offered unequivocal and
undivided support for this line of argument, however. Some of
the pre-reversion liberals who remained at high levels in the
S.A.R. government appear to have parted company with their
new bosses on this issue, seeing a threat to the rule of law and the
legal protection of rights in the methods that the S.A.R.'s Chief
Executive and legislature had adopted. Also, the freezing of the
labor laws seems to have triggered an unusually sharp divide
between the Tung administration and its most reliable legislative
supporters, on one side, and Hong Kong's most prominent "pro-
China" political party and the generally pro-China trade union, on
the other.w
" See, e.g., HK Legislators Pass Bill Freezing Some Pre-Handover Laws, New
China News Agency, July 17, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Tung Chee-
hwa's criticism of the "reckless passage . . .without full consultation and
detailed study" of laws which might "harm harmonious labor-management
relations"); Hong Kong PLC Operates Successfully, Paper Says, New China News
Age July 22, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing Ta Kung Pao report
that the Provisional Legislature concluded that the labor laws "had been
adopted without careful study of their impact" and were "harm[ful] to the long-
term interests of Hong Kong residents"); It Is Absolutely Necessary to Freeze the
Seven Bills, TA KUNG PAO, July 10, 1997, at A2 (asserting that "the purpose of
the former Legco" in "hastily" passing the labor laws was "to resist the
Provisional Legislature and pose difficult questions for the S.A.R. government
rather than to fight for the rights and interests of workers," and noting the
freeze was necessary to prevent "long-term negative impact on society" and to
permit the government to "determine whether they conform with the public
interest"); Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (asserting that there is a "nice irony" to
liberals' criticism of the hastiness of the freeze, given the haste with which the
initial legislation had been passed).
6N See, e.g., Fung Wai-kong, Tung Rift Revealed by Freeze 9fLaws, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 11, 1997, at 4 (reporting comments of veteran legislator
and Provisional Legislature member that senior S.A.R. officials who hadserved
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In another controversial move during the S.A.R.'s initial
weeks, the Provisional Legislature passed legislation to bar P.R.C.
children who had a right of abode in the S.A.R. (generally by
virtue of having parents resident in the Hong Kong) from entering
the territory until they obtained a government entry permit. The
new requirement was made retroactive to July 1, thereby making
some children already in Hong Kong subject to forcible return to
the mainland to await entry permits.6°s  Prominent liberal
politicians derided the interim legislature's action on the immigra-
tion issue as showing the same undue haste and undemocratic
spirit that marked the freezing of terminal colonial labor laws.
They also attacked the Provisional Legislature for making the
rights-stripping legislation retroactive, and for seeking to solve a
social problem by denying the children the enjoyment of rights
that the Basic Law guaranteed. In an argument reminiscent of
pre-reversion debates over rights and surely designed to cultivate
popular support, these critics asserted that the flaws in the
Provisional Legislature's approach to the question of the mainland
children raised the specter of a broader unravelling of legal rights
guarantees and the rule of law.6
in the colonial government gave only "lukewarm" support to Tung's proposal
to freeze labor and other laws); HK Legislators Pass Bill Freezing Some Pre-
Handover Laws, supra note 603 (describing Tung's condemnation of the labor
laws on the merits and Anson Chan's more mild argument that suspension was
necessary to permit careful examination of the laws); Tsang, supra note 601, at
16 (noting that one-third of the Provisional Legislature, including members of
the D.A.B. and the Federation of Trade Unions, had voted against the freeze).
Reports of a Tung-D.A.B. split over the issue seem plausible, and the D.A.B.'s
stance intelligible, given that the freeze and repeal of the late colonial labor
laws is generally thought likely to weaken organized labor, which has been a
main cause and constituency for left-leaning Hong Kong political organizations.
" See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 24 (providing that people with the
"right of abode" in the S.A.R. include "Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong"
and "[p]ersons of Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong" to specified
categories of Hong Kong residents); Immigration (Amendrrent) (No. 5)
Ordinance (1997) (imposing entry restrictions .
6% See, e.g., Cliff Buddle, Clamp on Migrant Children "Abuse of Power,? S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at 3 (quoting former Exco member and
lawyer's charges that the immigration law amendnients impermissibly sought
to "correct[] perceived social problems occasioned by permanent residents
asserting their constitutional right" and that making the effect retroactive to
July 1 was a troubling "legal fiction"); Democrats' Martin Lee Unhappy With
Retrospective Immigration Law, transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broad-casts, July 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quot-
ing Martin Lee's comments that the immigration amendment bill was "a
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P.R.C. and pro-China sources, joined by the S.A.R. govern-
ment, defended the legislature's actions, primarily in positivist
terms that were broadly familiar from pre-reversion arguments.
They insisted that the restrictions adopted by the Provisional
Legislature did not take away rights of abode granted under the
Basic Law and were consistent with earlier mainland laws and
administrative practices for processing such children's applications
to enter Hong Kong. In addition, they sought to play an
unusually strong popular opinion card, asserting credibly that
most Hong Kong people supported limits on the pace of an influx
that could strain social services and overburden public ameni-
ties.607
4.2.2.2. The Provisional Legislature and the 1998
Elections
The legitimacy and legality of the Provisional Legislature have
remained divisive issues in post-reversion Hong Kong. During the
S.A.R.'s first weeks, an unsuccessful court challenge to the body's
constitutionality under the Basic Law formed a principal focus of
dangerous precedent" and "contravened the Basic Law," and that its retrospec-
tive application would "make it much worse, because under common law you
just do not take away.., acquired rights," such as the right of abode that the
affected children acquired at birth); Ng, supra note 589, at 19 (criticizing Provi-
sional Legislature for passing the immigration legislation within one day after
gazetting and without prior consultation or significant amendment).
607 See, e.g., Amendment of Immigration Bill Conforms to Basic Law, TA
KUNG PAO, July 9, 1997, at A2 (arguing that the children's assertion of their
legal right of abode cannot "become a pretext" for their "illegal action" of
"crossing the border illegally"); Andy Ho, End of the Honeymoon, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 15, 1997, at 21 (noting independent surveys indicating
80% support in Hong Kong for imposing some restrictions on entry into Hong
Kong of mainland children with right ofabode in Hong Kong; Implement Basic
Law in Practical Way, TA KUNG PAO, July 14, 1997, at A2 (asserting that the
permit requirements imposed by the immigration amendment were consistent
with Basic Law, art. 22, which requires people entering Hong Kong from other
parts of China to "apply for approval," and arguing that "RHong Kong people
must understand that if we let a large number of mainland children come to
Hong Kong all at once, Hong Kong cannot stand the strains"); Leung, supra
note 592, (resenting S.A.R. Secretary for Justice's defense of retrospective
effect of the immigration amendments as "necessary to ensure that the same
system of verification should apply to all who claim the relevant right of
abode"); Teng Yue, Exit Visas Granted as Usual to Mainland Children Born to
Hong Kong Residents, WEN WEI PO, July 17, 1997 (quoting Director of Public
Security Bureau's Exit and Entry Management Subbureau's account of
established laws and practice).
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controversy. 6°' Defending the Provisional Legislature in court
and in the broader public arena, the S.A.R. government and Hong
Kong's pro-China press have built upon the positivist arguments
that China and its allies had offered during pre-reversion debates
about the interim body's legitimacy. They have repeated and
extended pre-reversion assertions that the Basic Law and several
N.P.C. Decisions provide ample legislative authorization for the
establishment of the Provisional Legislature. On this analysis, the
Basic Law and the 1990 N.P.C. Decision concerning the formation
of the first S.A.R. legislature reserved to the P.R.C. the discretion
to determine how the first legislature would be established. That
N.P.C. decision and a subsequent N.P.C. Standing Committee
Decision authorized the Preparatory Committee to exercise that
discretion and to do whatever was necessary to establish an
effective S.A.R. government. Decisions by the Preparatory
Committee in 1996 then exercised this delegated authority to
establish the Provisional Legislature and to define its powers and
functions. The N.P.C. then removed any lingering doubt about
the Provisional Legislature's status as the product of China's
sovereign acts when the N.P.C. ratified the actions establishing the
" See HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors, 1997-2 HKC 315, 1997 HK
LEXIS 57 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal, July 22, 1997). In the words of one
member of the three-judge intermediate appellate court that decided the case,
the "momentous" question of the legality of the Provisional Legislature came
before the court in a "somewhat incidental way." Id. at *78. Indicted for a
common law criminal conspiracy offense during colonial rule, the defendants
argued that they could not be prosecuted because no proper and effective action
had been taken to preserve the indictment, to adopt as S.A.R. law the law
under which they were charged, or to establish the court which was trying
them. They claimed that the P.R.C., through the N.P.C. and its Standing
Committee, had not taken necessary affirmative steps to accomplish these three
tasks, and that the Provisional Legislature's attempt to accomplish those tasks
through the Reunification Ordinance were ineffective because the Provisional
Legislature itself was unlawful. In three separate opinions, the judges of the
Court of Appeal held that the Basic Law itself accomplished the tasks in
question. Addressing the legality of the Provisional Legislature only in an
alternative holding and in dicta, the judges all concluded that the Provisional
Legislature had been established through sovereign acts of the P.R.C. (by the
N.P.C. and its delegates), the validity (although not the existence) of which
were beyond the jurisdiction of S.A.R. courts to review. Accordingly, a
challenge to the indictment and prosecution, based on the invalidity of the
Reunification Ordinance as the product of an unlawful legislature, must fail.
To varying degrees, the opinions went on to reject the defendants' arguments
about the Provisional Legislature on the merits, stating that the body's
establishment did not contravene, or require amendment of, the Basic Law.
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body in a March 1997 resolution approving the Preparatory
Committee's work.'
In addition, familiar claims about the importance of avoiding
a legislative "vacuum" became a piece of a more elaborate legal-
political argument that the doctrine of "necessity," and the
broader idea of preventing legal chaos, warranted upholding the
validity of the Provisional Legislature and its actions. From the
perspective of the S.A.R. officials who largely adopted the pre-
reversion arguments of the pro-China camp, the post-reversion
context made more immediate and tangible the dire consequences
of concluding that the enactments of the Provisional Legislature
were not laws for Hong Kong. In their view, finding for the
defendants in the case challenging the law-making body's legality
raised the specter of defacto legalization of post-reversion criminal
acts and the removal of vital - and popular - restrictions that
post-reversion laws imposed on mainland immigrants. Although
the court declined to decide the government's argument that the
doctrine of necessity required the court to find in the govern-
ment's favor and preserve legal and institutional continuity, the
judges embraced another broadly related and generally positivist
argument that was acceptable to the S.A.R. government and pro-
China elements: Even if the Provisional Legislature's establish-
ment did not conform to the Basic Law's and the N.P.C.'s
requirements for the first S.A.R. legislature, the interim body was
still lawful, for it was not the first S.A.R. legislature. Rather, it
was a temporary legislative organ with limited powers that would
serve until the first true S.A.R. legislature could be elected in
" See generally Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *46-*48, *61-*62, *90-*92, *96
(describing Solicitor General's arguments for Provisional Legislature's legality);
see also Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong Court Upholds China's Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 1997, at A10 (quoting Solicitor General Fung's description of
the court's decision as "unanimous" that the Provisional Legislature is a valid,
competent body"). In the context of the Ma litigation, the point was somewhat
narrower than extrajudicial arguments about the Provisional Legislature's
legality may seem to suggest. The Solicitor General's argument and the court's
analysis of the N.P.C. and P.C. actions and the "legality" of the Provisional
Legislature unfolded against the background of a successful argument that the
court did not have jurisdiction to hear challenges to the validity of the N.P.C.'s
decisions - or the P.C.'s decisions to the extent that the P.C. exercised
delegated sovereign power - where those challenges were based on the actions'
incompatibilit with the Basic Law or other P.R.C. laws. The court thus stated
that it limited its inquiry into the existence and purported effect of those
sovereign acts, which were matters that the court claimed authority to review.
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1998.610
Having won its case in the courtroom, the S.A.R. government,
along with some pro-China members of the legislature, turned to
the issue of popular and business reactions. These sources asserted
that the laying to rest of doubts about the Provisional Legislature
would, or at least should, receive a warm reception from the
Hong Kong people and Hong Kong's business community.
Echoing pre-reversion arguments for popular and business
acceptance of the Provisional Legislature and building upon in-
610 See Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *65, "98, *128 (refusing to rule on the
government's "necessity" arguments, but indicating acceptance of the
government's argument that the creation of the Provisional Legislature was
necessary to avoid a legislative vacuum). The S.A.R. government s invocation
of the doctrine of necessity. in the Ma need not have extended beyond the claim
that the doctrine's imperative to avoid legal chaos required the continuation in
force of the common law if the Basic Law and the Reunification Ordinance
were both held not to have done so. That is, the court could have relied upon
the doctrine to preserve the common law of criminal conspiracy (and the
common law more generally) without holding that the doctrine supported
recognition of an otherwise unlawful local legislative body or the laws it passed,
including the Reunification Ordinance. Comments made outside of arguments
to the court, and perhaps some in-court arguments as well, however, made the
broader assertion that "necessity" broadly defined, or some kindred notion,
required upholding the legality of the Provisional Legislature itself. See, e.g.,
Charlotte Parsons, Court Must Accept' Body, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
23, 1997, at 1 (quoting Solicitor General Fung's comment that the Provisional
Legislature's legality must be upheld lest Hong Kong slip into a legal vacuum
and "apeople or a society" be "sacrifice[d] ... under the banner of the rule of
law"); Charlotte Parsons, Solicitor General Admits Interim Body Does Not Fulfil
NPC Rules; Law "Had to be Broken," S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 25, 1997,
at 1 (quoting Fung's argument to the court that a Provisional Legislature not
com1 atible with the N.P.C.-established requirements for the first S.A.R.
legis ature was necessary because establishing a Basic Law-conforming first
Legislature - or amending the Basic Law - by July 1, 1997, "could not have
been done as a matter of law. It's not a question of short cuts. There was no
easy way out."); Jim Erickson & Law Siu-lan, Sovereignty and the Law,
ASIAWEEK, Aug. 8, 1997, at 18 (noting government's arguments that a ruling
for the defendants would have overturned "traditional common law on
everything from property rights to prohibitions against bank robbery," as well
as post-reversion statutes including the one that authorized deportation of
mainland children); cf Excessive Political Tasks, Inadequate Legal Backing, HSIN
PAO, July 30, 1997, at 1 (finding merit in the contention by counsel for the Ma
defendants that using the doctrine to support the legality of the Provisional
Legislature would be dangerous). See also Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *60, *90-
*91, *127-*128 (accepting government's argument that the Provisional
Legislature was not the first S.A.R. Legislature and thus not required to satisfy
the requirements for "election" and composition set forth in Basic Law, art. 68,
Annex II to the Basic Law, or the N.P.C. Decision of April 4, 1990).
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court arguments stressing the need to avoid legal chaos, they
asserted that the court's decision vindicated long-standing claims
that the body was legal, and thus eliminated uncertainty that had
threatened to produce needless, unpopular, and economically
dangerous instability and losses of confidence in Hong Kong.
611
Despite considerable continuity with pre-reversion patterns of
argument in favor of the Provisional Legislature, fissures within
the broadly "pro-China" camp seem to have grown deeper or
more evident, especially concerning issues of the temporary law-
making body's role. During the early months of the S.A.R.,
legislators, including some from the D.A.B., have been increasing-
ly vocal in insisting that the interim legislature is not, and must
not be, a "rubber stamp" with narrowly limited powers -
reportedly to the consternation of the most ardently pro-China
legislators and the Tung administration.612  Departing from the
611 See, e.g., Angela Li, Rita Fan Welcomes End to Uncertainty, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 6 (quoting Provisional Legislature President
Rita Fan's statement that the court "made very clear that the legality" of the
Provisional Legislature "is sound and strong and what we are now doing is
legitimate," reporting D.A.B. Chairman and Provisional Legislature member
Tsang Yok-sing's view that the court's decision would "help the legal status"
of the Provisional Legislature," noting pro-China legislator Selina Chow's
comment that the ruling provided "certainty" to Hong Kong and the
international business community, and describing the response of the pro-
business Liberal Party to the ruling as "enthusiastic"); Charlotte Parsons,
Legislature Left Open to Attack, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 1
(quoting Anson Chan's and Tung Chee-hwa's comments welcoming the verdict,
and Chan 's statement that the ruling "helps to clear up some doubts" about the
interim body s status); Frank Zhang, Court of Appeal Approves Hong Kong'sLegislature, July 29, 1997, Agence France Presse, July 29, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (noting stock market rise to record high asindicating apparent support for the ruling in the business community).
61 See e . PjcLrvoa Leg ilte il Nee Set sRbe tmSN
that has already achieved results); No Kwai-yan, Too Late to Put Back Genie ofChamber, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 8, 1997, at 4 (quoting D.A.B. vice
chairman and legislator Cheng Kai-nam's statement that Provisional Legisla-re's earlyvotes should have alerate Tng Chee-hwa that he should not hold
high hopes" that the body would be a rubber stamp rather than a counter-
force," and noting former Preparatory Committee member Lau Siu-kai'scriticism that the Provisional Legislature seemed to be exceeding its powers);
Tsang, supra note 601 (noting tat one-third of the Provisional Legislature,
including D.A.B. members, voted against the S.A.R. government's proposal to
freeze late colonial amendments to-labor laws).
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S.A.R. government's line on several points, the most prominent
D.A.B. legislator has both stressed the Provisional Legislature's
room for discretionary legislative choices, and expressed doubts
about its popular, and even its legal, legitimacy.613
Throughout these post-reversion debates concerning the
Provisional Legislature, official P.R.C. sources have remained
relatively quiet for any of several possible reasons, including:
reluctance to take sides openly in emerging disputes between a
China-picked and legally P.R.C.-accountable administration and
"pro-China" legislators; strong agreement with the S.A.R.
government's principal arguments in the court case challenging the
Provisional Legislature; and prudential calculation that strong
support from Beijing for the side that was likely to win anyway
would needlessly exacerbate fears of extensive P.R.C. intervention
and weak S.A.R. autonomy that the litigation and the broader
political controversies surrounding the Provisional Legislature
were already provoking in some quarters in Hong Kong.
On the other side of the fault line that has continued to divide
most key players in the politics and legal-institutional controver-
sies of transitional Hong Kong, liberals and democrats have
extended their pre-reversion assaults on the Provisional Legislature
and their pre-reversion attempts to rally key social constituencies'
support for their positions, although the specific terms of their
criticisms have shifted somewhat to reflect the conditions of the
post-reversion period. Thus, prominent former members of Legco
have led denunciations of the Provisional Legislature for rubber-
stamping the rights-betraying and democracy-undermining
proposals of a dangerously unchecked and illiberal regime. These
critics also have argued that the unseemly speed with which the
legislature enacted such measures has provided further evidence of
an undemocratic and high-handed executive-dominated govern-
ment that will leave the people, and the business community, with
little more than the good will of the Chief Executive to protect
613 Electoral Law Faces Challenge by ADPL, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
23, 1997, at 6 (quoting Tsang Yok-sing's statement that, "[ilt's not so clear
whether the Preparatory Committee's decision [regarding the constituencies for
the first S.A.R. legislature elections] is legally binding" on the Provisional
Legislature, in light of the "spirit" of "leav[ing] more room" for the S.A.R. to
make its own decisions); Li, supra note 611, at 6 (reporting Tsang's view that
the ruling in the Ma case would "help the legl status" of the Provisional
Legislature, but was "by no means a conclusive" result, and did not insulate the
body from intervention and interference by the N.P.C.).
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their rights.614
The court ruling rejecting the challenge to Provisional
Legislature's legality deepened liberals' and pro-democracy forces'
concerns, and failed to silence lines of argument rooted in the
liberal-democratic camp's pre-reversion positions. Acknowledging
that "the law" now was that the N.P.C. or its delegates could
"make sovereign acts which may not necessarily comply with the
Basic Law," the Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association
went on to criticize the ruling from a non- positivist perspective,
saying that "[t]he Basic Law must," as a normative and constitu-
tional matter, "bind the National People's Congress," and that the
court's analysis had erred in adopting a "backward-looking" focus
on ihe limited powers of constitutional review wielded by colonial
courts rather than a more "forward-looking" focus on courts'
appropriate powers in a new constitutional system for Hong
Kong. In the wake of the ruling, Margaret Ng pointed to a still
bleaker possibility in the court's apparent adoption of a concept
of "unchallengeable acts of the sovereign." For Ng, such a
doctrine portended a nightmare of radical P.R.C.-style positivism
that would accept China's discretionary authority to set narrow
limits on Hong Kong's legislative autonomy and to render the
local legislature, and the S.A.R's supposed constitution, irrele-
vant.6
15
Despite the unpositivist tone of many liberal reactions to the
decision in the Provisional Legislature case, the litigation also
pushed liberals and democracy advocates, and especially the
614 See, e.g., Fanny Wong, Business as Usual but No Enthusiasm, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 31, 1997, at 11 (notin& wide-spread perception, and
criticism, of the Provisional Legislature's unwillingness or inability to hold
government accountable or to resist its legislative proposals); see also supra notes
589, 602, 606 and accompanying text.
61 See Angela Li, Bar Chief Hits at "Backward-Looking" Example in
Provisional Legislature Case, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 6;
Margaret Ng, Decision that Resonates, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 8, 1997,
at 19 (aruing that the court's reference to "an unchallengeable act of the
sovereign was "difficult to understand," but might mean that "the NPC
reserves an unlimited power to legislate for Hong Kong which it can exercise
in any way and at any time it sees fit"); cf Sharon Cheung, Lee Says No to New
LegafChallenge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 1997, at 4 (quoting Martin
Lee s comment, in the aftermath of court's dismissal of an earlier challenge to
the legality of the Provisional Legislature, that Democrats would have no
"direct contact with" the Provisionl Legislature "because we don't think it is
a legal body").
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lawyers prominent among their leadership, to rely more heavily
on what are at base positivist arguments. Most simply, the suit
challenging the Provisional Legislature was fought, and had to be
fought, largely on the grounds that the body did not conform to
the Basic Law and related N.P.C. decisions. This claim, that the
Provisional Legislature failed under the very legal standards that
China had chosen to establish, was an argument that liberals and
democrats had adumbrated in pre-reversion conflicts, but it
became much more central to their position when the court
challenge became the principal focus of post-reversion conflicts
over the Provisional Legislature.616
In the controversies over the Provisional Legislature during the
S.A.R.'s early months, the U.K. has been much more restrained
than Hong Kong liberals in defending and advancing the norms
underlying the Patten reforms, which Britain continues to
embrace in principle. Although regarding the Provisional
Legislature as of "dubious legality" and "a step backwards on the
freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong," the official British position has
uhimately accepted the body's existence. The U.K. government
has urged the interim law-making organ, rather mildly, to
"confine itself to legislating only on what is urgent and necessary,"
and to leave other issues to be addressed by the first true S.A.R.
616 See, e.g., Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at "48-*51, *85 *89, *120-*122 (de-
scribing defendants' counsel, and liberal lawyer, Gladys Li's arguments to the
court: (1) that the Provisional Legislature was, in fact, the first legislature of
the S.A.R. and therefore had to conform to the requirements imposed by
article 68 of the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, which require that the
legislature be constituted by elections, and by Annex II to the Basic Law and
the April 4, 1990, N.P.C. Decision which prescribe the composition of the first
S.A.R. Legislature; (2) that the March 14, 1997, N.P.C. Decision approving the
Preparatory Committee's report on its actions establishing the Provisional
Legislature did not, as a matter of Chinese law, ratify the establishment, as the
first S.A.R. legislature, of a body that failed to conform to these legal standards;
(3) that the Basic Law needed to be, and had not been, amended in accordance
with the procedures set forth in article 158 of the Basic Law in order to permit
such a body to constitute a lawful first S.A.R. legislature); Ng, supra note 615,
at 19 (presenting similar argument of Margaret Ng, former pro-democracy
Legco member and Li's co-counsel in Ma); Excessive Political Tasks, Inadequate
Legal Backing, HSIN PAO, supra note 610, at 1 (criticizing the court for not
taking more seriously arguments that the Provisional Legislature's formation
must conform to the procedures set forth in the Basic Law if the body is to belawful, and tha  the N.P.C.'s purported ratification of the decision to establish
the Provisional Legislature was an amendment to the Basic Law "not done
according to the procedures" required by the Basic Law).
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Legislature that will be elected in 1998.617
The legal arrangements for the elections that will choose that
body have been a second principal focus of post-reversion conflict
over the legislature, democracy and the law. The government
proposed, and the Provisional Legislature passed, an electoral law
for the 1998 balloting that differs significantly from the law for
the 1995 elections, which implemented the Patten reforms.
Twenty members will represent geographic constituencies, but the
single-member, first-past-the-post system will be replaced by a
system of fewer, multi-seat districts with members selected on the
basis of proportional representation (on the basis of ballots cast
for party slates, not individual candidates). Thirty members will
represent functional constituencies, but the eligible electorate will
be roughly one-tenth the size that it was in 1995. An election
committee will chose the remaining ten members. Instead of the
panel of officials elected to local office that formed the election
committee in 1995, however, the 1998 election committee will be
an appointed, corporatist body similar in composition to the
Selection Committee that nominated the Chief Executive and
named the members of the Provisional Legislature. Candidates
who hold foreign passports or have rights of abode abroad, whom
the Basic Law permits to occupy twelve seats in the legislature,
will not be allowed to run in the most broadly elected constituen-
cies. 6
18
617 See Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former Sovereign, supra note 577
(quoting semi-annual government report to Parliament on conditions in Hong
Kong). The British government's position is, ironically, akin to the argument
calling for acceptance of "reality" that P.R.C. and pro-China sources urged
during the finl pre-reversion conflicts over political reform, and is lso
reminiscent of pro-China business leaders' urging Patten to restrict the scope
of his administration's and Legco's activities during the final months of colomal
rule.
618 See Basic Law, supra note 21, Annex I (prescribing mix of geographic,
functional and election committee-chosen constituencies for first S.A.R.
legislature); Electoral Provisions (Amendment) Ordinance (1994) (enacting the
Patten reforms to govern the 1995 Legco elections); Electoral Provisions
(Amendment) Ordinance (1997) (enacting the arrangements for the 1998 Legco
elections); Basic Law, supra note 21, Annex II (prescribing the sectoral
composition of the Selection Committee); id., art. 67 (providing that "perma-
nent residents" of the S.A.R. who "are not of Chinese nationality or who have
the right of abode in foreign countries" may be elected to the Legislature,
provided that the proportion of such members does not exceed 20 percent of
the total membership"); see also Chief Executive in USA Defenda Electoral
Changes as Move Towards More Democracy, supra note 586 (describing Tung
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S.A.R. officials have defended this arrangement as sufficient to
produce "fair, open and honest" elections and a "credible legisla-
ture," and as compatible with "democracy," which is the "hall-
mark of the new era."619 While these broad assertions echo both
the colonial government's and the pro-China camp's pre-reversion
arguments in favor of their conflicting positions on the legislature
and democratic reform, other elements in the S.A.R. government's
arguments for the new electoral law - as well as the content of
that legislation - have clear affinities with the China and pro-
China perspective on pre-reversion issues, and have dove-tailed
with post-reversion arguments from pro-China elements in Hong
Kong. Perhaps most notably, a key defense of the new electoral
arrangements has been more broadly and aggressively positivist
than Patten's defensive assertion that the 1995 rules were compati-
ble with the Basic Law: There are many versions of democracy;
Hong Kong has chosen, and its legislature has lawfully enacted, a
version that best fits Hong Kong's current circumstances and that
constitutes a prudent, careful first step in the journey toward the
system of universal suffrage that the Basic Law mandates as an
ultimate goal. 20
administration's proposed legislation to govern the 1998 Legco elections); Linda
Choy, Quinton Chan & No Kwai-yan, Anger at Guidelines for Legco Elections,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 1997, at 1 (describing Tung administration's
proposals and liberal responses).
619 Andy Ho, Risk-Free Elections, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 16, 1997,
at 17 (quoting official government description); Peter Lim, "Chinese Values"
Take Over in Hong Kong, Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Tung Chee-hwa); Chris Yeung,
Keeping a Tight Rein on Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1997, at 15
(quoting Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Nicholas Ng Wing-fui).
62"See, e.g., Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra
note 585 (presenting Anson Chan's comments that "[v]arious groups in Hong
Kong have different views" about what mix of constituencies for the 1998
elections are "more or less democratic," that "[w]e all know that there is no
universal truth about the perfect election," and that, while "[w]e may prefer
one system[,] ... each society should be allowed to develop its own process
based on its own particular... conditions"); Chief Executive in USA Defends
Electoral Changes as Move Towards More Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting
Tung's remark that "there will always be debates" about constitutional
questions of democracy, and that "[t]he Basic Law provides that further
democratic evolution will depend on the ... overall environment at that time
with universal suffrage being the ultimate objective"); Hong Kong Chief
Executive Promises More Democracy, Agence France Presse, Sept. 9, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Tung Chee-hwa,
asserting that being "prudent and careful" was a "good way of moving forward
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In addition, other comments from government officials and
unofficial P.R.C. supporters in Hong Kong have blended venera-
ble "pro-China" arguments for the adequacy of an electoral law
that rejects the Patten reforms with arguments that have attempt-
ed to bolster or assert popular and business backing for the less
expansively democratic arrangements that the new law will
introduce. For example, S.A.R. officials have claimed that a
system of proportional representation will yield a legislature that
accurately reflects the will of the voters in geographic constituen-
cies, and that the narrowed functional constituencies will ensure
proper representation of business and other important sectors of
the community during the transition to democracy. 21  An
immediate leap to a system of direct, universal suffrage would lack
these virtues and, a pro-China newspaper sycophantically opined,
might have led to the selection of someone other than the
excellent and popular Tung Chee-hwa if it had been applied in the
Chief Executive selection process.6z2 S.A.R. officials, with
support from pro-China sources, have further maintained that the
new electoral law is the product of adequate consultation with the
people.613 In arguments that at times evoke the P.R.C. and pro-
China side's pre-reversion appeals to Hong Kongers' senses of
Chinese nationalism and anti-colonialism, they also have asserted
that the people would accept the law, once they understood the
opportunity it gave them for participation in a system that
on democracy"); see also Tsang Yok-sing, Finding a System that Fits the Bill, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at 24 (presenting D.A.B. leader's
assessment of proposed electoral legislation and its validity in terms of
compatibility with the text of the Basic Law).
621 See, e.g., Choy, Chan & No, supra note 618, at 1 (quoting Secretary for
Constitutional Affairs Ng's assertion that "[t]he proportional representation
system more accurately reflects the will of the voters" than the single-member
district system); Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (presenting Secretary for Justice
Leung's assertion that the revamped functional constituencies would "ensure
that certain important sectors within the community that have made significant
contributions are duly represented").
622 See Safeguard the Authority of the Basic Law, supra note 588, at A2.
6'3 See, e.g., Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (presenting comments of Secretary
for Justice Leung); New Constitutional Affairs Official Says 1998 Elections "Top
Priority, WEN WEI PO, Aug. 6, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(reporting favorably Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Suen's description of
extensive consultation with the public concerning key aspects of the new
electoral law).
1997] 1025
U. Pa. j. Intl Econ. L.
ultimately would be more democratic than anything the people of
Hong Kong had enjoyed under colonial rule.624
In keeping with the P.R.C.'s public restraint on most
controversial legal and institutional issues in early post-reversion
Hong Kong, Chinese official sources remained on the sidelines of
the debate over an electoral law that the S.A.R. was certain to
adopt and that would implement arrangements similar to those
China had favored in the pre-reversion clashes. Similarly
characteristic of its reduced role and quiet approach to post-
reversion controversies, the U.K. has staked out a moderate,
perhaps reticent, position concerning the legislation to govern the
1998 Legislative elections. Reiterating a commitment to democra-
cy for Hong Kong, British official statements criticized retrench-
ment from the baseline established in the Patten reforms, but
added that Britain believed it would possibe to have open andfair
elections in 1998 under rules that Britain expected to be substan-
tially less broadly democratic than those that had governed the
1995 elections.6'
Hong Kong liberals and democrats have pursued a much more
forceful and uncompromising critique of the S.A.R. government's
arrangements for the 1998 elections, one that often has echoed
their arguments concerning the legislature and democratization in
the early and middle 1990s. Martin Lee, Emily Lau and others
have denounced the new electoral arrangements as "disgraceful"
and "a giant leap backwards," and the beginning of the "Singapor-
isation" of Hong Kong.626 In their view, the new law is danger-
624 See, eg., New Constitutional Affairs Official Says 1998 Elections "Top
Priority," supra note 623 (quoting, in favorable report in pro-China press,
S.A.R. Secretary for Constitutional Affairs' expectation that "the public will
acquire an adequate understanding" of the new law); Elections Calfed Stepping
Stone to Universal Vote, New China News Agency, Sept. 15, 1997, translated
in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File (quoting Anson Chan's belief that "Hong Kong people will respond
to the opportunity - the historic opportunity - to take part in its first
democratic election as . . . part of an increasingly open, prosperous and
powerful China"); Hong Kong Chief Executive Promises More Democracy, supa
note 620 (quoting Tung's assertion that elections for the second S.A.R.
Legislature would provide greater democracy than Hong Kong had ever experi-
enced under colonial rule).
62 See, e.g., Lau, supra note 578, at 18; Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former
Sovereign, supra note 577.
6 Lowe, supra note 590 (quoting Emily Lau); Ridding, supra note 581, at
22 (quoting Martin Lee).
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ously inconsistent with the requirements of a just and adequate
rule of law, which include having a democratically accountable
government.6V Liberal and pro-democracy leaders have charged
that the legal arrangements for the 1998 elections are consciously
designed to reduce the number of seats in the legislature held by
Democrats and independents - the groups who have been the
legislators most able and dedicated to holding the administration
accountable, and who had triumphed in the universal suffrage
constituencies under the old rules. Specifically, they have attacked
the shift to proportional representation in the geographic
constituencies, the drastic reduction in the size of the electorate
for functional constituencies, the establishment of a pro-business
and pro-establishment Election Committee, and the restriction of
foreign passport-holders to candidacy in twelve functional
constituencies. They have condemned these revisions as attempts
to "work backwards" to achieve the regime's desired results "by
changing the law."628 The new law's critics asserted that such
627 See, e.g., Yeung, supra note 582, at 6 (quoting Martin Lee's comment that
"a lasting guaranitee the future lay with the establishment of a democratic
system" which would render the Legislature and Chief Executive truly
accountable).
628 See, eg., Choy, Chan & No, supra note 618, at 1 (quoting Martin Lee's
condemnation of the government's resilt-oriented approacI to crafting electoral
laws); Hong Kong Democrats Warn of "Singaporisatzon," Agence France Presse,
July 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (reporting Martin
Lee's assertion that Democrats in post-reversion Hong Kong still "have the
hearts and minds of the people" and thus would do very well if S.A.R.
legislative elections were really fair and open"); Ng, supra note 600, at 27
(presenting Margaret Ng's critique of the principal features of the proposed
electoral laws as, "[s]hort of actually barring" democrats from running, "the
most effective way to limit the seats" that the government's "chief critics" can
win); Ridding, supra note 581, at 22 (describing Martin Lee's denunciation of
the shift to proportional representation as an attempt to cut the ranks of
government critics in the legislature); Linda Choy & Quinton Chan, Passport
Curb Challenged, Pro-Democracy Activists Hit Hardest by SAR Poll Restrictions,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1997, at 8 (noting that Emily Lau,
Christine Loh, and Huang Chen-ya, leaders of three principal pro-democracy
parties in the S.A.R. and elected representatives of geographic constituencies in
the 1995-elected Legco, were foreign passport holders). With the exception of
the Legal constituency, few if any of the twelve functional constituencies in
which foreign passport-holders were to be permitted to run seemed, in light of
the economic sector or organization represented and the apparent political
leanings of the constituency's electorate, to be a plausible seat for any of the
leading foreign passport-holding democrats. The designated constituencies
included Accountancy, the General Chamber of Commerce, Engineering,
Finance, Financial Services, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, Leg
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arrangements both undermined basic principles of democracy and
thwarted the popular will. In arguments that echoed pre-reversion
efforts to claim popular support for liberal positions on a variety
of issues, prominent democrats charged that the new electoral
scheme is "a big insult to the people," in "serious contravention
of public opinion," and the product of a sham process of popular
consultation.629 According to some of Hong Kong's leading
liberals, the unaccountable S.A.R. government that the new
electoral law will permit is something that neither the people nor
the business community should or would ultimately welcome.
Although there has been substantial continuity between Hong
Kong liberals' and democrats' arguments against the law to govern
the 1998 elections and their arguments in favor the Patten reforms
(or more radically democratizing alternatives) for the laws
governing the 1995 elections, liberal-democratic arguments in the
post-reversion period have seemed to indicate significant fragmen-
tation and a new uncertainty in Hong Kong's pro-democracy
circles. As developments in the final months of the colonial rule
had foreshadowed, leading democrats and independents have
Architectural, Real Estate and Construction, Tourism, Import and Export, and
Insurance. The Democrats had won nineteen of sixty seats in the 1995 Legco
elections, and many of the twenty independents elected that year were
staunchly "pro-democracy." See, e.g., do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted,
supra note 106, at 17.
629 Yeung, supra note 582, at 6 (quoting Martin Lee's criticism of the
functional constituency arrangements); Choy, Chan & No, supra note 618, at
1 (quoting Martin Lee's criticism of the proportional representation, multi-
member *strict arrangements); Ng, supra note 581, at 19 (presenting Margaret
Ng's criticism of a mere seven-day public consultation period on planned
electoral law changes); Chris Yeung & Genevieve Ku, Public Gets Limited Say
on Elections, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 28, 1997, at 1 (quoting Democrat-
ic Party vice chairman's criticism that public consultation on proposed law was
"consultation within a bird cage" and "not a responsible way of collecting
public opinion").
Early public opinion polls reinforced the credibility of critics' claims that
the planned electoral arrangements were unpopular. See Danny Gittings, Polls
Give Lie to Election Claims, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at 10
(reporting 70% opposition to the reduction in functional constituency
electorates, and only 26% support for proportional representation in geographic
constituencies); Most Oppose New Voting System, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 1, 1997, at 4 (reporting 51% support for first-past-the-post system for
geographic constituencies, 21% support for proportional representation, 44%
agreeing that elections under the new rules would be "open, fair, honest and
acceptable to the Hong Kong people," and a nearly equal number (38%)
disagreeing with that proposition).
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divided over how strictly to oppose the new electoral arrange-
ments and how to approach the elections to be held under them.
Although sharp denunciations of the new electoral law have been
common, at least one established pro-democracy politician has
accepted the new rules, and even Martin Lee has mixed his
criticisms with a cautious optimism about the state of the law and
democratic institutions.630 In what seems to be a more narrowly
post-reversion phenomenon (and perhaps in anticipation of
bringing a court challenge to the new election law's constitutional-
ity), some leading pro-democracy politicians have addressed the
issue on more positivist terms. Seemingly more than in pre-
reversion debates, they have attacked the new electoral arrange-
ments for being incompatible with the requirements set forth in
the Basic Law, as well as with fundamental democratic princi-
ples.
631
4.2.2.3. The Court of Final Appeal and Judicial
Review in the S.A.R.
The installation of the Court of Final Appeal's four permanent
members, and the naming of expatriate and local judges who
could serve as the five-member bench's lone temporary judge,
have provided another occasion for the principal participants in
Hong Kong politics to assess the propriety of the S.A.R.'s legal
and institutional arrangements. A fundamentally positivist
conception of the Court, evocative of P.R.C. and pro-China
arguments from the pre-reversion period, seemed evident in the
Provisional Legislature's July 1 confirmation of the previously
vetted permanent judges' and Chief Justice's appointments by
means of the omnibus Reunification Ordinance, and in the
Provisional Legislature's early enactment of additional legislation
630 See, e.g., deLisle, supra note 27, at 110-12 (describing pre-reversion splits
among democrats as they began to contemplate their post-reversion future);
Rodger Lee, Christine Loh to Give Up Passport, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 25, 1997, at 1 (reporting Loh's acceptance of the proposed provisions
concerning candidates with foreign passports as not "unfair" and her intention
to give up her foreign passport, and reporting Emily Lau's contention that the
provisions were not "right" and her consideration of a legal challenge); Yeung,
supra note 582, at 6 (qioting Martin Lee).
631 See, e.g., Choy & Chan, supra note 628, at 8 (describing liberal
objections to restrictions on seats for foreign passport holders); Lee, supra note
630, at 1 (describing plans for a court challenge to restrictions on foreign
passport-holding candidates).
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that tinkered with the laws governing the C.F.A.632 In addition
and in an apparent effort to garner support or acquiescence from
the people and the business community, S.A.R. sources (and
favorable coverage in the P.R.C. media) have emphasized the high
quality and continuity of justice that Hong Kong's new top jurists
would provide. Making arguments that were unavailable during
the pre-reversion conflicts over the Court's structure, jurisdiction
and establishment date, these sources pointed to the rich experi-
ence in Hong Kong law that the permanent members bring to the
Court, to the presence of British Law Lords and other distin-
guished foreign jurists on the temporary judges list, and, implicit-
ly, to the additional guarantee of judicial independence inherent
in most of the permanent judges having rights of abode outside
Hong Kong.633  Hong Kong liberals' and democrats' responses
632 See supra Section 4.2.2.1. (discussing the Reunification Ordinance); Basic
Law, supra note 21, art. 90 (requiring "endorsement" of the Legislature for
Chief Executive's appointment of C.F.A. judges); Emma Batha, Topfdge Expat
Rule May Ease, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 15, 1997, at 7 (describing plan
to amend Court of Final Appeal Ordinance to allow a permanent C.F.A.
justice, who does not meet citizenship and related requirements for Chief
Justice, to serve as acting Chief Justice in case of the Chief Justice's absence or
incapacity); Court of Final Appeal Bill Tabled at Provisional Legislative Council,
New China News Agency, June 9, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing
Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of amendment to the
Court of Final Appeal Ordinance to incorporate requirements of Basic Law art.
90, which provides that the *chief justice of the C.F.A. be a Chinese citizen
permanently resident in the S.A.R. with no right of abode elsewhere);
Provisional Legislative Council Discusses Judicial Service Commission Bill, New
China News Agency, June 9, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing
Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of the Judicial Service
Commission (Amendmeni) Bill (1997), and amendment of related proposed
legislation, that would help to preclude challenges to the appointment of C.F.A.
judges on the ground that the members of the commission, whom Articles 88
and-90 of the Basic Law require to recommend C.F.A. nominees to the Chief
Executive, would not have taken their oaths and become members of the
commission prior to making recommendations for C.F.A. judges who were to
be sworn in immediately after the reversion).
633 See, e.g., HK VIPs Welcome Chief Justice Recommendation New China
News Agency, May 20, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Anson Chan's praise
of Chief Justice nominee Andrew Li as "a very distinguished member of the
Hong Kong bar" with "an outstanding record of public service," quoting Tung
Chee-hwa's description of Li as "an outstanding awyer... who is very highly
regarded in legal and judicial circles," and quoting acting chief justice's
comments that the selection would aid "a smooth transition in the judiciary,"
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to these developments and arguments have been mixed and
guarded. They appear to consider Chief Justice Andrew Li to be
a fairly congenial choice, but some have expressed concern about
the relatively modest calibre and status of many of the jurists on
the list of temporary judges. 634 They seemed to find little that
was troubling in the substance of minor post-reversion legislation
affecting the Court, but doubtless saw cause for concern in the
S.A.R. regime's apparently easy willingness to alter laws governing
the Court.
Far more controversial has been the Hong Kong appellate
court's July 1997 decision denying a challenge to the legality of
which was "of fundamental importance" to Hong Kong); Chief Executive
Announces Recommendations for Appeal Court Permanent Judges, New China
News Agency, June 12, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's praise
of the choices for C.F.A. permanent justices as "distinguished" members of the
appellate bench and "outstanding legal practitioners before they joined the
bench"); Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra note
585 (presenting Anson Chan's assertion that the agreement "to make available
two of Britain's Law Lords" to serve on the C.F.A. "was universally applauded
for the signal it sent about the independence of our judiciary and the quality
of justice we can expect"); Batha, supra note 632, at 7 (noting that, aside from
the chief justice, all of the permanent C.F.A. justices had foreign passports or
rights of abode abroad). S.A.R. leaders' arguments stressing the continuity that
the judicial appointments would provide recalled some of the arguments that
the British colonial government made in seeking to justify and to promote
acceptance of Tung's selection as Chief Executive.
634 See, e.g., C.K. Lau, A Man to Keep Faith in the Law, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 22, 1997, at 19 (noting that "unlike the election of Tung Chee-hwa
as chief executive or Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai to chair the provisional legislature,
there has been no criticism implying Mr. Li is 'Beijing's man,'" and noting that
Li's "'British' background," which included service on Legco and a lack of open
criticism of the colonial regime, "should help allay fears" that Beijing s
"influence may extend to the judiciary"); Harmony Key to Rule of Law, Says To?
Judge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 6, 1997, at 4 (quoting C hief Justice Li s
statement that he was committed to the rule of law, including a free press and
an independent legal profession, and that "[t]he judiciary is an institution that
belongs to the community and serves the community" and takes "[c]ompetence,
integrity and independence" as "its hallmarks"); May Sin-mi Hon, 15 Judges
Selected to Sit on New Panel, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 23, 1997, at 1
(quoting Emily Lau's statement that she was "stunned and disappointed" by the
list of temporary justices, and that the eleven Hong Kong-based judges on the
list were not "up to the standard of judges in the Privy Council"); The Non-
Permanent Line-Up, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 18, 1997, at 5 (listing
names and background of those appointed to the list of eligible temporary
justices).
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the Provisional Legislature in HKSAR v. Ma Kwan David &
Ors.635 In a case that all sides viewed as an early indicator of the
role of the courts and the fate of judicial review in the post-
reversion era, the Court of Appeal rejected a criminal defendant's
argument that the court could, and should, declare the Provisional
Legislature illegal because it failed to conform to the requirements
of the Basic Law or other Chinese law. Largely accepting the
S.A.R. government's argument, the three judges concluded that
S.A.R. courts lacked authority to review the "validity" of the
decisions of the Chinese sovereign, whether made by the N.P.C.
or its Standing Committee or the P.R.C.-established Preparatory
Committee. The scope of the court's inquiry was limited to the
"existence" of such sovereign acts, specifically whether the N.P.C.
had established the Preparatory Committee and authorized it to
create a Provisional Legislature, and whether the Preparatory
Committee had established the Provisional Legislature pursuant to
the authority that the N.P.C. had granted. There was, in the
court's view, nothing further it could review concerning the
lawfulness of the Provisional Legislature, once the judges deter-
mined that: the Basic Law and N.P.C. and N.P.C. Standing
Committee decisions had retained discretion concerning the
method for forming the body that would exercise legislative
power in the S.A.R., and had provided for the creation of the
Preparatory Committee and empowered it to do whatever was
necessary to establish the first S.A.R. government (which included
finding a solution to the problems created by the "derailing" of
the "through train" for Legco); the Preparatory Committee had
taken steps to establish a Provisional Legislature of limited powers
and tenure to make possible the orderly establishment of an
S.A.R. government; and the N.P.C. had ratified the Preparatory
Committee's establishment of the Provisional Legislature after the
fact.
636
63 HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors, 1997-2 HKC 315, 1997 HK
LEXIS 57 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal, July 22, 1997).
636 See generally Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57; see also supra note 609 and
accompanying text. Like the court's related discussion of the Provisional
Legislature question, its decision on the permissible scope of judicial review was
not necessary to its principal holding that the Basic Law itself effected the adop-tion of the law under which defendants were charged, the survival of the
indictment, and the establishment of the S.A.R. court by which the defendants
were being tried. The court's conclusion that the Provisional Legislature was
not the first S.A.R. legislature, and thus not subject to the election and
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In the court's conclusions and in much of its analysis, leading
liberals and democrats have found signs that the worst fears they
had raised in pre-reversion debates over the C.F.A. were coming
true. They argued that the court's statement of the limits to its
jurisdiction, and its unwillingness to strike down a body that
failed to conform to the Basic Law, marked the beginning of the
end of judicial review and of the rule of law that depended on
strong and independent courts being willing and able to check
unconstitutional and other unlawful government action.637 As
some of the territory's most prominent pro-democracy politicians
and commentators saw it, the court had "bowled] to power,"
"automatically narrowed [S.A.R. courts'] jurisdiction," accepted
the cession to China of direct legislative authority over Hong
Kong, and invited the betrayal of Hong Kong's promised
autonomy. These critics also dismissed as spurious the claims by
the decision's defenders that the ruling constituted a victory for
the rule of law or that a contrary ruling would have created a
dangerous "legal vacuum" in which many criminal acts would
have been immune from prosecution. 638
composition requirements that the Basic Law and other N.P.C. decisions
imposed, provided yet another ground for holding against he defendants that
did not depend on the court's answer to the questions concerning its
jurisdiction.
637 See Erickson & Law, supra note 610, at 18 (quoting Martin Lee's
comment that the court's decision "raises very serious implications for the
future of Hong Kong's rule of law and autonomy," and former legislator James
To Kun-sun's comment, "The idea that national laws cannot be challenged by
local courts is not in accordance with the common law concept" of judicial
review); Gar an, supra note 609, at A10 (quoting Martin Lee's comment that
"[tlhere must be something seriously wrong if the Chinese Central Government
can introduce an appointed body, ignore the Basic Law at will, and Hong Kong
courts cannot do anything about it"); Linda Choy & Genevieve Ku, Fears as
"Bulwark of Basic Law Falls," S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 7
(quoting Frontier's statement that "[w]ith this ruling, Hong Kong is destroying
the bulwark of the 'two systems' principle, thus inviting interference with its
rule of law"); cf Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (criticizing the court for adopting a
vague concept of "unchallengeable acts of the sovereign" which claimed for
S.A.R. courts less power than colonial courts had to "look into [the] validity
and applicability in Hong Kong" of an act of Parliament).
631 See, e.g., Choy & Ku, supra note 637 (quoting statement from the
Frontier); Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (presenting former Legco member's
criticism of the court for abdicating its role of judicial review and suggesting
that "the N.P.C. reserves an unlimited, judicially unreviewable power to
legislate for Hong Kong which it can exercise in any way and at any time it
sees fit"; also presenting Ng's assertion that, contrary to the Solicitor General's
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As some of these assertions suggest, additional arguments from
the liberal-democratic perspective have addressed actual and
prospective attitudes among Hong Kongers, and done so in terms
generally familiar from pre-reversion battles over the C.F.A. and
the rule of law. Liberal leaders warned Hong Kongers that the
court's decision indicated that the courts were no longer available
to "com[e] to the people's rescue" and to hear challenges to unjust
or improper laws - or lawless decisions - that the S.A.R. or the
Central People's Government might seek to impose. As some
proponents of these arguments have seen it, the people (and
presumably a rule-of-law-dependent business community) would
recognize the threat this posed to the rule of law and Hong
Kong's autonomy, and would oppose the erosion of legality,
government accountability, and protection of Hong Kongers'
interests countenanced in the court's ruling.639
Other arguments from some pro-democracy figures have
departed a bit farther from pre-reversion precedents and addressed
argument for invoking the "doctrine of necessity" in the Ma case, "[n]o one.
.can advance the view that without a legislature from July 1, there would be
legal vacuum and chaos); cf. Danny Gittings, Our "Politically Correct" Courts,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at 10 (criticizing Ma court and a
lower court which had dismissed Democrats' pre-reversion challenge to the
Provisional Legislature for going "further than was necessary" in defining
narrow limits to Hong Kong courts' roles when "upholding the provisiona
legislature's legality"); Ng, supra note 581 (arguing that the government's hailing
of the Ma decision as a "victory for the ride of raw" was one of several points
"indicating a material," illiberal and anti-democratic "change in the direction of
the rule of law and the style of administration" in Hong Kong).
639 See, e.g., Choy & Ku, supra note 637, at 7 (quoting Democratic Party
member and former legislator Albert Ho's comment that the opinion seemed
to establish that "Hong Kong people will be able to do nothing if the NPC
violates the Basic Law," and quoting Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor
director Law Yuk-kai that "[w]hatever the mainland authorities d-o, there is no
chance of the courts coming to the people's rescue," and United Front Against
the Provisional Legislature leader Andrew Cheng Kar-foo's assertion that the
court's decision "signals the beginning of allowing an autocratic government to
control our people"); H.K. Court Dismisses Legal Challenge to Constitution,
Asian Political News, Aug, 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File (quoting Albert Ho's criticism that the court's ruling had cast into doubt
"every citizen['s] right to take any issue up to the court" - a right that "is of
tantamount importance" if "we are to preserve the rule of law in Hong Kong");
Lau, su a note 578, at 18 (presenting Frontier leader and former legislator
Emily u's charge that "[t]he court's attempt to undermine the S.A.R.
judiciary has caused alarm and dismay," leaving the Hong Kong people"worried" about "pressure on the courts" and surprised at the court's acting "so
swiftly to undermine the autonomy of the SAR").
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the question of Hong Kong courts' jurisdiction in more positivist
terms. The arguments that leading liberal barrister Gladys Li,
with her colleagues Margaret Ng and Paul Harris, made to the
court in the Ma case perhaps necessarily moved in this direction.
The same style of argument, however, seemed to characterize
broader suggestions that the court's ruling and the government's
arguments in the case reflected an opportunistic or hypocritical
refusal by S.A.R. entities - themselves the creations of Chinese
laws - to use the powers of judicial review, and to uphold the
standards for a lawful legislature, that were set forth in laws that
China and its Hong Kong allies had crafted. A considerable
willingness to argue on positivist terms also has seemed to surface
in some liberals' post-reversion calls for a strategy of using the
Basic Law as a basis to challenge or criticize S.A.R. government
actions.6
On the other side of the principal divide in the political
conflict over Hong Kong's legal and institutional order, the S.A.R.
government and some members of Hong Kong's pro-China circles
welcomed the court's ruling as a victory for the rule of law and
an independent judiciary. They also touted the government's
willingness to abide by any decision the court might reach as
proof of the government's commitment to the rule of law that is
vital to Hong Kong's success. Such sources' apparent comfort
"0 See, e.g., Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (presenting comments of Margaret Ng
which criticize the court for its abandonment of its Basic Law-conferred power
and duty to interpret the Basic Law, for failing to require the Provisional
Legislature to satisfy the requirements of the Basic Law and other N.P.C.
actions, for arguably permitting an amendment to the Basic Law - by means
of the N.P.C.'s ratification or authorization of a non-conforming Provisional
Legislature - that did not conform to Basic Law-mandated procedures, for
upholding the suspect Reunification Ordinance after determining that the Basic
Law included positive acts that solved the "legal vacuum" problem, and for
suggesting that "there are two sources of law" - one that "emanates from the
Basic Law" and another that consists of still-undefined "unchallengeable acts of
the sovereign"; Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *42-*43, *80-*81, *120-*121
(describing defense counsel Gladys Li's argument that the Basic Law gives
S.A.R. courts the jurisdiction and obligation to examine and interpret the Basic
Law, that the courts may and must therefore judge whether the Provisional
Legislature was properly established and whether it conforms to the Basic Law
and other N.P.C. enactments); Christine Loh, Future Lies in Our Own Hands,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 14, 1997, at 16 (presenting Citizens' Party
leader and pro-democracy former Legco member's argument that the Hong
Kong people "can make the Basic Law a friend and use it to argue for change"
toward universal suffrage and a stronger legislature).
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with the positivist tone of the court's analysis, as well as its
holding, suggested parallels to the China and pro-China camp's
pre-reversion perspective on the courts and the rule of law.'i
S.A.R. officials and pro-China politicians have further defended
the ruling with arguments that have sought to draw support, and
assuage concern, among the people. The Chief Executive asserted
that the litigation not only demonstrated the new government's
commitment to law, but also reflected the "respect" that "Hong
Kong society" has for the rule of law. Broadly echoing the China
and pro-China camp's assertions (and some of the colonial
government's statements) concerning the C.F.A. and several other
pre-reversion legal and institutional issues, S.A.R. government
officials proclaimed that the Ma decision has still claimed for the
post-reversion Hong Kong courts a power of judicial review that
is at least equal to what Hong Kong courts exercised during the
colonial era. 42 Moreover, the Solicitor General (who argued the
government's brief in the Ma case), broadly pro-China sources,
and others have added that the people of Hong Kong still enjoy
'4' Choy, supra note 586, at 1 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's statement that the
government had shown that it would argue its case in court and abide by the
court's ruling, and that such legal challenges "are part and parcel of the Hong
Kong legal system... [and] are part and parcel of the rule of law itself); Anson
Cban in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra note 585 (presenting
Anson Chan's argument that, having won the "landmark case" challenging the
Provisional Legislature, the government still "expect[ed] further challenges
which we will meet in accordance with the law'); Li, supra note 611, at 6
(quoting Provisional Legislature President Fan's comment that the process and
the outcome in the case "should strenghen our confidence in the independence
of the judicial system and the rule of law in Hong Kong").
I2 See, eg., Text of Statement of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, TA KUNG
PAO, July 30, 1997, at Al; Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (presenting S.A.R.
Secretary for Justice Leung's assertion that, after the Ma case, "[t]he truth is that
the rule of law in Hong Kong is at least as strong as ever" and that the Ma
court's determination that the courts could not review the validity of the
sovereign actions of the N.P.C. or its delegates was no more serious a
restriction on judicial review than colonial Hong Kong courts' having "had no
jurisdiction to challenge the validity of an Act of Parliament"); Ma, 1997 HK
LEXIS 57, at *41-*44, *79-*80, *82-*84, *122-*123 (describing Solicitor General
Fun&'s argument to the court that article 19 of the Basic Law provided for the
continuation of existing, pre-reversion restrictions on the jurisdiction of courts
and, thus, that the colonial Hong Kong courts' lack of jurisdiction to determine
whether parliamentary legislation or imperial orders were lawful under the
U.K.'s unwritten constitution or the Letters Patent established that S.A.R.
courts lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of actions by the N.P.C.,
or P.R.C. entities authorized by the N.P.C. under the Basic Law, other N.P.C.
enactments or other national Chinese laws).
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a variety judicial or political means to hold the S.A.R. and central
governments to account, and are, in any event, much better off
than they would have been if the court had declared the Provi-
sional Legislature unconstitutional and thrown Hong Kong into
a state of legal chaos.643
The other established political players in Hong Kong's
endgame appear to have kept some distance from these initial
post-reversion conflicts relating to the S.A.R.judiciary. Perhaps
regarding the issues as largely local matters of staffing a court or
deciding a particular case, or perhaps concluding that treating
them as such was the prudent course for a departed sovereign
reluctant to underscore its new impotence and a "resumed"
sovereign eager to demonstrate respect for S.A.R. autonomy, the
U.K. and the P.R.C. seem to have sought a low public profile,
arguably even more than they did in connection with the other
significant legal and institutional controversies of the S.A.R.'s first
months.
4.2.2.4. The Chief Exectutive after Reversion
Events and statements that have helped to define the role of
the Chief Executive and his administration have been a final focus
of legal and institutional controversy during the S.A.R.'s early
months. The post-reversion conflicts over what the Chief
Executive and the executive-led government are becoming, or
643 See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 611, at 1 (describing Solicitor General
Daniel Fung's assertion that there remained "judicial avenues, petitions,
legislation, administrative avenues and negotiations" to challenge N.P.C.
decisions, and that the Provisional Legislature could still be challenged outside
the S.A.R. by judicial or political means at the national or international levels);
Erickson & Law, supra note 637, at 18 (quoting Fung's comment that it was"the height of absurdity" for those who brought the constitutional challenge in
the Ma case "to cast doubt about the legal system or create a state of chaos in
the name of rule of law"); Li, supra note 611, at 6 (noting that D.A.B. leader
Tsang Yok-sing's urged Hong Kong's N.P.C. deputies to explore mechanisms
to prevent procedually improper N.P.C. amendments to the Basic Law, and
quoting Provisional Legislature President Fan's welcoming the ruling for
making it "very clear that the legality of the Provisional Legislative Council is
sound and strong and what we are doing is legitimate"); cf Status of Provisional
Legislature Yet to be Decided by Court of Final Appeal, SING TAO JIH PAO, July
30, 1997, at A2 (approving of the court's conclusion that it was "impossible for
a Hong Kong court to overrule a decision made by the N.P.C." and asserting
that "HongKong people" nonetheless could still "oppose [N.P.C. decisions]
through other channels" and "should not improperly belittle themselves" by
thinking that they cannot").
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should become, have continued many of the themes evident in
pre-reversion controversies over the selection and activities of the
Chief Executive-designate, with fairly subtle variations on
established themes. The high degree of continuity is unsurprising,
given that much of the endgame debate over the Chief Executive
had focused explicitly on expectations and exhortations concerning
Tung's use of the office after July 1, 1997.
Broadly echoing the pre-reversion arguments of the Chief
Executive-designate and pro-China sources, Tung and other S.A.R.
leaders have pointed to several characteristics of the new leader-
ship that are consistent with positivist principles of legality and
are expected to appeal to the people and the business community.
They have asserted that the S.A.R. regime's appointments of
senior officials have yielded a government that is broadly
representative and suited to the needs and unique characteristics
of Hong Kong and its people. In comments that have been
equally in keeping with pre-reversion arguments from the P.R.C.
and the colonial authorities, Tung and his supporters have also
emphasized the continuity in government that his administration's
legal and policy choices and its retention of experienced officials
will provide. 6"
Again playing the nationalism card that he and the pro-China
camp had deployed in the twilight of colonial rule, Tung also has
appealed to the people of Hong Kong to unite behind his
administration and to accept the new legal restrictions on political
organizations and activities that might threaten state security and
order. Largely updating pre-reversion arguments from the Chief
Executive-designate and the pro-China camp, Tung and propo-
nents of his administration have asserted, with some credibility,
that the people and the business community support the policies
and appointments that the Chief Executive has pursued since
taking office, and strongly desire the prosperity they are helping
to preserve. 64s Indeed, two of the most controversial legislative
' See, e.g., Zhang Shouying, "I am a Servant of the Hong Kong People" -
Interview with Tung Chee-hwa, RENMIN RIBAO, June 23, 1997, at 2 (reporting
Tung's assertion that the S.A.R. Exco "enjoys the advantages of the past
appointment system and represents broader sections of the people, particularly
grass-roots representatives").
64' See, e.g., id. (reporting Tung's assertions that "personnel arrangements
have enjoyed widespread support in Hong Kong," that surveys by three major
foreign chambers of commerce in Hong Kong show 90% confidence, that
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initiatives during the S.A.R.'s first months - the freezing of labor
laws passed on the eve of the last colonial Legco's dissolution, and
new immigration restrictions imposed on mainland children -
seem to have played well with business and popular audiences,
respectively.
In the initial months of the S.A.R., Hong Kong's liberals and
democrats have also addressed the Chief Executive question with
arguments similar to those they advanced during the final months
of colonial rule. Martin Lee and others have continued to urge
Tung to defend the interests of Hong Kong and Hong Kongers,
and have warned that Tung's moves on rights legislation and
elections foretell an early end to Tung's "honeymoon" with the
Hong Kong people, as well as a threat to Hong Kong's rule of law
upon which the people and the business community depend.64'
Nonetheless, the post-reversion debates about the Chief
Executive and his administration exhibit some significant disconti-
nuities with pre-reversion conflicts. The assertions concerning
popular attitudes toward specific appointments to office and the
immigration and labor laws reflect inevitable changes in the legal
and policy foci of arguments that address broader rule-of-law-
related questions. On both sides of the debates, there also has
been a striking "localization" of the conflict, as well as a decline
in attention to the underlying, fundamental issue of the legitimacy
of the office and the selection process. On the "pro-Tung" side,
the source of the arguments has changed perhaps even more
"people from all walks of life are confident" in the economy, and that "we
should place even more emphasis on 'one country' in the one country, two
systems formula"); Danny Gittings, Polls Give Lie to Election Claims, supra note
629, at 10 (noting Tung's 82% approval rating as a plausible indicator of
support for his policies); Maggie Farley, Hong Kong Leader Puts Emphasis on
Family, China, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at Al (quoting Tung's statement that
"economic vitality" and "sustan[ing] economic growth" were top priorities).
646 Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee's statement that he
was "still waiting for [Tung] to show that he is actually standing up for Hong
Kong's freedoms and not China's spokesman or apologist"); No Kwai-yan,
Tung "Disappoints" Democrats, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 21, 1997, at 2
(similar); Linda Choy, Lawyer Deplores Bill of Rights Rollback, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 18, 1997, at 4 (quoting human rights lawyer's critique of
the suspension of a bill extending Bill of Rights to private sector as reflecting
S.A.R. regime's bad attitude toward the rule of law); Ho, sup-a note 582, at 21
(concluding that "[r]ecent moves by Mr. Tung have made it increasingly
difficult for even more tolerant citizens to give the new administration the
benefit of the doubt").
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extensively than in the other legal and institutional controversies
of the post-reversion period. Since taking office, the Chief
Executive and his administration have been arguing increasingly
on their own behalf, with P.R.C. and even local pro-China
sources playing a more subdued role in praising or defending the
Chief Executive-led institutional order developing in the S.A.R.
On the other side, liberals' and democrats' arguments have
shifted their substantive focus, perhaps more thoroughly than in
other conflicts over laws and institutions during the S.A.R.'s early
months. They have placed less emphasis on the claim that Tung
will be China's puppet or that his selection was fatally flawed, and
more on the fear that he and others in key S.A.R. institution will
betray the interests of Hong Kong by trying to do what they
think China wants even if Chinese officials have not yet pressured
them to do so. 47 Having been in a difficult and ambivalent
position with respect to the Chief Executive question before
reversion, the now-departed colonial masters have been especially
reticent to engage publicly in this aspect of the post-reversion
process of shaping and evaluating the S.A.R.'s initial legal and
institutional order.
4.3. Assessing Hong Kong-s Endgame
Thus far, developments in post-reversion Hong Kong suggest
that transitional Hong Kong's endgame most nearly approaches
the "end of the game / on-going games" model identified in
Endgame L During the S.A.R.'s initial months, that type of
endgame's characteristic patterns of considerable continuity and
moderate change appear to be evident in the identity and roles of
key participants, in the legal and political questions over which
those participants have clashed, in the character of arguments they
have made about principles of legality and sovereignty and about
the actual and potential attitudes of the people and the business
community.
In addition to these developments with respect to particular
political actors and specific issues and audiences, the possible links
between Hong Kong's reversion and the seeming localization,
647 See, e.g., Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee's statement
that his "worry is not that [the P.R.C.] will actually be giving orders to Tung"
but that Tung might "try to second guess China andgive them what they never
even asked").
[Vol. 18:31040
HONG KONG'S END GAME (I)
depolarization and fragmentation that have marked the conflicts
of the S.A.R.'s infancy reinforce the impression that the third,
intermediate type of endgame may best fit the limited available
evidence. The withdrawal of British colonial authorities, the
dismantling of P.R.C.-established and not-purely-Hong Kong
transitional bodies, and the full establishment of S.A.R. laws,
institutions and offices appear to have created a newly local locus
for legal and political conflict and to have shifted the substantive
focus to even more specific, more clearly "sub-constitutional"
questions of S.A.R. laws and institutions. Lessened polarization
appears a relatively unsurprising consequence, as combatants in
the sharp conflicts of the pre-reversion endgame and earlier battles
have lost familiar targets and have had to assess and address new
or newly important entities that have less clear and perhaps less
settled allegiances in the clash of legal-political visions, and less
established images in the eyes of the people or the business
community. Considerable fragmentation could be expected to
follow as well, as established actors may have begun to develop
divergent interpretations of their changed political and institution-
al environment, and conflicting assessments of what their
respective "visions" demand or permit with respect to issues that
seem very loosely or complexly linked to basic principles of
positivist legality or substantive justice.
Viewed in this context, the more serious disagreements among
Hong Kong liberals and democrats and among broadly "pro-
China" elements in the territory, or more frequent coalitions
across the fault lines dividing "vision"-based camps, or even the
emergence of political strategies that more frankly recognize
divisions within key social constituencies, are potentially signifi-
cant post-reversion changes that need not represent a qualitative
break with the pre-reversion endgame. Although marking the
beginning of a "new game," the changes in institutional contexts
and specific topics of legal-institutional conflict that appear to have
attended these developments seem to suggest discontinuity that
stops short of an abandonment of vision-based politics or the
quest for broad support from "the people" or "the business
community."" In these respects, the final, formal transfer of
'4 The seemingly increased prominence of "positivist" arguments in the
post-reversion repertoire of liberals and democrats need not mark the
qualitative shift away from "vision"-based politics that might mark a technical
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power over Hong Kong, the establishment of S.A.R. institutions
and the shift toward more "sub-constitutional" issues thus may
prove to be analogous to the Tiananmen Incident, Patten's arrival
and longer term "structural" forces that triggered the commence-
ment of the endgame. At the end of the endgame, dramatic
political changes and more diffuse imperatives to address more
concrete legal and institutional questions may again have com-
bined to produce a new "game" in which already-established
participants, who continued to hew to long-held visions, engaged
in a newly fragmented and differently polarized politics of
addressing new, but not entirely novel, issues and long-present,
but differently perceived, social constituencies.
Any such conclusion must remain tentative, however. The
success or failure of principal parties' strategies of cultivating social
constituencies as "assets" for post-reversion conflicts remains
unknown, beyond the general point that, at least for now,
stronger forms of liberal-democratic arguments have not fared well
with much of the business community and perhaps with signifi-
cant segments of the general population. More fundamentally, the
discontinuity between Hong Kong's pre-reversion endgame and
the "games" of the S.A.R. period may prove to be much sharper
than it initially appears, and the "technical" endgame then may
provide a better model. With the passage of even a relatively brief
period or the occurrence of a major crisis, it may become clear
that the role of the U.K. (and the outside world more generally)
has indeed shrunk to nothing, or that China will exercise
extensively and intrusively the power over Hong Kong that, in
practice and in P.R.C. legal theory, it has always held and has
enhanced with Hong Kong's reversion."9 The fissures dividing
endgame. As the discussion in Endgame I and in this Article have noted,
liberals and democrats in Hong often invoked the Basic Law and the Joint
Declaration alongside appeals to normative first principles during the pre-
reversion period. As the discussion in Section 4.2., supra, suggests, liberals' and
democrats' appeals to normative first principles have continued in the S.A.R.
era. On the other hand, the "deals" struck and the arrangements imposed
during the pre-reversion endgame have not been so well-settled during the
S.A.R.'s opening months that a colloquial endgame seems to have occurred. As
the discussion in Section 4.2. indicates, the judicial challenge to the Provisional
Legislature and the political opposition to a number of early moves by the
S.A.R. government reflect a continuing battle to revisit and revise legal and
institutional arrangements that were nominally settled on the eve of reversion.
'4' The U.K.'s assertion that it will insist that China adhere to the pled es
China has made in the Joint Declaration (which Britain regards as a fully
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liberals and democrats may prove much more salient than the
principles that have united them, and the differences separating
the D.A.B. from its P.R.C. mentors and the S.A.R. administration
may overwhelm the ties that once bound them together in a
broadly positivist camp. A more clearly defined pro-business
political block, strongly linked to the S.A.R. administration, may
take shape as an important new participant and could force sharp
departures from pre-reversion patterns of conflict over one of the
two key social constituencies. In such a context, possible
"populist" and "pro-business" coalitions might define a new
principal cleavage in Hong Kong politics that would group key
participants very differently than the "vision"-based politics of the
pre-reversion years.6" In extreme circumstances, the character,
roles and even the existence of S.A.R. laws and institutions might
undergo rapid change in any number of directions that would
soon render pre-reversion "deals" irrelevant.
In this technical endgame scenario, some liberals' resort to
more positivism-accepting arguments during the S.A.R.'s early
days could appear in retrospect to be a significant shift away from
"vision"-based politics at a moment when the advent of a new
"game" made efforts to hold Hong Kong's new rulers to their
binding treaty at international law) have been noted above. The United States
has committed to promote the same general ends through a variety of means,
including conditioning retention of Hong Kong's preferential trade status on
China's keeping Hong Kon "sufficiently autonomous," with sufficient
autonomy to be determined with reference to the terms of the Joint Declara-
tion. 22 U.S.C. S 5722. See generally The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act
of 1992, 22 U.S.C. SS 5701-32 (1996) (providing the principal statutory
framework governing post-reversion U.S.-Hong Kong relations); Kerry
Dumbaugh, The U.S. Role During and After Hong Kong's Transition, 18 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 333 (1997) (reviewing the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act and
other legal and policy mechanisms available to the U.S. to promote continuity,
autonomy and adherence to the Joint Declaration in post-reversion Hong
Kong).
650 See, e.g., Maggie Farley, Interview: Tsang Yok-sing on the Role of
Democracy, Communism in Chinese Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at M3
(reporting D.A.B. leader Tsang Yok-sing's view that conflicts between "loyalty"
to ong ong and to the Chinese Communist Party may escalate considerably
in the future, given that "there could be certain changes in the policy" of the
Party); Ho, supra note 607, at 21 (discussing early post-reversion controversies
that point to the possibility of a populist alliance between Democrats and the
D.A.-B.); Yeung, supra note 602, at 17 (noting views that Tun 's agenda sought,
perhaps awkwardly, to combine electoral laws that wold appeal to the
business community with housing and other economic policies that would
appeal to a populist constituency).
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own post-reversion laws - rather than attempts to invoke
transcendent and timeless normative principles to bind those
rulers - became the most promising remaining weapon in the
arsenal of politically weak participants in struggles over laws and
institutions. Similarly, key participants' relative lack of focus on
the attitudes of the business community in the months following
reversion may later seem to have reflected an early recognition of
changes in the business community's political influence, roles and
identity that, in part, defined the terms of the post-reversion
period's "new game." In these and other respects, the initial
semblance of continuity with pre-reversion patterns will have
proven illusory.
The mistaken initial impression that pre-reversion patterns and
bargains might be surviving the reversion then will appear to have
reflected the mundane fact that even a sharp and sudden break
with the past could not be expected to occur completely, or
become evident, at the stroke of midnight on June 30, 1997. It
may also have reflected the principal players' desire to preserve a
contrary impression during the S.A.R.'s initial months. An
appearance of continuity would have had considerable appeal for
the P.R.C., which had long preached "convergence" and pledged
"continuity" between Hong Kong's immediate pre-reversion and
post-reversion legal and institutional orders, for Hong Kong's pro-
democracy forces and the British, who had reason to fear that any
sharp disjunction would accelerate the erosion of their pre-
reversion levels of power and influence, and for S.A.R. officials
and pro-business politicians, who might enhance their own
legitimacy and popularity by claiming to implement pre-reversion
legal and institutional deals or directives that promised to preserve
prior pro-business laws, institutions, policies and practices.
Alternatively, the degree of continuity between the final pre-
reversion period and the S.A.R. era may be greater than early
signs of moderate disjunction and uncertainty suggest, and a
colloquial endgame may eventually provide a more convincing
account of Hong Kong's transition. In the S.A.R.'s first months,
the S.A.R. laws and institutions shaped during the pre-reversion
endgame arguably have already been surviving significant challeng-
es, in the courts' handling of challenges to the Provisional
Legislature's constitutionality and more mundane matters, in the
preparations for what appears likely to be broadly accepted
legislative elections in 1998, and in the administration's pressing
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forward with controversial laws and economic policies and its
handling of the stock market and currency shocks of late
1997.61 If the passage of more time and the arrival of new
crises do not produce a fundamental departure from - or a
displacement of - the S.A.R.'s initial legal and institutional
arrangements, then the specter of irrelevance or evanescence that
inevitably haunts new and untested institutions will fade. The
changes in laws, institutions, issues, and the roles and orientations
of participants and social constituencies that will surely occur then
will appear to have been meaningfully constrained by the
arrangements that many of the same participants crafted or
accepted during the endgame of the middle 1990s.
In this colloquial endgame scenario, any sense that substantial
discontinuity characterized the immediate aftermath of reversion
will appear to have reflected a short-sighted emphasis on short-
lived difficulties of the transition, or a failure to see the forest for
the trees. In retrospect, Hong Kong liberals' turn to more
positivism-accepting arguments could seem to be the product of
the peculiar litigation-centered contexts in which much of that
turn occurred, or a lasting but limited turn in that direction may
be found to have had strong roots in liberals' fairly frequent
invocations of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration to supplement
their more natural law-rooted arguments during the pre-reversion
endgame. Similarly, the early S.A.R. era's fairly open splits
between the D.A.B. and other "pro-China" elements and S.A.R.
officials later may seem to reflect the unusual character of the
issues (most notably labor rights) or the moment (when align-
ments in the Provisional Legislature and within the administration
seemed unusually fluid or uncertain), or to be merely newly
651 See supra Section 4.2.2. (describing the Provisional Legislature's
enactment of legislation on a wide range of sometimes-controversial subjects,
the government's role in proposing, supplementing and interpreting such
legislation, and the courts' handlin of challenges to the Provisional Legisla-
ture); see also Angela Li, Stage Set for Final Court's Debut, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 26, 1997, at 1; Charlotte Parsons, Drug Case Review a First for Court
of Final Appeal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at 8; Charlotte
Parsons, Mtiffled StartforNew Court, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 12,1997,
at 4 (all describing the C.F.A.'s initial docket, which did not include a challenge
to the Provisional Legislature but did include commercial and criminal law
cases). See generally Henny Sender, Red October, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 6,
1997, at 70-73 (describing the stock market and currency crises and the Hong
Kong government's response); Seth Faison, Hong Kong Stocks Fall Steeply, New
Victim of Region's Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at D1 (similar).
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visible manifestations of long-standing divisions that were less
prominent, but still perceptible, during the pre-reversion endgame.
In addition, the notion that a new business block has emerged
to alter the mix of principal participants and key audiences may
prove misplaced as well, with any apparent consolidation behind
Tung's administration perhaps unravelling amid varied degrees of
distress and comfort in business circles with the Chief Executive's
embrace of industrial policy and increased spending for housing,
or perceptions of P.R.C. influence on (or frustration with) the
S.A.R. regime's economic policies and laws. More importantly,
what seem potentially to be major institution-defining moments
of the initial post-reversion period may only reflect another facet
of the undramatic point that real-world games often do not
conclude as suddenly and completely as simple models suggest.
With hindsight, early post-reversion battles over the legal changes
effected by the Reunification Ordinance, the constitutionality of
the Provisional Legislature, and the electoral arrangements for the
first S.A.R. legislature may look like belated and merely gap-filling
installments in a single, primarily pre-reversion, colloquial
endgame that did not end neatly on July 1, 1997.
In sum, an "end of the game / on-going games" paradigm
seems to fit best with the patterns that have emerged in the
protracted struggle that adherents to broadly liberal-democratic
and P.R.C.-style positivist visions of legality and sovereignty have
waged over the legal and institutional issues of Hong Kong's
endgame and over the attitudes and allegiances of the people of
Hong Kong and Hong Kong's business community. The principal
political participants' pre-reversion approaches to the conflicts
among themselves and over the two key social constituencies were
suited to this type of endgame, for they were compatible with
expectations that the participants were involved in a technical
endgame, a colloquial endgame, or an endgame of this intermedi-
ate, "end of the game / on-going games" type. The still-sketchy
developments of the post-reversion period have not yet yielded
enough information to provide a conclusive answer to the
question of which of these three types of endgame best approxi-
mates transitional Hong Kong's experience. Subsequent develop-
ments could lead to either a colloquial or a technical endgame
model's seeming to provide, in retrospect, a more persuasive
account of the impact of the principled and pragmatic struggles
over rule-of-law values, institutions, the people and the business
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community that the principal sections of this Article and Endgame
I have examined. In these circumstances, a conclusion that
transitional Hong Kong seems to have ended one game in a series
of on-going, evolving games must be cautious and preliminary.
Indeed, even the usually confident oracle of Hong Kong's future
legal and political order Martin Lee has warned that it will be too
soon to judge Hong Kong's legal, institutional and political fate
for some time, perhaps for years.5 2
652 Braude, supra note 581 1quoting Martin Lee's statements that he is "an
eternal optimist"-but that friends of civil liberties, democracy and the rule of
law would "have to live from anniversary to anniversary" because early
tolerance could offer limited reassurance where one could not "know" that a
crackdown or betrayal "won't happen tomorrow"). Lee added that "people will
become more comfortable" if "this first month" of relatively benign S.A.R. rule
"becomes a year." Id. Uncharacteristically and seemingly disingenuously, Lee
asserted that he "never sat down and tried to think seriously about what is
going to actually happen" and about whether the P.R.C. will interfere with
Hong Kong's laws and institutions. Id.
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